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Abstract 
The literature on management of common-pool resources and social-ecological 
systems is extensive.  It covers at least 40 years of research.  In that time, significant 
progress has been made in understanding the conditions and factors that characterise 
sustainable management schemes, particularly community-based schemes.  This 
thesis attempts to build on this literature.  Its core concern and unifying theme is the 
‘factors’ that explain why some management systems are successful and others are 
not.  Of course, the list of factors identified in existing literature is extensive.  Some 
of these factors - socio-economic heterogeneity, for instance - are explored in 
significant depth.  This thesis does not propose to contribute to our understanding of 
such factors.  Instead, it focuses on one factor – legitimacy – which is recognised as 
important by a large number of researchers, but has been subject to only limited 
investigation in the field.  The thesis adopts a multi-disciplinary and mixed methods 
approach to ask how resource management systems - and the organisations that 
design and operate them - gain legitimacy.  Much of the research is based on two 
case studies of resource management systems in Argentina and the United States.  
One of these systems is in the process of being implemented, but has been the source 
of much dissatisfaction to date.  The other system, a fisheries management plan, was 
introduced in 1995, and has changed the fortunes of fishermen and other stakeholders 
in mostly positive ways.  These case studies are the point of departure for developing 
a more complete picture of the factors that underpin legitimacy in resource 
management contexts.    
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Chapter 1 Introduction                                                                                                                                                                                               
A key problem in the environmental sciences is to understand how natural resources – fish, 
forests, water and so on – can be exploited in a sustainable way.  Considerable progress has 
been made in a number of fields.  Economists have classified four types of goods – private, 
public, toll, and common-pool resources – and identified the incentives that individuals face 
when availing themselves of these goods (Ostrom, 2010).  Common-pool resources 
(hereafter, CPRs) are of particular interest to environmental scholars because they include 
many of the resources that are most susceptible to exploitation – fish stocks, for instance.  
CPRs are characterised by two features: the difficulty of excluding others from using them (a 
feature they share with public goods); and high ‘subtractability of use’, the idea that the 
resources consumed by one individual cannot be consumed by another (a feature they share 
with private goods).  These two characteristics provide rational, self-interested individuals 
with an incentive to exploit CPRs rather than conserve them, because forfeiting one’s own 
consumption provides an opportunity for others to consume the resource.  Furthermore, once 
the resource is consumed, it will no longer be available to others for their own consumption.  
The specific attributes of CPRs therefore drive their over-exploitation. 
One way to address the perverse incentives presented by CPRs is to privatise the resource; 
another is to implement state control.  This basic dichotomy was first presented by Garrett 
Hardin in his seminal 1968 essay ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, and is evident in 
management schemes for CPRs across the world.  However, subsequent research has 
uncovered substantial evidence for sustainable CPR management systems that do not fall into 
Hardin’s simple private versus public (or ‘markets’ versus ‘states’) model (Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom, 2010).  These resource management systems are based on institutions created by 
local communities, sometimes over a period of several hundred years (see, for example, 
McKean, 1992).  Hardin’s argument therefore overlooks the important role that institutional 
arrangements can play in resource management outcomes (Feeney et al., 1990; Young, 2002). 
The research in this tradition therefore deals with the approaches to resource management 
that communities and organisations have taken.  To a certain extent, it also deals with a 
related and equally important question – why do certain management systems work well, 
insofar as they produce economically and ecologically sustainable outcomes?  In this thesis, I 
intend to explore various topics centred on this core question.  In particular, I am interested in 
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identifying the ‘factors’ that characterise ‘successful’ natural resource management systems.  
At this stage, I should clarify what exactly I mean by these various terms.  A resource 
management system (also referred to as a resource management initiative, plan, regime or 
scheme at various points in the thesis) is the regulatory and organisational framework that 
determines how a natural resource is used.  Thus, it is analogous to the community 
institutions investigated by Ostrom and others.  It also refers to a policy instrument like the 
European Union’s (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), including organisations like the 
European Commission (EC) and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 
(ICES) that contribute directly to the CFP.  The ‘factors’ which I mention are best thought of 
as the attributes or characteristics of the management system and the resources affected by 
the system.  They shape the way the management system functions and therefore influence 
management outcomes.  They provide at least part of the answer to the question, ‘Why is a 
particular resource management system successful or unsuccessful (in economic and 
ecological terms)?’  Factors therefore have explanatory power.   
A simple example should illustrate further what I mean by ‘factor’.  Consider a well-known 
fisheries management system like the CFP.  The CFP’s regulatory framework determines 
how fish are allocated amongst European fishermen, and how, when and where these 
fishermen are allowed to catch those fish.  One aspect of this regulatory framework is the 
mechanism that determines how annual quota is set.  In the CFP’s case, quota 
recommendations are first made by ICES, then passed on to the Commission for review, and 
finally brought before the Council of Fisheries Ministers for final agreement.  In previous 
years, this process has been characterised by political wrangling.  Quota recommendations 
have been watered down at each stage.  Although this has appeased fishermen, it has meant 
that the quota for some fish stocks has exceeded biologically sustainable limits.  Thus, 
politicisation is a factor that characterises the CFP and explains to some extent why it has 
failed to produce ecological sustainability in European fisheries.  More subtly, the particular 
way in which the CFP’s quota mechanism is arranged – with ICES the first step in a decision-
making hierarchy that ends with the Council of Fisheries Ministers – is also a factor that can 
help us understand the CFP’s failures.  Indeed, it is possible that the manner in which the 
decision-making hierarchy is arranged is what leads to the politicisation observed during the 
quota setting process.   
17 
 
There is a danger of confusing the meaning of ‘factor’ as it is used in this thesis with other 
similar terms like ‘variable’.  To a certain extent, the two might be used interchangeably 
(although I do not do so).  However, it is worth emphasising some of the differences that 
exist between ‘variables’ and ‘factors’ as they are understood here.  Firstly, a factor – unlike a 
variable – does not necessarily vary within a management system or across people.  For 
instance, the particular hierarchical structure of the CFP’s quota mechanism (described 
above) is fixed.  It is therefore not a variable precisely because it does not change (unless, of 
course, the CFP is reformed).  Secondly, a factor can be present or absent as well as varying 
in degree.  Conversely, a variable must have a value (usually numerical, but also categorical).  
But it is meaningless to assign values to many factors.  For example, political economic 
considerations can often influence management outcomes, but do not lend themselves to 
categorisation or quantification.  ‘Factor’ is therefore a broader term than ‘variable’, and 
more appropriate in summarising the range of things that influence resource management 
outcomes. 
It is also important to distinguish between ‘factors’ and words like ‘attribute’, ‘characteristic’, 
‘criterion’ and ‘feature’.  In this thesis, attributes, characteristics and features are used 
interchangeably to describe the nature of organisations, people, processes and resources.  
They do not have the same status as factors, however, in part because the things that they 
describe have less explanatory power than factors.  ‘Criteria’ are used differently to 
attributes, characteristics and features, and refer to things that require satisfaction if a 
particular desired outcome is to be achieved.  For instance, achieving effective cooperation 
may depend on the criterion of having regular communication between cooperating parties 
(Cardenas et al., 2011).        
Thus, ‘factors’ like the ones that characterise the CFP’s quota setting system may hold the 
key to designing, implementing and operating resource management systems that ensure 
natural resource sustainability and guarantee a long-term livelihood for those who depend on 
natural resources.  Unsurprisingly, there is an extensive literature that focuses on a large 
range of important and putatively important factors (Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 1990; Baland and 
Platteau, 1996).  Although this literature uses a variety of different terms for ‘factors’ – 
‘facilitating conditions’, for instance, or ‘contextual’ and ‘micro-situational’ variables – the 
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focus is the same1.  Indeed, the term ‘factor’ appears in other research projects (Agrawal, 
2002).  More importantly, the literature has ‘yet to develop fully a theory of what makes for 
sustainable CPR management’ (Agrawal, 2001).  Contributing to the development of such a 
theory provides us with a point of departure for the research outlined in this thesis. 
Through two case studies, I aim to identify and to understand in greater depth some of the 
factors that may influence the success or failure of resource management systems.  The first 
case study focuses on a ‘comprehensive environmental plan’ (hereafter, ‘PIECAS’, to use its 
Spanish acronym) for the Paraná River delta in Argentina; the second case study is an 
investigation of an ‘individual fishing quota’ (IFQ) system for the Alaskan Pacific halibut 
(Hippoglossus stenolepis) fishery (hereafter, the halibut fishery or fishery).  These two 
resource management plans are nested in and are part of wider social-ecological systems 
(SESs).  A SES is an ecological system that is ‘intricately linked with and affected by one or 
more social systems’ (Anderies et al., 2004).  It is possible that factors important to the 
success of a management system relate to both the ecological and social components of a 
SES.  For instance, the life-cycle of a fish species – a factor that concerns the ecological side 
of a SES - has significant implications for the way in which the species is managed.  The fish 
species may migrate across multiple jurisdictions, in which case the success of the 
management system in question may depend on the extent of jurisdictional coordination.  Of 
course, if one considers factors nested in both the ecological and social components of a SES, 
the number of potentially important factors is significant.  In this thesis, therefore, I limit the 
scope of research and focus on factors associated with the social systems in each SES.  I pay 
less attention to factors related to the ecological side of SESs.       
The resource management systems that form the case studies are themselves largely distinct 
in both biological and socio-economic terms, and therefore contrast one another.  Crucially, 
however, the outcomes in the Argentine case study have to date been largely unsuccessful, 
while the outcomes in the Alaskan case study are generally regarded as a resounding success.  
Consequently, the plans represent suitable cases for the identification of factors associated 
with success or failure in resource management.  Furthermore, they have a number of features 
in common.  In both cases, the governance architecture of the management systems is similar.  
Equally, the perceptions of those affected by the resource management systems may have 
                                                 
1 Arguably, the terminological diversity that characterises the CPR management literature is a weakness.  It is 
often unclear what level of explanatory power an attribute has compared to a facilitating condition, say. 
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similar consequences for management outcomes irrespective of the differences in their socio-
economic attributes.  For instance, people’s views on the legitimacy of government 
management authorities and the management plans themselves may shape outcomes in both 
the Paraná River delta and the Alaskan halibut fishery.          
In the second half of the thesis, I build on the analysis presented in the two case studies and 
focus on a specific factor – legitimacy – that appears in both case studies.  Legitimacy is 
recognised as an important factor in the CPR management literature (see, for instance, 
Ostrom, 1998; Tang and Tang, 2001; Berkes, 2002; Paavola, 2007; Pinkerton and John, 
2008), but is only lightly explored.  However, it has significant ramifications for compliance 
with management regulations (see, for instance, Karper and Lopes, 2014, although 
Ramcilovic-Suominen and Epstein (2015) find otherwise).  It is also a factor that is relevant 
at multiple governance levels.  For instance, it is as reasonable to talk about the legitimacy of 
international environmental regimes as it is the legitimacy of a community-based 
management system.  Legitimacy is therefore a factor of interest whether a management 
system operates at a local, regional, national or international level.  
Questions of legitimacy also tie in neatly with state involvement in management systems (and 
so are linked to Hardin’s ‘markets’ versus ‘states’ model).  In particular, state-led 
management of a CPR or SES brings into focus issues of political authority and power 
(Bernstein, 2005).  The distribution of power in a state-led management system is certainly 
different to the distribution of power in self-governance situations (Paavola, 2007).  As a 
result, it is perhaps fair to say that legitimacy is an inescapable and central concern whenever 
the state is involved in managing natural resources.  Furthermore, there is a sense that a lack 
of legitimacy in state-run management systems opens the door to alternative management 
arrangements like private property allocation and community-led systems.     
Thus, there are a number of good reasons to believe that legitimacy is an important but under-
studied topic in the CPR and SES management literature.  One area in which our 
understanding seems particularly limited is how or why a management system becomes 
legitimate or illegitimate.  I therefore start the second half of the thesis by asking what 
characterises a legitimate versus illegitimate management process.  My approach is similar to 
previous work in the CPR management and collective action literature on trust, which 
suggests that trust emerges when certain ‘micro-situational attributes’ are satisfied (Ostrom, 
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1998)2.  In a related way, I argue that a legitimate process or legitimate rules emerge when 
certain criteria are satisfied.  I develop a framework that identifies four specific criteria that, 
if present in a process or characterising a set of rules, increase the likelihood that they are 
perceived as legitimate.  These criteria serve a ‘legitimation function’.  The framework is 
therefore a legitimation function framework. 
The legitimation function is theoretical, although it is based in part on empirically derived 
findings from the literature.  Nevertheless, the framework has more than mere theoretical 
value; it also helps us to understand legitimacy in empirical settings.  Thus, I apply the 
framework to the two case studies in order to see if it explains the perceptions of legitimacy 
observed in both PIECAS and the fishery.  Although it is difficult to prove that the 
satisfaction of the legitimation function is indeed the cause of people’s perceptions of 
legitimacy in resource management systems, I believe that the picture developed in the 
framework has explanatory power and is a valuable contribution to a more complete theory of 
sustainable CPR management.  The framework certainly improves the precision with which 
we talk about legitimacy in resource management contexts.  
Understanding the relationship between legitimacy and the particular features of a resource 
management system is also important because it has policy implications that, at a practical 
level, justify this research.  In particular, identifying specific criteria that, if satisfied, can 
make resource management systems legitimate may improve our ability to design and 
implement management systems with which stakeholders are likely to comply.  But caution is 
required in applying these lessons because the conclusions on which they are based are drawn 
from two case studies rather than a more representative sample.  The arrangements that 
produced positive results in one case study may therefore have negative outcomes in different 
settings (Young, 2002; pg. 10).  Nonetheless, the suggestions made are an important first step 
toward a more complete understanding of legitimacy in resource management contexts and 
point to avenues for future research. 
Thus, the uniting theme of this thesis is a concern with the specific factors that shape 
effective resource management.  The thesis’ contribution is to help us build a more complete 
picture of these factors, and one factor in particular - legitimacy.  In this sense, the thesis may 
                                                 
2 Using the definitions I outlined earlier in the introduction, these ‘micro-situational attributes’ might be 
considered criteria that require satisfaction if trust is to develop.  
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have predictive or diagnostic value.  The legitimation function framework it develops may 
indicate why, in a practical sense, a resource management system is or is not legitimate.  
Equally, it may guide the efforts of resource managers in designing resource management 
systems that are likely to be legitimate.  In light of this introduction, I now summarise the aim 
of each chapter that follows. 
1.1 Chapter overview 
Chapter 2 outlines the methodology used in this research project.   
Chapter 3 is an attempt to identify factors that are associated with successful and 
unsuccessful outcomes in resource management schemes.  The chapter begins with a 
description of the development and application of frameworks for analysing institutional 
arrangements concerned with the management of CPRs and SESs.  These frameworks are 
useful in an analysis of resource management systems because they decompose the systems 
and the wider SESs in which they are nested into their constituent parts.  The chapter applies 
one framework in particular - the SES framework (Ostrom, 2009a) - to PIECAS and the 
halibut fishery.  Following the framework, each of the management systems is broken down 
into its component parts, in order that we might have a detailed description of each system 
that is grounded in the literature.  Subsequently, I use qualitative data collected during field 
work in Argentina and the United States to identify the factors that have ostensibly 
contributed to the success and failure of, respectively, the fishery and PIECAS.  Where 
possible, these factors are mapped to the SES framework.  In some cases, however, an exact 
match is meaningless because the factor identified has explanatory power beyond the mere 
descriptive power of the ‘variables’ (Ostrom’s term, used in much the same way that I use 
‘attributes’ or ‘features’ in this thesis) in the framework.  The implication is, perhaps, that the 
SES framework is not a diagnostic tool in the way originally conceived by Ostrom.  The 
validity of the conclusions drawn from the qualitative data is corroborated as far as possible 
with survey data.  The chapter closes with a hypothetical explanation for the outcomes in 
each plan that is based on these previously identified factors.   
The chapter is limited insofar as it does not explicitly consider factors linked to the ecological 
systems in each case study.  This is attributable in part to methodological constraints; the data 
used in the chapter are drawn from semi-structured interviews and surveys rather than the 
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ecological methods that would be more appropriate for identifying important ecological 
factors.  Nonetheless, the chapter builds a detailed and plausible explanation of the outcomes 
observed in each case study.  It also identifies a factor – legitimacy – that seems to play an 
important role in the resource management outcomes of interest.   
Chapter 4 – ‘Legitimation function – a framework’ – takes as its starting point the 
identification in chapter 3 of legitimacy as a factor of apparent significance in the two case 
studies.  It attempts to fill a gap in the literature, which has neglected to explore legitimacy in 
resource management contexts in real depth and left a number of unanswered questions.  
Most importantly, it is unclear how a resource management system becomes legitimate or 
illegitimate.  The chapter addresses this research gap by developing a framework that 
suggests legitimacy is an outcome produced when certain criteria are satisfied during a 
process or in a set of rules.  It argues that the satisfaction of these criteria makes it more likely 
that a resource management process will be legitimate, without actually guaranteeing 
legitimacy.  The criteria are therefore necessary but minimum conditions for the emergence 
of legitimacy.  I have identified four key criteria in the legitimation function: communication, 
participation, procedural fairness and trust.  These criteria do not exist in isolation; instead, 
there is some interaction and overlap between the criteria that is reflected in the framework.   
Of course, the legitimation function framework joins an already extensive literature on 
legitimacy, notably from Habermas (various works) and Weber (1922).  Indeed, a possible 
charge against the framework is that it is analogous to existing work.  However, I would like 
to emphasise the ways in which the legitimation function framework makes an original 
contribution of its own.  Firstly, the context in which legitimacy is explored by authors like 
Gramsci, Habermas and Weber differs significantly from the context of this thesis.  All three 
of these scholars explore themes in political philosophy and political theory.  Habermas is 
concerned with the legitimacy and legitimation of political orders, while Weber discusses the 
‘grounds’ on which ‘legitimate domination’ (that is, legitimate authority) rests.  Similarly, 
Gramsci investigates hegemony and ‘securing popular consent for the state’s use of coercion’ 
(Steedman, 2004).  The philosophical slant of this work is in contrast to the functional 
perspective taken in the framework.  The framework conceives of legitimacy as an outcome 
that is desirable and that is contingent on achieving specific criteria.  These criteria are 
relevant to the practical elements of natural resource management in a way that abstract 
philosophical work is not.  
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The functional perspective implicit in the framework suggests that it is possible to be 
deliberative about legitimacy in a resource management context, even if legitimacy is 
relatively difficult to define and measure.  Certainly, my observations in chapter 3 and my 
analysis in chapter 5 corroborate this point of view.  As a result, it is feasible to consider 
legitimacy when designing a resource management system.  Put another way, it is plausible to 
design legitimacy into a resource management system.  This conclusion is perhaps surprising 
when cast against previous scholarly research that emphasises a range of factors other than 
legitimacy that should be included in a resource management system’s design.  Indeed, if we 
place the scholarly nature of this research in the context of the success or failure of resource 
management systems, it is a reasonable assumption that any such system that does not 
produce decisions that are legitimate – at least in the eyes of key stakeholders - will 
ultimately fail.  As such, the ability of a resource management system to satisfy what I mean 
by the legitimation function is of first (rather than second) order importance.  This is a 
conclusion that has not been drawn in other research projects, and arguably ought to be 
emphasised more strongly. 
Chapter 5 uses the legitimation function framework developed in chapter 4 to understand the 
legitimacy (or lack thereof) of the two resource management case studies.  The chapter shows 
how the features that characterise each resource management plan may have satisfied (or 
failed to satisfy) the four legitimation function criteria and therefore contributed to a 
perception that a plan was or was not legitimate.  The assertions made in the chapter are 
based on a combination of document analysis, and interview and survey data.  The chapter 
therefore relates empirically derived observations about the legitimation criteria in the two 
resource management systems to observed legitimacy outcomes, although it does not claim a 
full causal link between observations and outcomes.   
Chapter 6 – ‘The influence of exogenous factors on legitimacy’ - addresses a problem with 
the legitimation function framework, namely that perceptions of a resource management 
system’s legitimacy may have more to do with exogenous factors than the legitimation 
function criteria themselves.  For instance, it is possible that previous negative experiences 
with government may colour one’s view of subsequent government interventions to such an 
extent that they are all illegitimate.  The case studies do not explore exogenous factors in any 
depth, and are therefore less useful in exploring the problem at hand.  Instead, I employ a 
meta-analytic approach to ask whether particular exogenous factors characterise legitimate 
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and illegitimate resource management systems.  An interesting finding that arises from the 
meta-analysis is that the extent to which a resource management system accounts for or 
reflects an exogenous factor is more important than then exogenous factor per se in shaping 
legitimacy.  In this respect, the meta-analysis corroborates the idea first presented in chapter 4 
that the design of a resource management system is crucial when it comes to legitimacy.  
Furthermore, it confirms that legitimacy itself is of fundamental importance to a resource 
management system and the outcomes it produces.  Where legitimacy resonates in a 
particular management scheme, the scheme is more likely to be successful. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.  In addition to summarising the research project’s main 
findings chapter-by-chapter, I reflect on the important of non-technical factors like legitimacy 
in resource management.  I also consider the policy ramifications of my conclusions.  
Although the legitimation function framework might superficially appear a panacea for 
legitimacy problems in resource management systems, I caution that it can be misused.  In 
particular, it can be used by resource management organisations as a justification for 
management decisions, even if those decisions are in reality questionable from both a 
legitimacy perspective and a sustainability perspective.  Overall, however, I hesitate to draw 
an overriding conclusion.  If there is one, it is perhaps that the sum of the chapters points 
toward the utmost importance of legitimacy and appropriate design in resource management 
system.  Continuing to build on our understanding of what constitutes a legitimate and well-
designed system would therefore seem a worthwhile path to pursue by the research 
community at large. 
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Chapter 2 Methodology 
The aim of this chapter is to describe not only the procedure used to produce this thesis, but 
also the trajectory that the thesis followed during its development.  The chapter therefore 
details the processes used to generate and interpret data, as well as the intellectual pathway 
along which the thesis travelled.  I begin by outlining this pathway, in part because it 
provides some context with which to understand the research’s subsequent evolution. 
2.1 Developing the thesis 
The common thread throughout the ‘journey’ that this thesis represents was an interest in the 
relative performance of different resource management systems.  It is puzzling that some 
resource management systems are apparently so superior to others, especially when one 
considers that the basic approaches to managing natural resources (command-and-control, 
market-based approaches and community-organised approaches) are well-established.  
Furthermore, obvious explanations for differences in performance like variations in human 
capital are unsatisfactory.  For instance, the CFP is widely regarded as a model of how not to 
manage fisheries resources, even though the EC has extraordinary human capital. 
In the context of these themes, I initially undertook a wide-ranging literature review.  I 
investigated a variety of approaches to managing natural resources, including command-and-
control and market-based approaches like water markets.  As the literature review progressed, 
I became interested in integrated resource management (IRM) schemes.  IRM schemes 
appeared to offer a solution to the sustainability problems from which other, more traditional 
approaches continued to suffer (Bellamy et al., 1998).  Moreover, IRM was a form of 
management which the United Nations (UN) in particular had promoted heavily.  Thus, there 
seemed to be good reason to concentrate on IRM and to try to understand what factors made 
for successful IRM.  Given the claims made about IRM, I believed that successful IRM 
schemes were likely to be superior to existing approaches like command-and-control. 
Initially, I carried out a review of the IRM literature.  As the review progressed, I found that I 
was analysing case literature on integrated catchment management (ICM) and integrated 
water resource management (IWRM).  In this vein, I attempted to identify factors that seemed 
to characterise successful IRM schemes.  My analysis led me to develop a set of 16 broad 
factors that were found in successful cases.  I used a meta-analytic approach that inspired 
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some of my subsequent research.  The overriding conclusion from the analysis of these case 
studies was that IRM did not actually constitute a meaningful or novel approach to natural 
resource management.  Instead, IRM seemed to be a ‘buzzword’ that could be applied to 
conventional centralised or market-based approaches to water management (or in some cases, 
no tangible management at all).  Far from being a superior approach or a panacea to problems 
with existing forms of management, I concluded that IRM was too abstract and poorly 
defined to produce positive, specific and tangible outcomes.   
My conclusions led me to believe that it was worth pursuing research in traditional resource 
management approaches.  Nevertheless, there were a number of positive outcomes from my 
investigations in IRM.  Firstly, my analysis of IRM case studies had given me an impression 
of the factors that might contribute to successful resource management systems.  The picture 
developed informed the interview questions I asked during my field research.  Secondly, a 
paper on the research was accepted for presentation at the 13th International Conference on 
Environmental Science and Technology in Athens, Greece.  Finally, and most importantly, 
the dead-end that IRM research represented encouraged me to pursue a different path for the 
thesis.  I decided to adopt a case study approach, which ultimately led me to PIECAS and the 
halibut fishery.  Appendix A contains an abridged version of the original IRM research.   
Case study research was still consistent with my primary research objective (to identify and 
to understand the factors that characterise successful versus unsuccessful resource 
management systems).  I aimed to offer an explanation for the outcomes observed in each 
case.  The results of this research are presented in chapter 3.  Through the case studies, I was 
able to identify a set of factors that had significant explanatory power.  It also pointed toward 
another avenue for research - were there lessons that I could draw from the case studies and 
existing literature about the ‘minimum criteria’ that a resource management system had to 
satisfy to be successful?  These criteria represented the lowest threshold which a resource 
management system had to clear in order to lead to sustainable outcomes.  They were 
therefore not necessarily sufficient for sustainable resource management. 
I quickly realised that this research initiative was problematic.  Firstly, there was 
disagreement on the minimum criteria themselves.  For instance, I initially suggested that not 
paying resource managers and establishing fixed terms for their service was one way to avoid 
politicisation of resource management decisions.  However, without an income from resource 
27 
 
management, one has to consider what motivation resource managers have to make good 
decisions.  In addition, fixed terms mean that there is no long-term accountability for the 
decisions that are made.  Secondly, it was difficult to develop a list that was comprehensive 
and in which the criteria identified were indisputably required for sustainable resource 
management.  Finally, I was introduced to Ostrom’s SES framework and her design 
principles (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 2009a).  These design principles are characteristics that 
help to explain the success of long-lived and enduring resource management institutions 
(Ostrom, 1990).  I concluded that this literature represented a better approach to 
understanding underpinning ‘success’ criteria than the minimum criteria framework. 
The observations I had made during my field work also suggested that focusing on a single 
factor might prove as worthwhile as focusing on a comprehensive assessment of factors in the 
manner of the minimum criteria framework.  Legitimacy had played an important role in both 
PIECAS and the fishery, and in addition it was not included in Ostrom’s design principles or 
the SES framework.  Furthermore, the superficial treatment afforded legitimacy in the 
literature suggested that there was a research gap around legitimacy in resource management 
contexts.  These observations were a point of departure for the investigation into legitimacy 
that makes up the second half of the thesis.  There were three clear research questions to 
consider: 
1. What, if any, criteria must be satisfied to make a resource management system 
legitimate? 
2. Do both case studies satisfy the criteria that make a resource management system 
legitimate? 
3. The legitimacy of a resource management system may depend on factors exogenous 
to the management system itself.  Are there particular exogenous factors that 
characterise legitimate or illegitimate resource management systems? 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 address each of these questions in turn.  Chapter 4 develops a framework 
(the legitimation function framework) that helps us to understand the criteria that underpin 
legitimate (or illegitimate) resource management systems.  The legitimation function 
framework is validated by reference to existing literature rather than data, as the theorised 
legitimation criteria have not been previously analysed by reference to case study evidence.  
The legitimation function framework is used in chapter 5 in dialogue with interview data and 
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survey data to demonstrate why perceptions of legitimacy in the two case studies differ 
significantly.  Chapter 6 explores the third and final research question, and suggests that 
exogenous factors can affect legitimacy when they are reflected in management systems. 
Figure 1 below outlines the broad methodological structure of the thesis.  The methodology 
has three components: case studies, which are found in chapter 3; a theoretical analysis of 
legitimacy and legitimation in chapters 4 and 5; and a meta-analysis in chapter 6. 
Figure 1. Methodology schematic. 
 
2.2 Case study selection and justification 
Choosing locations for fieldwork was shaped by considerations related to the thesis’ research 
question, and by more prosaic reasons like the accessibility of interviewees and the avoidance 
of unresolvable language barriers in view of the resources available for the research.  The 
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primary criterion for case study selection was that the resource management systems under 
analysis had produced outcomes that were contributing in either a positive or negative way to 
the sustainability of the resource under management.  In this context, a successful system was 
one where a CPR or SES was being exploited sustainably.  The rationale for focusing on the 
sustainability of the resource was that other criteria for success – the perception that a system 
was benefitting stakeholders, for instance – were not necessarily conducive to the long-term 
health of a system and the people who relied upon it.  Stakeholders might believe that a 
resource management system was highly successful because it had increased their incomes, 
say, even though the system was leading to the destruction of the very resource upon which 
their incomes depended.      
In choosing case studies, I was conscious of avoiding ‘perfectly’ successful resource 
management schemes.  There is a tendency in the literature to focus almost exclusively on 
instances of success, even though cases of failure are likely to provide as many valuable 
lessons.  Furthermore, the selection of perfectly successful schemes is unrepresentative and 
would not have tackled evidence of what characterises schemes that are moving in an 
apparently unsustainable direction (of which there are doubtless a significant number).  As 
such, I chose case studies that I anticipated were likely to be ‘imperfect’.  These resource 
management systems had challenging backdrops and demanding management objectives.  
What evidence there was suggested that the US IFQ scheme had had some successes, while 
PIECAS had had limited success and a number of difficulties and setbacks.  Thus, I did not 
select schemes that were complete successes or complete failures.   
The types of CPR or SES under management, or indeed the type of management system, 
were less important as selection criteria.  The rationale for this was twofold: firstly, I was 
interested in seeing whether there were factors that were common to resource management 
systems irrespective of the type of resource or system; and secondly, I did not believe that a 
comparative case study approach would necessarily contribute to a greater understanding of 
the factors that underpinned successful or unsuccessful resource management systems any 
more than a simple case study approach.  Identifying common factors in otherwise distinct 
systems was one way to overcome the lack of generalizability that usually applies to case 
studies, because the presence of these factors could not be attributed to one specific resource 
or management approach.  This is not to say that the findings from the case studies are 
generalizable.  Instead, it suggests that there is an increased likelihood that these factors are a 
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fundamental component of resource management systems generally, rather than a component 
of fisheries management systems, say, or wetlands management.       
In addition, I felt it was important that I spoke the language of the people involved in my 
cases.  I believed that too much would be lost in translation during interviews if I had to rely 
on an interpreter. That limited possible cases to the English and Spanish speaking worlds.  
Secondly, I needed to choose cases where it would be possible to contact and interview a 
wide range of stakeholders.  This required cases where I had local contacts and/or 
stakeholders’ contact details were easy to find. 
With these criteria in mind, a number of potential cases emerged.  However, two cases – 
PIECAS in the Paraná delta and the US IFQ halibut fishery – appeared to be good matches.  
PIECAS was an interesting example of a resource management system in which success and 
failure hung in the balance.  The plan was relatively new, and it might therefore prove 
difficult to discern specific outcomes attributable to it.  But it was clear that the plan’s design 
process had been challenging and had not yet led to the development of specific measures to 
prevent degradation of the delta’s wetlands.  Moreover, there was a sense that the plan was in 
stasis; efforts at pushing it forward to implementation appeared to have stalled or were 
apparently receiving little attention.  PIECAS therefore seemed to be a suitable example of a 
resource management system that faced a number of obstacles but might still prove 
successful in due course.  Finally, I was put in touch with an environmental NGO in Buenos 
Aires who had worked in the Paraná delta and would be able to provide me with the contact 
details of stakeholders involved in the plan.  I therefore had a sample of stakeholders for 
interview whom I could approach without too much difficulty.  These stakeholders were all 
Spanish speakers, and so I would be able to interview them in their own language. 
The second case study – IFQ management in the halibut fishery – was generally recognised 
in the fisheries management literature as a successful management system that had improved 
outcomes in the fishery relative to the previous derby fishery system (see Grimm et al., 
2012).  This view was based in part on the dramatic transformation that a move to IFQ 
management had engendered in the fishery.  (More details on the impact of IFQs follow in 
chapter 3, section 5.)  Most of the changes in the fishery were positive, including an increased 
likelihood of stock sustainability.  However, the introduction of IFQs had also had a harmful 
socio-economic impact on rural communities in Alaska.  Many people in these communities 
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relied on fishing but had been forced to leave the industry on account of economic pressures 
produced by IFQs.  Halibut IFQs were therefore an imperfect solution to the fishery’s 
problems, even though the balance of success or failure probably tended toward success.  In 
addition, I was confident that I would be able to find people for interview because the 
literature and common-sense indicated which organisations and stakeholders I should 
approach.  For instance, it was obvious that I would ideally speak to fishermen and fish 
processors during the fieldwork.  The contact details of many of these people were easily 
accessible through the Internet.  Finally, doing research in the United States meant that there 
were no language barriers to overcome. 
Many of the features that made the American halibut fishery an attractive case also applied to 
the Canadian halibut fishery.  My decision to focus on the American rather than the Canadian 
halibut fishery was due to the greater ease of contacting stakeholders in the former than the 
latter.  I had contacts at the University of Washington in Seattle, which coincidentally was the 
homeport for part of the halibut fleet and the city in which the International Pacific Halibut 
Commission (IPHC, one of the fishery’s key management organisations) was headquartered. 
The halibut fishery had one other feature that made it an attractive case study: it had 
undergone a natural experiment when the management system changed from a derby 
approach to an IFQ approach.  Changes in the fishery subsequent to this management shift 
were likely to be attributable to the new management system, rather than other factors like 
climate which would presumably have stayed constant.  It would therefore be possible to 
compare changes in the management systems and to connect these changes to newly 
observed outcomes.  In turn, this comparison might reveal something about the factors that 
were contributing to these outcomes.  Thus, the natural experiment that had taken place in the 
fishery provided an additional means to understand the factors that had contributed to the IFQ 
system’s success. 
Of course, the two cases imposed limitations on the research strategy.  Although (as 
mentioned) I was less interested in a comparative analysis, the two cases were so different 
that it ruled out a comparative approach entirely.  PIECAS is a ‘comprehensive’ management 
plan for a large river delta and wetland system, while IFQ management concerns a single-
stock fishery.  Naturally there are key differences in the biodiversity and ecology of both 
systems, and in the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of associated 
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communities.  There are also important institutional differences between Argentina and the 
United States, particularly in respect of rule of law (weak in the former, generally strong in 
the latter) and institutional stability.  For instance, Argentina has a more recently troubled 
past than the United States, with a military dictatorship between 1976 and 1983 that was 
responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Argentine civilians. 
However, the two cases were similar in one important respect – the structure of the 
governance architecture in both resource management systems was comparable.  This idea is 
explored further in chapter 3, but in general terms both PIECAS and IFQ management 
involve analogous organisations that operate at equivalent governance levels.  Indeed, the 
similarity in governance architecture provides further justification for the case study 
selections. Issues of governance and scale link PIECAS and the fishery and in that sense 
make the systems more relevant to one another than might originally appear to be the case.   
2.3 Stakeholder identification 
Interviewees were selected by targeted sampling.  For interviews relating to PIECAS, I 
contacted an environmental NGO based in Buenos Aires and asked them to name other 
individuals involved in PIECAS or individuals with expertise in the delta (Oppenheim, 2000).  
The environmental NGO initially contacted was the ‘Fundación Ambiente y Recursos 
Naturales’ (‘FARN’).  FARN is one of the largest environmental NGOs in Argentina.  
Between July 2009 and December 2010, it led an environmental project in the delta in 
collaboration with the National Environment Secretariat (the Argentine government’s 
environmental bureaucracy), local universities and other NGOs.3   Arguably, FARN’s size 
and prior experience in the delta meant they were well placed to identify other stakeholders 
for interview.     
For interviews relating to the halibut fishery case study, I contacted an academic at the 
University of Washington’s School of Aquatic and Fishery Science who had previously 
researched IFQs.  I also contacted scientific staff at the IPHC.  As with FARN, these 
interviewees were well placed to advise me on other people to approach for interview 
because of their expertise in the fisheries of Alaska and the Pacific north-west. 
                                                 
3 More information is available (in Spanish) from: http://www.farn.org.ar/areas/conservacion/delta-del-parana 
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Of course, there are limitations with the targeted sampling methodology employed.  Most 
importantly, the choice of ‘seed’ interviewees can introduce a bias that shapes the identity of 
subsequent interviewees.  This bias may explain the relative over-sampling of NGO 
respondents and academics in the PIECAS case study and the halibut fishery case study, 
respectively.  However, other studies have found that non-governmental actors are the 
primary participants in the Paraná delta’s governance subsystem specifically (see, for 
instance, Scholz et al., 2014).  More generally, targeted sampling was an appropriate method 
given my unfamiliarity with both study areas and the identity of relevant stakeholders. 
Another issue with the targeted sampling used in both case studies is that the final sample 
size for both case studies is small (n = 14 in the Paraná delta and n = 12 in the fishery) and 
unrepresentative.  The sampling procedure is also difficult to replicate. These limitations are, 
to a certain extent, unavoidable in qualitative research.  The number of respondents one can 
approach for interview is constrained by time and the respondent’s willingness to be 
interviewed.  Indeed, targeted sampling is serendipitous in terms of who is identified for 
interview and who replies.  Furthermore, it is not always possible to estimate with confidence 
what sample size constitutes a representative sample.  These issues all applied to the targeted 
sampling used in both case studies. 
2.4 Data collection                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Data for both case studies were collected using qualitative methods, including semi-
structured interviews, participant observation and secondary sources.  For PIECAS, I 
conducted 13 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders or experts on the delta in 
April and May 2013.  Most of these interviews took place in Buenos Aires, Argentina, 
although five were held in La Plata, the Lechiguanas Islands and Rosario.  I subsequently 
carried out 2 more semi-structured telephone interviews in June 2014 from London.  One of 
these interviewees I had previously interviewed in Argentina; the other was a new 
interviewee.  For the halibut fishery case study, I conducted 11 semi-structured interviews in 
June and July 2013 in Seattle, United States.  One further telephone interview took place in 
June 2014, from London. 
Semi-structured interviews typically begin with general or open questions, before moving 
toward more specific issues.  These issues are raised either because they are included in pre-
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planned questions, or because the interviewee has mentioned them.  Interview questions 
therefore serve as a guideline for the flow of the interview, without constraining the 
conversation in any way.  Thus, the interview proceeds in concert with the interviewer’s 
questions and the topics discussed by the interviewee.   
I followed this format in all the semi-structured interviews I conducted.  I had prepared 
questions in advance of the interviews.  Given my lack of knowledge of both case study 
systems, formulating appropriate interview questions was challenging.  However, I had 
developed an understanding of at least some of the factors that contribute to the success or 
failure of a resource management system during my early research on IWRM (see section 
2.1).  The ideas developed during that research provided me with an impression of important 
factors in resource management contexts around which I could base my questions.  In 
addition, my reading prior to the fieldwork had indicated which were the key organisations 
involved in each management scheme.  This reading also shaped the development of the 
interview questions.  I attempted to ask each of these questions during the interview, but I 
asked questions that were unplanned and that depended on the stakeholder’s expertise and on 
the subject of conversation too.  Moreover, I was careful to allow stakeholders to talk about 
topics as they saw fit.  Thus, both interviewer and interviewee were provided with the 
flexibility to discuss other relevant issues.  The result was that the interview data provided me 
with detail on a broad range of topics.  This, in turn, helped me to develop a more complete 
picture of management challenges and processes in both the delta and the fishery.  The 
interview questions for each case study can be found in Appendix A, noting that other 
dialogue and evidence flowed from ad hoc directions initiated by the interviewee. 
Most interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed, and notes were taken at each.  
In some cases, however, it was not possible to record interviews because they took place 
outside or in noisy environments where the quality of recording was affected.  This was 
especially true in Argentina, where I often met people in cafés or, in one case, spent the day 
with them on an island in the Paraná River.  Where this occurred, the notes taken at the 
interview were used as data in their own right.  Of course, there is a possibility that note-
taking during interviews introduced bias into the data.  An effort is therefore made to 
distinguish between data from recorded and unrecorded interviews in the results.  The former 
are quoted as direct speech; the latter are quoted as indirect speech.  Modal interview length 
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was 1.5 hours; the longest interview lasted just over 2.25 hours.  Tables 1 and 2 below list 
each interviewee, their profession, and their location (where appropriate). 
Table 1. PIECAS interviewees. 
Interviewee Profession Location 
♯1 Academic, University of San Martin Buenos Aires 
♯2 Academic, University of San Martin Buenos Aires 
♯3 NGO employee La Plata 
♯4 NGO employee Rosario 
♯5 NGO employee Paraná 
♯6 NGO employee Rosario 
♯7 NGO employee Buenos Aires 
♯8 NGO employee Buenos Aires 
♯9 Employee at forestry organisation Buenos 
Aires/Zarate 
♯10 Ministry of Agriculture Buenos Aires 
♯11 National Environment and Sustainable Development Secretariat Buenos Aires 
♯12 Buenos Aires Province Office for Sustainable Development 
(OPDS) 
La Plata 
♯13 National Agronomy Institute Campana 
♯14 Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, Santa Fe 
Province 
Santa Fe 
  
Table 2. Halibut fishery interviewees. 
Interviewee Profession 
A Academic, University of Washington 
B Academic, University of Washington 
C Academic, University of Washington 
D Academic, University of Washington 
E Retired fisherman 
F Executive Director, IPHC 
G Quantitative scientist, IPHC 
H Biologist, IPHC 
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Interviewee Profession 
I Pacific Seafood Processors Association 
J Fishing Vessel Owners Association 
K Marine Conversation Alliance (NGO) 
L Fisherman, Alaska Longline Fishermen’s Association 
 
I supplemented the interviews with observations made in the field.  In Argentina, I attended 
two meetings where stakeholders discussed topics of relevance to the delta’s management.  
The first meeting took place at the University of Buenos Aires’ Agronomy department and 
discussed insect pests in the delta.  The second meeting was convened at the Buenos Aires 
Province Office for Sustainable Development (OPDS) in La Plata.  Various topics were 
covered, including an initiative for ‘sustainable cooperatives’ in the delta and efforts to 
integrate PROSAP (a government body focused on agriculture) with PIECAS.  In addition, I 
was fortunate enough to organise a tour of the middle delta courtesy of a local beekeeper who 
took me to meet people in the area.  As part of that tour, all by boat, I visited a local school 
and a family of subsistence fishermen.  The trip was hugely valuable because it gave me an 
impression both of the delta’s size and remoteness, and the circumstances of many of the 
people living there. 
In Seattle, I collected data at the Nordic Heritage Museum in Seattle, and during informal 
conversations with fishermen in the Seattle Fishermen’s Terminal.  These conversations 
covered a range of topics, including the problems that younger fishermen had encountered as 
a result of IFQs (notably barriers to entry into the fishery), the high price of halibut quota 
(one of the causes of barriers to entry) and their views of management organisations.   I also 
made use of data in a ‘Report to the Committee to Review IFQs’ (Alverson, 1997) and of 
documents online. 
2.4.1 Cross-sectional survey data 
In addition to the qualitative interview data, I used cross-sectional survey data on people’s 
perceptions of water management in the Paraná delta to inform my analysis of PIECAS.  The 
data were generously provided by researchers at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and 
were collected with surveys administered in 2010, 2012 and 2014.  I thank Dr. Ramiro 
Berardo in particular for providing access to the data, which were collected with the support 
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of the National Science Foundation (SES-0921461).  These surveys were qualitative in nature 
and covered a large range of stakeholders in the delta, including academics, NGO employees, 
and public and private sector employees. 
The cross-sectional survey data are used both to validate some of the assertions made by 
interviewees in the PIECAS case study, and to support the argument in chapter 5 concerning 
the extent to which both case resource management systems satisfy the conditions that make 
a process legitimate.  The data were analysed with Microsoft Excel.  In most cases, I sampled 
those respondents who were involved in PIECAS (n = 26 in 2010, n = 34 in 2012, n = 23 in 
2014) and produced bar charts to illustrate the data.  I also used two-sample T-tests with 
unequal variances to determine whether there was a significant difference in stakeholder’s 
perceptions of procedural fairness in PIECAS depending on the rate of their participation in 
the plan.  The results of that statistical analysis are presented in chapter 5.      
Of course, the cross-sectional data were collected separately to this research and are not 
therefore an exact match for the questions explored in chapter 5 and the thesis generally.  
Nonetheless, they provide valuable detail on stakeholder perceptions of PIECAS and 
therefore merit inclusion in the analysis as proxies.  Furthermore, they have several 
advantages compared to the qualitative data.  Firstly, they are drawn from a large sample and 
therefore have the advantage of being more representative than the interview data.  In 
addition, the overall sample is large enough (n = 177 in 2010; n = 183 in 2012; n = 202 in 
2014) to allow the use of inferential statistics.  Finally, although the data are cross-sectional 
in character, they were collected in 2010, 2012 and 2014.  We can therefore track changes in 
perceptions over time and attempt to link changes in those perceptions to changes in 
PIECAS’s features. 
In addition to these data, I prepared two surveys – one for PIECAS, the other for halibut IFQs 
– which were sent to stakeholders in both systems in 2014.  For PIECAS, I contacted 
stakeholders who I had previously interviewed and asked them to recommend other 
stakeholders or colleagues who might be interested in taking the survey.  I then contacted 
these people via email with a URL to the survey.  I also requested that they pass the survey 
on to other colleagues if they were able.  For the fishery, I contacted two fishery 
organisations – the Deep Sea Fishermen’s Union, based in Seattle, and the Alaska Longline 
Fishermen’s Association, based in Homer, Alaska.  I asked that these organisations send out 
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the fishery survey to their members.  I do not know in a definitive sense the total number of 
people these surveys reached, but I estimate it was in the range of 40 to 100 people. Without 
a specific figure for the number of people contacted, I have been unable to calculate a 
response rate.  However, I believe that response rates were below 10% because the total 
number of respondents was low in both surveys.  Only 9 people responded to the PIECAS 
survey, of whom three I had already interviewed (interviewees ♯8, ♯9 and ♯13).  For the 
fishery survey, 12 people replied, of whom I had previously interviewed one (interviewee L).  
Tables 3 and 4 below outline the survey respondents and their affiliations. 
Table 3. PIECAS survey respondents. 
Respondent Profession 
Interviewee ♯8  NGO employee 
Interviewee ♯9  Employee at forestry organisation 
Respondent C Employee at forestry organisation 
Respondent D NGO employee 
Respondent E Buenos Aires Directorate of Forests and Forestation 
Respondent F Farmer; President, Council of Delta Farmers 
Respondent G NGO employee 
Interviewee ♯13 Researcher, National Agronomy Institute 
Respondent I Advisor to Papel Prensa, S.A., and Arauco Argentina 
 
Table 4. Halibut fishery survey respondents. 
Respondent Profession Affiliation 
Interviewee L Fisherman Alaska Longline Fishermen’s Association 
Respondent 2 Fisherman Alaska Longline Fishermen’s Association 
Respondent 3 Fisherman  
Respondent 4 Fisherman  
Respondent 5 Fisherman  
Respondent 6 Fisherman  
Respondent 7 Fisherman; NGO employee The Nature Conservancy 
Respondent 8 Fisherman  
Respondent 9 Fisherman  
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Respondent Profession Affiliation 
Respondent 10 Fisherman  
Respondent 11 Fisherman  
Respondent 12 Fisherman Deep Sea Fishermen’s Union 
 
2.4.2 Meta-analytic data 
The final source of data in the thesis was derived from a meta-analysis of studies in the 
fisheries management literature.  The meta-analysis methodology is distinct from the 
approach taken in the case studies.  It is covered in significantly more detail in chapter 6, the 
chapter produced as a result of the analysis.  Nevertheless, it is worth briefly summarising the 
meta-analytic approach taken at this stage.  From an original sample of 593 papers focusing 
on fisheries management, I selected a significantly smaller sample of 26 papers that I 
subsequently coded.  The coding first involved determining whether or not the resource 
management systems studied in a particular paper were legitimate.  Secondly, it required 
characterising the presence or absence of 15 exogenous factors that might putatively have an 
effect on legitimacy.  The data produced were both qualitative and quantitative.   
2.5 Interpreting the data 
A key part of the methodology in this thesis – especially in the two exploratory case studies - 
is a framework developed by Ostrom (2009a) to understand social-ecological systems.  Both 
the halibut fishery and the Paraná delta are social-ecological systems.  The framework 
informs the analysis in both case studies, and again later when I explore legitimacy in 
resource management systems. 
Using the framework to guide the case study analysis had a number of advantages.  Firstly, it 
facilitated what was proving to be a complex task.  In particular, it grounded the analysis in a 
set of variables that reflected the actual constituent parts of SESs.  Categorising the interview 
data on my own was more ad hoc and subjective, and therefore less likely to represent 
accurately the components making up a SES.  Secondly, Ostrom’s framework is made up 
only of variables that previous research had shown were important to sustainability in social-
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ecological systems.4  Thus, using the framework in my own research would ensure that my 
findings were comparable to the existing literature.  Furthermore, the framework’s extensive 
empirical foundation increased my confidence that the variables identified therein, and the 
relationships between variables, were indeed important to a SES’s sustainability.   
Ostrom’s framework is a component of the methodology not just in the case studies, but in 
the exploration of legitimacy that flows from them.  In chapters 3 and 4, legitimacy is seen as 
an attribute of many second- and third-level variables in Ostrom’s framework.  (Note again 
that variable is the term Ostrom uses in her framework.  My doing so should not suggest that 
legitimacy is no longer a factor in the way I defined it in the introduction.)  Legitimacy is a 
factor that provides second- and lower-level variables with some explanatory power.  
Moreover, the legitimation function framework developed in chapter 4 fits neatly within 
Ostrom’s framework; it represents a ‘framework within a framework’.  The legitimation 
function framework decomposes legitimacy into criteria that require satisfaction if legitimacy 
is to emerge.  In Ostrom’s language, legitimacy is broken down into third- and fourth-level 
variables (although the criteria I identify have explanatory power that some second, third and 
fourth-level variables do not).  Chapter 4 therefore extends Ostrom’s framework beyond the 
second-level variables it presently includes.  
In chapters 3 and 4, then, Ostrom’s framework guides the analysis by providing for 
consideration a set of variables that appear to be important in shaping the sustainability of 
SESs.  In some cases, the factors I identify in the case studies map neatly to these variables.  
Furthermore, the framework gives some indication of the way that variables are related to and 
influence one another.  This may tell us something about the way in which the factors in the 
case studies interact.  Thus, Ostrom’s framework is a key part of the theory that informed the 
development of knowledge in this thesis. 
2.6 Criteria for judging the quality of research 
Yin (2009) developed a set of criteria that are useful in assessing the quality of case study 
research.  According to Yin, there are four tests that effective case study research satisfies.  
These tests are outlined below (following Glatzel, 2013): 
                                                 
4 I have used ‘variables’ in this discussion in part because that is the term used by Ostrom to describe the 
component parts of her framework.  In addition, not all of these variables are factors with explanatory power in 
the way understood throughout this thesis. 
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Test Methodology 
Construction validity Triangulation 
Review of draft findings by key informants 
Internal validity 
Explanation-building 
Address alternative explanations 
Pattern-matching 
External validity Use theory and replication 
Reliability Rigour of the case study protocol 
Develop case study database 
 
Construction validity 
I attempted to satisfy the construction validity criterion of effective case study research by 
‘triangulating’ – using converging lines of evidence to support my findings.  Yin (2009) 
describes four types of triangulation: the use of multiple sources of data; the inclusion of 
multiple investigators in the research process; the use of theory; and the use of multiple data 
collection methods.  This research satisfies at least three of these triangulation techniques.  I 
use multiple sources of data in both my case studies: qualitative interview data, survey data, 
documents pertaining both to PIECAS and the fishery’s IFQ management system, and 
observations made during conversations and travels in the field.  In this respect, I also employ 
multiple data collection techniques.  Finally, I use existing evidence and theory in the 
literature to corroborate my arguments.  Existing work in the CPR management field is 
especially important in this respect.  The other triangulation method – including multiple 
investigators in the research – was difficult to achieve because I carried out my fieldwork 
alone.  However, I did collaborate with researchers at the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, and the product of that collaboration informed my analysis significantly. 
In addition to triangulation, I asked two of the stakeholders I interviewed during my 
fieldwork to review the analysis in chapter 3.  One of these stakeholders was Argentine and 
reviewed the PIECAS case study; the other was a halibut fisher and reviewed the halibut 
fishery case study.   
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Internal validity 
I attempted to validate my own research (‘internal validity’) by considering a range of 
alternative explanations to my findings, especially in chapter 3.  I also matched putative 
explanations to existing results in the literature (‘pattern-matching’, to use Yin’s term). 
External validity 
One limitation of this research is that many of the ideas I develop require external validation.  
I go some way toward demonstrating the utility of the legitimation function framework 
presented in chapter 4 by applying it to PIECAS and the fishery and showing that it helps us 
understand in detail why legitimacy in the two systems differs significantly.  However, only 
additional research can confirm or reject the generalizability of my ideas.  Furthermore, the 
conclusions drawn in chapter 3 are case-specific and should only be generalised with caution.  
Nonetheless, it is intuitive that at least some of the factors identified in chapter 3 are relevant 
to other resource management systems because they concern features that are found in many, 
if not most SESs.  For instance, one of the difficulties facing PIECAS is the delta’s 
fragmented legislative environment.  Fragmented legislative environments are possible 
wherever SESs straddle multiple provincial or national borders, of which there are 
presumably a significant number. 
Reliability 
Following Yin, the reliability of my research depends in part on the rigour with which I 
developed and carried out my case study protocol.  Although there are several areas where I 
believe I could have made improvements, the overall protocol matched the standards found in 
other doctoral theses (see, for instance, Gezelius, 2002; Glatzel, 2013).  Furthermore, and 
perhaps more importantly, the data used in the thesis were collected using well-developed 
methods, and, in the case of the interview data, were based on the views of reasonable people 
with an intimate understanding of the SESs and management systems under analysis.    
2.7 Methodology summary 
This chapter should provide a clear outline of the trajectory this thesis followed during its 
development, and the rationale underpinning this trajectory.  Moreover, it elaborates the 
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methodological choices made during the research.  Many of these choices are consistent with 
other research projects in the natural resource management field.  However, the methodology 
has original elements in a number of areas.  Most importantly, the legitimation function 
framework and its application to PIECAS and the halibut fishery is novel.  Other research on 
legitimacy (see, for instance, Tyler, 2001a) uses a methodological approach that correlates 
perceptions of legitimacy with potentially important criteria like trust, or simply analyses 
legitimacy in abstract terms.  The method in this thesis is distinct from this previous work.  A 
framework approach to legitimacy in resource management contexts therefore constitutes an 
original contribution in its own right.  Furthermore, the framework arguably constitutes an 
original extension to Ostrom’s SES framework.  In particular, the core idea implicit in 
Ostrom’s framework – that seemingly complex SESs can be reduced into component parts 
and therefore made more intelligible – is applied to legitimacy.  Finally, the recognition in 
Ostrom’s framework that SES components interact is evident in the legitimation function 
framework as well.  The four criteria that make up the legitimation function influence one 
another in a variety of ways, and the framework demonstrates that interplay neatly. 
Another aspect of the methodology that has some originality is the way in which the case 
studies are used.  Rather than forming the sole component of the methodology – like most 
research projects – the case studies here are exploratory.  The observations made in the case 
studies inspire subsequent research extensions like the legitimation function framework.  
Thus, the case studies are not used to test the impact of theoretically relevant factors.  Instead, 
they are used to ascertain which factors might be of theoretical interest in the first place.  It is 
interesting that this exploratory method led me to legitimacy as a key factor in successful 
resource management, given that it is frequently but superficially covered in the CPR 
management literature. 
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Chapter 3 Two resource management case studies. 
Keywords: communication, legitimacy, organisations, participation, social-ecological 
systems. 
Many natural resources that require sustainable management to avoid exhaustion are part of 
wider social-ecological systems (SESs).  For instance, a fish stock like the Pacific halibut 
stock is nested in a larger system that includes social components (a fishing fleet, say) and 
ecological components (the productivity of the stock, for example).  These SESs are complex, 
and as a result difficult to understand and to manage (Cox, 2011). 
In recognition of the complexity inherent in SESs, scholars have developed a number of 
frameworks that facilitate analysis of SESs.  Frameworks are the ‘most general forms of 
theoretical analysis’; they identify a set of variables that can be used in diagnostic or 
prescriptive analyses (Ostrom, 2011a).  These variables should be relevant to any theory 
describing a particular phenomenon (ibid).  Frameworks are therefore descriptive tools above 
all, but can also help in formulating research questions. 
Although a number of frameworks focused on SESs and CPR management have emerged 
over time, two have proved particularly valuable to scholars investigating environmental and 
other policy questions.  The first is the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework; the second is the SES framework, which is seen as an extension of the IAD 
framework (Bal, 2014).  The SES framework first appeared in two papers by Ostrom (2007; 
2009a), and has since been used by a number of scholars.  For example, Nagendra (2007) 
drew on the SES framework to examine drivers of change in Nepalese forests, and Gutiérrez 
et al. (2011) applied it to identify attributes that appear to lead to successful outcomes in co-
managed fisheries.  Fleischman et al. (2010) used the framework to classify features that 
influence disturbance and responses to that disturbance in five communities in Indiana 
(United States) that own forested lands.     
The SES framework conceives of SESs as comprising four ‘first-level’ subsystems: resource 
systems, resource units, governance systems, and actors (or ‘resource users’ in older versions 
of the framework).  These subsystems interact insofar as they influence outcomes in other 
subsystems and in the SES as a whole.  Each subsystem is itself made up of ‘second-level 
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variables’, which in turn are composed of third-level and deeper variables (Ostrom, 2009a).  
(‘Variables’ is the specific term used by Ostrom, and should not be confused with ‘factors’ as 
understood in this thesis.)  The SES framework therefore decomposes complex systems into a 
hierarchy of variables that are progressively more detailed each level down (Cox, 2011).  In 
addition, the framework reflects the economic, social and political environment in which 
SESs are placed by considering these ‘external variables’ and their impact on first-level 
subsystems.  Ultimately, the framework is meant to be exhaustive in that it should be possible 
to classify any variable at some level of the framework (McGinnis, 2010).  The variables 
identified essentially provide a descriptive list of the constituent parts of a SES.   
However, the SES framework is limited precisely because it is a purely descriptive tool.  
Thus, the framework cannot help explain the outcomes observed in SESs, nor can it tell us 
anything about the factors that are important to producing successful outcomes in a resource 
management system.  Additional frameworks and theories that complement the SES 
framework are needed if one is to draw meaningful conclusions about the outcomes from, 
say, a resource management system focused on a SES.  A second criticism of the framework 
is that it provides little guidance in cases where putatively novel second- or lower-level 
variables are identified.  It is unclear if researchers should assume that new variables fall 
under existing ones, or whether new variables should be added to the framework.  Perhaps 
the only indication that novel variables do merit inclusion in the framework is that the 
framework is unlikely to be exhaustive in the sense implied by McGinnis.  A final criticism is 
that the framework does not address the issue of changes brought about by interactions in a 
SES (Bal, 2014).  Do interactions change existing sub-variables, or do they generate new sub-
variables? 
Despite these shortcomings, the SES framework is valuable in three ways in particular.  
Firstly, it provides the researcher with a list of variables that can be used to organize his or 
her data in a way that is consistent with other studies also making use of the framework.  The 
framework should therefore help make the findings of research in different disciplines more 
relevant to and more comparable with one another.  Secondly, the framework can be used to 
structure comprehensive descriptions of particular SESs.  For instance, Ostrom (2011b) 
applied the framework in order to understand irrigation systems in the American West at the 
turn of the 19th Century.  Used in this way, the framework categorises otherwise complex 
systems and in so doing makes them intelligible.  Finally, the framework can assist 
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researchers in developing research questions by identifying specific variables that might 
merit investigation. 
In this chapter, I use the SES framework to guide an analysis of PIECAS and the halibut 
fishery.  The chapter’s overall aim is to identify in broad terms the factors that have 
contributed to the success and failure, respectively, of these resource management schemes.  
Some of these factors may constitute second-, third- or lower level variables in Ostrom’s 
framework.  A secondary aim is to hypothesise how these factors have led to these outcomes.  
The SES framework plays an important role throughout the chapter; it is used to organize the 
data collected for each case study, and to provide a detailed description of the SESs involved 
in each management scheme.  The former is made possible by ‘mapping’, where appropriate, 
the factors identified in each case study to second-level variables already included in the 
framework.  However, not all of the factors identified map to second-level variables in the 
framework.  For instance, legitimacy – one of a number of factors that seem to underpin the 
different outcomes produced by each resource management scheme - is not a second-level 
variable in the sense implied by Ostrom’s framework, because it has explanatory power in a 
way that otherwise descriptive second-level variables do not.  Thus, there is a distinction 
between factors that have explanatory power and variables in Ostrom’s framework – the 
latter are simply the elements of a SES.  The former are, of course, more interesting in the 
context of this thesis and this chapter because we are concerned with the factors that are 
important to successful or unsuccessful outcomes in resource management systems. 
The two government-led resource management schemes that form the unit of analysis for this 
and subsequent chapters are the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Plan for the Conservation and 
Sustainability of the Paraná River delta’ (‘PIECAS’), and a market-based management plan 
for the Alaskan Pacific halibut fishery.  PIECAS was developed by the Argentine government 
in 2008, following serious agricultural fires in the Paraná delta.  However, its development 
has been fraught with difficulty since its inception.  Indeed, the plan has many of the 
characteristics of a weakly institutionalised governance system (Berardo and Lubell, 2016) 
and is only just beginning to advance to a stage where implementation is feasible.  Thus, the 
chapter attempts to identify the factors that have caused PIECAS’s design to proceed so 
slowly. 
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Management of the halibut fishery is based on ‘individual fishing quotas’ (‘IFQs’).  Like 
PIECAS, IFQ management in the fishery was borne out of crisis – but unlike PIECAS, the 
fishery’s governance is strongly institutionalised.  It was introduced in 1995 in response to 
significant difficulties arising from a management plan based on limited-entry and total 
allowable catch (‘TAC’)5 limits.  The introduction of IFQs has by and large been a success; it 
has improved a number of key sustainability metrics relevant to the fishery (see Olson, 2011, 
for a commentary on the benefits attributable to IFQs in the halibut fishery).  However, IFQs 
have also had a significant socio-economic impact, especially in rural communities in the 
Gulf of Alaska.  I aim to understand the factors that might explain the relative success of 
IFQs compared to the problems encountered in the limited entry fishery.   
The two case studies are exploratory in nature, and the conclusions drawn should be assessed 
in this context.  Furthermore, the two SESs in each case study are too dissimilar to justify a 
comparative study, although as mentioned in chapter 2 both cases are united by analogous 
governance architectures.  Nevertheless, the findings from the two cases are mutually 
validating, especially in respect of the importance of legitimacy in resource management 
systems.  The chapter proceeds as follows: in section 3.1, I briefly review framework 
approaches for the study of CPR management and SESs.  Section 3.2 describes PIECAS and 
the Paraná River delta, and presents the results of my study; likewise, the halibut fishery and 
associated results from the case study are outlined in section 3.3.  The results for each case 
study comprise the factors that I identify as playing an important role in the success and 
failure of each management system (the halibut IFQ system, and PIECAS).  As the analysis 
uses Ostrom’s framework for guidance, I map these factors against the second-level variables 
included in the framework where it is appropriate to do so.  However, as I explain above, 
some of the factors identified are not purely descriptive and therefore do not map easily to the 
framework.  Instead, some of these factors may actually fit more closely with Ostrom’s ideas 
on design principles (see Ostrom, 1990).  The chapter concludes with section 3.4. 
                                                 
5 A TAC is the total amount of fish that a fishing fleet can catch in a given management region.  For instance, 
the TAC applicable to the Alaskan halibut fleet in 2013 was 21,810,800 Imperial pounds (lbs) – NOAA 
Fisheries Service, 2013.    
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3.1 The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and other frameworks 
for analysing institutional arrangements and social-ecological systems. 
Frameworks identify the structural variables that are present in most, if not all institutional 
arrangements, and the interaction between these variables (Ostrom, 2011a).  A number of 
frameworks have been developed over several decades of research.  Here, I briefly outline the 
framework approach to analysing CPRs and SESs.  Although this summary is not 
comprehensive, it should clarify the basic tenets that characterise most CPR and SES 
frameworks and help demonstrate how the SES framework is a useful tool for categorising 
the factors identified in the two case studies presented in this thesis. 
A notable example amongst the various frameworks used by scholars in analysing 
institutions, CPRs and club or public goods is the IAD framework developed at the 
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, Bloomington by 
Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom and colleagues (Ostrom, 1990).  The focal point of the 
IAD framework is an ‘action situation’.  Action situations are the ‘social spaces in which 
individuals interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or 
fight…’ (Ostrom, 2011a).  A pattern of interactions and outcomes flows from any given 
action situation.  An action situation itself has various constituent parts, most notably the 
actors involved in the action situation and their particular attributes.  These actors occupy 
specific positions, and in turn actions are assigned to these positions.  Information about 
positions, and control over positions, are linked to the outcomes that flow from actions 
attributable to a position. 
Figure 2 below (based on Ostrom, 2011a) illustrates the internal structure of an action 
situation. 
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Figure 2. The structure of an action situation. 
 
The IAD framework has been used widely in a number of contexts, including studies of 
metropolitan public services, governance systems, donor-sponsored infrastructure 
development projects and international political regimes (Rudd, 2003).  For example, 
Bushouse (2011) used it to investigate the delivery of child day care services.  Andersson 
(2004) applied the framework to formulate a series of hypotheses concerning effective 
decentralised forest governance, which were then tested using data from Bolivian 
municipalities.   
In addition to the IAD framework, a number of scholars have developed other frameworks to 
analyse situations that involve CPRs and tragedies of the commons.  For instance, Oakerson 
(1992) developed a framework for analysing commons.  He saw commons as comprising four 
constituent attributes: the physical characteristics of the resource, and the technology used in 
its appropriation; the decision-making arrangements that influence how resource users relate 
to each other and other people; the patterns of interaction that arise from the choices 
individuals make in the context of the resource’s physical attributes, available technology, 
and the rules governing resource use; and, finally, the outcomes produced by the interaction 
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of the other three attributes.  In addition, Oakerson recognised that commons are nested in a 
wider social and political context without explicitly including this context in his framework.   
Elsewhere, Anderies et al. (2004) developed a framework for analysing SESs that is closely 
related to Oakerson’s version but also clearly embedded in the IAD framework.  Their 
framework splits SESs into four components: the resource itself; resource users; ‘public 
infrastructure’, and public infrastructure providers.  Public infrastructure has two elements: 
‘physical capital’ which includes ‘hard’ engineering infrastructure like irrigation canals; and 
‘social capital’, which comprises the institutional rules that govern resource use, the 
monitoring and enforcement of those rules, and research and innovation that keep the system 
functional even as circumstances change.  Public infrastructure providers receive 
contributions – labour, taxes – and create policy that determines how those contributions are 
invested in the construction, operation and maintenance of public infrastructure.  
Like Oakerson, Anderries et al. suggest that outcomes in CPR management are also 
conditional on the ‘external environment’.  They define the external environment broadly; it 
covers biophysical variables and disturbances like climate change, earthquakes and floods, 
but also socio-economic changes: economic growth or recession, population growth and 
political change.  They argue that biophysical factors affect the resource, while socio-
economic variables primarily influence resource users and their behaviour.  The external 
environment in their framework is therefore similar to the recognition by Oakerson that the 
social and political context in which CPR management is placed is important to management 
outcomes. 
Crucially, Anderies et al., Oakerson, and Ostrom do not distinguish between ‘factors’ (as I 
understand them) and variables in their frameworks.  They therefore omit characteristics like 
legitimacy, which are found to play a significant role in both the case studies examined here 
(see section 3.2.9 and section 3.3.9).  This omission, coupled with the observation that 
legitimacy is important to the halibut IFQ regime and PIECAS, leads to a more thorough 
exploration of legitimacy in chapters 4, 5 and 6.  On this point, it is posited that resource 
management systems that are not subscribed to as legitimate by key stakeholders will 
struggle, perhaps unnecessarily, in achieving their objectives. 
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3.2 Study I: Policy design and implementation challenges in PIECAS 
3.2.1 The study location and the development of PIECAS 
The Paraná River is the second-largest river in South America, smaller only than the 
Amazon. It flows some 5,000km from its headwaters in south-eastern Brazil.  Its drainage 
basin is 3 million km2 in area and spreads across Paraguay and parts of Argentina, Bolivia 
and Brazil.  In its lower section, the Paraná joins the Paraguay River and forms an extensive 
delta – the Paraná delta, which is the area under PIECAS’s management.  The river itself 
finally converges with the Uruguay River to form the River Plate, or Río de la Plata, which 
flows into the Atlantic Ocean in central-eastern Argentina. 
The Paraná delta drains a watershed some 22,587 km2 in area (Secretaria de Ambiente y 
Desarrollo Sustentable, 2008) and extends 320km through three Argentine provinces – 
Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe.  It is informally divided into three distinct sections: 
the upper, middle and lower delta (Secretaria de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustentable, 2008).  
The upper delta lies between the cities of Diamante in Entre Ríos and Villa Constitución in 
Santa Fe; the middle delta falls between Villa Constitución and Ibicuy in Entre Ríos; and the 
lower delta occupies the remaining area, from Ibicuy to where the river joins the River Plate.  
The deltaic region is noteworthy both for its biodiversity and – paradoxically perhaps - for 
the scale of agriculture within and around it.  There are some 700 plant species, 260 bird 
species and a further 172 fish species in the area (Secretaría de Ambiente y Desarrollo 
Sustentable, 2008).  In respect of agriculture, grain exports from Buenos Aires province alone 
were valued at some US$416 million in 2012 (Buenos Aires Provincia, 2013).  The Paraná 
River is a vital conduit for the transportation of this grain to international markets.  
Anecdotally, I observed tankers being filled with grain at the town of San Pedro in the middle 
delta before making their way toward the Atlantic Ocean and foreign markets. 
The three provinces that straddle the delta make up the most heavily populated parts of 
Argentina.  Indeed, Argentina’s largest city – the capital, Buenos Aires - is located adjacent 
to the lower delta.  The environmental impact of the city has been largely negative.  There 
has been a sharp increase in the development of tourism projects and private neighbourhoods 
in the area, as well as encroachment by illegal settlements (Zagare, 2012).  In the upper and 
middle delta, cattle farming and other agriculture has had and continues to have a significant 
environmental impact.  Construction of dykes to drain naturally flooding fields is common, as 
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is slash-and-burn that removes native vegetation in order to clear pasture for grazing cattle.  
Other problems include over-harvesting of certain fish species, and dredging of river 
channels to ensure that the delta remains navigable to commercial shipping. 
Many of these environmental problems have been exacerbated by a number of factors.  At 
one level, pressure on land and other resources in the delta has increased.  For instance, the 
rise in soybean prices on global markets has encouraged farmers to convert land adjacent to 
the delta that was previously used for livestock farming to soybean cultivation.  This change 
has pushed cattle farming into the delta’s marginal lands.  As a result, the head of cattle in the 
area has increased significantly over the last 15 years.  Figures from Baigún et al. (2008) 
suggest that cattle numbers rose from 160,000 head in 1997 to 1,500,000 in 2007.  At another 
level, the delta lacks a coherent legal framework to regulate access to, and use of, its natural 
resources.  Regulations at a provincial level are fragmented and even contradictory.  
Furthermore, the Argentine constitution provides few incentives for provinces to coordinate 
governance of their shared natural resources (Berardo et al., 2013). 
More generally, policy-making in Argentina is of lower quality than many other countries 
(Spiller and Tommasi, 2003).  It is frequently incoherent and inconsistent.  Standards at the 
bureaucracies charged with developing policy are low.  Indeed, Rauch and Evans (2000) 
ranked Argentina in the bottom five of 35 developing countries for bureaucratic quality.  
Efforts to address environmental problems in the delta are therefore nested in a less than ideal 
policy space.    
These factors make the delta vulnerable to environmental crises.  In April 2008, one such 
crisis struck the region.  Slash-and-burn fires started by farmers in the Entre Ríos section of 
the delta burned out of control.  The fires were fanned by strong winds and a long drought.  
Hundreds of thousands of hectares of land were burned.  In addition, smoke from the fires 
hung over the area for a number of weeks and affected visibility as far south as Montevideo 
(BBC, 2008).  Air quality and visibility in Buenos Aires deteriorated rapidly, with the smoke 
thick enough to prompt closure of the city’s airports and motorways (BBC, 2008).  The fires 
sparked widespread debate on the delta’s environmental problems amongst the public and 
policy-makers, and opened a policy window that allowed governmental and non-
governmental actors to promote their own individual agendas. 
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One response to the crisis was an initiative by the National Environment and Sustainable 
Development Secretariat (Argentina’s top environmental bureaucracy, hereafter referred to as 
the ‘Environment Secretariat’ or ‘Secretariat’) to create a legal framework for the 
management of the delta’s natural resources.  The first step in this process was the signing of 
a Letter of Intent by the federal government and the provincial governments of Buenos Aires, 
Entre Ríos and Santa Fe in 2008.  The Letter of Intent bound those governments to design 
PIECAS.   
As its name suggests, PIECAS is an environmental management plan for the delta.  In broad 
terms, it aims to improve environmental management in the delta by harmonising (or 
‘integrating’) environmental legislation, encouraging public participation, and finding 
solutions to the problems caused by slash-and-burn and draining wetlands (Berardo et al., 
2015).  More specifically, the plan has four principal objectives: 
1. To protect, to conserve and to take advantage of biodiversity and natural resources in 
the area in a sustainable manner. 
2. To maintain or to restore the structure and the ecological function of the Paraná 
delta’s strategic ecosystem; 
3. To promote its sustainable development; 
4. To ensure the participation of all actors in contributing to the government’s legal 
framework. 
It is clear that objective 4 calls for participatory contributions from actors involved or 
interested in PIECAS.  This is noteworthy in the context of the research subsequently 
introduced in the thesis.  In particular, a variation of objective 4 is seen as an explicit 
component of legitimate resource management systems and therefore serves a ‘legitimation 
function’.  I explore these ideas further in chapter 4.  
PIECAS also aims to fulfil Argentina’s international responsibilities under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) and the RAMSAR Wetlands Convention (Secretaria de 
Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustentable, 2008).  PIECAS should also contribute to achieving 
domestic responsibilities that Argentina is bound to under UNESCO’s Man and Biosphere 
Programme (Secretaria de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustentable, 2008). 
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Following the Letter of Intent, the process of designing PIECAS got underway.  In 2009, the 
‘High Level Inter-jurisdictional Committee for Sustainable Development in the Paraná delta’ 
(hereafter, the ‘High Level Committee’ or ‘Committee’) was created.  The High Level 
Committee is comprised of one delegate from each of the three deltaic provincial 
governments (Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe), as well as a federal government 
delegate.  The Committee was tasked with developing an environmental report that would 
serve as the foundation on which PIECAS would be designed and subsequently implemented.  
In addition, a ‘Strategic Environmental Evaluation’ (SEE) was performed with the aim of 
complementing the High Level Committee’s environmental report and identifying problems 
policy-makers might face in designing and implementing PIECAS.  It was completed in 
November 2011 with input from academics and NGOs, but not local government.  More 
recently (August 2013), the High Level Committee announced6 it was going to send a draft 
bill containing a finalised version of PIECAS and a set of minimum standards for the delta’s 
conservation and sustainable development to the Argentine Congress for debate.  As of 
August 2014, however, the draft bill is yet to reach Congress and has not been made publicly 
available.  Nevertheless, the pending nature of the draft bill has not stopped the formation of 
PIECAS because the Letter of Intent is seen as a sufficient basis for moving the plan forward. 
In general, and in spite of the High Level Committee’s recent announcement, the process of 
designing PIECAS has been fraught with difficulty since the Letter of Intent was signed in 
2008. In many respects, the plan’s progress toward implementation is in stasis. The aim of 
this study was to understand the factors that underpin this stasis.  The remainder of this 
section proceeds as follows: firstly, I follow Ostrom (2011b) and use her SES framework 
(2009a – see section 3.1) to describe the Paraná delta SES; and secondly, I use the interview 
and survey data to suggest which factors have contributed to the plan’s difficulties.  The 
factors I identify are mapped to Ostrom’s framework, where possible.  Those factors that are 
not present in the current framework and have explanatory power beyond that captured by 
existing second-level variables are of particular interest.   
                                                 
6 ‘Avances en el ordenamiento ambiental de la Región DELTA del Paraná’. (2013) National Secretariat of 
Environment and Sustainable Development. [Online.] Available at: 
http://www.ambiente.gov.ar/?idarticulo=12149 
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3.2.2 Understanding the Paraná delta and PIECAS using the SES framework 
Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 break down the Paraná delta into the four subsystems that constitute a 
SES, following Ostrom’s framework.  Each of these first-level subsystems is then further 
decomposed into second-level variables.  Second-level variables are identified either from 
existing literature on the Paraná delta, my observations in the field, or the interview data (or a 
combination thereof).  The tables are therefore a first step in the process of mapping the 
characteristics of PIECAS and the delta to Ostrom’s framework.  The tables also demonstrate 
how the framework is a descriptive rather than explanatory tool.  The second-level variables 
included tell us something about the way in which PIECAS is organised, and about the 
delta’s environmental characteristics.  However, they tell us little if anything about the factors 
that are important to PIECAS’s success.  I continue the mapping in section 3.2.10 when 
describing the factors underpinning PIECAS’s unsuccessful performance to date. 
Table 5. Description of the Paraná delta’s resource subsystems. 
Resource systems Description 
Type of resource system Riverine habitat, wetland 
Location Eastern Argentina 
Size of resource system Large – 300km as the crow flies 
Productivity of system Varied, but generally low 
Clarity of watershed boundaries Clear 
Human-constructed facilities Bridges and roads, dykes 
Predictability of system dynamics Predictable flooding events 
 
 
Table 6. Description of resource units in the Paraná delta. 
Resource units (various) Description 
Types of resource units Agricultural pasture, fish, wetlands 
Economic value of pasture Low 
Economic value of fish stocks Low 
Economic value of wetlands Low 
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Table 7. Description of actors in the Paraná delta. 
Actors Description 
(Subsistence) farmers and fishermen:  
Economic status Varied, from poor to very wealthy 
Knowledge of SES Varied; many farmers involved in workshops 
to educate themselves about, for instance, 
insect pests. 
Federal officials:  
Knowledge of SES Varied; frequently incomplete 
Provincial officials:  
Knowledge of SES Varied; frequently incomplete 
Municipal officials:   
Knowledge of SES Varied; probably better than federal or 
provincial officials. 
 
Table 8. Description of the Paraná delta's governance subsystem. 
Governance system (PIECAS) Description 
Government organisations PIECAS High Level Committee 
National Environment Secretariat 
Provincial environmental departments (i.e. OPDS) 
Non-governmental organisations Environmental NGOs (i.e. FARN) 
Property rights systems Mostly open access or state-owned lands 
Operational rules  Undefined 
Collective choice rules Defined by and mediated through the High Level 
Committee. 
Constitutional rules  Argentine constitution; Articles 41 and 124 key. 
Monitoring and sanctioning processes Weak or non-existent 
 
Table 9. Interactions taking place in the delta under PIECAS's auspices. 
Interactions Description 
Deliberation processes High Level Committee meetings (government 
officials only) 
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Interactions Description 
Conflicts among users  Tension between agricultural stakeholders and 
officials 
Self-organising activities Meeting and workshops amongst agricultural 
producers and NGOs 
 
Several of the delta’s features stand out in tables 5 to 9.  Firstly, the delta is very large (table 
5) and comprises a patchwork of different land uses.  Some areas are relatively untouched 
wetland; other areas are degraded by the effect of agriculture and infrastructure.  My own 
observations in the delta are certainly consistent with this description.  Secondly, the actors 
present in the delta – many of whom are active participants in PIECAS or are directly 
affected by the scheme – are heterogeneous.  A gamut of individuals, from subsistence 
fishermen to wealthy real estate developers, all have an interest in the delta (table 7).  Finally, 
table 8 suggests that the operational rules that determine how a resource management system 
works day to day are presently undefined in PIECAS.  Of course, this may reflect the plan’s 
ongoing development – that is, operational rules are yet to be designed and will be in due 
course.  However, given that six years have elapsed since the plan’s inception, it is reasonable 
to argue that there should at least be a basic framework in place for those rules.  In the section 
that follows, I explore this and other factors that interviewees believed to be an explanation 
for PIECAS’s failures to date. 
3.2.3 Factors underpinning PIECAS’s problems   
The lack of well-defined operational rules in PIECAS is, of course, a strong indication that 
PIECAS is not yet at a stage where it can be implemented in any practical sense.  It means 
that PIECAS cannot regulate use of the delta’s resources (its wetlands, say).  For instance, 
PIECAS in its present form does not determine who can use resources in the delta and when 
they can use those resources.  Clearly, this is tantamount to PIECAS lacking ‘teeth’ as a 
resource management system.  In particular, PIECAS cannot yet regulate agricultural slash-
and-burn fires in the delta, a surprising state of affairs given that PIECAS was developed in 
response to the agricultural fires that swept uncontrolled through the delta in 2008. 
As long as these operational rules remain undefined, PIECAS will not progress to a stage 
where it is ready for implementation.  Without well-defined rules, the plan will certainly not 
contribute in a positive way to the sustainability of the delta.  However, it is insufficient to 
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claim that the lack of rules is itself a contributory factor in PIECAS’s difficulties.  Instead, it 
is arguably a symptom of deeper, underlying problems.  Interestingly, the interview data give 
some indication of a potential reason for the lack of rules, namely that PIECAS’s core 
objectives were themselves too broad to allow for the development of focused and actionable 
rules.  Interviewee ♯11, for instance, said that 
“First of all, the objectives are to protect, conserve and to take advantage of components of 
the delta’s biodiversity and natural resources in a sustainable way.  Also to restore 
ecological function in the Paraná delta’s ecosystem; to promote sustainable development; 
and to ensure the participation of stakeholders. But they’re very general.  And then in the 
Letter of Intent that we asked for, it talks about voluntary actions to achieve these objectives.  
Um…in particular I want to say that they’re very broad… Perhaps too broad.” 
Similarly, interviewee ♯12 argued that, although objectives were clear at a ‘macro-level’, the 
best that one could hope for with PIECAS was to see the establishment of a ‘general 
management framework’ or ‘minimal management conditions’  – “a support framework to 
regulate decisions [that concern the delta].”  Although these comments do not explicitly 
identify broadly defined management objectives as a problem for PIECAS’s development – 
indeed, the opposite might be true – it is striking that interviewee ♯12 felt that the final shape 
PIECAS would take would itself be general and concern ‘minimum conditions’ rather than 
the regulation of specific activities.   
These comments provide limited evidence, but they do at least point to the possibility that 
PIECAS suffers from management objectives that are broad and therefore difficult to 
operationalise.  The stasis in which the plan finds itself may be attributable in part to the 
problems that stem from these objectives.  Analysing the objectives themselves supports the 
idea that they are not achievable in any practical sense, insofar as there are no specific tools 
that can obviously contribute to meeting them.  For instance, the goal of promoting 
sustainable development (while laudable) is essentially meaningless in the absence of a 
defined implementation strategy because it (sustainable development) can mean different 
things and be achieved in several different ways.  Thus, placing an objective like sustainable 
development at the core of PIECAS does not clarify the particular management regulations or 
tools needed to achieve the objective.  It provides PIECAS officials with no real clarity or 
guidance for designing PIECAS.   
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This critique applies to PIECAS’s other objectives, not just the goal of promoting sustainable 
development.  The aim of protecting, conserving, and taking advantage of the delta’s natural 
resources, and of restoring the delta’s ecological function, is more tangible than promoting 
sustainable development, but it remains unclear how exactly the High Level Committee can 
achieve those goals.  For instance, conserving the delta may require the establishment of 
protected areas free from human interference; but equally, it may constitute the introduction 
of legislation that bans the draining of wetlands for agricultural pasture, say.  Indeed, it is 
notable that neither of these objectives defines the particular resource(s) or ecological 
processes that require management.  Presumably this is left to the discretion of the High 
Level Committee.  But in so doing, the High Level Committee is left with a range of 
management options, any of which might prove beneficial to the delta.      
PIECAS’s final objective – to ensure the participation of stakeholders – is, perhaps, clearer 
than the plan’s other goals, insofar as the High Level Committee is obliged to include 
stakeholders in management processes.  It also resonates with satisfaction of the legitimation 
function (see chapter 4).  But on further consideration, it leaves the High Level Committee 
with significant discretion and unanswered questions.  In particular, the objective fails to 
define what ‘participation’ means in PIECAS.  Does it constitute meetings that are open to 
the general public, or does it simply entail the High Level Committee keeping stakeholders 
up to date on PIECAS’s development?  In this respect, the objective provides no guidance on 
the role that stakeholders can play in PIECAS.   
Each of these problems creates uncertainty about basic features of PIECAS’s design.  An 
overall conclusion from the analysis is that fundamental aspects of the plan – which resources 
fall under its remit, what limitations on resource use are intended, the stakeholders to which it 
will apply – require further elaboration.  So too do the relevant, detailed implementation 
strategies that would pertain to PIECAS’s objectives.  In their present form, however, the 
plan’s core objectives are not actually detailed enough to shape PIECAS’s development in a 
meaningful way.  As a result, PIECAS has struggled to progress significantly since its 
inception.  Arguably, making decisions about core stipulations like the ones described above 
will be the first step in pushing the plan toward a point where implementation is feasible. 
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3.2.4 Legislative fragmentation in the delta 
A number of the stakeholders interviewed during my field research suggested that PIECAS’s 
difficulties were attributable to the delta’s complex legislative environment.  Legislation in 
the delta corresponds to two second-level variables in Ostrom’s framework: constitutional 
rules, and collective-choice rules (see table 8).  However, of more interest than the legislation 
itself are the attributes of that legislation and their impact on various aspects of PIECAS’s 
development.   
One attribute of the delta’s legislative environment is that it is highly fragmented at both a 
constitutional and collective-choice level.  Arguably, PIECAS has been strongly affected by 
this fragmentation.  For instance, the Argentine Constitution defines the constitutional rules 
that influence and are relevant to PIECAS.  Under the Constitution7, provinces are 
responsible for all those activities that are not delegated to the State.  In particular, Article 
124 states that natural resources in a province’s territory are under the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the province rather than the State (Nonna, 2002; Berardo et al., 2013)8.  Each province will 
have a body charged with applying existing regulations and coordinating environmental 
policy generally (Nonna, ibid).  Of course, attitudes and legislation regarding the use of 
natural resources are shaped by the particular objectives of provincial governments.   
Despite the apparently clear separation of responsibility for natural resources between federal 
and provincial government outlined in the Constitution, questions remain about the balance 
of authority and responsibility between the two levels of government.  For instance, Article 
41 of the Constitution provides the Argentine people with the right to a healthy environment.  
There are various provisions under Article 41 that imply that both levels of government will 
protect this right, and also conserve biodiversity and provide for the use of natural resources 
in a rational way.  Article 41 authorizes federal government to develop minimum standards to 
achieve these goals, ostensibly without affecting provincial authority for environmental 
affairs (Nolon, 1996).  But in practice, this stipulation means that jurisdiction for 
environmental issues is shared.  It has led to the development of environmental regulation 
that overlaps at the federal and provincial level.  This overlap applies to water quality 
                                                 
7 The Argentine Constitution was amended in 1994, in response to international economic pressure and the 
output from the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.  
8 Article 124 of the Constitution states that ‘provinces have original jurisdiction over natural resources in their 
territories’ (‘Coresponde a las provincias el dominio originario de los recursos naturales existentes en sus 
territorios’).  
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regulation and other environmental issues, and has caused ‘redundancy and confusion’ 
(Nolon, ibid).  The constitutional rules that are part of the delta’s governance subsystem and 
that affect PIECAS therefore have two important effects: they delegate responsibility for 
natural resources to provinces, but they also blur the lines of responsibility for addressing 
environmental problems between federal and provincial governments.  The delta’s 
fragmented legislative environment therefore has roots in the Argentine Constitution. 
More generally, the responsibility for natural resources that the Argentine Constitution places 
in the hands of provinces is problematic to PIECAS because it exposes the plan to provincial 
politics.  For instance, different provincial governments often have representatives from 
different political parties.  Interviewee ♯5 mentioned that the “provinces that make up the 
plan [PIECAS] have governments of different political parties.”  An examination of the 
existing provincial governments in the delta corroborates this claim.  For example, the 
governor of Entre Ríos (Sergio Urriburri) is a member of the Peronist Justicialist Party, while 
the governor of Santa Fe (Antonio Bonfatti) belongs to the Socialist Party.  An inter-
provincial agreement like PIECAS is therefore exposed to the political and environmental 
objectives of individual provincial governments.  But if federal government assumed 
responsibility for managing the delta’s resources, thereby avoiding provincial interest 
politics, it would contravene the Constitution.   
This problem is exacerbated by the presence of different political parties in the High Level 
Committee.  The Committee is the collective-choice arena in which decisions about 
PIECAS’s development are made.  Each Committee member from Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos 
and Santa Fe will bring with them the interests of the parties they represent.  These interests 
may be contradictory or mutually exclusive.  Clearly this is not an insurmountable problem, 
but it adds a layer of complexity to the collective decision-making that takes place in the 
Committee.  Perhaps leaving the work of the Committee to individual appointees selected 
both by government and by stakeholders for their scientific expertise rather than their 
political affiliations would reduce such complexity. 
Legislative fragmentation is also caused by the different approaches to regulating 
environmental issues taken by each of the provinces with territory in the delta (Buenos Aires, 
Entre Ríos and Santa Fe).  Each province has environmental frameworks that in some cases 
differ one from the other or are even conflicting.  Although PIECAS is arguably an attempt to 
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develop a form of harmonized legislation that will address differences in provincial 
legislation, the plan itself needs to be consistent with existing provincial regulation.  
Interviewee ♯12 gave one example that illustrates the point neatly.  In 1977, during the years 
of the military junta in Argentina, Decree 8912/779 (‘Decreto Ley 8912/77 de Ordenamiento 
Territorial y Uso del Suelo en la Provincia de Buenos Aires’) gave municipalities in Buenos 
Aires province authority over environmental management and planning.  Municipalities in 
Buenos Aires province are therefore responsible for land use decisions in both rural and 
urban areas that fall within their jurisdiction. 
However, authority for environmental management and planning decisions in Entre Ríos and 
Santa Fe is not vested at the municipal level.  Instead, the provincial governments themselves 
take those decisions.  Municipalities draft environmental management plans that are then 
passed on to the provincial government for approval.  For instance, both houses in Entre 
Ríos’ provincial government10 recently passed an environmental management plan for native 
forests in the province (Government of Entre Ríos, 2014).  The different approaches to 
environmental management in the provinces are problematic for PIECAS because the plan 
must meet the minimum standards developed by regulations in each municipality in Buenos 
Aires, and the other two provinces (Entre Ríos and Santa Fe).  Furthermore, PIECAS cannot 
contradict existing regulation at either a municipal level (in Buenos Aires) or provincial level 
(in Entre Ríos and Santa Fe). 
Decree 8912/77 is especially problematic because there are 135 municipalities in Buenos 
Aires province, of which Campana, San Fernando, San Pedro, Tigre, Varadero and Zarate 
have territory in the delta.  (Interviewee ♯10 mentioned that Campana and San Fernando are 
the two municipalities of greatest relevance to the delta’s islands.)  Interviewee ♯12 noted 
that each of these municipalities have different economic interests, whether agriculture, 
forestry or real estate development.  PIECAS requires harmonization with the environmental 
regulations developed by each of these municipalities.  But harmonization is challenging 
because of the number of municipalities and other actors in the delta, the way in which their 
varying interests shape environmental regulation, and the dynamic nature of municipal 
                                                 
9 Decree 8912/77 governs ‘the environmental management and planning of the Province [of Buenos Aires], and 
regulates the use, occupation, subdivision and fitting of the Province’s land’ (Government of Buenos Aires, no 
date). 
10 Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe all have bicameral legislatures, with a Senate and a Chamber of 
Deputies. 
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politics.  To complicate matters further, interviewee ♯12 pointed out that municipalities had 
not been involved from the beginning of the PIECAS design process.  There had therefore 
been a delay in addressing the difficulties presented by legislative fragmentation.  Indeed, 
interviewee ♯12 said that PIECAS officials had only started to deal with the issue recently.  
Interviewee ♯12 believed that these problems would have been avoided entirely with better 
planning.  (I return to the steps leading to and taken during PIECAS’s development in section 
3.2.5.) 
Interviewee ♯12’s comments were echoed by interviewee ♯10.  Without discussing Decree 
8912/77 specifically, interviewee ♯10 noted that 
“I think there’s also a jurisdictional theme, because the delta is made up of three provinces 
and, amongst them, municipalities.  It’s pretty complicated to develop a plan that speaks to, 
let’s say, all of the municipalities and provinces…  Each municipality is doing in parallel its 
own environmental management plan for the islands.  And, in turn, the provinces are also 
developing, in an isolated and parallel way, environmental management plans for their 
sections of the delta.  And there’s no inter-communication between the municipalities and 
provinces, nor between the provinces…” 
More specifically, interviewee ♯10 gave an example of legislative fragmentation in action in 
the delta: 
“[San Fernando and Campana] are pushing on with their own environmental management 
and conservation plans.  In turn, the OPDS [the Buenos Aires Office for Sustainable 
Development], which is the principal body for sustainable development in the province of 
Buenos Aires, also has an environmental management project.  In turn, there’s PIECAS, and 
various other examples of similar interventions in the islands.  And each one is working with, 
let’s say, a closed door.” 
With these various environmental and legislative projects taking place, interviewee ♯10 
argued that PIECAS’s design problems were attributable to the failure to adopt an 
‘integrated’ approach to environmental management in the delta: 
64 
 
“It seems to me that the plan doesn’t have a focus that’s integrated.  It has a focus that’s…I 
don’t know…environmental.  I don’t know if that’s the word.  But it has a focus that 
doesn’t…they’re doing it such that it can’t be carried out.  The problem is that there isn’t an 
integrated plan for development in the delta.  That’s the word.  There are isolated projects 
like PIECAS, environmental management projects for native forests, environmental 
management projects for land use, at a municipal, provincial and national level, all working 
separately, without an integrated master plan.” 
Further evidence of the failure to work in an integrated way was provided by interviewee 
♯11.  Interviewee ♯11 mentioned that  
“It’s [PIECAS’s design] very slow and difficult because there’s no exercise of working 
between provinces.  We’re…it’s a federal country, but relatively new federalism.  The change 
to the Constitution in 1994 said that provinces are responsible for the management of their 
natural resources.  So, everything to do with natural resources, by agreements – the national 
government can’t impose them [agreements].  Let’s say, you’ve got to look for consensus 
amongst the entire group.” 
These remarks emphasise two important points.  Firstly, the delta’s fragmented legislative 
landscape presents harmonization challenges for the officials charged with designing 
PIECAS (that is, the High Level Committee, who may bring with them the political agendas 
of their respective parties – see page 61 above).  The range of other organisations, interests 
and activities taking place in the delta exacerbates the harmonization problem.  Secondly, 
PIECAS appears not to have addressed satisfactorily the challenge that harmonization 
represents.  Interviewee ♯10’s focus on the lack of an ‘integrated’ approach suggests that 
PIECAS officials have failed to integrate PIECAS with the delta’s existing legislative 
framework.  As interviewee ♯10 points out, PIECAS is an ‘isolated project’.  The plan is 
therefore less likely to deal effectively with the challenges posed by the delta’s fragmented 
legislative system. 
Interestingly, the problems PIECAS has experienced with legislative fragmentation and inter-
jurisdictional harmonization are typical of public policy in Argentina generally.  For example, 
Spiller and Tommasi (2003) note that ‘inter-jurisdictional interactions are fairly non-
cooperative and poorly coordinated’.  Furthermore, they suggest that ‘in Argentina each 
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sector has its own way of being regulated, reflecting the discretion and lack of coordination 
among the sector Secretariats’ (which presumably includes the National Environment 
Secretariat and associated provincial environment bodies). 
Summarising legislative fragmentation in the delta 
Three key points have been made in the preceding discussion.  The first is that features of the 
Argentine Constitution, especially Articles 41 and 124, have created a legislative 
environment in the delta and Argentina more generally that is complex, fragmented and at 
times redundant.  These articles represent constitutional rules in Ostrom’s framework.  In the 
delta, each province has a different approach to regulating environmental problems.  In Entre 
Ríos and Santa Fe, authority over environmental decision-making follows the Constitution 
and is in the hands of the provincial government.  In Buenos Aires, as a result of Decree 
8912/77, this authority is vested at the municipal level.  Environmental regulation in the delta 
is therefore a patchwork of rules developed by different levels of government.  These rules 
may not necessarily complement one another.  Legislative fragmentation of this kind is an 
attribute of, amongst others, the constitutional rules and property-rights systems that Ostrom 
includes as second-level variables in her framework.   
As an inter-provincial agreement, PIECAS cannot contravene these rules, nor fail to meet the 
minimum standards established by them.  But designing PIECAS so that it is consistent with 
each existing environmental regulation in the delta is a significant challenge and one that the 
plan has failed to meet. 
Secondly, the constitutional vesting of authority for natural resources at a provincial level 
leaves inter-provincial agreements like PIECAS vulnerable to provincial realpolitik.  Federal 
government cannot bypass these provincial political interests and manage the delta itself 
because doing so would contravene the Constitution.  PIECAS must therefore satisfy or at 
least not contradict the political priorities of the parties involved in the plan.  In Buenos 
Aires, this argument applies to municipalities too, as a result of Decree 8912/77. 
Thirdly, PIECAS has failed to address the problems posed by legislative fragmentation 
because it lacks an ‘integrated’ approach; that is, there is insufficient cooperation between 
provinces to address legislative fragmentation.  Municipal officials, who could have assisted 
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the High Level Committee in developing PIECAS in such a way that it is consistent with 
municipal regulations, were absent at the earliest stages of the plan’s design (interviewee 
♯12).  The High Level Committee itself meets infrequently.  PIECAS is therefore ‘isolated’ 
(interviewee ♯10) and there has been inadequate coordination to account for legislative 
fragmentation in the delta.  Arguably, PIECAS has been poorly planned overall.  I turn to this 
theme briefly in the following section.  
3.2.5 PIECAS’s early development 
In section 3.2.4, I noted that interviewee ♯12 believed problems arising from Decree 8912/77 
could have been avoided if PIECAS had been better planned.  Interviewee ♯12 was not alone 
in thinking that at least some aspects of PIECAS were poorly thought out.  Interviewee ♯2, 
for instance, felt that PIECAS was “absolutely inoperable” and that there is a ‘disconnect 
between what PIECAS plans and the reality on the ground in the delta’.  Interviewee ♯6 
thought that many people involved in PIECAS had a poor understanding of the delta.  
Interviewee ♯10 was more scathing, remarking that 
“I think first they gave the plan its name, and they were still developing the plan…! I don’t 
know if I’m explaining myself.  The first thing that appeared was the ‘Comprehensive 
strategic…’ I don’t know what all the letters in PIECAS stand for.  Written or planned by 
someone who doesn’t know anything about the delta’s islands.  When a project is all about 
integration and conservation in the delta, and you don’t know anything about the delta, 
you’re going to make water11.  Do you understand the expression?  You’re going to trip up on 
a mountain of things that you hadn’t foreseen, because you don’t know the area.”   
Evidently, interviewee ♯10 shared the concerns expressed by interviewees ♯2, ♯6 and ♯12.  
Taken together, their comments suggest that the people involved in designing PIECAS may 
have had an insufficiently nuanced view of the delta, or that they lacked the expertise or 
familiarity required to put together a plan appropriate to the area.  Furthermore, there is the 
implication that PIECAS has encountered difficulties in part because the plan’s decision-
makers failed to take into account the complexity of the region when they were making 
decisions at an early stage of the plan’s development.  However, it is harder to determine 
from the interview data why PIECAS has been poorly planned.  One interesting possibility is 
                                                 
11 ‘Hacer agua’ (to make water in English) is a Spanish expression without a direct translation in English, but 
approximately it means ‘to spring a leak’. 
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that the particular sequence of events that led to PIECAS’s establishment were rushed and 
motivated by political rather than environmental concerns, with direct consequences for the 
plan’s effectiveness and legitimacy. 
The impression from the interview data is that PIECAS was indeed politically motivated, 
insofar as the plan demonstrated that politicians were attempting to address the crisis 
presented by the fires in the delta.  Interviewee ♯5, for instance, suggested that PIECAS was a 
“preventative response, if not born out of necessity in front of a crisis.”  Similarly, 
interviewee ♯4 believed that PIECAS was ‘required’ in response to the fires.  Interviewee ♯3 
echoed this comment, saying that PIECAS was a ‘political response’ to the fires.      
Interviewee ♯9 suggested that a fundamental problem with PIECAS was that it was not 
developed out of genuine environmental conviction.  Instead, the plan was ‘politically 
convenient’.  Interviewee ♯1 believed that, without the fires and the crisis they caused, 
PIECAS would never have been developed in the first place. 
One implication of these comments is that PIECAS is as much political as it is 
environmental.  By political, I mean that PIECAS was established in part as a means by 
which politicians could divert attention away from themselves and by which they could act in 
the short-term on the delta’s environmental problems.  There are a number of reasons to 
interpret PIECAS in this way.  Firstly, the effect that the fires had on Buenos Aires – with 
smoke posing a public health risk to the city’s inhabitants – temporarily focused the media’s 
gaze on the delta.  The attention generated forced policy-makers to discuss the issue of 
environmental management in the delta, and provided governmental and non-governmental 
actors an opportunity to advance their own interests (Berardo et al., 2015).  Policy-makers 
were presumably under pressure from the citizens of cities like Buenos Aires and Rosario to 
demonstrate that they had the situation under control, and moreover that they had a strategy 
for preventing future fires in the delta.  In this sense, PIECAS was a political as well as an 
environmental tool.  The political priority was to be seen to be responding to the fires, with 
the feasibility of the plan and its longer-term environmental outcomes of less immediate 
concern.  Under these circumstances, it is unsurprising that PIECAS’s early development 
may have been poorly planned.  Preliminary decisions about the structure of PIECAS and its 
aims and objectives may not necessarily have facilitated its implementation or the likelihood 
of it having a positive impact on the delta.  Instead, the manner in which the plan was 
conceived was expedient to the political imperative of the moment.  Its development was 
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politically motivated and, as interviewee ♯9 points out, ‘politically convenient’.  Moreover, 
once the fires and the attention they generated had died down, so too did political interest in 
the delta and PIECAS (interviewee ♯12).   
The problems from which PIECAS is presently suffering may therefore have roots in the 
events that led to its establishment.  The fires gave rise to a short-term but severe political 
crisis that required a political response.  PIECAS represented an ideal solution.  The 
probability of its succeeding as an environmental management plan was of secondary 
importance, and so the manner in which it was designed may have lacked the care and 
thought required to make its implementation feasible.  Similarly, the likelihood that PIECAS 
was (or is) seen as legitimate may have been influenced by the seemingly hurried and 
politically motivated circumstances of its inception.  Certainly, the haste and lack of care 
apparently taken in designing PIECAS would have made it difficult to satisfy the conditions 
that might lead to legitimacy.  In this respect, it is interesting that the Letter of Intent that was 
the first step in PIECAS’s design process was signed in September 2008 – a mere 5 months 
after the fires and the political pressure that came with them (Secretaria de Ambiente y 
Desarrollo Sustentable, 2008).  Planning an effective, legitimate environmental management 
regime in such a short space of time was bound to be difficult, especially given the legislative 
and ecological complexity of the delta. 
Mapping these two factors (a lack of understanding of the delta on the part of PIECAS’s 
decision-makers, and a political rather than environmental motive skewing the plan’s 
development) to Ostrom’s framework is difficult.  Nevertheless, it is perhaps possible to 
argue that both factors are features of the leadership shown by decision-makers and their 
knowledge of the delta SES.  Leadership and knowledge of the SES in question are both 
second-level variables in the ‘users’ subsystem of Ostrom’s classification.  But the crucial 
point is that both factors have explanatory power, rather than representing constituent parts of 
a SES.    
Arguably, one consequence of PIECAS’s poorly planned and possibly rushed development 
was that participation in the plan was skewed in a number of ways.  Interviewee ♯12’s 
comment on the failure to include municipal officials in the design process (mentioned 
above) is a good example of the participation problems that have characterised the plan to 
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date.  I focus on participation as a factor in the difficulties PIECAS has experienced in the 
section below.      
3.2.6 Participation in PIECAS 
One of the topics discussed most forcefully by interviewees is that participation in PIECAS 
has not been as inclusive as one might reasonably expect or even deem necessary.  
Interviewee ♯12, for instance, emphasised that PIECAS ‘has not been participative’.  Indeed, 
some stakeholder groups – most notably agricultural stakeholders – have until recently found 
themselves absent entirely from the plan.  Whether or not this is intentional is unclear.  
However, the absence of certain stakeholder groups has had a detrimental effect on 
PIECAS’s design.  Firstly, participation problems have shaped perceptions of PIECAS in a 
negative way.  In particular, some stakeholders – especially agricultural stakeholders – 
believe that the plan lacks legitimacy, a failing that they attribute in part to these participation 
problems.  These observations are especially interesting in the context of this thesis.  In 
chapter 4, I argue that there is an explicit link between a resource management system’s 
legitimacy, and participation in that system. 
Secondly, the failure to have stakeholders participating in PIECAS who are representative of 
the communities and activities taking place in the delta has affected PIECAS’s design insofar 
as it is not commensurate with the reality of life in the delta (a comment made by interviewee 
♯2 – see section 3.2.5 above).  The argument here is that the High Level Committee has 
lacked the expertise or understanding required to make the plan relevant to the delta.  Input 
from stakeholders with expertise of the delta would have helped the High Level Committee 
overcome these limitations.  
Opinions on participation in PIECAS varied from interviewee to interviewee.  Interviewees 
♯9, ♯10 and ♯13 (all agricultural stakeholders) were critical of the plan because of its failure 
to include farmers and other groups with agricultural interests in the design process.  
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, these interviewees felt that farming was a key activity in the delta.  
They believed that the High Level Committee’s failure to establish dialogue with farmers was 
evidence that it was ignoring farming interests and their importance, economically and 
socially, to the region.  Another part of the problem, they argued, was that PIECAS’s vision 
for the delta was influenced heavily by environmental NGOs, who had a ‘utopian vision’ for 
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the delta (interviewee ♯9) that was unrealistic and not in keeping with the heavy agricultural 
production in the area.   
Interviewees ♯4, ♯9, ♯12 and ♯13 suggested that improving participation in PIECAS was a 
key element in addressing the plan’s problems and that its absence explained some of the 
failures outlined above.  They argued that widening the scope of participation to include 
agricultural and other stakeholders was necessary to make PIECAS appropriate to the delta.  
The plan could not have a purely environmental focus, interviewee ♯12 suggested, because 
the delta was no longer a pristine environment.  Changing its focus to encompass the full 
breadth of activities and interests in the delta could be achieved by including other, non-
environmental groups in the plan.  Furthermore, broadening participation would make 
PIECAS representative of the delta’s diverse interests and communities.  Interviewee ♯4 felt 
that it would ‘make sure other dynamics are allowed’ in the plan.  Both of these points were 
seen to be of the highest importance; indeed, interviewee ♯12 believed that the plan was 
‘doomed to failure’ if it did not address participation problems.  Participation should not 
therefore be regarded as trivial to PIECAS’s success.  Even if limited participation is 
symptomatic of deeper, underlying flaws in the plan’s design, it has become in and of itself a 
significant factor in the plan’s difficulties – including its overly environmental focus, its 
failure to represent adequately the delta’s varied interest groups, and its legitimacy. 
Interviewee ♯12 also focused on participation in PIECAS’s High Level Committee.  The 
High Level Committee’s current composition – three officials from each provincial 
government in the delta and one federal official from the National Environment Secretariat – 
was a weakness, interviewee ♯12 believed.  There was a need to include municipal officials, 
in order to deal with the complexities imposed by Decree 8912/77.  Interviewee ♯12 also 
thought that extending membership of the High Level Committee to other federal government 
ministries, especially the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Infrastructure, would help 
ensure that PIECAS is harmonized with projects sponsored by both these ministries, which 
interviewee ♯12 stressed had not been incorporated or considered in PIECAS’s design.  (I 
return to the High Level Committee’s membership and its implications for legitimacy in 
chapter 5.) 
The survey data also provide some interesting information on participation in PIECAS.  They 
largely reiterate the interview data.  Although small sample size is once again a problem, 
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none of the 9 respondents to the survey participated in PIECAS on a daily basis.  Indeed, 
most respondents (6 in total) participated only on an annual basis (2) or did not participate at 
all (4).  Furthermore, only two respondents believed that participating in meetings at PIECAS 
was easy in any way.  The majority of respondents suggested that participating in meetings 
was not very easy, or that it was not actually possible to participate in meetings at all. 
As a result of the small sample size, these data are perhaps not as interesting as the comments 
that accompany them.  These comments provide an insight into participation in PIECAS.  For 
instance, respondent I complained that there was ‘very little diffusion of information’ about 
PIECAS meetings.  Respondent F noted that ‘the meetings are not open’.  Respondent C said 
that ‘We have asked to participate, but they [the High Level Committee] have told us that 
they [the meetings] are closed.  I understand that only national or provincial government 
entities participate’.  Interviewee ♯9 noted that ‘We don’t know anything about the 
development of these meetings’. 
These short comments were accompanied by longer, more informative comments from 
interviewees ♯8 and ♯13.  Interviewee ♯8 said that 
‘We have wanted to be involved for the last couple of years, but there’s been no formal 
invitation to my organisation to participate in the meetings.  We requested information on the 
meetings but we got a scant reply from PIECAS.’ 
Equally, interviewee ♯13 noted that 
‘PIECAS’s authorities only meet with representatives from municipal and provincial 
Environment Secretariats, and they’re much more predisposed to meet with environmental 
NGOs than with productive organisations in the delta like cooperatives, farming associations, 
civil society groups in the delta, municipal agricultural secretariats, and national and 
provincial forestry directorates’. 
There are perhaps two overriding points to make from these data.  The first is that 
participating in PIECAS through meetings is not straightforward.  There are no procedures to 
follow, and appeals to the High Level Committee are apparently ignored.  Indeed, some 
respondents appear to believe that these meetings are closed to them entirely.  Secondly, 
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where stakeholders are able to participate, some only do so infrequently.  How their 
participation can shape the plan when it is infrequent is unclear, however.   
Another implication raised by the limited and restricted participation that characterises 
PIECAS concerns issues of fairness, and in particular procedural fairness.  Even though 
resource allocation decisions have not yet taken place in PIECAS, and thus there are no 
fairness issues about the distribution of resources and benefits that the plan has produced, 
there are questions about the fairness of including some stakeholders in the plan at the 
expense of others.  For instance, it is difficult to argue that the exclusion of agricultural 
stakeholders – many of whom have families who have lived and worked in the delta for 
generations – is fair.  Their prolonged absence from the plan raises fundamental concerns 
about the procedures PIECAS has followed during its development. 
The final point in this discussion is that, in the year that elapsed between my first interviews 
and subsequent interviews in London, progress had been made in addressing PIECAS’s 
participation problems.  Interviewee ♯9 described this change: 
“We continued working with the people from PIECAS and with the people from the National 
Environment Secretariat, including municipalities.  And the same things that we told you [last 
year], we told them, and they started at least to take us into account as actors in the delta, as 
actors in the delta’s watershed…  It has given us the possibility of having an opening that we 
didn’t have previously….  And I think it’s a point in favour, and a very important step.  
That…at least they understand, or are ready to listen to our position, and to understand the 
position of actors who are in, and have been in the delta for some time.” 
It is not yet possible to attribute any progress in finally implementing PIECAS to this change.  
However, it will be interesting to see whether broader participation brings about the 
improvements envisaged by interviewee ♯9, ♯10 and ♯12, especially in respect of 
harmonization.  This is a worthwhile avenue for future research because it may demonstrate 
(or otherwise) the importance of participation in the success of resource management plans 
more generally. 
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3.2.7 Communicating PIECAS 
If participation has been a factor in the difficulties that PIECS has encountered, then there is 
also evidence from the interview data that poor communication has hindered the plan’s 
development.  Interviewee ♯9 in particular suggested that communication was neither clear 
nor frequent enough, and as a result interviewee ♯9 and other agricultural stakeholders still 
felt more distant from PIECAS than they would have liked.  More seriously, interviewee ♯9 
did not know enough about the plan from the information relayed by the High Level 
Committee.  This produced uncertainty, prevented long-term decision-making and most 
importantly a lack of trust in the Committee, according to interview ♯9.    
Elsewhere in the interview data, interviewee ♯4 felt that there had been few instances of 
‘constructive dialogue’ during the plan’s development.  More seriously, a lack of effective 
communication meant that “no one knows about PIECAS”.  Similarly, interviewee ♯10 noted 
that agriculturalists see PIECAS as a threat because “they fear what they don’t know.”  These 
stakeholders “don’t know about the plan, and they don’t know what is being talked about at 
meetings.” 
The survey data provide additional useful information on communication in PIECAS.  
Respondents F and C and interviewees ♯8, ♯9 and ♯13, all believed that communication 
between the High Level Committee and stakeholders in the delta had been ineffective and 
unclear.  Indeed, on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 meant that communication had been, 
respectively, ineffective and unclear, the highest score given by these respondents and 
interviewees was only 3 for effectiveness (interviewee ♯8) and 5 for clarity (interviewee ♯13).  
Interviewee ♯9 and respondent C both assigned scores of 0 for the effectiveness and clarity of 
communication.  Perhaps more strikingly, respondent I did not know about the High Level 
Committee.  Interviewee I also noted that ‘there is no communication on PIECAS’ and that 
‘except for very few stakeholders in the delta, no one knows or knew about PIECAS’. 
Interviewee ♯13 expanded on the answers given in the survey, suggesting that 
‘There is very little communication.  The strategy of communicating solely amongst the 
environmental lobby has generated mistrust and even fear amongst businesses, agricultural 
producers and people living in the delta.  Only communicating on environmental issues, or 
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not communicating at all, is a message that says there is no interest and that nothing is going 
to be done for those stakeholders or those problems (economic and social problems)’.   
These negative views were balanced by much more positive assessments of communication 
in PIECAS from respondents D and G (both of whom worked for NGOs).  Respondent D 
gave scores of 7 for both effectiveness and clarity; respondent G assigned scores of 8.  
Respondent G also provided some interesting detail to his/her answer.  According to 
respondent G, communication had been ‘good but perhaps it would be even better to 
formalize an exact contact point with NGOs to strengthen the links between them’. 
The survey data also shine light on perceptions of the honesty with which the High Level 
Committee communicated.  Unlike effectiveness or clarity, assessments of honesty were 
generally positive.  Only interviewee ♯9 believed that communication from the High Level 
Committee to stakeholders in the delta was dishonest.  Most respondents and interviewees 
suggested that communications were either honest (interviewee ♯13 and respondents D, E, 
and G) or honest from time to time (interviewee ♯8 and respondent F).  
Despite the generally negative sentiment around communication, there was some evidence to 
suggest that new participation opportunities afforded to agricultural stakeholders by the High 
Level Committee had opened a window for dialogue (interviewee ♯9): 
“The fact of having an opportunity for dialogue, and to be able to engage with them [the 
High Level Committee], and to find us open – just as they were open – I think has given us 
the possibility of doing things a little better, and they’re prepared to change certain positions 
that they had… When…there was dialogue, and we saw that we didn’t actually disagree that 
much, things…my understanding is that they’re changing.”  
Furthermore, this dialogue was effective in that it filled gaps in the High Level Committee’s 
knowledge of the delta: 
“We engaged in dialogue that was very, very useful.  He [Garcia de Garcias, an official at the 
National Environment Secretariat in charge of PIECAS] told us that there were some aspects 
of the delta that he didn’t know, and he thanked us for approaching him.  And from there, at 
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least a door had opened for us to engage in dialogue – the chance to [inaudible] and give him 
our arguments.” 
(It is worth noting that, despite the relatively optimistic tone adopted by interviewee ♯9 in the 
conversation quoted above, interviewee ♯9’s answers in the survey were overwhelmingly 
negative.  It is hard to explain the discrepancy.  The survey was administered after the 
interview, and it is possible that interviewee ♯9’s opinions had changed in the intervening 
months.) 
These data strongly suggest that communication in PIECAS – especially communication 
between the High Level Committee and the delta’s stakeholders – is not as clear or generally 
effective as desirable.  However, it is more difficult to discern the impact that ineffective 
communication has had on PIECAS’s development.  Arguably, it is likely to be similar to 
those stemming from participation problems.  Poor communication and participation have 
skewed PIECAS’s outlook to one that is primarily environmental, even though the delta is an 
economically active area and characterised by diverse land-use practices.  A lack of input 
from agricultural and other stakeholders actively living and working in the delta has shaped 
the plan in such a way that it may not be appropriate to the region.  Poor communication has 
also had an impact on the plan’s scope and the trajectory of its development.  Interviewee ♯9 
summarised the problems arising from poor communication (and participation) neatly: 
“... it’s also certain that if we end up making PIECAS a plan that is non-applicable because it 
doesn’t contemplate the reality of what is happening in the delta today, the regulation will 
end up being an infliction on everyone, because nobody can apply it.  And those things have 
happened a lot in the delta.” 
In terms of Ostrom’s framework, both communication and participation are attributes of the 
interactions between stakeholders in the delta.  Ostrom includes two second-level variables of 
which I suggest effective communication and participation in PIECAS are usefully seen as 
attributes: information sharing among users, and deliberation processes.  Information sharing 
is made possible by communicating, and only then by communicating clearly and effectively.  
In PIECAS’s case, these attributes of communication – clarity and effectiveness - are 
inadequate (although the honesty of communication is satisfactory).  For the second variable 
– deliberation processes, participation should arguably play a key role.  PIECAS fares poorly 
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in terms of participation in the High Level Committee, for instance, or in meetings hosted by 
the National Environment Secretariat.  (This theme is explored in more depth in chapter 5.)  
Deliberation processes in PIECAS are therefore characterised by the involvement of a narrow 
and even restricted range of stakeholders.  These are attributes that describe the nature of 
deliberation processes in PIECAS.   
It is noted that any resource management system involves some level of communication in 
the sense that people talk to one another casually.  The communication which is implicit in a 
second-level variable like information sharing is arguably more formal.  The same applies to 
participation in deliberation processes.  The effectiveness of information sharing and 
deliberation processes depends largely on attributes like clarity, honesty and frequency 
(amongst others).  The presence or absence of these variables is important; but once they are 
present, the attributes that I describe have a significant bearing on the impact they have on 
resource management systems.  This analysis adds a level of granularity and meaning to 
Ostrom’s SES framework that is currently missing. 
There is one final point to make in respect of communication in PIECAS.  As I argue in the 
preceding paragraph, informal communication is a feature of everyday life.  ‘Chit chat’ is 
common in any resource management system.  Conversely, formal communication (and 
participation) processes of the kind identified by Ostrom are rarer.  More importantly, these 
processes have meaning by reference to, for instance, procedural fairness, their translation 
into decisions that reflect stakeholder inputs, and the trust they engender in the management 
system and management authorities.  Interviewee ♯13’s complaint that the High Level 
Committee communicated only with environmentalists is especially interesting in light of this 
last point, because interviewee ♯13 explicitly stated that communication with such a narrow 
focus had led to ‘mistrust’ and even ‘fear’ amongst businesses, farmers and people living in 
the delta.  Communication is therefore crucial to issues like trust, procedural fairness and 
representation in decision-making.  I return to these themes in chapter 4, focusing particularly 
on the impact that communication has on legitimacy.  
3.2.8 Political economy as a factor in PIECAS’s failures 
Some interviewees – notably interviewees at environmental NGOs – believed that PIECAS’s 
failures were attributable to the efforts of certain stakeholders to obstruct the plan.  These 
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stakeholders anticipated that PIECAS would have an effect on politically sensitive economic 
activities in the delta.  In short, the interviewees suggested that political economic factors 
were at play in PIECAS’s difficulties.  According to these interviewees, certain groups in the 
delta have determined that PIECAS is detrimental to their interests, and have subsequently 
lobbied provincial and federal government to block the plan’s development and delay its 
ultimate implementation.  The problems that PIECAS is experiencing may therefore have less 
to do with the manner in which the plan is being designed, or the environment in which it is 
placed, and more with the response of the economic and political interests that it may disrupt. 
Interviewees employed at environmental NGOs believed that the lobby who were threatened 
by PIECAS were ‘agricultural or industrial interests’ (interviewee ♯4).  Interviewee ♯5 made 
a similar claim, noting that 
“These regulations [like PIECAS] sometimes get in the way of infrastructure regulation, 
infrastructure developments.  They can block the development of real estate in marginal 
locations.  All of these works are works typically associated with big business.  And so the 
situation of weak governance in the delta favours certain sectors.  And these sectors 
generally are associated with, or can have an important political lobby.” 
However, it is difficult to attribute PIECAS’s failings to the lobbying efforts of agricultural 
and/or industrial stakeholders.  An interpretation along those lines is inconsistent with the 
absence of agricultural stakeholders from the plan.   Instead, their apparent exclusion would 
suggest that the High Level Committee is intentionally blocking their input.  This would 
certainly contradict the hypothesis that federal and provincial government are hindering 
PIECAS’s design and implementation in order to satisfy the interests of agricultural 
stakeholders.     
Nevertheless, other political considerations may represent factors that have contributed to 
PIECAS’s difficulties.  In particular, several stakeholders pointed out that environmental 
policy in Argentina generally is of secondary importance to economic policy.  Furthermore, 
the power of the National Environment Secretariat is limited compared to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, say, or the Ministry of Infrastructure.  For example, interviewee ♯7 believed that 
the “National Environment Secretariat, that coordinates the plan, doesn’t have a lot of 
power.”  In addition, interviewee ♯7 remarked that “obviously the Ministry of Agriculture 
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has a lot more weight than the National Environment Secretariat.”  Similarly, interviewee ♯1 
suggested that strengthening the Secretariat’s voice within government would help PIECAS.  
In general, the Secretariat had a “limited capacity” to promote environmental management 
issues.  Interviewee ♯1 hoped that the “Secretariat would have more voice in management.”  
Interviewee ♯5 noted that there was a “marked absence in the exercise of the power of policy 
[in the delta].”  Moreover, the slow rate at which PIECAS was being introduced was due in 
part to a lack of “interest on the part of government in pushing forward that process.  One 
doesn’t notice that…there’s an honest interest in pushing forward that process…” 
Collectively, these comments give the impression that PIECAS and environmental 
management in the delta generally lack the political support enjoyed by economic policy.  
This is hardly surprising.  The latter is seen to promote social welfare more effectively than 
the former.  In this respect, the comparatively limited power wielded by the National 
Environment Secretariat is also predictable.  However, it is likely that the relative 
unimportance in government of environmental issues has contributed to PIECAS’s problems 
in a significant way.  In particular, political support for PIECAS probably dissipated after the 
fires in 2008, and so the willingness of federal government and provincial governments to 
take on the political risk associated with implementing PIECAS has decreased.  That political 
risk is meaningful because there are apparently powerful lobbies like real estate with interests 
in the delta (even if the agricultural lobby, usually powerful elsewhere, does not appear to be 
playing an important role in obstructing PIECAS).  At its core, PIECAS is a political 
initiative and therefore requires political support to see it accepted by both houses of federal 
and provincial government.  Support may be contingent on the attitudes that lobbies have to 
the plan.  Without such support, and given the general antipathy toward environmental policy 
in Argentina, it is unsurprising that little progress has been made in implementing PIECAS. 
The broad political economic factors identified are attributes of at least two of the second-
level variables identified in Ostrom’s framework.  The lobbying that at least some 
interviewees believed was taking place falls within the ‘lobbying activities’ second-level 
variable.  Equally, the general political economic climate in Argentina is a feature of the 
external political settings that Ostrom includes in the framework.  Ostrom specifically 
mentions ‘political stability’ as an external second-level variable.  It is not clear whether 
these political economic factors are aspects of political stability.  There is a sense that 
government processes in Argentina do not always follow due process as strictly as they 
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should because of political economic factors.  As a result, there is a tendency toward political 
instability (consider, for instance, the Argentine government’s default on its debt in 2002).   
Finally, there is an interesting interaction between these political economic factors and the 
aforementioned problems with participation.  The interview data suggest that there is a 
tension between political influence over PIECAS and the plan’s design and ultimate 
implementation.  Of course, participation is one way to counteract political influence – but as 
seen, participation in PIECAS is not as inclusive or representative as perhaps it might.  The 
other way to overcome political influence is to establish clear rules that limit the power of 
lobbyists to influence the decision-making process; but again, the lack of operational rules in 
PIECAS means that such rules do not exist.  The two elements that could mitigate the impact 
of political economic factors are therefore missing in PIECAS. 
3.2.9 PIECAS’s legitimacy 
A final factor that may explain PIECAS’s difficulties is the perception that the plan lacks 
legitimacy.  Legitimacy has an important role once a resource management plan is actually 
implemented through its effect on compliance (see, for instance, Nielsen, 2003), but it may 
also be significant at the design stage because it shapes support for a plan.  For instance, a 
management plan that is considered illegitimate is unlikely to have buy-in from stakeholders, 
which in turn will increase the political costs associated with its implementation.  Indeed, a 
plan totally lacking legitimacy is almost by definition politically unviable, unless the form of 
government is tyranny.  Legitimacy is therefore a factor that determines how interests 
coalesce in favour or in opposition to a resource management plan.  
The interview and survey data suggest that, by and large, PIECAS lacks legitimacy.  
Interviewee ♯10, for instance, said that PIECAS is “totally, totally” illegitimate.  Interviewee 
♯1 similarly noted that “it lacks legitimacy.”  Interviewee ♯12 also believed that PIECAS 
lacks legitimacy, and linked this to poor communication.  In addition, interviewee ♯12 felt 
that more participation in the plan would be helpful; a significant challenge for the plan’s 
legitimacy was to “recognise local participation.”  Finally, interviewee ♯5 also suggested 
that PIECAS lacks legitimacy.  Like interviewee ♯12, interviewee ♯5 attributed this to poor 
communication and limited opportunities for participation.  Interviewee ♯5 focused on 
PIECAS meetings, for example, noting that few had been held and that those that had taken 
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place were largely ineffective.  The emphasis that interviewees ♯5 and ♯12 placed on 
communication and participation is worth highlighting.  It suggests that, in the Paraná delta at 
least, communication and participation are linked in some way to perceptions of legitimacy.  
As I have mentioned elsewhere, this connection is explored further in chapter 4. 
Despite these strong views, a number of interviewees suggested that perceptions of 
PIECAS’s legitimacy varied between different stakeholder groups.  Interviewee ♯3, for 
instance, said that views on legitimacy depended on the group in question, and that some 
groups were more aware of PIECAS than others.  (Presumably those groups who are unaware 
of PIECAS do not have a firm opinion on its legitimacy.)  Similarly, interviewee ♯4 argued 
that, in a purely legal sense, PIECAS had legitimacy because it had been conceived and was 
being designed by democratically elected officials.  Nonetheless, in recognition perhaps of 
the participation problems that PIECAS has experienced, interviewee ♯4 suggested that 
PIECAS requires a ‘more democratic process’ in respect of its legitimacy. 
The survey data provide a similar picture of PIECAS’s legitimacy as the interview data.  
Respondent C believed that PIECAS had no legitimacy for the moment, while respondent F 
suggested it lacks legitimacy entirely.  Interviewee ♯9 also suggested that PIECAS lacks 
legitimacy.  Interviewee ♯13 believed that PIECAS had no legitimacy for the moment.  
Interestingly, respondents C and F and interviewees ♯9 and ♯13 had connections to 
agriculture in the delta.  Respondent C worked for the Argentine Forestry Association 
(AFOA, to give its Spanish acronym) and respondent F was a farmer.  Conversely, 
respondents D, E, G and interviewee ♯8 all believed that PIECAS was legitimate.  These 
respondents worked either at NGOs (respondents D and G, interviewee ♯8) or in provincial 
government (respondent E).  Finally, respondent I argued that legitimacy was of secondary 
concern to PIECAS given that no environmental or social measures had yet been taken under 
PIECAS. 
Some of these answers were coupled with comments that provide additional detail on the 
factors that might underpin these perceptions of legitimacy.  For instance, respondent D – 
who believed that PIECAS was legitimate – noted that the ‘provincial governments don’t 
apply decisions and so weaken legitimacy’.  Respondent D commented further that ‘the 
officials who represent the provinces in PIECAS have limited decision-making power in their 
provincial state structure’.  Interviewee ♯13 argued that, although the existence of PIECAS 
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was important, a failure to ‘contemplate other realities and to consult the remaining interests 
[in the delta] in order to create answers and policies for real problems (environmental, 
economic and social)’ detracts from PIECAS’s legitimacy and may even ‘turn [PIECAS] into 
a threat for certain sectors’. 
It is evident from the interview and the survey data that perceptions of PIECAS’s legitimacy 
vary.  Some groups consider that PIECAS lacks legitimacy, while others believe that 
PIECAS is totally legitimate.  Nonetheless, it is striking that those interviewees who argued 
that the plan lacks legitimacy represented a range of professions.  Academics (interviewee 
♯1), agricultural stakeholders (interviewees ♯9, ♯10 and ♯13, respondents C and F), officials 
from the High Level Committee (interviewee ♯12), and environmental NGOs (interviewee 
♯5) all suggested that PIECAS is in some way illegitimate.  It is perhaps an indication that 
PIECAS’ legitimacy is not widely and firmly established.  Furthermore, there is a sense that 
the stakeholders with the strongest reason for being interested in PIECAS – agricultural 
stakeholders and government officials on the High Level Committee – are the ones most 
likely to question PIECAS’ legitimacy. 
Where the interview and survey data are less useful is in providing information on the 
specific effect that legitimacy may have had on the PIECAS design process.  With limited 
data, it is difficult to support the idea that negative perceptions of legitimacy are an important 
factor in explaining PIECAS’s difficulties.  Nevertheless, it is interesting that a link was 
made between legitimacy and communication and participation in the plan.  As argued in 
sections 3.2.6 and sections 3.2.7, poor participation and communication have had a 
detrimental impact on PIECAS because it has given the plan an overly environmental outlook 
and therefore caused a loss of support from stakeholders who recognise that PIECAS cannot 
be purely environmental because the delta is a mixed-use area.  It is possible that there is a 
chain connecting this poor communication and participation to a lack of legitimacy, with a 
lack of legitimacy in turn leading to a loss of support.  Although this cause-and-effect 
relationship remains speculative at best, it does explain how poor communication and 
participation can lead to a wider loss of support.  Conversely, it is difficult to intuit how 
communication and participation alone could directly cause a loss of support for PIECAS.   
Thus, legitimacy may have explanatory power in helping us to understand PIECAS’s failures.  
As a result, it is not a second-level variable in Ostrom’s framework.  Instead, it is a factor that 
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tells us something important about a great many of the second-level variables listed in the 
framework.  For instance, legitimacy is an attribute of constitutional, collective-choice and 
operational rules that has a measureable impact on the effectiveness of those rules (through 
its role in shaping compliance).  It is an important feature of leadership, because a leader’s 
authority is grounded in his legitimacy.  Stakeholders can also perceive government and non-
government organisations (also second-level variables) as legitimate or illegitimate.  In 
government-led resource management systems like PIECAS, the legitimacy of government 
organisations is vital because it may determine whether the management system itself is 
legitimate.  Consider, for instance, a resource management system implemented by a 
government department that has lost all legitimacy amongst affected stakeholders.  The 
resource management system by extension will lack legitimacy of its own (see, for instance, 
King, 2011, and chapter 6).  Finally, legitimacy is an attribute of at least one of the external 
settings mentioned by Ostrom: existing government resource policy may or may not have 
legitimacy.   
Given the number of second-level variables that can be described as legitimate or illegitimate 
- especially in the governance subsystem of a SES - it is clear that legitimacy has significant 
explanatory power and provides us with a better understanding of many of the second-level 
variables listed by Ostrom.  What is less obvious is how legitimacy emerges in a resource 
management system.  Although Ostrom’s SES framework cannot address this question 
(indeed, the framework does not analyse legitimacy at all), some of the second-level variables 
identified (deliberation processes, for instance) are plausibly linked to legitimacy.  
Furthermore, the interview and survey data provide us with some clues about the conditions 
that allow legitimacy to emerge.  In PIECAS, for instance, legitimacy was linked to 
communication and participation processes by interviewees ♯5 and ♯12.  Interviewee ♯4 
believed it corresponded to the legality of a resource management system.  Interviewee ♯13 
discussed how a failure to take into account different perspectives on the delta had detracted 
from PIECAS’ legitimacy.  These observations are important to the analysis in chapters 4, 5 
and 6. 
3.2.10 Summarising the factors that explain PIECAS’s difficulties 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the problems from which PIECAS has suffered 
– primarily the failure to implement the plan, despite six years passing since its establishment 
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– are underpinned by a variety of factors.  Although it is at times difficult to determine 
whether some factors are causes of the plan’s problems, and others symptoms, I believe it is 
likely the factors outlined are indeed contributing in some way to the plan’s difficulties.  
Arguably, the most significant factor in the plan’s stasis is the complexity of the delta’s 
legislative environment.  The vesting of responsibility for natural resources at the provincial 
level outlined in Article 124 of the Argentine Constitution creates a fragmented legislative 
landscape, with each province in the delta regulating on environmental issues in slightly 
different ways.  Evidently, designing PIECAS so that it is consistent with each of these 
provincial legislative frameworks is challenging; and to date, PIECAS has not apparently 
succeeded in meeting that challenge.  The situation is complicated further by Decree 8912/77 
in Buenos Aires province, which provides municipalities, rather than the Buenos Aires 
provincial government, with the authority to manage natural resources.  Decree 8912/77 
therefore adds an extra layer of law with which PIECAS must align. 
A factor that is potentially connected to legislative fragmentation in the delta is PIECAS’s 
overly broad objectives.  Arguably, these objectives are not achievable in any practical sense.  
They have therefore exacerbated the difficulties presented by the delta’s legislative 
environment because they provide the High Level Committee with little if any guidance on 
the particular regulatory tools that could be used to achieve them. 
In addition to these constraints on PIECAS’s development, the events and steps leading up to 
the plan’s inception may have played a role in the plan’s current difficulties.  In particular, 
PIECAS appears to have been a politically motivated response to the fires that swept through 
the delta in 2008.  As a result, political support for the plan was directly correlated to the 
political costs associated with the fires.  Once the fires died down, and the costs of inaction 
were reduced, political support for the plan decreased.  Indeed, PIECAS arguably continues 
to suffer from insufficient political interest.  Conversely, it is reasonable to assume that the 
plan is more likely to have been successful if there was genuine political conviction that an 
environmental strategy for the delta was important and necessary. 
The lack of political support from which PIECAS may suffer is also attributable to the 
secondary importance of environmental policy in Argentina compared to economic policy.  
Although it is not surprising that economic issues are of greater concern to the Argentine 
government than environmental issues, it does mean that PIECAS is unlikely to be seen as a 
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priority by either federal or provincial government.  Furthermore, the federal government 
department responsible for designing and implementing PIECAS – the National Environment 
Secretariat – lacks power relative to ministries like the Ministry of Agriculture.  The officials 
designing PIECAS therefore have less voice in government than their counterparts at 
Agriculture and Infrastructure, say.  This too may contribute to a lack of political support for 
PIECAS. 
Finally, there are aspects of the manner in which PIECAS has developed over the last six 
years that have led to disillusionment with the plan.  In particular, the High Level Committee 
has poorly communicated the plan’s design.  Opportunities for participation in the plan have 
been limited.  Certain groups have until recently remained conspicuously absent from the 
plan, notably agricultural stakeholders.  Poor communication and scant participation have 
arguably affected the plan in two ways.  Firstly, they have limited the input of stakeholders 
who do not necessarily have an environmental outlook.  As a result, PIECAS may have 
objectives that are overly environmental and not commensurate with the range of economic 
activities taking place in the delta.  In turn, PIECAS may prove inappropriate to the delta, and 
in that respect have unintended and/or harmful consequences.   
Secondly, PIECAS’s problems with communication and participation may have caused the 
plan to lose legitimacy with stakeholders in the delta.  A loss or lack of legitimacy is 
problematic both for future compliance and for current support for the plan.  The latter is an 
important factor because it shapes political coalitions for or against PIECAS, and therefore 
increases or decreases the political costs associated with implementing the plan.  If, for 
instance, PIECAS did not have widespread support amongst the stakeholders who were likely 
to be affected by it, then government’s appetite to implement the plan would be significantly 
reduced. 
This discussion on legitimacy is also important in the context of the remainder of the thesis.  
The interview and survey data suggest that there is a link between legitimacy and 
communication and participation.  Indeed, communication and participation can be seen as 
criteria that, if satisfied, would have increased the likelihood that PIECAS was perceived as 
legitimate.  Communication and participation would therefore have served a legitimation 
function in PIECAS.  The legitimation function framework is outlined in chapter 4. 
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Table 10 below summarises the factors that appear to be contributing to the difficulties that 
PIECAS is experiencing, and where appropriate maps these factors to second-level variables 
in Ostrom’s framework, or maps them as attributes of second-level variables. 
Table 10. Factors underpinning PIECAS's failings to date. 
Factor Attribute/corresponding second-level variable 
Legislative fragmentation Attribute of constitutional, collective-choice, 
operational and property-rights rules. 
Un-implementable objectives Attribute of constitutional, collective-choice and 
operational rules. 
Decision-makers lack a profound 
understanding of the delta 
Attribute of knowledge of SES/leadership. 
Plan’s development was 
politically motivated/ convenient 
Attribute of leadership 
Lack of clear, effective 
communication 
Attribute of information sharing between 
stakeholders 
Limited and/or restricted 
participation 
Attribute of deliberation processes between 
stakeholders 
Political economic factors Attribute of lobbying activities/external political 
settings 
Lack of legitimacy Attribute of government organisations, and 
constitutional, collective-choice and operational 
rules. 
 
3.3 Study II – Successful management in the Alaskan Pacific halibut fishery 
I now turn to an examination of the factors that appear to underpin the largely successful 
management of the Alaskan Pacific halibut fishery.  The fishery makes a valuable case study 
because its fortunes have ebbed and flowed over the last 25 years.  In particular, it was in a 
state of crisis prior to the introduction of IFQs in 1995.  A natural experiment therefore took 
place when the management plan changed, in that most of the fishery’s key attributes 
remained constant save for the management plan itself.  Although attribution remains 
difficult, the experiment does at least give one greater confidence that outcomes post the 
introduction of IFQs are indeed linked to IFQs themselves.  For more details, see chapter 2. 
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3.3.1 The fish and the fishery 
Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) are flatfish of the family Pleuronectidae.  They are a 
long-lived species, and can reach large sizes; older specimens weigh up to 250kg, although 
most halibut caught in Alaskan and Canadian fisheries weigh between 5 and 30kg (Bell, 
1981).  They are found in the coastal waters of the Pacific north-west, ranging from northern 
California to the Bering Sea.  They are most heavily concentrated in waters off Alaska and 
British Columbia (Casey et al., 1995). 
There are three key organisations involved in the Alaskan halibut fishery: the International 
Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC); the North Pacific Fishery Management Council 
(NPFMC); and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).  The NPFMC and NMFS 
were created by the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.  
The NPFMC is charged with managing halibut and other species within the United States’ 
200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  The NPFMC develops fishery regulations for 
Alaskan waters, which are then approved by the NMFS (representing the federal 
government).  In the case of the halibut fishery, the NPFMC works closely with the IPHC.  
The IPHC provides information on the state of the halibut stock through stock assessments, 
as well as conservation measures – including harvest limits - in ten statistical regions across 
the Gulf of Alaska, Aleutian Islands and eastern Bering Sea.  The NPFMC then chooses how 
to allocate the harvest limits determined by the IPHC.  Figure 3 below shows the position of 
the 10 IPHC regulatory regions.  
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Figure 3. IPHC regulatory areas. (Source: NMFS.) 
The IPHC significantly pre-dates the NPFMC and NMFS.  Its history is noteworthy.  It was 
established after apparent over-fishing of the halibut stock at the turn of the 19th Century.  
The first commercial halibut fisheries developed in British Columbia (Canada) and 
Washington state (United States) in the 1880s, before spreading to south-eastern and south-
central Alaska and the Aleutian Islands (ibid).  As early as 1914 – some thirty years after the 
development of a halibut fishery - it appeared that stocks were declining (IPHC, 2014a).  In 
response to these declines, regulation was introduced under the 1923 Halibut Convention 
between Canada and the United States.  The Convention provided for a 3 month long close 
season during the winter, as well as regulation on halibut caught accidentally during the close 
season (IPHC, 2014a).  The Convention also led to the establishment of the International 
Fisheries Commission, which later became the IPHC.   
Under the IPHC’s recommendations, the halibut stock rebuilt.  However, two factors led to 
the re-emergence of over-fishing in the fishery from about 1950 onward, and also established 
structural flaws that caused serious problems in the 1980s and 1990s.  Firstly, increased stock 
abundance led to an increase in catch limits, which in turn attracted more and more vessels to 
the fishery (Criddle, 2012).  The effect was compound by the ease with which vessels could 
join the fishery.  There were no restrictions on entry, except for vessel registration and fishing 
permits.  Entry into the fishery was also facilitated by increases in the price of halibut in the 
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1970s, which encouraged fishermen previously involved in salmon gillnet and trawl fisheries 
to switch to halibut fishing.  A limited entry programme in the salmon fisheries was a further 
incentive to move into halibut fishing (Hartley and Fina, 2001a).  Secondly, managers were 
unable to prevent foreign vessels that were fishing outside United States territorial waters 
from over-harvesting halibut.  Prior to 1966, territorial waters only extended 3 nautical miles 
(hereafter, miles) from the coast.  Post-1966, they reached 12 miles, but it was only in 1976 
that the United States assumed full regulatory authority over all fishing in its EEZ (Criddle, 
2012). 
In an attempt to address stock declines, fishery managers introduced a TAC, imposed gear 
restrictions, and limited the length of the fishing season.  For the latter, the IPHC designated 
an opening date for each regulatory region under its jurisdiction.  It would then close the 
season when it appeared that the TAC was on the verge of being harvested.  However, it 
proved difficult to monitor catches during the open season; frequently, the TAC was 
exceeded before the IPHC had finished counting the catch.  As a result, TAC overages were 
common (Hartley and Fina, 2001a).  The problem was exacerbated by the increasing number 
of participants in the fishery, who were encouraged to join by the incentives outlined above.  
In response to these difficulties, the IPHC progressively shortened the fishing season.  The 
rationale was that shorter seasons would give fishermen less time to exceed the TAC.  Thus, 
in 1975, the fishing season totalled 125 days.  By 1985, it was only 25 days long; and by 
1994, the season was a mere 3 days for most vessels in the American fleet, with fishing in 
some regulatory areas restricted to 24 hour periods (Fina, 2011; IPHC, 2014a).   
However, shortening the fishing season had a number of unintended consequences.  In 
particular, it magnified the effects of the perverse incentives created by TACs.  TACs 
incentivise fishermen to compete against one another for catch (or more properly, a share of 
the fleet-wide TAC), because the fish caught by one fisherman cannot be caught by another 
fisherman.  (This is a property of CPRs termed ‘subtractibility of use’ by Ostrom – see the 
introduction to the thesis.)  This incentive is made worse by the time constraints imposed on 
fishermen in a shortened season.  Fishermen have a limited amount of time in which to catch 
the fish on which their livelihoods depend.  They are therefore not just competing against 
themselves for a share of the TAC; they are also racing against time.  In the halibut fishery, 
the combination of incentives created by TACs and progressively shorter fishing seasons led 
to the emergence of ‘halibut ‘derbies’ or a ‘race to fish’. 
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The halibut derbies led to a number of serious problems in the fishery.  Alverson (1997), 
Hartley and Fina (2001a) and Grimm et al. (2012) have detailed these problems extensively, 
and the discussion that follows is based heavily on their work.  Above all, halibut derbies 
compromised the safety of halibut fishermen.  Firstly, the opening day of the fishing season 
was arbitrary from the point of view of weather.  Both fishery managers and fishermen had 
no way of knowing what the weather would be like on the opening day.  In a typical fishery 
with relatively long seasons, the state of the weather on the opening day is not problematic 
because fishermen can choose to postpone their operations until the weather improves.  
However, in the shortened seasons that characterised the halibut fishery in the 1990s, 
fishermen had no operational flexibility.  They were obliged to put to sea even in dangerous 
conditions, because the season might finish before the weather turned and before they had 
had an opportunity to catch any fish.  Secondly, the limited amount of time available in a 
shortened season meant that any pauses in fishing carried a significant opportunity cost.  
Fishermen therefore fished round-the-clock and in all weathers. 
Unsurprisingly, the halibut fishery during the derbies was a dangerous place to work.  A 
comparison of the average number of IFQ search and rescue missions undertaken by the 
United States Coastguard Service demonstrates how dangerous the fishery had become.  
Grimm et al. (2012) suggest that there was an average of 27 search and rescue missions per 
season before the introduction of IFQs.  In comparison, there was an average of 5 search 
rescue missions per season between 1999 and 2012 for both the halibut and sablefish fisheries 
(NOAA, 2012).  Furthermore, figures from Alverson (1997) show that there were 2 to 3 
fatalities a year during the halibut derbies, with six fatalities in 1992 alone.  Conversely, there 
were an average 0.7 fatalities between 1999 and 2012 in the halibut and sablefish fisheries 
(NOAA, 2012). 
The high opportunity costs characteristic of the halibut derbies also influenced fishing 
practices.  In order to maximize catches during the limited window open to fishing, fishermen 
would often set more fishing gear than they could retrieve before the season ended.  Any gear 
that had not been hauled in before the season closed was abandoned.  In addition, gear would 
become entangled because so many vessels (4,000 to 6,000) were fishing at the same time 
(Alverson, 1997).  The derby fisheries were therefore characterised by significant gear losses, 
with losses valued in the region of $2.0 to $2.4 million annually (ibid).  In addition, 
abandoned or entangled gears continued to catch fish, because halibut and other species 
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would hook themselves on abandoned gear and subsequently die.  Lost gear therefore 
contributed to high fish mortality and over-harvesting problems.  ‘Deadloss’ from unretrieved 
gear was estimated to be between 2 million and 2.5 million tonnes in 1990 and 1991, 
respectively (Hartley and Fina, 2001a). 
High halibut mortality was also driven by harvesting in excess of the TAC (a perverse and 
tragic outcome, given that shortened seasons were meant to reduce TAC overages).  The 
problem was that regulating the length of the fishing season was actually a crude tool for 
achieving a pre-determined TAC.  It was difficult to predict when the TAC had been reached, 
and so over-shooting (and under-shooting) of the catch limit was common (Hartley and Fina, 
2001a).  Indeed, Grimm et al. (2012) suggest that catches in excess of the TAC averaged 
between 5% and 10% during the derby fishery years. 
Finally, the halibut derbies affected the quality of the halibut brought to port, to the detriment 
both of consumers and fishermen.  One problem was that halibut were poorly handled and 
inappropriately stored during the rush to maximize catches, affecting product quality.  
Furthermore, a consequence of the shortened seasons was that halibut were delivered to ports 
for processing at roughly the same time.  With so many participants in the fishery (as shown 
above, some 4,000 to 6,000 vessels), there was in effect over-supply of halibut and 
insufficient demand to sell it all fresh.  Thus, the majority of the fish that were caught were 
subsequently frozen, even though frozen halibut is less desirable to consumers and fetches a 
lower price than fresh halibut.  Both consumers and fishermen suffered.  Fishermen had the 
added problem of being unable to bargain with processors for better prices for their catch, 
because the number of fishermen selling halibut was large relative to the number of buyers 
(the processors).  Processors essentially formed an oligopsony. 
Another ramification of halibut over-supply was the development of an excessively 
capitalized processing sector.  Given that halibut were delivered at roughly the same time, the 
processing sector needed enough equipment to handle a high volume of halibut in a short 
space of time.  The processing sector’s investment decisions were made with these 
requirements in mind.  However, longer seasons would reduce the amount of processing 
equipment necessary and leave processors with stranded capital.  The introduction of IFQs 
led to the realisation of just this problem. 
91 
 
In light of these difficulties, it is reasonable to argue that the fishery was in a state of crisis by 
the time a move to IFQs was sanctioned.  From a social (safety), economic (gear losses, low 
product quality, oligopsony in the processing sector), and ecological (TAC overages, 
deadloss) perspective, the derby system was failing.  It was certainly unsustainable.  The 
transformation that IFQs have engendered is in many ways remarkable, although they have 
also had some harmful social impacts.  I now turn to describing IFQ management in the 
halibut fishery, and the steps that led to their introduction.  
3.3.2 IFQ management in the halibut fishery 
At the time that the fishery was experiencing the difficulties discussed above, the Canadian 
Department of Fisheries and Ocean (DFO) was in the process of introducing an individual 
vessel quota (IVQ) system for the British Columbia halibut fishery.  The Canadians’ decision 
to move to IVQs was in response to problems that were largely similar to those being 
suffered in the Alaskan fishery (Casey et al., 1995).  The effects of IVQs on the British 
Columbia halibut fishery were dramatic: the season lengthened to 245 days (or 9 months); 
there were increased sales of fresh fish; product quality improved; and fishermen enjoyed 
increased processing options (Herrmann and Criddle, 2006).  Furthermore, the spread 
between ex-vessel halibut prices in British Columbia and Alaska jumped from US$0.32 per 
pound before 1990 to US$0.95 per pound between 1991 and 1994 – after IVQs had been 
implemented in British Columbia but prior to IFQs’ introduction in Alaska (ibid). 
The positive experience with IVQs in Canada, and recognition that something had to change 
in the Alaskan halibut fishery, prompted the Americans to introduce an IFQ system in 1995.  
The basic principle on which IFQ management is based is that holders of ‘quota shares’ are 
entitled to a fraction of the TAC set for a given regulatory region (Hartley and Fina, 2001b).  
Quota shares (QS) were initially allocated in 1994, and were based on the average amount of 
halibut active participants in the fishery had caught in a qualifying period between 1988 and 
1990.  One pound (lb) of halibut was equal to one quota share.  The quota shares that any 
individual fisherman owns are then used to calculate an annual IFQ, or the pounds of halibut 
that a fisherman is allowed to harvest in a given fishing season.  The annual IFQ is calculated 
using the following equation (QSP is the ‘quota share pool’, or the total amount of quota 
issued in a specific regulatory region): 
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(QS/QSP) x TAC = annual IFQ 
There are different classes of quota share, depending on the regulatory region and vessel type 
to which they apply.  The IFQ that flows from QS issued for one particular regulatory region 
cannot be used in another regulatory region.  QS holders can sell their rights, although there 
were and are restrictions on trading and ownership to avoid quota consolidation and changes 
in fleet structure.  For instance, in the Aleutian Islands and Bering Sea, QS ownership is 
capped at 1.5% of the total QSP in both areas.  In the Gulf of Alaska and southeast Alaska 
regulatory regions, ownership cannot exceed 0.5%.  Furthermore, QS holders must be on-
board the vessel that catches their allocated halibut (Carothers, 2008a).  The exception to this 
provision is one quota share class (‘A’ shares, or ‘freezer’ shares), which applies to vessels 
that can process their catch at sea.  Finally, only American citizens, corporations or 
partnerships are eligible to own QS.   
Almost 20 years after their introduction, the IFQ reforms are by and large regarded as a 
success.  Many of the apparently intractable problems that affected the halibut derbies have 
been solved or mitigated by IFQs.  For instance, and perhaps most importantly, the length of 
the halibut season increased; it now stands at 244 days (NOAA, 2014), a dramatic 
transformation compared to the two or three-day seasons that took place in 1994.  As a result, 
fishermen’s safety has improved significantly.  In addition, gear losses and ‘deadloss’ from 
abandoned gear have been reduced.  Finally, for those fishermen who were allocated quota 
and so were able to participate in the IFQ fishery, the reforms have provided a significant 
windfall.  Many fishermen now make ‘low six figures’ compared to the ‘poverty wages’ of 
the halibut derbies (interviewee J). 
Nevertheless, it is disingenuous to claim that the IFQ reforms have been an unqualified 
success.  In particular, they have had serious socio-economic consequences (Carothers, 
2008b).  Quota share has consolidated in the hands of a narrowing pool of fishermen and 
organisations.  For instance, NOAA (2012) noted that there were fewer quota share holders in 
2012 than there were when quota was initially allocated in 1994.  The total number of holders 
fell from 4,827 in 1994 to 1,482 in 2012, a 69% reduction.   
In addition, the impact on small, rural communities has been significant.  Quota share has 
flowed out of these communities, even though fishing has traditionally represented an 
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important component of the local economy (Carothers, 2013).  The number of halibut and 
sablefish IFQ holders in small Gulf of Alaska communities decreased 46% between 1995 and 
2011 (NOAA, 2013).  With few alternative economic opportunities, there is justifiable 
concern about unemployment in rural communities and its associated socio-economic 
impacts (ibid).  Furthermore, the dollar value of the quota shares that have migrated out of 
rural communities is significant.  For instance, a block of 1300 quota shares for statistical 
region 2C in the Gulf of Alaska was worth $66,300 in mid-2015 (Alaska Broker, 2015).  A 
block of quota share of this size represents approximately 20% of the 2015 average per-vessel 
catch of halibut (and 2015 was a ‘poor’ year in which only 68% of the fleet-wide TAC was 
caught – NOAA, 2015).  The loss of quota share therefore represents a serious reduction in 
the financial assets owned by these communities.   
Another problem that has emerged with IFQ management is significant barriers to entry for 
new participants in the fishery.  Above all, this has affected younger fishermen.  One aspect 
of the problem lies in the high value of IFQs.  As the figures above demonstrate, a block of 
quota share is now expensive enough that it is difficult for younger fishermen to raise the 
capital required to buy it in sufficient quantity to justify fishing.  The cost of entry into the 
fishery is therefore an inter-generational issue and requires attention from managers. 
Finally, the structure of the IFQ reforms has led to the emergence of ‘hired skippers’ – 
skippers who are hired to fish QS belonging to another fishermen.  The ‘owner on board’ 
restriction that accompanies QS ownership was conceived of as a way to avoid situations 
where QS owners are not actually active participants in the fishery.  Nonetheless, the impact 
that hired skippers have on the fishery is significant.  In 2012, for instance, hired skippers 
caught 45.5% of the entire halibut TAC (NOAA, 2012).  These numbers have largely 
remained steady over the last 15 years; the average percentage of the halibut TAC caught by 
hired skippers between 2000 and 2010 was 44.78% (data are missing for 2007).  However, it 
is worth noting that the number of hired skippers who do not own QS themselves has fallen 
between 2000 and 2012, from 41.2% to 29.6% (figures are calculated from NOAA reports 
between 2000 and 2010). 
Overall, then, the IFQ reforms achieved many of their stated goals.  Most importantly, they 
ended the halibut derbies and the problems associated with a race to fish.  They have 
benefitted consumers, and some fishermen have seen their incomes rise.  Nevertheless, the 
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socio-economic consequences of IFQs, especially in rural Alaskan communities, have been 
significant.  It is a source of continued concern for the fishery’s management authorities and 
participants alike. 
3.3.3 Understanding the fishery and IFQ management using Ostrom’s SES 
framework 
As with the Paraná delta and PIECAS, I use Ostrom’s SES framework to break down the 
fishery into its constituent subsystems.  Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14 below describe the fishery 
subsystem by subsystem. 
Table 11. Description of the fishery's resource subsystem. 
Resource subsystem Description 
Type of resource system Fishery 
Location Coastal waters off Alaska, United States 
Size of resource system Large – several thousand km2 
Productivity of system Productive 
Clarity of fishery boundaries Clear – well-defined EEZ 
Human-constructed facilities Ports, processing plants 
Predictability of system dynamics Difficult to predict, but sophisticated means of 
doing so. 
 
Table 12. Description of the resource units in the fishery. 
Resource units Description 
Types of resource unit Pacific halibut, Hippoglosus stenolepis 
Economic value of fish stock From $2.72 to $6.29 per pound (2014 
prices)12 
Resource unit mobility Mobile 
 
 
                                                 
12 Source: NOAA Fisheries Alaska. Average ex-vessel prices. [Online] Available from: 
www.alaskafisheires.noaa.gov/ram/halibut_multiyr.xls.  The spread between maximum and minimum prices 
increased between 2013 and 2014. 
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Table 13. Description of actors in the fishery. 
 
Table 14. Description of the fishery's governance subsystem 
Governance subsystem Description 
Government organisations National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
 
North Pacific Fisheries Management Council (NPFMC) 
International organisations International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) 
Non-governmental 
organisations 
Numerous; for instance, Alaska Longline Fishermen’s 
Association 
Property rights systems Pseudo-property rights in the form of a ‘privilege’ to the 
resource; can be revoked or renewed at the discretion of the 
United States government. 
Operational rules  Quota share-based IFQ allocations; IFQ limits on catches; 
closed seasons; management fee 
Actors (‘users’) subsystem Description 
Fishermen:  
Socio-economic status Varied, from poor to very wealthy 
Knowledge of SES Profound, even if not couched in scientific 
language 
History of use Long history of use; often community-based. 
Leadership In some cases, intimately involved in fisheries 
management. 
Fisheries management officials – NMFS:  
Knowledge of SES Criticised for poor knowledge 
Fisheries management officials – NPFMC:  
Knowledge of SES Very strong, both in scientific and traditional 
terms. 
Fisheries management officials – IPHC:  
Knowledge of SES Very strong, especially in scientific terms 
(outstanding fisheries science background). 
Non-governmental organisations:  
             Knowledge of SES Varied; in some cases, run by fishermen and 
therefore strong. 
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Governance subsystem Description 
Collective choice rules 
IPHC ‘Commission’ recommends TAC and management 
measures; NPFMC ‘Council’ implements measures; NMFS 
oversees measures 
Constitutional rules  
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Act and 
Management Act 1976 
Halibut Act 1982 
Monitoring processes Thorough and extensive; IPHC collects ecological data; 
NMFS collects fishery data   
Sanctioning processes Thorough and extensive 
 
3.3.4 Factors underpinning the success of IFQ management in the halibut fishery 
The dramatic turnaround that the fishery experienced following the introduction of IFQs 
suggests that many of the changes observed were attributable to the characteristics of IFQs 
themselves.  Indeed, many interviewees I spoke to during my field work agreed that IFQs 
were simply the right tool for the problem at hand.  For instance, interviewee D said that 
“ITQs aren’t the cure-all, but they’re really good at ending the race to fish.  So if that’s your 
problem, that’s your tool.”  The fishery’s general success since 1995 is therefore attributable 
in part to the choice to use IFQs instead of other management tools.  Again, interviewee D 
argued that, “it was a good match of a policy tool to the problem.”  Interestingly, other 
alternatives had been considered by the NPFMC to address the fishery’s problems, namely 
licence limitations and annual fishing allocations (Carothers, 2008a).  These proposals were 
rejected by the NPFMC because they were deemed not to address economic 
overcapitalization and to be an administrative burden, respectively (NOAA, 1993).          
The decision to reject licence limitations and annual fishing allocations is instructive because 
it demonstrates that the NPFMC had a clear understanding of the root of the problems from 
which the fishery was suffering.  Indeed, a NOAA report (NOAA, 1993; pg. 59380) noted 
that, ‘The economics of the halibut and sablefish fishery were a central concern to the 
Council [the NPFMC] and a motivating influence to develop the IFQ programme.  Six of the 
ten conservation and management problems identified by the Council are economic 
problems’.  Thus, it is evident that the Council had spent some time defining and 
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understanding the nature of the problem confronting them.  It had specified ten key problems 
(allocation conflicts, gear conflicts, deadloss from lost gear, by-catch loss, discard mortality, 
excess harvesting capacity, product wholesomeness, safety, economic stability in the fisheries 
and fishing communities, and rural coastal community development of a small boat fleet).  It 
also had a grasp of the management tools available and the likelihood that they would solve 
these problems.   
The NPFMC had an advantage in this respect because of the Canadian experience with IVQs 
in British Columbia.  There was clear evidence from British Columbia that IVQs were 
effective in ending the race to fish.  Furthermore, other fisheries provided additional 
information on the impacts the NPFMC could expect if it introduced IFQs into the halibut 
fishery.  New Zealand, for instance, had transitioned to ITQ management in October 1986 
(Annala, 1996).  The NPFMC therefore had up to eight years’ worth of data to consider for 
the fishery’s IFQ programme, and some of these data were directly comparable to the halibut 
fishery itself. 
The Canadian experience with IVQs was probably especially valuable to the NPFMC given 
that it was essentially the same fishery.  Indeed, interviewee A believed that there had been a 
‘leadership effect’ from the British Columbia fishery.  Similarly, interviewee C noted that, 
“…this was something where everyone pretty much had a look at British Columbia and said, 
‘Wow, it’s working so well up there, we should do the same thing’.”  Although not a major 
factor contributing to the IFQ programme’s success, it is nonetheless important that the 
NPFMC had evidence from British Columbia and elsewhere about how best to design an IFQ 
programme and how to avoid problems like quota consolidation.  It is likely that existing 
experience with IFQs facilitated the design process.  In short, the NPFMC was aware of the 
types of impacts IFQs might have, and also had some idea about the ways in which an IFQ 
management system might be designed.  Furthermore, the subsequent success of IFQs 
reinforced the value of operating a resource management plan along such lines, which in turn 
begat further success.  A virtuous, mutually-reinforcing circle was established. 
The idea that IFQs were the right tool for the problem at hand has explanatory rather than 
descriptive power, and is therefore clearly not a second-level variable in Ostrom’s 
framework.  Furthermore, it is not an attribute of any existing second-level variables.  The 
leadership effect from British Columbia’s experience with IFQs is easier to map to the 
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framework.  It maps neatly to ‘leadership’ in the users subsystem, although it is perhaps 
worth emphasising that successful leadership is the key.  A further important subtlety is that 
leadership in the sense implied in my discussion refers to the overall experience in British 
Columbia as the key element in persuading managers in the Alaskan halibut fishery that IFQs 
were a sensible management tool.  Leadership from one or a handful of Canadian officials or 
stakeholders (encouraging the Americans to adopt IFQs, for instance) may have been 
important, but there are no data to corroborate this. 
3.3.5 The development of the IFQ programme 
In a related way, the manner in which the NPFMC developed the IFQ programme was 
arguably a key factor in the management plan’s future success.  The NPFMC had two 
advantages in designing the programme: the first, mentioned above, was the wealth of 
previous experience with ITQs; the second was the near consensus amongst fishery 
stakeholders that the derby system was untenable and had to change.  Interviewee K, for 
instance, noted that, “80 to 90% of the fleet knew something had to change.”  Similarly, 
interviewee B said that, “Everyone agreed that there was a huge problem.”  Interviewee D 
remarked that, “I think whenever you get to the point where the fishery is open for four days, 
I think everyone’s sort of aware that’s not a good situation.”  Perhaps most tellingly, 
interviewee G suggested that 
“So everyone kind of got behind it, because everyone recognised what the problem was.  So, I 
think in the case of halibut and sablefish, the stars kind of aligned in a major way that 
everyone was going to be able to win out of this one.  It was pretty much a win-win situation 
all over the place.”    
The recognition that change was needed is different to supporting IFQs specifically.  
Nevertheless, agreement that the status quo could not continue almost certainly helped the 
NPFMC push forward its proposals.  There was essentially a mandate for change. 
In this respect, the IFQ reforms had a strong political foundation on which to proceed.  
Interestingly, interviewee G believed that, “If I’ve seen any kind of pattern across successful 
quota systems, it’s that they tend to go much more smoothly when things are broken and it’s 
really clear that something needs to change.”  Thus, broad consensus that reform was 
essential was a factor that facilitated the subsequent success of the IFQ management regime.  
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That consensus provided the foundations that made radical changes to the fishery possible.  It 
is also plausible that this consensus provided at least one pre-condition for IFQ management 
to be legitimate.  
Consensus was not limited to fishery stakeholders alone.  The political motivation for reforms 
came from organisations not directly involved in the fishery.  For example, interviewee K 
pointed out that the U.S. Coastguard Service had come out in favour of IFQs specifically.  
“Politicians could not run from that,” interviewee K remarked.  Furthermore, the Governor of 
Alaska (Walter J. Hickel, who was affiliated to the Alaskan Independence Party during his 
governorship) at the time that IFQs were being discussed had expressed support for IFQs 
(even though his position vacillated somewhat – see Zharoff, 1992, pgs. 228-230).     
Nonetheless, there was vociferous opposition to reforming the fishery’s management with 
IFQs in particular (rather than some of the other management tools proposed).  In the letter to 
Governor Hickel cited above, Senator Zharoff of the Alaska State Legislature mentions the 
‘tremendous public outcry in opposition to the IFQ plan’, and notes that ‘serious concerns 
have been presented by a wide range of individuals, organisations and various public entities 
regarding the socio-economic impacts of a shift to an IFQ management regime on Alaska’s 
fishing industry and coastal communities’ (Zharoff, 1992).  Similarly, interviewee J described 
the ‘huge battle’ that took place over the introduction of IFQs, most of it driven by a core 
philosophical belief that fish are a public resource.  These are hardly ideal circumstances in 
which to develop a resource management plan.  Nonetheless, I suggest that they influenced 
the plan’s design in a profound way because they necessitated a process that was open and 
participative.  A lack of transparency or a perception of secrecy would arguably have been 
fatal to the NPFMC’s efforts, because any proposal made under such circumstances would 
probably have lacked legitimacy and support given people’s passion and concern for the 
fishery.  Thus, the anxiety and strength of opinion that surrounded the IFQs reforms 
demanded an open process.        
Various interviewees commented on the bottom-up approach that the design process 
followed.  Interviewee K said that, “As controversial as it was, it was very bottom-up in its 
design.  Government didn’t want to touch it.  They encouraged it, but they were not 
necessarily in the design element.”  Interviewee D remarked that “Basically all stakeholders, 
including the management bodies that oversee it, were all involved in the creation [of IFQs].  
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And it had to have played a role, in it being well-designed for the system.”  Interviewee G 
noted that the NPFMC “facilitated the process that was essentially requested by the 
industry.”   
Interviewee L, who was heavily involved in the IFQ design process, described the bottom-up 
process in some detail: 
“And working with a few others, small boat organisations, we came to the table saying, “Ok, 
if you expect us to go along with this quota share programme” – [inaudible] what had 
happened in New Zealand, for example, where they went from a fleet of small, independent 
fishermen to a few corporate owned boats that controlled the entire fishery and ran 
everybody else out of business. “We want it to look very different, we want it to be owner on-
board.” Some people, you know…real low and meaningful limits on quota consolidation, so 
how much any one person can own or how much can be fished from any one boat. We pushed 
for vessel size classes, so that quota that was caught on boats less than 35 feet was issued as 
quota that could only be caught on boats less than 35 feet. And then, finally, for a block 
proposal that also further limited the amount of consolidation that could occur. And, um, the 
Council…there were some people on the Council who shared our concern, certainly, about, 
um, communities and small boats.  There were processors who were concerned that if a few 
fishermen owned the whole resource, they would then dictate price. So the processors wanted 
to see, sort of, a relatively large and diverse group of fishermen still in the business. And then 
there were those who just wanted IFQs at any cost, but they realized that they needed the 
small-boat Alaska voice on their side to get this through. And, you know, went along with it.” 
Arguably, then, the bottom-up process that the IFQ reforms followed was a key factor in the 
subsequent success of the management system.  As interviewee D pointed out, a bottom-up 
approach ensured that the IFQ reforms were appropriate to the fishery and therefore more 
likely to operate smoothly and to produce outcomes that were satisfactory from both an 
ecological and socio-economic perspective.  For instance, one of the principal objectives (or 
conditions) of the reforms was that they should not change the structure of the fleet to any 
significant extent.  The rationale behind the objective was to protect rural communities, 
which in many cases are largely dependent on the fishery.  The socio-economic impact of the 
IFQ reforms was evidently a matter of importance to a number of fishermen (amongst them 
interviewee L, quoted above).  A bottom-up approach ensured possible socio-economic 
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impacts were addressed.  Although it is likely that a top-down approach would also have 
taken into account the welfare of rural communities, it would not have guaranteed action on 
rural social welfare, unlike a bottom-up approach.  Thus, a bottom-up approach meant that 
the reforms were more responsive to the concerns of the fishery’s stakeholders.  The 
importance of the involvement of fishermen in the reform process was best summarized by 
interviewee L, who suggested that the ‘voice of fishermen’ was key and that the reforms 
would have been ‘devastating’ from a socio-economic point of view if fishermen had not 
been actively involved in the reform process. 
Furthermore, a bottom-up approach may have contributed to the system’s legitimacy.  In 
particular, designing the IFQ regime from the bottom-up would have ensured that 
stakeholders were, at best, able to participate in influencing decision-making (as interviewee 
L did) and, at worst, to communicate their concerns to the NPFMC.  Thus, a bottom-up 
approach guaranteed that the IFQ design process satisfied criteria for communication and 
participation.  Furthermore, there is a sense – evident in interviewee D’s comment - that the 
IFQ management regime better reflected the needs of stakeholders than would have been the 
case if it was designed from the top-down.  Arguably, this made for a design process that was 
procedurally fairer than a top-down approach, because stakeholders were able to shape the 
rules that would subsequently affect them.  The legitimacy of the fishery may have emerged 
through the satisfaction of procedural fairness that was demonstrated by the bottom-up 
approach to its design. 
Although the bottom-up approach taken during the development of the IFQ regime clearly 
contributed to the fishery’s subsequent success, it is a factor that is difficult to map to 
Ostrom’s framework.  However, it is reasonable to suggest that it is an attribute of the 
deliberation processes in which stakeholders engage.  In the PIECAS case study, limited and 
restricted participation in meetings and in decision-making was also seen as an attribute of 
deliberation processes.  In the fishery, a bottom-up approach is an attribute of the process 
stakeholders went through as they discussed and shaped the fishery’s reform.  Clearly, there 
is a danger of defining deliberation processes too widely and therefore finding that a variety 
of factors might be classified into that second-level variable.  This is, perhaps, a 
demonstration of the framework’s limitations.  The two factors identified in the case studies 
are of themselves important in explaining PIECAS’s problems.  Mapping them to existing 
second-level variables is useful but not essential to understanding them or their impact. 
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3.3.6 The IPHC and the NPFMC 
There was broad agreement amongst interviewees that the IPHC and NPFMC were unusually 
knowledgeable and skilful fisheries management organisations.  There were, unsurprisingly, 
some negative comments about each, but overall it appeared that both organisations 
contributed in a meaningful way to the fishery’s success.  Of course, one of the problems 
with this line of argument is that the IPHC and NPFMC were the lead organisations at the 
time of the unsuccessful derby fishery.  The change in fishery outcomes cannot therefore be 
attributable solely to these organisations, unless there have been significant changes at the 
IPHC and NPFMC themselves – which apparently there have not.  Nonetheless, the shift 
from a derby system to an IFQ system seems to have made the processes in which both 
organisations engage more effective.  In short, both organisations are competent and well run, 
but the derby system may have imposed constraints on them that negated these qualities.  For 
instance, the IPHC is required to monitor halibut catches.  During the severely shortened 
seasons characteristic of the derby fishery, the IPHC’s ability to monitor catches was 
compromised simply because it was difficult to count such a large number of fish in such a 
short period of time (Hartley and Fina, 2001a).  Clearly, this is no longer a problem with the 
longer seasons that take place under IFQ management.  The key point is that, irrespective of 
the circumstances, the IPHC attempted to continue delivering high quality catch monitoring 
and assessment.  It was the circumstances, then, rather than any incompetence at the IPHC 
that curtailed its ability to do so. 
Perhaps one aspect of the IPHC that underpins the fishery’s success is the excellence of its 
scientific staff.  Interviewee D, for example, said that, “they routinely attract top-notch 
modellers.  The roster of people that have been in their, sort of, stock assessment rolls is just 
an all-star list.”  Similarly, interviewee C noted that, “the IPHC has traditionally hired the 
brightest of the bright stock assessment scientists… And they’ve had a succession of people 
like Steve Hare and Alan Palmer and Rick Direso13…all of whom are very well known stock 
assessment scientists in that field.”  Furthermore, the IPHC “pay very well, because they’re 
an international organisation,” and issue diplomatic visas if they wish to hire internationally 
(interviewee C).  Thus, the IPHC appears to have talented staff, and it is able to attract and to 
                                                 
13 Dr Steve Hare is now at the Secretariat of the Pacific Community.  He served for 17 years at the IPHC, during 
which time he became Chief Scientist.  Dr Rick Direso is now Chief Scientist at the Inter-American Tropical 
Tuna Commission, having also served as Chief Scientist at the Tuna-Billfish Programme and as an Associate 
Adjunct Professor at the Scripps Institute of Oceanography.  I could find no information on Alan Palmer, so 
perhaps the name is incorrect.   
103 
 
retain that talent.  Both of these things are clearly beneficial to the organisation’s 
effectiveness, and by extension the fishery’s management. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the IPHC has recently admitted that it has had problems 
with its stock assessment model.  These problems relate to retrospective bias in the model.  It 
is a concern that, in spite of the excellence of its scientific staff, the model should still suffer 
from these sorts of problems.  It could suggest that the IPHC is not as competent as needed or 
expected.  Nevertheless, there are two mitigating arguments that should give us confidence 
that the talent of IPHC staff is indeed an important factor in the organisation’s and fishery’s 
success.  Firstly, the complexity inherent in any stock assessment is likely to prove difficult 
to address.  That the IPHC has made mistakes is not sufficient reason to question the 
capability of its staff, in light of this complexity.  Secondly, the IPHC has responded swiftly 
to rectify the retrospective bias and therefore evidently has the means and understanding to 
correct its mistakes.  Furthermore, the reaction to problems in the model is evidence of a 
desire at the IPHC to maintain trust and to behave with transparency.  It would have been 
easier for the IPHC to dismiss concerns about its model.  Instead, its response arguably says a 
great deal about the organisation.  (I mention problems with the stock assessment model 
again in chapter 5.) 
In addition to the talent of its staff, the IPHC is effective because of a culture that encourages 
high standards, openness and a willingness to engage.  Even in the brief time I spent at the 
IPHC’s offices, I was impressed by the knowledge and the trouble senior staff took to speak 
to me.  Less anecdotally, the IPHC recently underwent an independent review of its activities 
(see McCreary and Brooks, 2012).  The report made twelve recommendations to help the 
IPHC address the challenges it faced in managing the fishery in the 21st Century.  The 
IPHC’s reaction to the report is indicative of the strong culture I mention above.  Only two of 
the report’s twelve recommendations (♯6 and ♯10, to expand the number of Commissioners, 
and to ‘elevate the importance of Tribes and First Nations in the Commission process’, 
respectively) were not adopted (IPHC, 2014b).  The IPHC was satisfied with the existing 
number of Commissioners.  It also believed that the existing processes both Canada and the 
United States had in place for addressing their relationship with and responsibility to First 
Nation tribes should be respected. 
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But with the remaining ten recommendations, the IPHC either acted immediately in 
implementing them or initiated preparatory work (IPHC, 2014b).  For example, it changed 
the way in which it presented stock assessment advice in time for the 2012-2013 annual 
meeting.  The recommendations have also become ‘part of standard practice and continuing 
work’ (IPHC, 2014b).  In addition, the IPHC has of its own accord aimed to make 
performance reviews ‘a regular feature of its operations’, in part because performance 
reviews ‘stand out in the literature’ as a ‘fundamental best practice’ (IPHC, 2014b). 
Arguably, each of these responses demonstrates the IPHC’s willingness to accept and act 
upon criticism.  In addition, it suggests a concern for operating at the highest standards.  The 
focus on best practice is a good example of that concern.  The reaction to the performance 
review is even more impressive when one considers that the IPHC was well regarded even 
before the review (McCreary and Brooks note that the IPHC has been ‘widely praised for its 
skill in managing a sustainable fishery’ and that, over the long-term, ‘one can see many 
successes’).  Moreover, the organisation is over 90 years old.  One might assume, then, that 
many of its processes were embedded and that it would struggle to change, but this is not 
apparently the case. 
The final aspect of the IPHC’s effectiveness is the manner in which it communicates its 
decisions, and the efforts it makes to ensure participation in its research and decision-making.  
I describe these in significant detail in chapter 5.  In short, however, the measures the IPHC 
takes in respect of communication and participation improve transparency and therefore 
accountability.  For instance, the IPHC organises collaborative research trips in which 
scientific data on the fishery are collected by fishermen hired by the IPHC.  Interviewee L 
suggested that this and other communication and participation measures contributed to the 
confidence and trust many stakeholders felt in the IPHC (even though the problems with the 
stock assessment model mentioned previously had shaken that confidence).   
Thus, there are at least three factors that make the IPHC an effective organisation, which in 
turn almost certainly contributes to the success of IFQ management.  The first is the 
excellence of the IPHC’s staff, especially its stock assessment scientists.  The second is 
strong culture, which has made the Commission responsive to criticism and determined to 
maintain the highest standards.  The strength of its culture is arguably attributable to an 
emphasis on maintaining trust and on communicating effectively.  In this respect, the third 
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factor that makes the IPHC an outstanding organisation is the transparency that accompanies 
its communication, and the inclusivity of participation in IPHC decision-making and other 
processes. 
Similar factors characterise the NPFMC.  Unsurprisingly, then, interviewees also praised the 
NPFMC.  Interviewee I believed that it did a “credible to incredible job” with fisheries 
management, further noting a culture of conservative management where ‘fish come first’.  
Similarly, interviewee K said that the NPFMC was ‘fantastic’.  “There’s nothing else like it, I 
wouldn’t trade it,” interviewee K claimed.  Interviewee L believed that the NPFMC, with the 
IPHC, did an excellent job managing the fishery. 
One aspect of the NPFMC that has contributed to the IFQ reforms’ success is the 
conservative approach to management mentioned by interviewee I above.  Conservatism 
manifests itself in various features of the NPFMC’s decision-making.  Interviewee C gave 
one example: 
“So the general view is that the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council is very 
conservative about fishing levels. Typically you would have catches less than MSY14 levels, 
try to keep biomass levels high, they’ve closed big areas to fishing, they’ve done all sorts of 
conservation type measures. And the biggest one of those is the 2 million tonne cap. So 
there’s a cap on…how much they can catch. …and there’s no doubt that you could catch 
more out of the ecosystem.” 
Similarly, interviewee B explained that 
“the North Pacific Council has only twice not taken the recommendation of the Scientific and 
Statistical Committee on quota settings, or total allowable catch settings. Now we call it 
‘ACL’, allowable catch limits. And in those two instances, the Council chose to go below, 
because we were uncertain about the implementation of a new model. And the industry was 
saying, “Look, we don’t want to take those fish now” – it was Pacific cod [Gadus 
macrocephalus] – “we don’t want to take those fish now and find out next year that the model 
was wrong, and so we have less out there, we’d rather do this. Furthermore, it’s our estimate 
                                                 
14 MSY, or maximum sustainable yield, is the largest fishing yield that a fish stock can sustain indefinitely.  
Fishing at the MSY therefore produces the largest possible catch without affecting the viability of the fish stock.   
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that the market won’t…will react in an unfavourable way if we put out another 100,000 
tonnes out there than if we put another 50,000 tonnes out there. The price will drop 
precipitously with this big change.” 
These two examples neatly demonstrate conservative management at the NPFMC.  Although 
these aspects are not related to managing the halibut fishery specifically, they do nonetheless 
affect it directly.  Perhaps more importantly, conservatism at the NPFMC means that the 
halibut fishery and other Alaskan fisheries under the NPFMC’s jurisdiction are less likely to 
suffer from the problems caused by incautious decision-making, notably over-fishing.  The 
contrast with fisheries in, for instance, New England or the European Union could not be 
more striking.  In the European Union, for example, there is a well-documented history of 
ignoring proposed TACs at every step of the CFP decision-making chain.  In 2002, for 
instance, ICES recommended a complete moratorium on all fishing where Atlantic cod 
(Gadhus morhua) are caught incidentally or purposely.  The European Commission watered 
down this recommendation and proposed an 80% cut to the cod TAC.  However, by the time 
the Council of Ministers agreed on a TAC, the reduction was only 45% (Daw and Gray, 
2005).  There is a clear difference between the attitudes to conservatism and science shown 
by the European Council of Fishery Ministers, and the NPFMC. 
Like the IPHC, the NPFMC also appears to have measures in place that ensure effective 
communication with, and the participation of the fishery’s stakeholders.  I describe these 
features in more detail in chapter 5.  Irrespective of the particular features that foster 
communication and participation, however, it is apparent that the NPFMC places some 
importance on clear communication and broad participation, with attendant benefits to fishery 
stakeholders.  For instance, respondent 5 noted that NPFMC meetings ‘come to my home 
town, comments are easy to email, process is accessible to the public for personal testimony’.    
As with the IPHC, this emphasis on communication and participation encourages 
transparency and public debate and thus a ‘better attitude between science and fishermen’ 
(interviewee J).  Indeed, cooperation tended to lead to ‘more agreement on where the 
resource is going’ (interviewee J).  Support for IFQ management is therefore based in part on 
the measures the NPFMC (and IPHC) use to communicate clearly and to encourage public 
participation.  Finally, interviewee K went as far as to say that, “without openness, we would 
start to see the sustainability of the resource undermined.”  At a number of levels, then, the 
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openness of the Council process in both communication and participation contributes in a 
significant way to the halibut fishery’s success.  It fosters cooperation and stakeholder buy-in, 
and leads to the emergence of legitimacy. 
However, it would be uncritical to suggest that the NPFMC is as highly regarded as the 
IPHC.  Comments from the survey data reveal that some fishery stakeholders feel the 
NPFMC is less responsive to the concerns of smaller fishers than it ought to be, and in 
extreme cases is even mendacious.  For instance, respondent 9 believed that the ‘NPFMC is 
driven by big corporate fishing interests. Trawl and factory online groups tend to be given 
priority over small fishing vessel interests’.  Furthermore, the focus on communication and 
participation that I found so notable has not apparently benefitted all stakeholders.  
Respondent 9 noted that the ‘NPFMC has been pretty much of a brick wall and a deaf ear for 
small vessel longliners in the halibut fishery for the past decade’ and believed that ‘my 
concerns are considered trivial and only listened to because the law requires that they do’. 
These comments are not isolated, but they are much the strongest recorded in the survey.  
They are also the only ones that are critical of the NPFMC’s communication and participation 
efforts.  Where respondents did make other criticisms of the NPFMC, they concentrated on 
the idea that NPFMC decision-making was driven by agendas and by stakeholders with 
significant financial resources.  I discuss these criticisms again in section 3.3.9. 
The factors outlined in the preceding analysis all contribute to the overall effectiveness of the 
IPHC and NPFMC.  As table 14 shows, the IPHC and NPFMC are examples of international 
and government organisations, respectively, both of which constitute second-level variables 
in the governance subsystem component of Ostrom’s framework.  (International 
organisations are not presently included as second-level variables in the framework, although 
it is not difficult to imagine that they might be included.  Many social-ecological systems, 
especially fisheries, have international organisations nested within their governance 
structure.)  The analysis outlined in section 3.3.6 shows that factors like strong culture at the 
IPHC, and conservatism at the NPFMC, provide a partial explanation for the strong 
performance of these two organisations in the fishery.  Although neither organisation is 
perfect, with the NPFMC in particular criticised by some stakeholders, the overall picture is 
favourable.  The fishery’s broad success is correlated with the excellence of both 
organisations.    
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3.3.7 Separating risk assessment from risk management 
The analysis above should, I hope, demonstrate how competent and effective the IPHC and 
NPFMC are in and of themselves.  It is a singular benefit to the fishery that both these 
organisations are involved in managing the halibut stock.  In addition to their competence, the 
way in which they relate to each other is equally important.  In particular, there is a 
separation between the risk assessment (that is, determining stock levels and TAC) in which 
the IPHC engages, and the risk management (administering TAC and quota share) that is the 
purview of the NPFMC.  Interviewee A believed this distinction was important.  ‘The IPHC 
separates scientific determination from competitive allocation processes’, which prevented 
scientific determinations from being politicised, interviewee A said.   
It is reasonable to argue that politicization prevents scientific advice from being the basis on 
which decisions for catch limits or fishing seasons are made.  Politicization leads to decisions 
that are more discretionary and ad hoc.  Furthermore, politicization means that a resource 
management system reflects vested interests rather than criteria like the legitimation function 
criteria.  Decisions are taken that are no longer consistent with legitimation function criteria 
like participation and procedural fairness; they are instead overtly political.  The clear lines of 
responsibility between the IPHC and NPFMC are one way to avoid the problems associated 
with politicization.  Only the IPHC has the authority to produce catch recommendations.  
Catch recommendations are therefore less likely to reflect political interests introduced by 
lobbying the NPFMC.   
Of course, the IPHC and the Secretary of State (who, under the provisions of the Halibut Act 
1982, may accept or reject the recommendations made by the IPHC) may themselves be 
exposed to lobbying, politicisation and regulatory capture.  To date, this appears not to have 
been a problem.  A number of interviewees suggested reasons why the IPHC in particular has 
managed to avoid political pressure or manipulation.  Interviewees F, G and H argued that the 
Commission was established at a time (1923) when fisheries were not heavily politicized.  It 
therefore developed procedures and processes independently of any government interference.  
Once the IPHC was well established – and once it had developed a reputation for prudent 
management – it is plausible that any attempt at political interference would have drawn a 
(negative) reaction from fishery stakeholders in Alaska and British Columbia.  In this vein, 
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interviewee A believed that the IPHC avoided political capture precisely because it had been 
doing things well for some time.   
Unfortunately, the interview data do not provide any information on how the Secretary of 
State avoids capture when accepting or rejecting the IPHC’s recommendations.  However, an 
obvious explanation is that the Secretary of State is sufficiently removed from fishery 
interests that the incentive to make decisions in their favour is significantly reduced.  As an 
appointed rather than elected official, the Secretary of State does not stand to gain votes by, 
say, increasing catch limits.  There is the added constraint of diplomatic problems if the 
Canadians see that IPHC recommendations are being ignored for political rather than 
scientific reasons.   
Finally, the number of stages at which capture is possible in the scientific determination stage 
of the fishery’s management is limited (there are two stages, one at the IPHC and the other at 
the Secretary of State level).  Furthermore, the number of people involved and susceptible to 
capture is also small (the six members of the Commission, and the Secretary of State).  In 
comparison, politicization and/or capture is possible at three stages in the CFP (ICES, the 
European Commission and the Council of Ministers), and with a much larger pool of people. 
The separation of risk assessment from risk management also has benefits for the 
jurisdictional issues that might arise if the Canadians and the Americans negotiated over 
quota limits.  Sharing the stock in this way could lead to disagreements or horse-trading over 
quota, which would affect each country individually but the halibut stock equally.  These 
problems are avoided in both the Alaska and British Columbia fisheries by providing the 
IPHC with the sole authority for risk assessment.  Doing so significantly reduces the potential 
for disagreements over one country’s share of quota, because neither country has the 
authority to negotiate over, or establish quota.  The IPHC’s presence in the fishery therefore 
removes the problem of either Canada or the United States seeking an advantage on quota for 
their own fishery at cost to both the halibut stock and fishery stakeholders in the other 
country.  Interviewee C made the point neatly: 
“Well, it’s got to help that they’re [the IPHC] in charge of the whole thing.  So their authority 
supersedes the Council’s, and the government’s and the State’s. So, having one person in 
charge obviously helps. But at least you’re not fighting and saying, ‘Canada wants this, US 
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wants this’, and so you can’t reach agreement. I’ve heard of some other locations where 
countries fight over quotas.” 
Of course, the apparent absence of politics from the IPHC’s risk assessment would have little 
value if the science itself was flawed or did not take a conservative, precautionary approach 
to managing the fishery.  Indeed, the problems with retrospective bias that have affected the 
IPHC’s model would suggest that the science has been unsound for a number of years.  
Nevertheless, as discussed in section 3.3.6, there is good reason to believe that the IPHC 
produces the best possible science, even if it is imperfect.  Furthermore, the conservatism 
evident at the NPFMC should provide some margin for error in risk assessment. 
Arguably, then, the separation of risk assessment from risk management in the halibut fishery 
is a key factor underpinning IFQ management’s success.  Its primary benefit is in reducing 
the likelihood of catch recommendations being politicized, thus ensuring that scientific 
determinations are the sole basis for the fishery’s management.  The problems that overly 
politicized decision-making can cause are clear from the European Union’s CFP, where 
discretionary decision-making has essentially condoned over-fishing.  In addition, separating 
risk assessment from risk management has removed the possibility of disagreements over 
quota between Canada and the United States because neither country has the authority to set 
its own quota limit.  Disagreements are disadvantageous because they lead to bargaining, 
which in turn is more likely to produce the ad hoc decision-making characteristic of political 
rather scientific processes.  Again, the European Union’s CFP is a good example of the 
difficulties that quota bargaining causes. 
As with the specific qualities of the IPHC and NPFMC, the separation of risk assessment 
from risk management processes is an attribute of these government and international 
organisations.  However, it is worth distinguishing between the various attributes of the IPHC 
and NPFMC.  Qualities like competence and conservatism describe something about the 
cumulative impact of people’s attitudes; the separation of risk assessment from risk 
management processes concerns the structure of the interaction between those organisations.   
3.3.8 Culture and the halibut fishery 
One of the limitations of the preceding discussion is that it provides no indication of the 
causes of the conservatism that characterise the IPHC and NPFMC.  Interestingly, a number 
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of interviewees believed that these factors had roots in the cultural legacy of the halibut 
fishery.  This cultural legacy may have established a propensity for satisfying legitimation 
function criteria like communication and participation.  The original participants in the 
fishery were of Scandinavian and particularly Norwegian descent, whom interviewee H 
pointed out were ‘conservative, close-knit’ people.  Interviewee H suggested that, by 
mechanisms unclear, the ethos and philosophy of these original halibut fishermen had ‘bred 
its way into the fishery’ and informed the IPHC’s approach in particular.  Similarly, 
interviewee A compared the fortunes of New England’s groundfish fisheries (which 
historically have been some of the most important fisheries in the world but have declined 
enormously since the 1980s) to the halibut fishery, and suggested that the difference was 
because “Alaskans are Norwegians and New Englanders are Portuguese and Spanish.”  
Interviewee B said that there are 
“…cultural differences between largely Scandinavian, northern European, law abiding, 
hard-working people, where…versus eastern European…southern European predominantly – 
Spain, Portugal, Italy – um…um…fishing groups where, you know, used to a whole different 
style of management, not interested in the science, not, you know, trusting the science, hard-
working, highly competitive, but also very much thought of regulations as cat and mouse, and 
science has not been helpful, science is only getting in the way. So here there was a strong 
commitment to the science, that’s been the basis for management, and a…um…willingness to 
abide by the rules. I’m sure you’ll find people who’ll say, “Well, there’s a lot of rule-
breaking too out here,” but it wasn’t the same kind of cat and mouse game that was played 
elsewhere. And, you know, it’s in part…you have a lot more people out there, a lot more 
landing ports, tended to be smaller scale, short-term, short trips, whereas here even halibut 
or salmon fishing was all summer, you were gone. And, and…and so…I think there is a 
strong cultural component to why this would develop in this way.” 
Interviewee L reflected interviewee B’s comments, noting that 
“So I have gone to meetings in New England, and the scientists who were saying there’s no 
fish left, get shouted down by fishermen.  And fishermen here [Alaska] come from a real 
culture of conservation.  We’re in it for the long term.  If they tell us there aren’t fish out 
there, we may say, “We think there’s more fish than you think there are, but we’re going to 
go along with your quotas.”  We might grumble, but we’ll go along with it.  I mean – at 
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worst.  At best, well, we better take care of those fish then.  So, you know, I think there’s a 
culture of conservation in Alaska.  There is also, yes, a very high level of engagement relative 
to other areas of fishermen in fishery management here.”     
Certainly, an analysis of the halibut fishery’s earliest days suggests that its conservative ethos 
was well established even then.  Fishermen displayed their conservatism when they 
petitioned the Canadian and United States governments to manage the halibut fishery in 
response to apparent halibut stock declines as early as 1914 (IPHC, 2014a).  When efforts to 
ratify a management convention in 1919 failed, the halibut fishing industry persisted in 
demanding international control of halibut fisheries, leading ultimately to the 1923 Halibut 
Convention.  That fishermen reacted in the way they did (twice petitioning the two North 
American governments) when halibut stocks declined is evidence, perhaps, of cultural 
conservatism at work.  Without a conservative attitude, it is likely that fishermen would have 
been unconcerned by stock declines and may never have petitioned the Canadian and United 
States governments to manage the halibut fishery in the first place.  In addition, showing 
caution of the kind displayed by early halibut fishermen was, for the time, novel and unusual; 
indeed, the Halibut Convention was the first treaty ratified for the conservation of a deep-sea 
fishery anywhere in the world (IPHC, 2014a). 
A further link may exist between the conservatism and caution shown by Scandinavian 
fishermen and the central role that science has played in management of the halibut fishery.  
The Halibut Convention included provision for the establishment of the International 
Fisheries Commission (now the IPHC) to research the halibut’s life history and to 
recommend how best to regulate the fishery.  Thus, science played a key role at the earliest 
stage of the fishery’s development.  The conservatism that halibut fishermen displayed in 
creating the Halibut Convention also led, albeit indirectly, to the development of a scientific 
organisation whose advice was at the core of the management system for halibut.  It suggests, 
perhaps, that fishermen were concerned that they did not understand halibut sufficiently well 
to manage them effectively – a surprising result, given the profound ‘traditional’ knowledge 
of fish stocks that fishermen usually have (Mackinson and Nøttestad, 1998). 
Interestingly, many of the Norwegians who emigrated to Alaska and the Pacific north-west 
were Lutherans, a church that emphasised piety and orthodoxy (Fevold, 1966).  It is possible 
that the conservatism of early immigrants and halibut fishermen has roots in their church.  
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Indeed, the focus on orthodoxy in the Lutheran church presumably means that social 
conservatism was an important part of the lives of these immigrants.  It is not unreasonable to 
imagine that this conservatism shaped attitudes to the fishery.  Reckless over-fishing, for 
instance, would hardly be in keeping with the conservative values of Lutheranism.       
Although these links are interesting, and merit further ethnographic research, it is simply too 
difficult to claim with any certainty that there is indeed a correlation between the fishery’s 
cultural legacy and the conservatism and science-driven management that characterise it 
today.  Nevertheless, the comments made by interviewees certainly suggest that cultural 
legacies have played a significant role in the fishery.  Furthermore, cultural legacies have 
successfully explained patterns of behaviour in a variety of other contexts15.  Their 
importance in the halibut fishery’s success should not be ignored.  In this respect, it is 
noteworthy that cultural legacy is not included as a second-level variable in Ostrom’s 
framework.  The closest second-level variable is ‘History of use’ (in the ‘users’ subsystem), 
but that does not capture the full picture implied by cultural legacy.  Furthermore, cultural 
legacy is arguably more appropriately included in the ‘external’ social, economic and 
political settings that Ostrom outlines.  Cultural legacy is external in the sense that it existed 
as a factor in the fishery’s success well before the fishery was managed with IFQs and indeed 
any other formal management system. 
3.3.9 The legitimacy of the IFQ management regime 
IFQ management of the halibut fishery is widely seen as legitimate, according to most of the 
experts and stakeholders interviewed during my fieldwork.  Interviewee I, for instance, said 
that IFQ management was, “considered legitimate by almost all players” and further that, 
“To all of us, it has legitimacy.”  Interviewee C noted that, “everyone thinks of them [IFQs] 
as legitimate”, although noting that, “there are several other factors involved.”  Interviewees 
F, G and H all believed that the IFQ management regime was legitimate, remarking that the 
results IFQs had produced had legitimated the new management regime.  They also argued 
that the IPHC itself had legitimacy in part because of the measures it had implemented to 
encourage participation and effective communication.  (I comment on these measures in more 
                                                 
15 Although not peer-reviewed, Gladwell (2008) describes in detail the effect that cultural legacies play in 
explaining differences in attitudes to aggressive behaviour and power structures.  He notes that there is a 
correlation between cultural conceptions of hierarchy and power (as measured by Hofstede’s dimensions) and 
the frequency with which a country’s airplanes crash, for instance.  The airlines of countries with deep respect 
for authority are more likely to suffer catastrophic air disasters.   
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detail in chapter 5.)  Interviewee L said that, “It is a really accessible, and legitimate and 
transparent process.”  Interviewee B was less forthright about the regime’s legitimacy, 
however, suggesting that, “you will find that the people who promoted it, and gradually got 
into it, consider it legitimate”, but that, “The people who consider themselves losers, will 
consider it an illegitimate process.”  Nevertheless, it is clear from interviewee B’s comment 
that, in interviewee B’s opinion, at least some of the fishery’s stakeholders believe the IFQ 
management regime is legitimate. 
The survey data collected after my interviews also point to a widespread perception that IFQ 
management is legitimate.  Figure 4 illustrates these data.  It is worth emphasising that these 
data come entirely from fishermen (n = 11), with one respondent also working for a NGO.  
This is important not only because active fishermen are under-represented in the interview 
data, but also because fishermen represent a key (perhaps the key) stakeholder group in the 
halibut fishery.  Their perceptions of legitimacy matter a great deal because they are the 
stakeholder group most affected by IFQ management.  It is therefore noteworthy that all but 
one of the fishermen who responded to my survey all believed that IFQ management is 
legitimate or legitimate for the time being.   
Individual comments made in addition to the survey answers provide further detail on the 
legitimacy of IFQ management.  Respondent 10, who believed that IFQ management was 
legitimate, noted that, ‘I have fished under the old system and the IFQ system. All aspects of 
the fishery are much better’.  Similarly, respondent 8, who also said that IFQ management 
was legitimate, wrote that ‘Yes, overall it is [legitimate], especially when you compare it to 
the Bering Sea crab, AFA pollock etc’.  However, these comments also betrayed concerns 
with IFQ management.  There was anxiety about the outcomes produced by IFQs and the 
manner in which decision-makers conducted themselves.  For instance, in the comment 
quoted above, respondent 8 also argued that 
‘The de facto reallocation of IFQ to by-catch fisheries is an area that makes one question the 
legitimacy of IFQ program and how it pertains to National Standards 1 (OY of halibut), 4, 9 
and 10.  The costs of entry to buy IFQ is another area that undermines program goals as is the 
lack of willingness of decision-makers to recognise that commercial halibut fishing was one 
of the first domesticated fisheries in Alaska’.   
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In a similar vein, respondent 3 – who believed IFQ management was legitimate for the time 
being - was anxious that ‘there could be decisions made in the future that could restrict the 
general public from the opportunity to purchase halibut at the general market’.  Respondent 9 
felt that IFQ management was legitimate but suggested that there were ‘many problems with 
IFQ systems’, especially with the way in which quota allocation was based on historical 
catches in the fishery.  This, respondent 9 argued, does not ‘take into account illegal fishing 
practices when they [halibut quota] are initially allocated’ and therefore promotes ‘cheating 
and legal but wasteful practices during the qualifying years’.                 
 
Figure 4. Perceptions of IFQ management legitimacy. 
In addition to these data on the overall legitimacy of the IFQ management regime, the survey 
collected data on the legitimacy of the IPHC and NPFMC.  Figures 5 and 6 below summarise 
the answers given by respondents.   
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Figure 5. Perceptions of the IPHC's legitimacy. 
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Figure 6. Perceptions of the NPFMC's legitimacy. 
The difference in the legitimacy of the IPHC and NPFMC is striking.  Additional comments 
made by respondents to the survey provide some indication of the factors that might have led 
to this difference.  For instance, respondent 2 believed that the NPFMC lacked legitimacy and 
noted that ‘I used to feel like I, we (ALFA16) had a voice with the NPFMC, but it’s not like 
that anymore’.  Respondent 3 suggested that ‘terrible decisions’ had been made by the 
NPFMC and that it was ‘hard to give any credibility to a group that has had members with an 
agenda’.  Conversely, respondent 3 had ‘always felt that the decisions by the IPHC have been 
for the best of the resource’.  Respondent 7 believed that the NPFMC was ‘in the pocket of 
the trawl fleet’, on account of its failure to address and reduce halibut and king salmon 
(Oncoryhnchus tshawytscha) by-catch.  In comparison, the IPHC did a ‘very good job of 
management, especially considering the increased pressure on the resource’.  Respondent 10 
felt that, although the NPFMC did ‘well in some aspects’, there was ‘too much politics and 
not enough science’.  In contrast, IPHC staff were ‘very knowledgeable’ and ‘did their best to 
                                                 
16 Alaska Longline Fishermen’s Association. 
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manage the resource’.  Finally, respondent 12 believed that the NPFMC put a ‘little too much 
weight on stakeholders’ and ‘not enough on science’. 
It is evident from these comments that respondents’ perceptions of legitimacy are linked in 
broad terms to the conduct of the IPHC and NPFMC, their interaction with stakeholders, and 
to management outcomes attributable to the organisations.  In particular, it is noteworthy that 
respondents mentioned factors like having voice with the NPFMC (respondent 2), credibility, 
decision-making and politics in connection with legitimacy.  It suggests that factors of this 
kind are correlated with legitimacy in resource management contexts.  Furthermore, it is 
interesting that respondents mentioned factors that were not just related to management 
outcomes.  The implication is that legitimacy rests on more than outcomes alone.      
It is more difficult to discern from these data (both the interview and the survey data) the 
impact that perceptions of legitimacy may have had on the IFQ management regime’s 
success.  However, it seems likely that they will have affected compliance with IFQ 
management.  For instance, it is striking that all of the fishermen surveyed believed the IPHC 
was legitimate.  It is reasonable to suggest from this that fishermen (or at least the ones 
surveyed) are more likely to accept and follow the IPHC’s quota decisions.  More generally, 
the high overall legitimacy of the IFQ management system provides a strong foundation for 
compliance.  If perceptions of legitimacy varied significantly, one might expect that 
compliance would also vary.  The fact that legitimacy is apparently so robust is perhaps an 
indication of high compliance.  Regrettably, however, data on compliance are limited and so 
it is difficult to corroborate this argument.  The best available data, for at-sea safety violations 
in 2011, suggest there was a 3.4% decrease in violations between 2010 and 2011 (from 46 
violations on 26 vessels to 33 violations on 20 vessels – NPFMC, 2011).  These figures are 
hardly useful to this discussion, however. 
As is the case in PIECAS, legitimacy is best considered an attribute of a number of second-
level variables in Ostrom’s framework.  It is an attribute of the government (and 
international) organisations involved in the fishery (the NPFMC and the IPHC).  It is also an 
attribute of the management regime as a whole.  If the IFQ management regime is part of the 
fishery’s governance subsystem, then it means that the governance subsystem as whole has 
attributes of which legitimacy is one.  Legitimacy in this sense (as a feature of the entire 
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management system) is harder to map to Ostrom’s framework because it is not related to a 
single variable.  Instead, it may be an attribute of the governance subsystem as a whole.  
3.3.10 Summarising factors that explain the halibut fishery’s success 
The preceding discussion should demonstrate that there are a variety of factors underpinning 
the success of IFQ management in the halibut fishery.  Above all, the choice to use IFQs 
rather than alternative management systems was instrumental in transforming the fishery.  
IFQs themselves are the key factor in explaining the fishery’s success.  They addressed the 
economic problems that were affecting the derby fishery, and so were the appropriate tool for 
the problem at hand.  However, there were several additional factors that contributed to the 
correct selection and development of IFQs.  Firstly, there was the leadership effect from 
British Columbia, which had introduced IFQs in 1992.  It is reasonable to assume that British 
Columbia’s experience with IFQs gave NMFS and the NPFMC confidence about what they 
could expect in terms of outcomes in the Alaskan fishery.  Secondly, the development of 
IFQs was remarkably bottom-up.  Fishermen in particular appear to have shaped the 
management system in a profound way, especially in terms of mitigating against the socio-
economic consequences associated with IFQs.  Arguably, the bottom-up approach adopted 
for the IFQ reforms was critical in making the new management system appropriate to the 
fishery.  It ensured the IFQ management regime was as commensurate as possible with the 
fishery’s social and economic characteristics.  It also gave IFQ management a measure of 
legitimacy by satisfying key legitimation function criteria like participation and procedural 
fairness. 
Once it became clear that IFQs were proving successful, it was equally evident that the 
bottom-up, legitimation function-oriented manner in which the fishery was designed and run 
was an important part of that success.  Arguably, this would have promoted further 
legitimation-oriented behaviour and so further success.  Thus, designing the fishery from the 
bottom up and satisfying legitimation function criteria established a virtuous, self-reinforcing 
cycle.  
In addition to these factors, the IFQ management regime has the singular advantage of being 
managed by two outstanding organisations, the IPHC and NPFMC.  Culture at the IPHC and 
NPFMC is apparently strong, with an emphasis on legitimation function criteria like 
120 
 
communication and participation in the management process.  There is significant 
transparency.  Moreover, at the IPHC specifically, there appears to be a real willingness to 
engage criticism and to ensure that standards are as high as possible and in line with best 
practice elsewhere in the world.  The science produced by the IPHC, while imperfect, is as 
good as can be reasonably expected.  Its scientific staff are world class.  The NPFMC itself 
has a strong ‘fish first’ focus, and a conservative, precautionary attitude to managing the 
halibut fishery.  Each of these factors contributes to making the IPHC and NPFMC model 
fishery management organisations. 
The separation of risk assessment from risk management between the IPHC and NPFMC is 
another factor in the fishery’s success.  It has reduced the likelihood of politicization in the 
fishery, and therefore hindered the reflection of vested interests in decision-making.  Instead, 
decision-making is largely legitimate because it satisfies legitimation function criteria rather 
than the needs of vested interests.  Risk assessment processes are distinct from risk 
management because the authority for catch limit recommendations is the IPHC’s and the 
Secretary of State’s alone.  Thus, catch limits cannot be ‘watered down’ as they pass from 
one decision-making organisation to another, as has happened in the CFP.  Furthermore, the 
opportunity for politicization at the IPHC level is limited in part because the culture at the 
IPHC is strong enough to resist it and in part because it is an organisation that has been doing 
things well for some time (since 1995 at least, and possibly since 1923).  Finally, oversight 
from Canadian authorities reduces further still the likelihood of politicization in the Alaskan 
fishery. 
Finally, two intangible factors seem to have facilitated the overall success of IFQ 
management in the fishery: the perception that IFQ management is legitimate, and the 
fishery’s cultural legacy.  Although it is difficult to discern from the interview data, the 
former is likely to have improved buy-in to the IFQ reforms.  It may also have increased 
compliance with novel IFQ regulations.  The latter may explain the remarkable conservatism 
and prudence that seems to characterise management in the halibut fishery.  Again, however, 
it is difficult to make any connection between the two with confidence.   
Perhaps more importantly, the various factors identified in this study go some way toward 
satisfying the criteria needed for legitimacy.  For instance, the fishery’s cultural legacy may 
have established a tendency for legitimation function criteria to be embedded in fishery 
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processes.  As a result – and as seen in the interview and survey data – the fishery is 
perceived to be legitimate by almost all its stakeholders.   
Table 15 below outlines these factors and the second-level variables to which they map. 
Table 15. Factors underpinning IFQ management's success. 
Factor Attribute/corresponding second-level variable 
IFQs as appropriate management tool for the 
mainly economic problems affecting the derby 
fishery. 
External market incentives? 
Leadership effect from British Columbia IVQs Leadership (users subsystem) 
Bottom-up development Attribute of deliberation processes? 
Knowledgeable, skilful management 
organisations 
Attributes of government and international 
organisations (NPFMC and IPHC, respectively). 
Separation of risk assessment from risk 
management 
Attribute of government and international 
organisations 
Cultural legacy 
‘Cultural legacy’ (as an external second-level 
variable). 
History of use? 
Legitimacy 
Attribute of government and international 
organisations, and the management regime as a 
whole. 
3.4 Governance architecture, polycentricity and institutionalised governance 
The preceding analysis outlines the specific factors that explain the successes and failures of, 
respectively, the fishery and PIECAS.  There is relatively limited overlap between the factors 
identified in the case studies, although legitimacy appears in both.  However, as mentioned in 
chapter 2, PIECAS and the fishery have comparable governance architectures.  This 
architecture may be important to the outcomes observed in the management systems.  In 
particular, the governance structure of PIECAS and the fishery may influence the 
participation of stakeholders in both systems -– and, as argued above, participation has 
played a key role in the difficulties PIECAS has experienced to date.  Furthermore, 
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participation may also shape perceptions of legitimacy, an idea that is expanded upon in 
chapter 4. 
The primary similarity between PIECAS and the fishery in governance terms is the presence 
of organisations at high governance levels.  In PIECAS, the High Level Committee is a 
governmental organisation that leads the plan’s development.  In a similar way, the IPHC and 
the NPFMC are supranational and governmental organisations, respectively, that are 
responsible for the fishery’s administration.  There are also a number of civil society 
organisations like NGOs that are involved or interested in the management of each system.  
In the delta, for instance, FARN and Fundación M’Biguá are amongst several NGOs that are 
contributing to the debate on PIECAS’s development.  In the fishery, equivalent 
organisations include the Alaska Longline Fishermen’s Association and the Deep Sea 
Fishermen’s Union.  These civil society groups play an important role in holding the IPHC 
and NPFMC to account, and in contributing to discussion about developments in the fishery.  
In addition, the Alaska Longline Fishermen’s Association was instrumental in the process of 
developing the IFQ regime. 
However, despite these similarities in the scales at which governance takes place, the 
governance architectures of the delta and the fishery differ profoundly in terms of 
institutional strength.  The delta is a weakly institutionalised system (Berardo and Lubell, 
2016).  As seen, the forums in which stakeholders participate in PIECAS are less strongly 
institutionalised, or even ephemeral (Berardo, Olivier and Lavers, 2015) compared to the 
fishery; governmental or technically capable stakeholders are frequently marginalised 
(consider the near-absence of agricultural stakeholders in the plan); and the legal framework 
upon which PIECAS is based is poorly developed and/or insufficient for regulating access to 
and use of CPRs in the delta (consider PIECAS’s lack of operational rules).  Furthermore, 
weakly institutionalised systems suffer from higher transaction costs and weak procedural 
rules - indeed, the latter are mentioned on page 71 as contributing to the participation 
problems from which PIECAS suffer.  Berardo and Lubell (ibid) argue that these weaknesses 
lead to management efforts that are ‘fragmented and symbolic’ – a description that fits 
PIECAS neatly. 
In comparison, the fishery is a strongly institutionalised system.  There are a large number of 
professional and technically competent stakeholders involved in the IFQ regime (for instance, 
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fisheries scientists at the IPHC), well-defined property rights (consider quota shares), and 
‘extensive participation by governmental and non-governmental actors in many stable and 
formal decision-making processes’ (ibid).    
Thus, the characteristics of the governance architectures in both management systems help to 
explain the management outcomes observed in both cases.  Although PIECAS and the fishery 
share governance architectures that are structured in the same way, differences in the 
institutional strength of these governance systems have had a significant impact on the ability 
of each plan to produce sustainable outcomes.  It is unsurprising that the weakly 
institutionalised governance system in PIECAS is associated with largely disappointing 
outcomes, while the strongly institutionalised governance system in the halibut fishery has 
created a successful management regime. 
This discussion also points to an interesting extension of ideas about polycentric governance.  
Polycentric governance requires a ‘complex combination of multiple levels and diverse types 
of organisations drawn from the public, private and voluntary sectors that have overlapping 
realms of responsibility and functional capacities (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2012).  The term 
refers to the existence of multiple decision-making centres and units of government within a 
governance system and so relates to the governance architecture of a management scheme.  
Arguably, both PIECAS and the fishery are characterised by multiple levels and diverse 
organisations and might therefore constitute polycentric governance systems.   
The supposed advantage of polycentric governance systems is that such systems provide 
stakeholders multiple opportunities to negotiate solutions to problems that are specific to the 
stakeholders in question (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, 1961; McGinnis and Ostrom, 2012).  
In the fishery, this advantage is realised; but in PIECAS, there is a marked absence of 
communication and participation, even with polycentric governance architecture.  The 
implication of this observation is that polycentricity is not sufficient in and of itself to give 
stakeholders voice in decision-making.  There is perhaps an additional requirement for 
strongly institutionalised governance if polycentricity is to confer the advantages it ostensibly 
does.  This conclusion suggests that the architecture of a governance system generally – 
whether polycentric or not – can only go some way toward explaining the outcomes produced 
by the system.  An understanding of whether or not the governance system is strongly 
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institutionalised is also needed.  Indeed, this issue may be the most important one to consider 
when explaining the success or failure of a natural resource management system.                                               
3.5 Conclusions arising from PIECAS and the halibut fishery 
The analysis of the two case studies provides us with valuable lessons about the factors that 
underpin successful or unsuccessful resource management regimes.  The factors identified in 
the analysis are case specific, and therefore should not be generalised to other resource 
management regimes.  Nevertheless, at least some of the factors outlined are almost certainly 
relevant to other resource management regimes.  Communication and participation, and the 
effectiveness thereof, have been shown to be important issues in a number of resource 
management systems (Cardenas et al., 2011).  Similarly, the competence of management 
organisations is likely to be an important factor across a range of situations.  Thus, the case 
studies help us to understand two specific management regimes but also provide us with an 
indication of the kinds of factors that might be broadly significant to resource management 
outcomes, and their relative importance in resource management.   
More generally, the factors identified in the case studies are characteristic of weakly or 
strongly institutionalised governance systems.  Unsurprisingly, PIECAS suffers from a 
weakly institutionalised governance system, while the fishery benefits from a strongly 
institutionalised governance system.  It is notable that the factors outlined in the case studies 
were identified independently of any theory on the institutionalisation of governance systems.  
It suggests, perhaps, that thinking about management system in terms of how weakly or 
strongly institutionalised their governance systems are is a useful framework for thinking 
about each management system and the outcomes observed.  This is a worthwhile avenue for 
further research.        
The case studies also tell us something useful about Ostrom’s SES framework.  In particular, 
they suggest that the framework in its present form is incomplete.  It lacks second-level 
variables that one might reasonably expect to be included (‘international organisations’, for 
instance).  More importantly, it lacks explanatory power.  The second-level variables 
included in the framework are purely descriptive.  As outlined in tables 10 and 15, a useful 
extension to the framework might be to include attributes (my own term, as defined in the 
introduction to the thesis) for each or certain second-level variables.  This is different to 
125 
 
decomposing second-level variables into constituent third-, fourth-, or lower-level variables.  
Instead, it suggests that second-level variables are made up of both lower-level variables, and 
particular attributes.  So, using the example given in table 10, government organisations (a 
second-level variable) have attributes like legitimacy, or competency (how knowledgeable 
and skilled are officials at the organisation).  The second-level variable can also be 
decomposed into additional lower-level variables.  For instance, third-level variables for 
government organisations might include ‘regional committees’ or ‘environment agencies’. 
This extension is important because it provides second-level variables with a level of 
explanatory power that is currently absent from the framework.  ‘Attributes’ (again, I would 
stress this is my own term, not Ostrom’s) tell us something about the nature of particular 
second-level variables.  For instance, in my example above, an attribute like legitimacy 
causes us to ask whether or not government organisations are legitimate and to consider the 
implications of, say, a lack of legitimacy.  Conversely, identifying government organisations 
as present or absent in a resource management system is useful only in a descriptive or 
possibly classificatory sense. 
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Chapter 4 Legitimation function – a framework 
Keywords: communication, legitimation function, participation, procedural fairness, trust. 
Many of the factors identified in the two case studies in chapter 3 fit neatly with existing 
theory on the determinants of successful management of CPRs and SESs.  However, the two 
studies also identified factors for which there is limited theory in the CPR management and 
SES literature.  Most notably, legitimacy appears to have played a role in the success and/or 
failure of both management systems, but is relatively under-explored in the literature.  
Furthermore, it is striking that legitimacy features in two management systems that are 
otherwise largely distinct.  In the Paraná delta, the perception amongst some stakeholders that 
PIECAS lacks legitimacy may complicate the process of designing and subsequently 
implementing PIECAS.  In particular, PIECAS’s lack of legitimacy amongst a key 
stakeholder group – the delta’s agriculturalists – has implications for buy-in for the plan.  In 
the halibut fishery, a widespread sense that IFQs are legitimate appears to have strengthened 
commitment to the plan and probably facilitated cooperation and compromise between the 
fishery’s stakeholders.  
Of course, legitimacy has been the subject of academic inquiry in a variety of disciplines.  In 
sociology, Habermas (1973) discussed the ‘legitimation crisis’ he believed was afflicting 
political orders in ‘modern capitalist societies’.  Similarly, Weber was interested in the 
legitimacy of power, a theme that goes as far back as Machiavelli and Thucydides.  In 
criminology and social psychology, legitimacy is an important research theme because it is 
seen to have an impact on compliance and cooperation with authorities and rules (see, for 
example, Tyler, 2006).  Legitimacy therefore affects the extent to which management 
authorities and regulations are effective (Tyler, 1997a; Tyler, 2001a).  In addition, it may 
influence how much stakeholders are willing to cooperate with one another, including the 
extent to which they cooperate with stakeholders in positions of authority.   
Legitimacy is also relevant to discussions of the way in which resources or rewards are 
distributed.  Aristotle took up this theme in his Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 2004).  Under 
what conditions will individuals accept that rewards and the way they are shared are just or 
right?  A key aspect of this question is the possibility that some individuals find themselves 
127 
 
disadvantaged by the distribution of rewards, but still believe that the distribution is 
legitimate. 
Both of these strands are relevant to CPR and SES management.  Firstly, virtually all 
resource management systems are made up of rules, whether formal or informal, and the 
success of these rules depends, in part, on compliance with them17.  (The importance of rules, 
and compliance with them also explains the emphasis on rule enforcement, monitoring and 
sanctioning made in the CPR management literature.)  Legitimacy can go some way toward 
explaining voluntary as well as enforced compliance, insofar as rules that are perceived as 
legitimate are less likely to be broken by the people affected by them.  Indeed, one might 
argue that legitimacy is sufficient to allow one to rely on voluntary compliance alone.  This 
connection between legitimacy and compliance is well recognised in the literature.  For 
instance, Ostrom (1998) notes that people are more likely to follow rules when those rules are 
‘understood and perceived to be legitimate’.   
Secondly, resource management systems are often characterised by the presence of an 
authority (or authorities).  Their prerogative is to make decisions about resource management 
that constrain the freedoms stakeholders might otherwise enjoy.  Clearly, then, it is possible 
to ask questions about the legitimacy of that authority – and when an authority lacks 
legitimacy, the decisions it makes and the rules it crafts are themselves unlikely to be 
legitimate and therefore more frequently ignored.  Thirdly, many resource management 
systems shape how resource units are distributed amongst stakeholders.  In the halibut 
fishery, for example, ownership of quota share determines how much halibut any given 
fisherman is allowed to harvest in a season.  Questions about the legitimacy of resource 
allocation decisions are therefore also pertinent in a resource management context. 
Thus, at least three features of resource management systems can be better understood by 
considering legitimacy.  These theoretical considerations, combined with the preliminary 
observation that legitimacy has played an important role in both the halibut fishery and 
PIECAS, justify exploring legitimacy in resource management contexts further.  
Interestingly, the subject has received some attention in disciplines closely related to CPR 
and SES management.  In the fisheries co-management literature, for example, questions 
                                                 
17 Factors like coercion, tradition, and apathy can also produce compliance.  In economic analysis, compliance is 
more simply a calculation made based on the costs of rule-breaking versus the benefits of rule-breaking. 
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about legitimacy have been discussed in some detail, especially with regard to compliance 
(see, for instance, Jentoft, 2000; Nielsen, 2003; Pinkerton and John, 2008).  Similarly, 
legitimacy and its impact on compliance and cooperation is an increasingly important 
research theme in conservation science (Stern, 2008).  There is also a literature on the 
legitimacy of international environmental agreements (see Andresen and Hey, 2005; 
Breitmeier, 2008). 
Of these papers, Jentoft (2000) and Pinkerton and John (2008) are particularly useful to this 
thesis because they outline criteria and ‘key conditions’ (to use Pinkerton and John’s 
language) that a fisheries management system must satisfy if it is to be legitimate.  For 
instance, Jentoft discusses the relationship between legitimacy and participation, although he 
is (perhaps wrongly) sceptical of the idea that devolving authority (that is, increasing 
participation in decision-making) for fisheries management to fishermen is certain to make 
the management system legitimate.  Similarly, Pinkerton and John suggest that legitimacy 
emerges in a fisheries management system when, amongst others, scientists share ecological 
knowledge, when management authorities ‘demonstrate effectiveness in implementing 
regulations’, and when management authorities are perceived as an ‘effective defender of 
local fishing rights’.  (These papers and the conclusions they draw about the criteria 
underpinning legitimacy are described in more detail in section 4.2 of this chapter.) 
The approach taken by Jentoft and Pinkerton and John in their studies treats legitimacy in 
fisheries management contexts in a functional way.  My own approach in this chapter is 
similar, in that I develop a functional framework for legitimacy (the ‘legitimation function 
framework’).  In addition, Jentoft’s discussion also raises two important points.  Firstly, 
different authors have different conceptions of legitimacy.  Some see legitimacy as derived 
from social norms or moral values; for others, it is instrumental and linked to outcomes.  
Either way, it is clear that there is no single set of criteria that are unequivocally accepted as 
leading to legitimacy.  Secondly, legitimacy may be in the eye of the beholder – that is, the 
individuals affected by a resource management system – or an attribute that is specific to the 
system itself.  This distinction has practical consequences.  If the former is true, legitimacy is 
something that emerges depending on the way in which a resource management system is 
presented and received; if the latter is correct, the actual design of the system is the key 
element (ibid). 
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These observations provide us with a point of departure on which to base our research 
questions.  One question that evidently requires further analysis is, “How can a resource 
management system gain legitimacy?”  In particular, are we able to make functional 
statements about the criteria that a resource management system must satisfy if it is to be 
legitimate?  The two case studies presented in the preceding chapter conveniently provide us 
with some indication of these criteria, because PIECAS is perceived to lack legitimacy 
amongst some stakeholder groups, and IFQ management is, conversely, broadly recognised 
as legitimate.  However, the case studies do not clarify which aspect of each resource 
management system is deemed legitimate.  For instance, the view that PIECAS lacks 
legitimacy may refer specifically to the legitimacy of the High Level Committee, whereas in 
the fishery, it may relate to the management system as a whole.  Caution is therefore required 
in comparing the legitimacy of each system, lest we draw conclusions that are based on 
perceptions of the legitimacy of different things.  In particular, the criteria that underpin 
perceptions of the legitimacy of a resource management authority may differ from those that 
underpin perceptions of a management system in its entirety.  This chapter should be read and 
interpreted in light of this difficulty. 
One final issue to consider in this analysis is the distinction, mentioned on page 128, between 
legitimacy as something that emerges based on an individual’s experience, and legitimacy as 
something that is intrinsic to the rules or organisation in question.  The practical implications 
of this difference for our research question are significant.  The former would imply that a 
resource management authority could legitimate itself by behaving toward individuals in a 
particular way.  The latter suggests that the conduct of a resource management authority is 
much less important than the way it is organised and related to other administrative.  Clearly, 
both perspectives are likely to change the nature of the criteria that must be satisfied for 
legitimacy to emerge.  Nevertheless, I do not propose to support one point of view over 
another, in part because any choice is bound to be difficult to justify.  Furthermore, the 
interview data do not point conclusively to one or the other. 
We therefore have one overriding research question, and two more specific research 
objectives: 
 How can a resource management system gain legitimacy?  
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 Identify the criteria a resource management authority must satisfy if it is to be 
legitimate. 
In order to achieve these research objectives, I develop a framework that outlines the criteria 
that imbue a resource management system – including its constituent resource management 
authorities - with legitimacy.  The criteria included in the framework probably relate as much 
to the legitimacy of resource management authorities (the IPHC and NPFMC, for instance) as 
they do to resource management systems overall.  The framework is developed largely from 
the literature, but also from the evidence in the interview data.  In subsequent chapters, I use 
the framework to analyse the halibut fishery and PIECAS.  In particular, I aim to show how 
IFQ management and PIECAS satisfy or fail to satisfy the criteria included in the framework.  
I have termed the framework and its constituent criteria a ‘legitimation function’ framework 
because the criteria I discuss serve a legitimation function; that is, they are involved in 
legitimating the resource management systems in which we are interested.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: in sections 4.1-4.4, I provide a definition 
of legitimacy; in section 4.5, I complement chapter 2 by providing additional detail on the 
method used in this chapter; and in sections 4.6, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 I outline four criteria –
procedural fairness, trust, communication and participation - that, if satisfied, increase the 
likelihood that a resource management authority is legitimate.        
4.1 Background - what is legitimacy? 
A simple definition of legitimacy is ‘right to rule’ (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006) – the sense 
that an authority of some description is entitled to create rules which affect the lives of other 
people.  A better definition, perhaps, is that legitimacy is ‘recognition of the right to govern’ 
(Coicaud, 2002).  Legitimacy therefore ‘tries to offer a solution to a fundamental political 
problem, which consists in justifying simultaneously political power and obedience’ (ibid).  
Still another definition is ‘the acceptance and justification of shared rule by a community’ 
(Bernstein, 2005).      
These definitions provide us with a working understanding of legitimacy that is useful for the 
remainder of the thesis.  Thus, legitimacy is taken to mean ‘recognition of the right to govern’ 
in this and other chapters.  However, this simple definition does not capture other important 
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elements of legitimacy that many scholars emphasise.  These limitations should be borne in 
mind when reading the thesis.  Notably, several definitions of legitimacy emphasise the 
term’s normative component.  For instance, something might be legitimate if it is consistent 
with the cultural beliefs, norms and values that are assumed to be shared amongst people 
(Zelditch, 2001; Johnson et al., 2006).  This focus on beliefs, norms and values has its origins 
in Weber (1922), who argued that people’s adherence to a ‘social order’ (rules, for instance) 
is shaped not only by custom or self-interest, but by ‘determinable “maxims”’.  For example, 
Weber described a civil servant who appears in the office at the same time each morning.  His 
punctuality is not only attributable to habit or the costs of turning up late; it is also 
determined by his sense of duty to the civil service rules, the breaking of which would offend 
that sense of duty.  Weber noted that an individual might act in accord with a set of rules not 
because he personally agreed with them, but because he presumed that the rules were 
consistent with widely shared beliefs, norms and values.  Thus, Weber’s key insight is that 
legitimacy can emerge even if individuals disagree with the rules in question or do not share 
the same beliefs or norms (Johnson et al., 2006).  For Weber, then, legitimacy does not 
require every individual in a situation to deem something as legitimate; instead, it is sufficient 
that individuals believe that a majority of the other people in a group themselves perceive 
something as legitimate. 
The influence of Weber’s ideas is evident in other definitions of legitimacy.  For example, 
Suchman (1995) suggested that legitimacy is a ‘a generalised perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’.  (Suchman writes in the organisational 
theory literature, and so presumably the ‘entity’ in question in the definition is an 
organisation of some description.)  Again, there is an emphasis on congruence with beliefs, 
norms and values.  Dornbusch and Scott (1975) explicitly recognised Weber in their 
discussion of legitimacy, noting that ‘social norms legitimate action by defining it as correct, 
or appropriate, or permissible’ (pg. 38). 
Coicaud himself discusses the importance of norms to legitimacy, while also analysing the 
importance of consent to notions of legitimacy.  Consent is integral to the right to govern.  
Where there is a possibility of limitations to individual freedom – as exists in any situation, 
including resource management, where an authority makes and implements decisions that 
will constrain what one can and cannot do – there is also a need for consent ‘in order to 
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establish the right to govern’ (ibid, pg. 12).  Coicaud summarises the importance of consent 
to legitimacy neatly by noting that, ‘to the extent that those who govern respect the rights of 
the members of the community, and discharge their specific duties, individuals consent to 
renounce some of their capacities for action and turn them over to political institutions’ (ibid, 
pg. 14).  By extension, the withdrawal of consent is an indication of a lack of legitimacy. 
Conceiving of legitimacy in terms of consent is part of the tradition of social contract theory, 
to which Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls contributed (Rosenfield, 2001).  These 
theorists suggest, in broad terms, that the ‘legitimacy of government depends on the consent 
of the governed’ (ibid).  However, there is less agreement on what constitutes adequate 
consent amongst these theorists. 
These ideas about the legitimacy of government invoke issues of authority and power.  Any 
discussion of the legitimacy of power requires the presence of people or positions ‘linked by 
power relations’ (Dornbusch and Scott, 1975; pg. 38).  These power relations imply that 
some individuals are ‘power-wielders’, and others are subordinate to that power.  Clearly, the 
actors in a government-led resource management system like PIECAS and halibut IFQs are 
involved in power relations of this kind; some individuals are subject (or subordinate) to 
management rules that are devised, implemented and monitored by resource management 
authorities like the NPFMC.  The distinction between superiors (‘A’) and subordinates (‘B’) 
leads Dornbusch and Scott to distinguish between ‘authorised’ and ‘endorsed’ power.  
Authorised power emerges when a subordinate believes that the power wielded over him by 
A is legitimate because A’s own superiors see it as legitimate.18  Endorsed power occurs 
when B believes that his own colleagues perceive A’s exercise of power as legitimate.  
Weber’s point about the importance of an individual’s perception of the beliefs of other 
people is evident in Dornbusch and Scott’s idea of endorsed power.   
Secondly, and continuing their focus on Weber and the relationship between subordinates and 
superiors, Dornbusch and Scott discuss the validity and propriety of the norms underlying 
                                                 
18 Of course, authorised power can only go so far.  In particular, there are certain positions with no 
immediate superiors, and therefore no source of authorised power.  The legitimacy of these positions must rest 
on other elements.                
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legitimate power.  Here, validity refers to ‘whether subordinates acknowledge the existence 
of a normative order’ (pg. 39).  Propriety relates to the subordinate’s acceptance and approval 
of the order in question.  Both are seen as elements that shape an authority’s legitimacy. 
Weber himself identified the importance of validity to legitimate power.  He suggested that 
validity was the recognition that a certain maxim is binding.  Furthermore, he pointed out that 
compliance was not a necessary condition in determining validity.  The example he gives to 
demonstrate this principle is insightful.  Weber suggests that a thief behaves in a surreptitious 
way precisely because he perceives the criminal law as valid.  Furthermore, the law’s validity 
is evident in the punishment the thief receives should he be found breaking it.  The thief 
cannot openly violate the criminal law without being punished, precisely because it is valid. 
Weber contrasted binding, valid maxims to propriety maxims that subordinates are happy and 
willing to accept.  A sense of propriety can therefore determine whether or not an authority 
(broadly defined) is perceived as legitimate.  The key difference, then, between propriety and 
validity as dimensions of legitimacy is the acknowledgment in the latter that something is 
binding, irrespective of one’s own views.  Recognising validity as an important element in 
legitimacy reinforces Weber’s original insight that legitimacy can emerge even if individuals 
disagree with the authority or rules in focus (the thief and the criminal law, for instance). 
Although the ideas presented by Dornbusch and Scott and other scholars are useful to our 
understanding of legitimacy, it is less apparent how they are relevant in a resource 
management context.  However, there is one important application for these ideas that is 
worth considering: namely, authorised power, endorsed power and propriety are all 
potentially shaped by the conduct of a resource management authority and the manner in 
which a resource management system is designed, implemented and enforced.  For instance, 
endorsement of a resource management authority’s legitimate power is more likely to occur if 
the resource management authority has behaved in a reasonable way.  It may have made a 
significant effort to allow stakeholders to participate in the design of the management system, 
say.  Similarly, it may have established strong relationships with stakeholders by 
communicating in a clear and honest fashion.  In turn, these stakeholders may trust the 
management authority and therefore accept its adjudications more willingly.  Thus, people’s 
perceptions of endorsed power and propriety in particular depend to a certain extent on the 
choices and decisions made by a resource management authority.  The essence of this 
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argument is that resource management authorities can be deliberative about ensuring that 
stakeholders in a SES view them and the regimes they manage as legitimate.   
It is less clear whether the same is true of authorised power and validity.  There is a sense that 
authorised power and validity depend on factors that are beyond the immediate control of a 
resource management organisation.  For instance, authorised power is by definition shaped by 
the presence and decisions of higher levels of authority.  This is especially relevant to 
government-led resource management systems like PIECAS and IFQs, where the ultimate 
authority of the State may legitimise the management system, irrespective of the resource 
management authority’s conduct.  Similarly, validity may depend simply on the legality of a 
resource management system, or on grounds of tradition.  Of course, if a resource 
management authority begins to behave illegally, then its validity – and the validity of the 
decisions it make – is bound to be questioned.  Equally, the higher authority that provides it 
with authorised power may remove its endorsement.  Thus, a resource management authority 
can be deliberative about authorised power and validity, but to a significantly lesser extent 
than endorsed power or propriety. 
4.2 Legitimacy and law 
The discussion above makes brief reference to the link between legality and legitimacy.  It 
raises a fundamental question – can an action be legitimate even if it is not legal?  For 
instance, is an action legitimate if it is illegal but morally or politically legitimate (Falk, 
Juergensmeyer and Popovski, 2012)?  In dictionary definitions at least, legitimacy is 
‘presented as that which conforms to the law’.  Thus, at one level, ‘decisions made in 
conformity with a legal procedure suffice to establish political legitimacy’ (Coicaud, 2002; 
pg. 20).  At another level, however, legitimacy as conformity to the law is unsatisfactory 
because it emphasises the procedure used to create and adopt a law at the expense of the 
content of the law.  Instead, legal decisions might be legitimate not just because they follow 
accepted procedure, but because they are ‘considered to be the expression of recognised and 
accepted norms’ (ibid, pg. 23).  Thus, legality and norms are perhaps two sides of the same 
coin in contributing to legitimacy. 
An extension of this analysis is to consider legitimacy and the ‘rule of law’.  Rule of law is 
seen as essential to contemporary constitutional democracies.  It limits the power of 
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government and protects individual citizens from the arbitrary application of law.  It also 
ensures equality before the law (Rosenfield, 2001).   
However, it can be challenging to see how rule of law is legitimated, for a variety of reasons.  
Firstly, rule of law is at some level coercive, because individuals may have to follow laws 
which they find oppressive or with which they disagree.  The solution to this problem is ex 
ante consent to the application of the law.  ‘Uncoerced agreement’ about the application of a 
law should be sufficient to legitimate the law’s subsequent enforcement (Rosenfield, 2001).  
Nevertheless, even this explanation is problematic because laws might continue to be 
accepted ex ante by some and yet rejected by others.  The key issue, perhaps, is determining 
the legitimacy of constraints on law-making.  If constitutional or other constraints on a 
legislature are deemed legitimate by the majority of the citizenry of a country, then 
majoritarian law-making should also be legitimate (ibid).  The rule of law is legitimated by 
virtue of the constraints that exist on law-makers - even though some individuals may 
disagree with those laws.  But if unanimous consent is required, the legitimacy of the rule of 
law remains difficult to establish. 
A narrow understanding of the legitimacy of the rule of law like the one outlined above also 
misses what Rosenfield describes as the ‘minimum requirements of a legitimate 
constitutional democracy’.  The argument here is that the rule of law might be consistent with 
legal regimes that are based on oppressive or degrading ideas like apartheid or slavery 
(Rosenfield, 2001).  This is perhaps an extension of Coicaud’s argument that content is 
important in establishing the legitimacy of the law.       
4.3 Legitimacy and democracy 
One final aspect of legitimacy worth discussing is the idea that legitimacy and democracy are 
inextricably linked, insofar as ‘legitimacy requires democracy because it [democracy] is the 
central principle in contemporary politics that justifies authority’ (Bernstein, 2005).  Thus, 
something is legitimate if it satisfies or is a manifestation of democratic principles.  However, 
it is clear that a conception of legitimacy based solely on democratic ideals is limited.  For 
instance, Bernstein (ibid) notes that global environmental governance satisfies many of the 
criteria implicit in democratic legitimacy, but still suffers from a perceived lack of 
legitimacy.  Legitimacy is therefore not solely a democratic issue. 
136 
 
4.4 What contributes to legitimacy? 
The preceding discussion should provide us with some understanding of what is meant by 
legitimacy.  However, it is equally important to consider what contributes to legitimacy; that 
is, on what criteria does legitimacy rest?  For Weber, legitimate ‘domination’ (where 
‘domination’ is defined as the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) 
will be obeyed by a given group of persons) was based on three criteria (or ‘grounds’, to use 
Weber’s language): rational grounds, traditional grounds, and charismatic grounds (Weber, 
1922, pg. 215).  Under rational grounds, legitimacy emerges when there is a belief in the 
‘legality of enacted rules’, and a further presumption that those in authority have a right to 
make decisions and commands.  Under traditional grounds, legitimacy rests on an 
‘established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions’ and the sense that those who 
exercise authority as a result of these traditions are themselves legitimate.  Under charismatic 
grounds, legitimacy is a function of ‘devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or 
exemplary character of an individual person’.  In all three of these ‘grounds’, the importance 
of validity and propriety are again evident.  For instance, legitimacy based on ‘rational 
grounds’ acknowledges that ‘enacted rules’ are in some way valid. 
These ideas are clearly useful in a resource management context; they suggest that the 
legitimacy of a resource management authority like PIECAS’s High Level Committee is 
based on legality, tradition, or the charisma of the Committee’s members.  However, there are 
other criteria upon which legitimacy might rest.  For instance, there is extensive evidence to 
suggest that legitimacy and procedural fairness are strongly correlated (see, for instance, 
Tyler, 2001a).  Perhaps it is more reasonable to say that there are a variety of criteria that 
contribute to legitimacy, some of which will depend on context.   
Of course, Weber and Tyler write in disciplines distinct to the CPR and SES management 
literature.  Their ideas are therefore not as immediately applicable to resource management 
contexts (although I would argue they are still valuable).  Nevertheless, for an understanding 
of the criteria that contribute to legitimacy in resource management systems, it is worth 
turning to Weber, Tyler and other scholars.  We also turn to literatures like the local 
governance and resource localism literature that are similar to the CPR and SES management 
literature.  I have already mentioned two important papers in this regard – Jentoft (2000) and 
Pinkerton and John (2008).  Pinkerton and John in particular develop a number of hypotheses 
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about the key conditions that create legitimate fishing regulations and legitimate management 
authorities.  Their hypotheses are based on a study of local aboriginal management of clams 
in British Columbia, Canada.  The hypotheses they outline include: 
‘Sharing of ecological knowledge by natural scientists plays a key role in legitimising 
regulations’. 
‘Regulatory legitimacy’ is a key dimension of legitimacy creation, ‘to the extent that a local 
authority can demonstrate effectiveness in implementing regulations…and keeping the 
system functional, orderly and acceptable…’ 
‘Political legitimacy’ is an important dimension of legitimacy creation, to the extent that a 
‘local authority is perceived as an effective defender of local fishing rights…’ 
‘Moral legitimacy’ is based on fishers’ perceptions that regulations are ‘fair, democratically-
made, transparent, inclusive, and produce good outcomes’. 
‘Moral legitimacy’ can only develop after scientific, regulatory and political legitimacy have 
been established.  Thus, the order in which different kinds of authority are exerted is 
important. 
Interestingly, these conditions differ significantly from the criteria I identify in this chapter.  I 
therefore disagree to some extent with the conditions that Pinkerton and John believe 
underpin legitimacy.  Indeed, I would argue that many of the conditions they hypothesise as 
playing a role in legitimacy creation lack explanatory power.  For example, suggesting that 
political legitimacy arises from a perception that a local authority is an ‘effective defender of 
local fishing rights’ does not explain how a local authority might win that perception.  
Furthermore, Pinkerton and John’s key conditions are arguably variations on the four criteria 
outlined in this chapter.  For instance, one of the criteria I believe is critical in establishing 
the legitimacy of a resource management system is effective communication.  I would argue 
that the sharing of ecological knowledge by fisheries scientists, say, is simply an extension of 
this criterion.  If scientists have access to ecological information, then it is essential to a 
management system’s legitimacy that this information is communicated in such a way that 
fishermen do not believe management authorities are hiding sensitive details.  The key is 
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honesty, openness and sincerity, rather than the specific ecological data shared.  This 
conclusion is strengthened by considering the inverse situation, where ecological information 
has indeed been shared but a management system still lacks legitimacy.  Ceteris paribus, one 
reason why such a system may lack legitimacy is that the specific way in which ecological 
information was communicated failed to satisfy fishermen’s standards for clarity, honesty, 
sincerity and other criteria.  It is not enough simply to share these data; they must be shared 
in the right way. 
Elsewhere in the literature, different contributory factors (‘criteria’) for legitimacy are 
emphasised.  In a paper focusing on environmental governance, for instance, Paavola (2007) 
argues that ‘legitimate environmental decisions…have to reflect both distributive and 
procedural justice concerns’.  In addition, Paavola suggests that the plurality of ‘ethical 
premises of behaviour’ that the people involved in a management system are likely to 
espouse means that ‘recognition, fair participation and legitimate distribution of power’ all 
underpin legitimacy in environmental decision-making contexts.  In another paper 
investigating governance (in rural local government rather than environmental situations, 
however), Welch (2002) emphasises the importance of ‘constituent representation’ for the 
continued legitimacy of local authorities.  It is interesting that both Paavola and Welch 
identify explicitly and implicitly participation and issues surrounding participation 
(recognition and representation, for instance).  Although the specific criteria they identify 
differ from the four outlined in this thesis, participation is clearly an area of overlap.  
However, I would argue that a condition like ‘fair participation’ (mentioned in Paavola’s 
paper) conflates two distinct criteria: participation and procedural fairness. 
In a similar paper examining global environmental governance, Bernstein (2005) discusses 
the elements of democratic legitimacy.  They include accountability, transparency, access to 
participation, deliberation, and fairness (although Bernstein notes that fewer scholars focus 
on fairness).  These elements are seen to improve the legitimacy of global governance 
institutions (including environmental governance institutions) that are criticised for ‘usurping 
domestic democratic institutions’.  Thus, Bernstein infers a causal link between these various 
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elements and the legitimacy of global environmental governance institutions in cases where 
deliberative and democratic mechanisms are absent from those institutions.19 
As with Paavola (2007), there is some overlap between the legitimation function criteria and 
the elements of democratic legitimacy identified by Bernstein.  Participation is once again a 
key consideration.  Deliberation and transparency are arguably references to communication, 
and procedural fairness is reflected in Bernstein mentioning ‘fairness’.  Despite these 
similarities, however, I maintain my argument that many of these elements are simply 
component parts of the broader legitimation function criteria I identify.  Deliberation and 
transparency demonstrate this point neatly.  Both elements characterise effective 
communication.  Without communication in the first place, deliberation and transparency are 
not relevant to considerations of legitimacy. 
The literature on environmental governance therefore tells us something useful about the 
criteria or factors that contribute to legitimacy.  There are similar insights to draw from the 
compliance literature.  Clearly, the compliance literature does not deal with legitimacy per se, 
but it nevertheless focuses on legitimacy to some extent given its impact on compliance.  For 
instance, Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) suggest that perceptions of legitimacy in Danish 
fisheries depend on communication and persuasion and on the belief that fishery regulations 
are meaningful in some way.  Meaningfulness in the sense used by Nielsen and Mathiesen 
refers to the idea that fisheries regulations are indeed conserving fish stocks.  Thus, Nielsen 
and Mathiesen imply that the outcomes of fishery regulations are important to their 
legitimacy.  Furthermore, they point out that evaluations of meaningfulness depend in part on 
the confidence that fishermen have in the regulations and the research on which those 
regulations are based.  Although Nielsen and Mathiesen do not discuss the criteria 
underpinning confidence, I would argue that confidence emerges when there is effective 
communication and leadership on the part of management organisations.  Communication, 
confidence and meaningfulness are therefore inter-linked. 
                                                 
19 Bernstein’s paper is interesting in a broader sense because it deals with a fundamental and contemporary 
political problem, namely the legitimacy of supranational political institutions like the European Union or World 
Trade Organisation (WTO).  In particular, Bernstein’s paper raises a key question – from where do institutions 
like the EU or WTO acquire their legitimacy?  An answer to this question is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
it is nevertheless a valuable point to consider. 
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In a similar paper, Viteri and Chávez (2007) used econometric methods to determine which 
factors could influence compliance to artisanal fishery regulations in the Galápagos Marine 
Reserve.  Legitimacy is one such factor.  Although Viteri and Chávez do not discuss the 
criteria that underpin legitimacy, it is worth noting that they treat legitimacy and participation 
as two separate factors in compliance.  This approach is interesting because it suggests that, 
in Viteri and Chávez’s conception, legitimacy does not depend on participation, despite some 
papers concluding otherwise.  Instead, Viteri and Chávez measure legitimacy not just by 
assessing boat owners’ views of the various regulations inside the Galápagos Marine 
Reserve, but also by evaluating the extent to which boat owners feel management authorities 
take into account the fishery sector and the extent to which leaders in the artisanal fisheries 
represent the interests of the sector in general. 
These last two measures of legitimacy are arguably not measures per se, but more like 
underpinning criteria.  Seen in this light, they might provide us with some indication of the 
criteria Viteri and Chávez see as playing a role in legitimacy.  I suggest that communication 
is implicit in the two criteria because communication goes some way toward ensuring that 
views are taken into account and represented.  The other element that can contribute to 
accounting for and representing views is, of course, participation.  Thus, the criteria that 
Viteri and Chávez putatively identify actually relate to communication and, perhaps, 
participation, despite their separating legitimacy from participation in their analysis. 
Thus, there is a small but useful literature on legitimacy in the environmental studies 
discipline.  I should like to emphasise the ways in which this literature is different to the 
legitimation function framework.  Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, this literature does 
not refer to criteria that require satisfaction if legitimacy is to emerge.  Pinkerton and John 
(2008) identify the various stages over which legitimacy emerges, and Bernstein discusses 
different conceptions of legitimacy and the factors in which it is rooted.  Bernstein’s review 
comes closest, perhaps, to the idea that legitimacy depends on the satisfaction of certain 
criteria, but at no point in his review does he explicitly talk about satisfying criteria.  
Secondly, the legitimation function framework identifies four criteria – communication, 
participation, procedural fairness and trust – that are not all identified in other papers.  
Although the literature highlights the importance of one or another to legitimacy, I have not 
come across a paper that discusses all four as interdependent but important in their own right.  
Furthermore, the idea of interdependence is itself significant.  The legitimation function 
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framework suggests that the four criteria interact and influence the extent to which each of 
the criteria is satisfied.  By extension, all four of the legitimation function criteria require 
satisfaction if legitimacy is to emerge in a resource management system.          
4.5 Legitimacy and Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action 
The preceding discussion emphasises the importance of communication to legitimacy.  The 
proposal that legitimacy is rooted in communication (amongst other criteria) is based largely 
on Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action (outlined in two volumes of the same 
name).  Habermas’s work focuses on moral, social and political philosophy, and is therefore 
beyond the purview of this thesis.  Nevertheless, he is an interdisciplinary theorist in the 
truest sense of the phrase and so shares the academic ethos that underpins this thesis.  His 
ideas on communication and communicative action also resonate in the legitimation function 
framework.  For these reasons, I will attempt to outline Habermas’s ideas on legitimacy.  
Doing so should help us build a more complete picture of the conditions that underpin 
legitimacy.  However, I should caution that my discussion of Habermas is necessarily 
condensed.  A complete treatment of his ideas would merit several PhD theses in their own 
right.   
Amongst other topics, Habermas was interested in the question of how social order is 
possible (Finlayson, 2005, pg. 25).  The ‘order problem’ centres on the observation that 
societies are (mostly) stable and predictable, even though social outcomes emerge as a result 
of the actions of large numbers of usually discrete individuals who typically do not 
coordinate their behaviour (ibid).  In addition to this problem, Habermas was concerned by 
the Marxist belief that societies are in crisis (Frank, 2000).  In Legitimation Crisis (1973), 
Habermas analysed these two themes and attempted to develop a theory of ‘social 
pathologies’ (Gray, 2012) that was further developed in The Theory of Communicative Action 
(Volume 1, 1984; Volume 2, 1987).  One kind of social pathology is a loss of legitimacy, 
particularly in government institutions.  Such pathology has ramifications for the ‘order 
problem’ in which Habermas was interested, because legitimacy is linked to social order 
(Frank, 2000).  In Legitimation Crisis, Habermas traced a loss of legitimacy to the 
displacement of crisis tendencies in the ‘economic sphere’ to the ‘cultural sphere’.  This 
displacement is caused by state action, and leads to ‘social integration’ problems, including 
the possibility of government institutions losing their legitimacy (Heath, 1996). 
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A key element of Habermas’s analysis of legitimation problems in Legitimation Crisis is a 
model of social systems.  This model drew on work by the American sociologist Talcott 
Parsons.  Parsons argued that modern societies are characterised by four distinct 
‘subsystems’, each of which solves particular social problems20.  In addition, each subsystem 
produces outputs of one kind or another.  Parsons believed that legitimation was one such 
output.  In a similar way, Habermas also suggested that the social system had constituent 
parts, but his model in Legitimation Crisis was tripartite in structure.  He distinguished 
between three systems: the economic system; the political system; and the socio-cultural 
system.  When Habermas speaks about the displacement of crisis tendencies from the 
economic sphere to the cultural sphere (see paragraph above), the economic sphere and the 
cultural sphere are references to two of the systems that comprise a social system. 
Legitimation crises emerge in modern capitalist societies in part as a result of this social 
structure and the transfer of crisis tendencies from one to the other.  The other element in 
legitimation is the way that capitalist societies are characterised by a class-based division of 
labour.  These divisions are problematic because they hinder or prevent ‘social integration’ – 
the development of shared values that motivates people to subscribe and conform to a 
prevailing system of norms (Heath, 1996).  These shared values cannot be imposed on 
individuals; instead, they must be adopted by building consensus.  But for consensus to 
emerge, the values under discussion must represent ‘generalisable interests’ (ibid).  This 
condition is difficult to satisfy in class societies because such societies are made up of groups 
with fundamentally different material interests and asymmetric economic and political power. 
One consequence of these issues is that problems in the economic or political systems of a 
society rapidly turn into problems of social integration.  This occurs because economic or 
political problems cannot be solved socially; that is, the economic and political asymmetries 
that underpin many economic and political problems cannot be justified on account of the 
lack of generalisable interests in class-based societies (ibid).  In the West, the polity has 
reacted by attempting to manage economic crises through the welfare state.  But this 
management transforms economic problems into political problems.  Usually the political 
system is able to justify its actions by drawing upon outputs like legitimation from the socio-
cultural system.  However, the ‘procurement of legitimation is self-defeating’ as soon as it 
                                                 
20 This is a brief summary of Parsons’s work and misses a number of important details, but which are not 
immediately relevant to the discussion.  For a more complete treatment of Parsons, see Heath (1996). 
143 
 
becomes obvious that the need for legitimacy is strategic (Habermas, 1973).  Using 
legitimacy for strategic means compromises the validity of legitimacy itself.  This is the 
source of the legitimation crisis. 
My description of Habermas’s ideas in Legitimation Crisis is brief and misses out various 
aspects of the argument.  However, there are two key elements to bring away from the 
discussion: firstly, Habermas’s model of the social system, which reappears in his later work; 
and secondly, the observation that consensus is needed to produce social order.  Consensus is 
a part of communicative action, and communicative action is one condition that leads to the 
emergence of legitimacy.  It is also worth drawing attention to the Marxist elements in 
Habermas’s argument.  I will return to this theme later on in my analysis.   
Habermas builds on his ideas in The Theory of Communicative Action.  He returns to the 
central problem of social order.  His answer to the problem is that in ‘modern, secular 
societies social order rests chiefly on the basis of communicative action’ (Finlayson, 2005, 
pg. 47).  We have already seen an allusion to communicative action in Legitimation Crisis, 
when Habermas emphasises the importance of consensus in social integration.  However, it is 
important not to conflate consensus and communicative action.  The latter is ‘action 
coordinated by validity claims’ (ibid, pg. 47).  A ‘validity claim’ is a commitment made by 
the speaker to provide reasons that could convince the listener to accept the speaker’s 
utterance (ibid, pg. 41).  Usually, a validity claim is tacitly accepted by the listener.  
However, in cases where the listener does not accept the validity claim, the listener and the 
speaker enter into a discourse where the speaker must make good on the commitment to 
provide reasons that would cause the listener to accept the speaker’s claims. 
Challenging validity claims in a discourse situation requires following certain formal rules.  
Habermas calls these rules ‘pragmatic presuppositions’.  Pragmatic presuppositions are not 
written down in the same way that the rules of a board game are written down; instead, they 
are rules that one follows without necessarily knowing what the rules are or even that one is 
following them in the first place (ibid, pg. 43).  Habermas suggests that pragmatic 
presuppositions are a necessary part of entering into a discourse; that is, a discourse situation 
requires an individual to commit to pragmatic presuppositions like sincerity, not excluding 
other participants and other arguments, and ensuring that all voices are heard and the best 
argument wins.  Furthermore, a discourse that satisfies these criteria ‘results in a consensus 
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on the basis of reasons acceptable to all’ (ibid, pg. 44).  An idealised discourse situation of 
this kind is important because it leads to the emergence of legitimacy.  Thus, legitimacy 
requires that decisions ‘rest on ‘good arguments’ made under conditions in which free and 
equal autonomous actors can challenge validity claims, seek a reasoned communicative 
consensus about their understanding of the situation and justifications for norms guiding their 
action, and are open to being persuaded’ (Bernstein, 2005). 
This element of Habermas’s theory of communicative action is important because it describes 
the conditions that might restore legitimacy in situations where a lack of legitimacy has 
developed (Frank, 2000).  I have already discussed how Habermas believes legitimacy is lost 
in late-capitalist societies (outlined in Legitimation Crisis).  The ideas presented in 
Legitimation Crisis are expanded upon in The Theory of Communicative Action.  In 
particular, Habermas takes his tripartite model of modern society and reduces it to two 
spheres of sociality: ‘lifeworld’ and ‘system’.  Lifeworld refers to that part of society that is 
informal and ‘unmarketized’ (Finlayson, 2006, pg. 51), and in which shared understandings 
can develop (Frank, 2000).  Lifeworld includes social groups like families, households, 
cultures, voluntary organisations and so on.  Most importantly, lifeworld is the home of 
communicative action.  Conversely, system comprises money and power, and the economic 
and political institutions that wield money and power.  It is also the home of instrumental 
(rather than communicative) action.   
Habermas argues that system often and increasingly encroaches upon and destroys lifeworld.  
In Habermas’s language, system ‘colonises’ lifeworld (Frank, 2000).  The colonisation of 
lifeworld by system leads to the absorption of lifeworld functions by system.  For instance, 
strategic decisions are increasingly left to the market or expert administrators (Finlayson, 
2005, pg. 56).  This process is damaging because social processes are gradually removed 
from public scrutiny and public discourse.  A loss of legitimacy is one amongst a variety of 
social pathologies that emerges as a result. 
4.6 Is Habermas’s social theory useful for understanding legitimacy in resource 
management contexts? 
The purpose of the preceding discussion is to summarise Habermas’s ideas on legitimacy and 
legitimation.  I am therefore adding Habermas’s views on legitimacy and the conditions that 
underpin it to those of scholars like Jentoft, Pinkerton and John, Paavola and Welch.  
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However, there is a sense that Habermas’s work is so significantly different to the work of 
Jentoft and others that it is not immediately relevant to understanding legitimacy in resource 
management contexts specifically.  I would argue that, to a certain extent, this criticism is 
warranted.  The legitimation function framework and the views of researchers like Pinkerton 
and John are qualitatively different to Habermas’s treatment of legitimacy.  Nevertheless, 
there are elements of Habermas’s social theory that can inform the legitimation function 
framework directly and that also overlap with the work of the aforementioned scholars.  In 
particular, Habermas makes a number of interesting points about communication that are 
relevant both to the framework and to the research of the scholars I mention.  I will discuss 
the ways in which Habermas’s social theory is and is not relevant to the legitimation function 
framework in turn, starting with reasons why it is not immediately relevant. 
Most importantly, Habermas’s research question asks, ‘How is social order possible?’  
Clearly, this is a different question to the one that the legitimation function framework 
attempts to answer.  On this basis alone, Habermas’s ideas are not immediately transferable 
to this thesis.  Nevertheless, one might argue that, irrespective of the differences in research 
focus, there remains significant overlap between Habermas’s work and the legitimation 
function framework.  In particular, Habermas’s social theory provides an explanation for how 
legitimacy emerges in a society.  If the legitimacy of a resource management system is 
contingent on wider social legitimacy, then a Habermasean perspective could be useful in 
explaining a particular management system’s legitimacy or illegitimacy.  However, I suggest 
that this overlap is superficial and not sufficient to make use of Habermas in the legitimation 
function framework.   
Firstly, Habermas’s theory is at an exceptionally high level of abstraction.  It is therefore 
difficult to use his ideas to explain legitimacy at the more specific, functional level of an 
individual resource management system.  His ideas do not map neatly to cases where greater 
detail is required to explain instances of legitimacy.  There is an explanatory gap between his 
elucidation of legitimation crisis and legitimation and an understanding of legitimacy in 
particular resource management systems. 
Furthermore, Habermas implies that legitimacy (or a lack thereof) arises as a result of the 
way in which society is structured and operates.  A legitimation crisis emerges when system 
colonises lifeworld.  Thus, the existence of distinct social domains (lifeworld and system) is a 
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necessary condition for legitimation crisis, as is the tendency for one of those domains 
(system) to encroach on the other (lifeworld).  This view of legitimacy is fundamentally 
different to the one I espouse in the legitimation function framework, and indeed the one 
outlined by Pinkerton and John and others.  I do not suggest that the structure of society is a 
determinant of legitimacy in resource management systems.  Indeed, the legitimation 
function framework implies that legitimacy depends much more on the specific manner in 
which resource management systems are designed and operated, and the way they are 
perceived, than wider social structures.  Wider social legitimacy is important, but I argue that 
it does not depend on social structure so much as existing cultural norms and traditions.  (In 
this vein, see chapter 6 for a discussion of exogenous factors and legitimacy in resource 
management contexts.)  
Finally, Habermas’s analysis has Marxist elements that inform his ideas on social integration 
(particularly in Legitimation Crisis).  The legitimation function framework does not invoke 
social theory, Marxist or otherwise, of any kind.  I would argue that the Marxist angle adds to 
the ways in which Habermas’s ideas on legitimation are fundamentally distinct to my own 
and not immediately relevant to the thesis.  In particular, the Marxist or neo-Marxist 
overtones in Habermas’s work imply that analysing legitimacy in resource management 
contexts using Habermas requires a similarly Marxist interpretation of, say, the way fisheries 
are organised.  The legitimation function framework does not entail any such interpretation.  
Indeed, I suggest that referring to Marx adds a layer of complexity which is not actually 
needed to explain legitimacy. 
Thus, Habermas’s ideas on legitimacy and legitimation crises are not directly applicable to 
my treatment of legitimacy in resource management contexts.  The different research 
problem Habermas addresses, his view that legitimacy emerges as a result of fundamental 
patterns in the way society is structured, and the Marxist overtones of his analysis, mean that 
his theory of legitimation is not directly transferable to the functional research question I 
address in this thesis.   
However, Habermas’s ideas on ‘ideal discourse’ are relevant to my exploration of legitimacy 
in resource management systems.  In particular, Habermas’s view that legitimacy rests on 
‘good arguments’ made under conditions of idealised discourse (see the discussion above on 
pages 143/144) may tell us something useful about the nature of effective communication, 
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which I suggest has a key role in legitimacy.  For Habermas, ‘ideal discourse’ is ‘free from 
domination of any kind’ and one to which ‘participants have equal access’ (Blaug, 1997).  
There should also be ‘an absence of constraints on communication, and equal opportunities to 
object to and put forward arguments’ (ibid).  One could argue that these conditions also 
characterise effective communication.  Certainly, a failure to satisfy the standards outlined in 
‘ideal discourse’ will prevent communication between actors from being truly effective.  For 
instance, communication where one group of actors is dominant over another is unlikely to be 
effective because some actors will be unable to have their voices heard or unable to present 
their point of view accurately. 
Habermas’s ideas on communication and ‘ideal discourse’ therefore provide us with some 
indication of the criteria that effective communication will satisfy.  This aspect of 
Habermas’s social theory is of some significance to the legitimation function framework and 
the thesis generally.  The conditions that characterise ideal discourse are not abstract; indeed, 
they are functional and therefore map to the legitimation function framework.  Furthermore, 
Habermas states that legitimacy requires ‘good arguments’ made under ideal discourse 
conditions.  We can therefore have confidence that there is a possible link between legitimacy 
and the discourse Habermas describes. 
The other element of Habermas’s ideas on legitimacy and legitimation – the colonisation of 
lifeworld by system – also has some value to the thesis.  This is perhaps surprising, given the 
concept’s abstraction and my view that Habermas’s ideas are so abstract that they leave an 
explanatory gap with legitimacy in resource management contexts.  Nevertheless, the 
interaction between lifeworld and system is important in a resource management system at a 
number of levels.  Firstly, system often ‘frames’ a management system.  For instance, a 
common concern when developing a management system is that it delivers ‘value for money’ 
and ‘economic efficiency’.  The halibut fishery is a case in point.  As mentioned (see page 
96), the problems in the derby fishery identified by the Council were largely economic rather 
than social or environmental problems.  Framing a resource management system in this way 
is arguably a constraint on lifeworld processes, and therefore an obstacle to the discourse and 
good arguments which lead to legitimacy.  Thus, a key question for the individuals and 
organisations involved in designing a resource management system is, “How can we bring 
into play lifeworld functions and processes in a resource management system?”  Indeed, a 
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Habermasean perspective would imply that the legitimacy of a resource management system 
depends on preserving lifeworld structurally in the management system. 
Although this argument may seem overly abstract and not immediately relevant to the 
legitimation function framework, it may tell us something important about the manner in 
which the legitimation function criteria are satisfied.  In particular, a resource management 
system that is framed by system is likely to treat the legitimation function criteria 
instrumentally – that is, as a means to an end.  The legitimation function criteria may become 
part of a box-ticking exercise, for instance.  But it is clear that claiming that a resource 
management system is legitimate because boxes have been ticked is qualitatively different to 
claiming legitimacy on the basis of an authentic and genuine attempt to satisfy the 
legitimation function criteria.  I would argue that the latter is more likely to occur if lifeworld 
characteristics frame and are included in a resource management system.  A failure to do so 
leads to the encroachment of system and a purely instrumental approach to legitimacy and 
other resource management factors. 
Thus, it is evident that Habermas’s ideas on the colonisation of lifeworld and system are 
relevant even at the level of the legitimation function framework.  The distinction between 
lifeworld and system reveals something about the way in which the legitimation function 
criteria should be approached.  They are not merely means to an end.  In this vein, it is 
incumbent on the stakeholders in a resource management system to consider the lifeworld 
values that they bring to a management system, irrespective of their particular professions or 
roles.  The legitimacy and success of a resource management system depends on people 
cooperating and compromising.  Cooperation will at times mean that individuals have to put 
aside their own narrow self-interests or the interests of their profession in order to pursue a 
collective good.  It requires communicative rather than instrumental action.  This is the 
essence of lifeworld, and it rests partly on the individual consciously embracing lifeworld 
rather than system values. 
It is possible to demonstrate the impact that a lifeworld versus system approach to resource 
management has on resource management outcomes.  Consider an open access derby fishery 
versus an ITQ fishery.  Both management systems have been applied to the halibut fishery.  
The derby fishery was characterised by competition for a limited resource (the halibut stock) 
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and by the operation of a largely unrestricted market (the fishery was open access)21.  
Cooperation between stakeholders only started when it was abundantly clear that the fishery 
was broken and required reform.  (See chapter 3 for more detail on the events leading up to 
the introduction of ITQs.)  The introduction of ITQs broke the cycle of competition and 
established effective restrictions on the market.  Crucially, open access – and the perverse 
incentives it creates with CPRs – was replaced with pseudo property rights (that is, ITQs).  
However, ITQs have not been completely successful in limiting system from colonising 
lifeworld in the fishery.  A number of interviewees mentioned the problems presented by 
quota accumulation and quota migration, and their impact on rural communities in Alaska.  
Accumulating quota is a way of increasing one’s economic share of the halibut resource, and 
of acquiring power and influence in the fishery – and money and power are the two sub-
systems that comprise system (Finlayson, 2005, pg. 53).  Interestingly, interviewee L 
believed that the grassroots approach taken during the development of ITQs had prevented 
more damage from quota accumulation.  Thus, a process of discourse and compromise had 
constrained the worst excesses of system. 
There is one final point to make in respect of the relevance of lifeworld and system to 
legitimate resource management systems.  The environmental and sustainability problems 
faced by resource management authorities are highly technical, and therefore call for 
technical solutions.  But this position is problematic in terms of lifeworld and system, 
because we ascribe technology and technology-driven approaches to system rather than 
lifeworld.  Clearly, the need for technical solutions is difficult to reconcile with a position 
that emphasises the importance of lifeworld.  Perhaps the solution to this problem is to 
recognise that a successful resource management system requires a combination of lifeworld 
and system-framed measures.  Thus, the ITQ management in the halibut fishery has proved 
effective because it combines a technical tool for addressing the race to fish (ITQs) with 
measures that preserve lifeworld (for instance, IPHC research trips that are carried out in 
collaboration with fishermen). 
In summary, Habermas’s ideas on legitimation and communicative action are valuable to the 
legitimation function framework and this thesis in a number of ways.  Although Habermas’s 
views on the nature of legitimation crisis are not immediately relevant, the concept of 
                                                 
21 This comment should not be taken as a critique of unregulated markets or ‘laissez faire’ generally.  I have 
tried to make the thesis as apolitical as possible. 
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discourse and the criteria that accompany ideal discourse inform my argument on effective 
communication in the legitimation function framework.  Furthermore, Habermas’s insights 
on the nature of lifeworld and system point to the importance of preserving lifeworld 
structures in a resource management system.  This applies both to the design of the 
management system and the conduct and values of the stakeholders involved in the system.  
It also applies to the legitimation function criteria.  If the criteria are satisfied in a purely 
instrumental way (that is, if the criteria are framed in system), then they cannot contribute to 
‘true’ legitimacy, only a shadow of it.  Finally, the interaction between lifeworld and system 
suggests that the need for technical solutions in resource management systems should be 
balanced by lifeworld considerations – amongst which is legitimacy.       
4.7 Developing the legitimation function framework 
The legitimation function framework I develop in this chapter builds on the work I have 
discussed above.  Overall, the framework is based on a key assumption: that a resource 
management authority can indeed be deliberative about securing its legitimacy and the 
legitimacy of the management system it organises.  The criteria identified in the framework 
are those that require satisfaction if legitimacy is to emerge; that is, if a resource management 
authority is deliberative about these criteria, it is more likely that stakeholders will perceive it 
and the management system it operates as legitimate.  The legitimation function framework 
can therefore serve a diagnostic function.  It can be applied to other resource management 
systems and used to evaluate both the likelihood that the system is legitimate, and, in 
functional terms, the reasons why legitimacy may or may not have emerged. 
4.7.1 Method 
The legitimation function framework developed in this chapter is based on the literature in 
criminology, sociology, social psychology, new institutional economics, and organisations.  
The framework is therefore truly inter-disciplinary. The findings outlined in these literatures 
are used to construct a framework made up of particular criteria that may contribute to the 
legitimacy of an organisation or a process.  In some cases, a criterion is included in the 
framework because the literature establishes empirically a connection between legitimacy and 
the criterion in question.  In other cases, the literature discusses legitimacy from a theoretical 
point of view or provides details on concepts like trust that intuitively are linked to 
legitimacy. 
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Some of this literature may not appear immediately relevant to research on CPR management 
and SESs.  In particular, the criminology and social psychology literature examines people’s 
behaviour in the courts and in relation to other criminal justice organisations like the police.  
It draws heavily on the work of Tyler, who has investigated legitimacy and procedural justice 
over a number of decades and whose scholarship is central to the field.  I accept that using the 
ideas and evidence presented in the criminology and social psychology literature is 
questionable.  Arguably, however, the criteria that shape legitimacy are likely to be similar 
across a wide range of administrative contexts.  Thus, the criteria underpinning police 
legitimacy, say, are akin to the criteria that influence legitimacy in the halibut fishery.  
Furthermore, there are no data or studies to suggest that ideas on legitimacy from 
criminology and social psychology are not applicable to the study of management systems in 
SESs.  Indeed, a recent paper (Jodoin, 2014) uses Tyler’s ideas to explore the way rights-
based approaches could enhance legitimacy in conservation initiatives.  There is therefore at 
least some precedent for the application of Tyler’s and other ideas from criminology and 
social psychology to contexts that are similar to CPR management.  But most importantly, the 
criminology and social psychology literature has explored legitimacy extensively and often 
has strong empirical and experimental foundations.  It represents an excellent platform on 
which to base at least part of the framework.  There is also the sense that the rules we hold 
dearest are those that, if breached, carry the harshest sanctions. We turn to the criminal justice 
literature to understand these rules. 
Another potential limitation of the method is that the literature is inadvertently ‘cherry 
picked’ and therefore selection bias is introduced into the way legitimation function criteria 
are identified.  I have attempted to avoid selection bias by covering the literature as broadly 
as possible.  Indeed, the range of distinct research areas from which evidence and ideas for 
the framework are drawn, suggests that selection bias is avoided as far as possible.  
Nonetheless, it would be invidious to claim that the framework includes an exhaustive list of 
the criteria that lead to legitimacy; actually, it is likely that certain criteria are not considered 
that might subsequently prove to have an important legitimation function.  However, I am 
confident that the legitimation function framework as presented in this chapter is an 
important and useful contribution to the literature. 
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4.8 Criteria I - procedural fairness 
Several authors emphasise the legitimation function served by the perception that a procedure 
is administered fairly (see Tyler, 2006, for a review).  In this model of legitimacy, people 
judge the legitimacy of authorities or institutions based on an assessment of the fairness of 
decision-making processes.  Tyler (2001b) summarises the ‘fair process effect’ by noting that 
‘authorities and institutions are viewed as more legitimate…when they exercise their 
authority through procedures that people experience as fair’.  Procedural fairness is therefore 
a criterion that shapes legitimacy.  The procedural fairness model is distinct to ‘instrumental 
models’ of legitimacy that link perceptions of legitimacy to whether or not the outcomes 
produced by an institution or organisation are favourable.          
The fair process effect is widespread.  A meta-analysis by Colquitt et al. (2001) of 183 papers 
in the organisational justice literature showed that procedural fairness was highly correlated 
with, amongst others, evaluations of authority.   A study of people’s trust in legal authorities 
based on data collected in two Californian cities (Los Angeles and Oakland) suggests that 
perceptions of legitimacy are shaped by trust in the motives of legal authorities.  Trust, in 
turn, is shaped by a person’s sense that a process was fair (Tyler, 2001c).  Similarly, in a 
survey of attitudes to policing in New York City, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that 
procedural fairness was the primary driver of the perception that police authorities in New 
York City were legitimate22.  This was true irrespective of the ethnicity of respondents, and 
was observed both pre- and post- the September 11th 2001 terrorist atrocities.  A more recent 
study of police legitimacy by Braga et al. (2014) suggests that assessments of police action 
(evaluated by recording the responses of 1,361 people to three videos of police-citizen 
interactions in a randomised factorial experiment) are negatively impacted by a priori 
knowledge that: the police department in question is being investigated for abusive 
behaviour; that the police officer in question is being investigated for corruption; and that the 
interaction shown in the video is illegal.  Furthermore, Braga et al. show that the procedural 
fairness experienced by respondents in prior encounters with the police influenced their 
evaluation of police actions in the three videos.  Respondents who had experienced 
discourteous or disrespectful treatment were more likely to assess the videos negatively.  The 
                                                 
22 A weakness of Sunshine and Tyler’s study is that it is based on self-reporting of law-related behaviour, rather 
than actual behavioural data from, say, police records. 
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authors conclude that ‘past experiences with police officers shaped citizen attributions of the 
legitimacy of those actors and the institutions they represent’.              
These and other studies provide the empirical foundation for a link between procedural 
fairness and legitimacy.  They also clarify what makes a process fair or unfair.  For instance, 
Leventhal (1980) argued that a process – whether occurring in a legal or non-legal context - is 
fair if it meets six particular criteria: 1) it is applied consistently across people and across 
time; 2) it is free from bias; 3) accurate information is collected and used in decision-making; 
4) it has a mechanism that corrects flawed or mistaken decisions; 5) it conforms to personal 
and/or prevailing ethical and moral standards; and, 6), it accounts for the opinions of groups 
affected by the decision-making process.  In Tyler’s model of legitimacy (1997a, 1997b), 
four factors influence assessments of procedural fairness: inter-personal respect, neutrality, 
trustworthiness and level of participation.  Inter-personal respect is expressed by treating an 
individual with courtesy, dignity and respect.  Neutrality includes assessments of ‘honesty, 
impartiality, and the use of facts, not personal opinions, in decision-making’.  
Trustworthiness is established when one third-party is motivated to treat another fairly, shows 
concern about their needs, and considers their arguments fully.   
More recently, Tyler (2009) conceptualised procedural fairness as including two issues: the 
quality of decision-making, and the quality of inter-personal treatment.  In the former, factors 
like the independence, neutrality and technical competence of decision-makers are important; 
so too is the consistency of decision-making, and the ability of people to have a say before 
decisions that affect them are made.  Quality of inter-personal treatment is shaped by factors 
like the dignity with which a person is treated, and the care and concern shown by authorities 
(Tyler, 2009).  It is clear that Tyler’s earlier ideas on the factors that influence assessments of 
legitimacy (1997a, 1997b) have informed this more recent model. 
Conceptualisations of procedural fairness are also found in other areas of scholarship.  In 
common law jurisprudence, for instance, the concept of ‘natural justice’ ensures that 
decisions - and the process that led to those decisions - are fair.  Natural justice comprises 
three rules: the rule against bias, or nemo iudex in causa sua (‘no one should be a judge in his 
own case’); the hearing rule, or audi alteram partem (‘hear the other side’); and the evidence 
rule.  The rule against bias requires that a decision-maker is disinterested and unbiased in the 
matter to be decided.  The hearing rule requires that a person whose interests will be 
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adversely affected by a decision have an opportunity to have their say in the decision-making 
process.  The evidence rule requires that decisions be based upon evidence and logic, rather 
than speculation and suspicion.  If a legal process satisfies these three rules, then it is 
manifestly objective and fair.  
What is striking about the concept of natural justice in procedural fairness is its similarity to 
conceptualisations of fairness in otherwise unconnected scholarship.  For instance, 
Levanthal’s fairness criteria require that a process is free from bias and that it accounts for the 
opinions of groups affected by the decision-making process.  Both of these criteria satisfy the 
rule against bias, and the hearing rule, respectively.  Tyler’s ideas suggest that the 
independence and neutrality of decision-makers are important factors in determining the 
quality of decision-making.  Where decisions are made as a result of independent and neutral 
deliberations, they are also most likely to satisfy the bias rule.  Similarly, Tyler’s emphasis on 
allowing people to express their opinions before decisions that affect them are made satisfies 
the hearing rule.      
Although Tyler’s work and other studies suggest that legitimacy is based primarily on 
procedural fairness, there is also a view that legitimacy is determined only by the 
effectiveness of an authority or authorities.  This approach to legitimacy – termed 
‘eudaemonic legitimacy’ – argues that legitimacy depends on the effectiveness with which 
material benefits and/or prestige are produced for citizens.  Tyler and other scholars account 
for eudaemonic legitimacy when they note that, in addition to procedural fairness, the 
performance of authorities plays a role in determining legitimacy.  For instance, a study by 
Tankebe (2008) concluded that people who believed the Ghana police force conducted itself 
in a procedurally fair manner were also likely to have evaluated police effectiveness and 
police outcome fairness and favourability in a positive way. 
Assessments of performance are shaped by factors like costs, delays, and the perceived or 
actual benefits associated with outcomes.  Nonetheless, it is perhaps unhelpful to conceive of 
legitimacy only in terms of effectiveness, or procedural fairness.  Bottoms and Tankebe 
(2012) suggest instead that effectiveness and legitimacy are interactive and interdependent, 
and that ‘effectiveness is a necessary but not sufficient condition of legitimacy’.  Arguably, 
thinking about legitimacy in this way is more realistic than a purely effectiveness-based or 
procedural fairness-based view. 
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The findings of the research outlined above therefore suggest that one criterion a resource 
management system must satisfy to be legitimate is procedural fairness.  The research also 
implies that procedural fairness is expressed both during the design phase of a resource 
management system (that is, the rule-development phase), and in the outcomes produced by a 
resource management system.  Thus, procedural fairness relates to rule-development in a 
resource management context – how fairly were the rules designed?  Effectiveness is 
associated with management outcomes – were outcomes procedurally fair?  In addition, 
management features that attempt to address instances of unfairness will also legitimate the 
system.  For example, the appeals mechanism in the Alaskan halibut fishery was one way in 
which injustices (perceived or otherwise) could be dealt with in as objective and impartial a 
way as possible; its apparent effect was to provide the IFQ reforms with a measure of 
legitimacy (see chapter 5 for further discussion of the appeals mechanism).  The framework 
below (figure 7) shows the criteria a decision or a process must satisfy to be perceived as fair.  
The framework is based on Tyler’s idea that quality of decision-making and quality of inter-
personal treatment inform assessments of procedural fairness.  It also uses the concept of 
natural justice and Leventhal’s six fairness criteria to identify the criteria that make a process 
fair. 
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Figure 7. A framework for understanding legitimation variables based on procedural 
and outcome fairness. 
This framework suggests that those features of a resource management system that contribute 
to, for instance, independent and neutral decision-making, or that mean the management 
system considers group opinions, will indicate that the rule-development process is being 
carried out in a procedurally fair way.  That, in turn, will help legitimate the management 
rules and the management system. 
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4.9 Criteria II - trust 
Trust is a term that lacks a precise definition.  Its meaning varies across disciplines.  In parts 
of the economics literature, for instance, it is thought of as a tendency to cooperate (see La 
Porta et al., 1996).  In the CPR management literature, there is a sense that trust is expressed 
when ‘an individual puts herself at risk of an outcome dependent upon the actions of others’ 
(Henry and Dietz, 2011).  Across disciplines, however, there are a number of shared concepts 
and ideas in definitions of trust.  The first is that a willingness to be vulnerable is a key 
component of trust.  The second is that trust often involves having positive expectations of 
others, whether individuals or organisations (Rousseau et al., 1998).  The third is that 
emergence of trust depends on the existence of risk - or the perceived probability of loss - and 
on interdependence in the interests of individuals or groups.  When all three of these 
conditions are taken into account, a satisfactory definition of trust emerges.  In this thesis, it 
is understood as a ‘willingness to be vulnerable under conditions of risk and interdependence’ 
(ibid).   
Although this definition gives us a clearer idea of the meaning of trust, it says little if 
anything about the conditions that must be satisfied for trust to develop.  At one level, trust 
emerges when norms like ‘reciprocate’ or ‘behave in a trustworthy way’ are widespread 
amongst the individuals in a group, community or society.  Norms shape both the way in 
which people behave, and also their beliefs and expectations about others.  Thus, an actor 
who conforms closely to trusting norms and who lives in a society in which trust norms are 
frequently adhered to by other people is more likely to trust and be trusted in turn.  She will 
believe that her trusting behaviour will be reciprocated reliably.   
At another level, trust and trustworthiness are shaped by formal and informal institutions 
(Fehr, 2009).  There is a sense here that an actor can trust the institutions themselves – she 
may have trust that property rights institutions guarantee her ownership of a particular good, 
for instance – but also that institutions can encourage or hinder the development of trust 
between people (inter-personal trust).  The role that institutional mechanisms play in bringing 
about trust suggests that the ‘quality’ of institutions can partly determine the trust that exists 
in a community or country.  Thus, communities or countries with weak institutions and norms 
of ‘bad conduct’ are unlikely to have high levels of trust, neither in other people, 
organisations or authorities, nor in the institutions themselves.  In turn, the factors that shape 
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institutions, notably the history of a country, can themselves shape the levels of trust that 
characterise a society. 
An implication of this argument is that the emergence of trust has a strong exogenous 
component.  For instance, trust in the authorities that are designing and implementing a 
resource management plan does not just depend on the nature of the management rules and 
the way in which the authorities conduct themselves; it may also depend on the pre-existing 
levels of trust that exist in a community or country as a result of its history and the strength of 
its institutions.  This exogenous component distinguishes trust from procedural fairness and 
other criteria contributing to legitimacy.  The satisfaction of communication, participation 
and procedural fairness in a resource management plan is a result of processes directly 
associated with the plan itself.  Conversely, the satisfaction of trust in a resource management 
plan may owe more to exogenous conditions that are independent of the plan.               
One implication of trust’s exogenous component is that people are more likely to trust a 
resource management plan if they have pre-existing trust in the authorities that are designing 
the system.  Of course, authorities can earn stakeholders’ trust once a resource management 
system has been designed or implemented, but clearly it helps a great deal if people trust 
resource management authorities before a resource management system is designed and 
implemented.  Furthermore, authorities have to maintain the trust bestowed on them if their 
decisions and the rules they craft are to continue being trustworthy.  Of course, it is easy for 
authorities to lose the trust that is placed in them.  In this sense, trust is analogous to a good 
reputation: difficult to earn, but easily and quickly lost.   
Like procedural fairness, trust has an important function as a criterion underpinning 
legitimacy.  The basic intuition here is that people who trust decision-makers and other 
authorities are more likely to accept the decisions they make and the rules they devise.  If 
legitimacy stems from the sense that an individual has an obligation to accept rules, then that 
sense of obligation to accept will be stronger when the individual trusts the authorities.  As 
Tyler (2001) notes, ‘trust in the motives of authorities is central to judgements about their 
legitimacy’.  Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that trust moderates the effect of 
procedural fairness (see, for example, De Cremer and Tyler, 2007).  The impact of procedural 
fairness on perceptions of legitimacy is larger when people are dealing with authorities or 
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organisations they trust (ibid).  Thus, trust can serve an indirect legitimation function through 
its influence on assessments of procedural fairness. 
4.9.1 ‘Micro-situational’ attributes that enhance trust  
There are certain attributes of a situation that increase or decrease the probability that 
individuals will use norms like reciprocity and trust, and that therefore lead to norm-abiding 
behaviour (Ostrom, 2009b).  In situations characterised by repeated interactions (which 
approximates most closely to what is happening in the Alaskan halibut fishery, the Paraná 
delta, and other SESs), the use of norms like reciprocity and trust that lead to cooperation is 
more likely to occur when: 
1. ‘Information about past actions is made available’; 
2. The same group of participants interact repeatedly with one another; 
3. Participants can communicate by sending pre-structured information; 
4. Prescriptions (rules governing harvest levels, for instance) that lead to better outcomes 
are adopted and enforced; 
5. Participants are able to communicate fully; 
6. Participants are able to communicate fully with other individuals whose identities are 
known to them; 
7. Participants can sanction or reward past behaviour; 
8. ‘Participants can design their own rules related to levels of cooperation and sanctions 
that are assigned to those who do not follow agreed-upon rules’. 
(These attributes are derived or quoted from Ostrom, 2009b.) 
An implication of identifying these attributes is that a resource management system in which 
at least some of these attributes are present is more likely to be characterised by trusting 
behaviour, and therefore by greater legitimacy.  Consequently, those features of a resource 
management system that lead to the emergence of these attributes may indirectly legitimate 
the management system.  For instance, mechanisms like public meetings which allow full and 
effective communication will go some way toward satisfying attributes like information 
being made available and participants being able to interact repeatedly with one another.  
Public meetings may therefore have a function in building trust between the actors in a 
resource management system. 
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4.9.2 Communication, information and trust   
Interestingly, many of the attributes that Ostrom identifies above concern the availability and 
flow of information.  For instance, there is a need to make information about past actions 
available.  Participants must be able to communicate by ‘sending pre-structured information’; 
and communication in general is a major feature of the micro-situational attributes.   
Information and trust are arguably linked via uncertainty.  In a resource management context, 
uncertainty can arise when stakeholders in a SES do not know how a management authority 
will proceed when designing management regulations, or are unsure how those regulations 
will impact their livelihoods and the SES itself.  Moreover, the dynamics and function of 
ecological systems are inherently uncertain and chaotic.  In general, the individuals involved 
in a SES will differ in their information about the system and therefore experience 
‘information inequality’ (Arrow, 1974).  (Henceforth, ‘information inequality’ – the term 
used by Arrow – is referred to as information asymmetry.)  Furthermore, the benefits and 
costs of the information they have will also differ.  For instance, it may be much more 
valuable to know whether or not one statement about the world (statement A) is true than it is 
to know whether or not statement B is true.  Equally, the resources required to determine the 
truthfulness of statement A may be much greater than those for statement B (ibid).  
Information asymmetry is therefore the source of uncertainty, except where uncertainty is 
caused by a total lack of information or knowledge.  The latter necessarily affects all 
individuals equally.  Uncertainty impacts some individuals more than others, either because 
one individual has less information than another, or because the information he has is less 
valuable.      
Uncertainty due to information asymmetry can lead to a lack of trust (or the presence of 
mistrust) between at least two individuals, or between groups, especially if the freedom of 
one of the actors in the situation is constrained by the decisions of another.  Consider the 
following example.  The stakeholders in a SES almost certainly know less than management 
authorities about the design of a resource management system, and what they do know is 
probably less detailed than the information held by the management authorities.  If it is less 
detailed, it is probably less valuable as a guide to determine what the management authorities 
intend to do.  The dilemma that confronts stakeholders, then, is how to know with the 
incomplete information they have whether they will be negatively impacted by the 
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management authority’s decisions.  The dilemma can only be resolved if the stakeholders 
receive additional information.  But if it appears that management authorities are withholding 
information (by failing to communicate, say), and therefore maintaining the information 
asymmetry, there is reason to mistrust them.   
This situation occurs frequently in resource management contexts.  It has important 
implications for the legitimation of resource management systems.  Where uncertainty leads 
to mistrust of management authorities, mistrust itself will reduce the likelihood that actors in 
a resource management situation perceive management rules as legitimate (for the reasons 
described in section 4.7).  More generally, the way information is distributed in SESs is 
characterised by asymmetries.  The uncertainty caused by information asymmetry is therefore 
a central feature of CPR and SES management.  When particular stakeholders are in a 
position of responsibility or authority, information asymmetry places them in a delicate 
situation in terms of the way they handle and distribute information.  If authorities do not use 
information competently, they risk engendering ill feeling and mistrust.  At one level, then, 
legitimacy (and trust) problems are information problems.  This is a simple but fundamental 
point.  It emphasises the importance of effective communication and participation in resource 
management systems as a way to address information asymmetries and establish trust and 
legitimacy between actors in a resource management system. 
4.9.3 Institutions and trust   
The observation that formal and informal institutions shape trust (Fehr, 2009) suggests that 
pre-existing institutional arrangements can have an effect on the way in which trust, and 
therefore legitimacy, emerges in a resource management system.  Identifying and 
understanding the nature of these institutions can help in understanding instances where trust 
is present or absent irrespective of the micro-situational attributes described above.  However, 
it is difficult to make generalised statements about the institutions that consistently shape 
trust.  Indeed, it is likely that the role played by institutions in trust is context-specific.  For 
instance, people in Argentina may mistrust government institutions because of the recent 
history of repressive military governments in the country.  Conversely, people in some parts 
of the United States – including, arguably, Alaska and the Pacific north-west – trust 
government institutions to a much greater degree than in Argentina.  The impact of 
institutions on trust will therefore vary from place to place. 
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4.9.4 Summarising the relationship between trust and legitimacy 
Figure 8 below summarises the various facets of the relationship between trust and 
legitimacy.  Trust’s temporal component is taken into account by distinguishing between pre-
existing trust in decision-makers and authorities, and trust that is earned by authorities.  The 
broken arrow between trust and legitimacy indicates the indirect effect that trust has on 
legitimacy through procedural fairness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. A framework to illustrate the relationship between trust and legitimacy. 
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Paraná delta, and has been investigated in other empirical and laboratory settings (see, for 
instance, Bresig et al., 2003).  Furthermore, the micro-situational attributes identified by 
Ostrom (2009b) include a number that relate to communication.  Communication is therefore 
a key variable in overcoming CPR and other social dilemmas.  I argue that it is also a criteria 
contributing to legitimacy in resource management for SESs like the halibut fishery and the 
Paraná delta. 
4.10.1 ‘Effective’ communication 
In my discussion of Jürgen Habermas’s ideas on legitimation crisis and communicative action 
earlier in this chapter, I emphasised the importance of his views on ‘ideal discourse’.  I 
suggested that the conditions that characterise ideal discourse should also apply to ‘effective’ 
communication.  Communication that is effective and that can contribute to building 
legitimacy is therefore based in part on these conditions.  Habermas argues that judgements 
about the quality of communication are made using various criteria: clarity, honesty, 
sincerity, and a lack of deception, distortion and manipulation (Lockwood et al., 2008).  
These criteria are in addition to and complementary of the principles underpinning ideal 
discourse: equal access to a discourse, the absence of domination, the ability to communicate 
without constraints and the option to put forward and object to arguments. 
According to Habermas, then, ‘effective’ communication is communication that meets a 
number of standards: clarity, honesty, sincerity, and freedom from deception, distortion and 
manipulation.  However, closer examination of these criteria suggests that at least some of 
them are redundant in explaining ‘effective’ communication.  For instance, it is not 
immediately clear how honesty differs from sincerity.  Indeed, being sincere about something 
is tantamount to being honest about it.  Perhaps the issue that Habermas is attempting to 
capture when he includes sincerity is ‘intent’, or the motivation that underpins 
communication.  In this sense, communication is effective when the communicator’s motives 
are genuine, honest and concerned with the resolution of problems to mutual benefit.  In 
short, the motivation for communicating must be ‘pure’.  ‘Motivation’ in the sense implied 
here is therefore a more appropriate criterion for effective communication than sincerity. 
In a similar way, it is arguable that a lack of deception is also redundant in explaining 
effective communication.  In particular, a lack of deception is just a negative framing of 
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honesty.  Indeed, deceiving someone requires behaving in a dishonest way; deception 
obscures the truth.  A more appropriate way to think about this standard is to consider 
whether or not a conversation or communication is honest both in content (is the information 
relayed an accurate reflection of the truth, to the best of the communicator’s knowledge?) and 
intent (is the motivation for engaging in a conversation pure?).  It is noteworthy that intent is 
again a key issue in understanding these standards.  It suggests, perhaps, that the genuineness 
and purity of motivations are of general importance to effective communication and 
legitimacy.    
Based on this analysis, effective communication as it is understood in this thesis is slightly 
different to the Habermasean conception of effective communication.  Here, effective 
communication satisfies four criteria: clarity, honesty, and a lack of distortion and 
manipulation.  Furthermore, these criteria must be reflected in the motivation that underpins 
communication. The focus on motivation (or intent) is absent in Habermas’s discussion, and 
is perhaps a better way of thinking about sincerity and a lack of deception, both of which are 
included in Habermas’s original. 
These criteria are relevant at two levels: they apply not only to the content of a 
communication, but also to the underlying rationale behind the communication.  In 
determining whether communication is effective, one must therefore ask two questions – is 
the information contained within a communication clear and honest? And, perhaps more 
importantly, is the motivation for sending a communication in the first place honest and free 
from a desire to distort and manipulate?  There is a sense that the recipients of a 
communication are more likely to be understanding of any shortcomings in the content of a 
communication if it is evident that the motivation behind the communication is authentic, 
honest and focused on producing mutual benefits.  Thus, there is reason to conclude that 
‘effective’ communication depends ultimately on the purity of the motivations and reasons 
underpinning it.  Content is important, but a secondary consideration in determining 
effectiveness. 
This discussion focuses in particular on instances where one group of stakeholders are 
delivering information to another group of stakeholders, the recipients.  Of course, 
communication also entails discourse between stakeholders.  When Habermas writes about 
discourse, he is referring to argumentation and debate between individuals who are free to 
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participate in the discourse and who are willing to respect, listen to and be swayed by the 
arguments put forward by other participants.  Arguably, criteria like clarity and honesty 
remain relevant in determining the effectiveness of a discourse.  These criteria apply to the 
content of a particular argument.  For instance, an effective argument is one in which the 
content and logic is clearer than in another. 
However, there are a number of difficulties with a definition of effective discourse and 
effective argument that is based on the satisfaction of these criteria.  In particular, an effective 
argument may not necessarily be a winning argument.  For instance, discourse may arise 
because stakeholders in a fishery are attempting to determine quota limits for the year.  These 
stakeholders are aiming to persuade their peers of the merits of a particular quota limit.  An 
effective argument in this discourse is one that is clear and honest.  However, a winning 
argument may not necessarily satisfy these criteria.  A fisherman may win a discourse in 
which he argues that quota limits are increased because his is the most logical argument; but 
this same fisherman may actually believe that quota limits should be reduced and his 
argument is motivated by a pressing short-term need.  The rationale underpinning his 
argument is dishonest, and the motivation for it is insincere and self-interested.  As a result, I 
would define his argument as ‘ineffective’ – and yet his argument won the debate.  Problems 
of this kind are common in resource management contexts, where discourse often leads to 
outcomes that can benefit or harm the interests of stakeholders in the management system.  In 
these cases, the motivation underlying a stakeholder’s point of view is the protection of his 
interests. 
There are two solutions to this problem.  The arguments in a discourse are still effective if 
they are clear and honest, but there is also a need for stakeholders to be honest and sincere 
about their motivations and in particular their interests.  In the example above, 
communication in the quota limit discourse would have been effective if the fisherman had 
been straightforward about his reasons for wanting a quota limit increase.  Secondly, 
effective discourse requires – as Habermas points out – the absence of domination and the 
ability to object to arguments.  The former means that stakeholders are unable to protect their 
interests to the detriment of others without sufficient justification.  Sufficient justification is 
achieved by communicating effectively during the discourse.  Winning an argument is not 
necessary, in part because the challenges raised by other participants in the discourse should 
clarify which arguments are ineffective.  Thus, the ability to object to another participant’s 
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point of view is important because it can reveal instances in which communication has failed 
to satisfy the criteria that make it effective. 
Habermas’s ideas on communication and discourse provide us with an indication of the 
criteria that characterise effective communication in discourse situations and when 
information is delivered and received by stakeholders.  However, it is worth emphasising that 
these criteria are difficult to meet in practice.  In many instances, communication between the 
stakeholders in a resource management system may fail to reach the standard implied by the 
criteria.  Habermas himself recognised this; Finlayson (2005) notes that ‘in real life, where 
time is limited and participants prone to error, discourses will only ever approximate these 
ideals to a greater or lesser degree’.  Nevertheless, I would argue that communication that 
does not satisfy the criteria is not immediately ineffective.  Instead, effective communication 
falls along a continuum.  Communication becomes more effective the closer it gets to 
satisfying all of the criteria.  Clearly, then, the priority for a resource management authority 
and for the stakeholders involved in a resource management system is to encourage 
communication that approximates the Habermasean ideal.   
In this vein, there are two other points that merit discussion.  Firstly, the aspects of effective 
communication that concern motivations and reasons are difficult to incentivise or promote.  
Legislating for ‘purity’ in people’s motives for communicating is challenging.  This is 
problematic for a resource management authority that is trying to be deliberative about 
communication and in turn legitimacy.  To some extent, effective communication is beyond 
their immediate control.  Indeed, the only practical option for encouraging ‘pure’ motivations 
is, perhaps, to lead by example.  The onus is therefore on resource management authorities in 
demonstrating that the reasons underpinning their own efforts at communication are honest 
and not purely self-interested.  Although this may sound utopian, I would argue that people 
respond well and in kind to instances of authenticity.  Effective communication is therefore a 
virtuous cycle; when it is evident that people are genuine in their efforts to communicate 
effectively, others will follow suit. 
Secondly, it is worth re-emphasising that effective communication contributes to the 
development of legitimacy.  The connection between effective communication and 
legitimacy is largely intuitive.  For instance, I have already mentioned how communication 
can build trust between the participants in a resource management system – and trusting a 
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resource management authority and the rules it promulgates increases their legitimacy.  
Certainly, satisfying criteria like honesty is an expression of trustworthy behaviour.  In 
addition, effective communication goes some way toward demonstrating procedural fairness.  
In particular, the requirement for participants in a discourse to have equal access to the 
discourse, an equal ability to communicate and to put forward and object to arguments, and 
the absence of domination, ensure satisfaction of the hearing rule.  Equally, a discourse in 
which arguments are made and rebutted is less likely to produce biased outcomes.  And 
finally, ideal discourse in the Habermasean sense is one in which participation (see section 
4.9 below) is guaranteed.  Thus, effective communicate is perhaps an expression of the 
satisfaction of the other three legitimation function criteria.  Indeed, a failure to communicate 
effectively may preclude satisfaction of the other criteria.  It therefore has an important 
legitimation function in and of itself.          
4.10.2 What might effective communication look like in a resource management 
context? 
The discussion above is useful because it gives us an understanding of effective 
communication and its legitimation function.  But the discussion is also at a relatively high 
level of abstraction.  It may not be clear what effective communication in a resource 
management system looks like in any practical sense, and therefore what deliberative steps a 
resource management authority should take in promoting effective communication. 
Arguably, addressing this shortcoming requires a focus on the two forms of communication 
typical in a resource management context: communication where one stakeholder is receiving 
information from another (a fisheries scientist providing information to fishermen, say), and 
discourse between stakeholders (a management committee debating the merits of different 
quota limits for halibut, for instance).  Ideally, a resource management system will provide 
opportunities for stakeholders to engage in both kinds of communication.  The former could 
include communicating through newsletters and other media that keep stakeholders updated 
on developments in the management system.  The latter entails meetings and fora in which 
stakeholders are able to provide their point of view.  If the discourse that takes places in 
meetings and fora is to approximate to the Habermasean ideal, then it is necessary that at 
least one element of a meeting or forum is open to the public and therefore provides equal 
access.                  
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4.10.3 Communication, information and uncertainty 
The idea that legitimacy is in some respects an information problem was established in 
section 4.7.2.  If true, it reinforces the importance of communication in legitimacy because 
communication is one way in which information is transferred and information asymmetries 
can be addressed.  
Arrow’s (1974) seminal work is again useful in understanding the way in which 
communication and information are connected.  For Arrow, there is a distinction between the 
‘state of knowledge existing at any moment of time’ and ‘the possibility of acquiring 
information in the future’.  Education is one way in which an individual might acquire 
information; face-to-face communication is another.  Both of these entail costs in terms of 
capital, effort, time and even politics.  Many of these costs are sunk costs.  There is also a 
tendency toward increasing costs with increasing scale of operations or number of members 
in an organisation (Olson, 1965).  These costs are, of course, crucial to the ease with which 
information is transmitted.  Clearly, if the costs of investing in information transmission are 
higher than the benefits, organisations will choose not to invest.  Equally, when 
communication costs are higher than communication benefits, the frequency of information 
transmission will decrease or fall to zero because organisations will move to minimise their 
costs. 
This simple point suggests that the communication costs that a resource management 
organisation like the IPHC incurs will determine how frequently it is able to communicate.  
The literature suggests that there is a strong, positive relationship between frequency of 
communication and trust (Lubell, 2007), and so communication costs (in addition to the 
quality of communication) should shape the ability of organisations to engender trust, and by 
extension to earn legitimacy.  This is not to say that costs alone are the key factor in shaping 
the frequency and effectiveness of communication.  The quality of communication affects the 
latter.  Intangible factors like leadership and political considerations might influence both. 
Communication therefore serves an important legitimation function.  Its legitimating effect is 
both direct and indirect.  It is direct in a Habermasean sense because it allows stakeholders in 
SESs to reach a common understanding about their interests and goals, and in so doing to 
develop ‘good arguments’ under conditions of ‘ideal’ discourse.  Legitimacy rests on ‘good 
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arguments’ made under these circumstances.  Communication also has an indirect 
legitimation function through its effect on trust.  The ability to communicate effectively, 
especially in face-to-face settings, is a ‘micro-situational’ attribute that enhances trust.  In 
addition, effective communication can provide a process with some of the attributes that 
make it fair.  Figure 9 below illustrates the connection between communication and 
legitimacy. 
   
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. A framework to illustrate the connection between communication and 
legitimacy. 
4.11 Criteria IV – participation 
The final criterion contributing to legitimacy in the legitimation function framework is 
participation.  Here, participation is understood as it is described in Pillar II and Articles 6, 7 
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and 8 of the Aarhus Convention.  The Aarhus Convention was adopted in June 1998, and 
establishes a number of rights to the environment for the general public.  I make use of the 
Convention because it is relatively new (it was implemented in October 2001), because the 
application of its principles is widespread (there are 46 parties to the convention, in addition 
to the European Union) and because it focuses on securing citizens’ right to a ‘healthy 
environment’ through public participation specifically (as well as access to information and 
access to justice).  Although the Convention does not define public participation, it suggests 
that, at its core, public participation provides citizens with a way to ‘assert their right to live 
in an environment adequate to health and wellbeing, and to fulfil [their] duty to protect the 
environment’.  Furthermore, public participation ‘gives the public opportunity to express its 
concerns, and enables public authorities to take due account of such concerns’.  The 
Convention suggests that public participation should be ‘timely, effective, adequate and 
formal’, and that it entails various requirements in respect of communication, information, 
notifications, and responses.   
The Convention also covers participation in various decision-making and policy-making 
processes.  Article 6 concerns public participation in specific decisions that may have an 
environmental impact; Article 7 relates to public participation in the development of ‘plans, 
programmes and policies’ that concern the environment; and Article 8 covers public 
participation in the preparation of environmental laws and regulations by public authorities.  
More generally, the Convention is at a fundamental level recognition of the concept of 
natural justice and procedural fairness and the rule of audi alteram partem specifically (see 
section 4.6).  The premise on which the principle of public participation in the Convention is 
based is that public participation is an expression of audi alteram partem and therefore 
improves the quality of decision-making, both in terms of appropriateness and procedural 
fairness. 
Reference to the Aarhus Convention is also useful because it emphasises that participation is 
often enshrined in law.  When thinking about participation, therefore, it is worth 
distinguishing between participation that is not a formal requirement in a management 
process, and participation for which there is an underlying legislative obligation.  The former 
is likely to be ad hoc and irregular; the latter, by virtue of its legislative underpinning, is 
probably more predictable and beneficial, in the sense that stakeholders have recourse to the 
law when participation does not meet a required standard.  For instance, the Aarhus 
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Convention makes it possible to challenge decision-makers on issues concerning 
participation, and to change participation for the better when it does not satisfy the letter or 
the spirit of the Convention.  When participation does not have a similar legislative basis, 
stakeholders are less able to hold decision-makers to account.          
Based on these ideas, I define participation as a way in which the stakeholders in a process 
are able to have their voices heard in a predictable way.  A formal legal requirement for 
participation is not necessary, but it is helpful.  It enables stakeholders to make judgements 
about the honesty, reliability and sincerity of the people and processes that direct resource 
management systems.  Thus, the primary test to determine whether or not a resource 
management scheme is participative is whether it satisfies the hearing rule.  A secondary test 
is to ascertain whether the management scheme in place has mechanisms that provide 
stakeholders with sufficient information to evaluate the honesty, reliability and sincerity of 
management organisations and their members.  
My definition of participation might lead to confusion because it suggests that participation 
and communication are tantamount to the same thing.  Although communication and 
participation are perhaps on a continuum, there are several key distinctions between 
communication and participation.  Firstly, participation implies something more than mere 
communication.  Most importantly, it denotes that stakeholders are able to attend in person 
the functions and meetings that accompany processes like resource management.  Secondly, 
participation can also include the involvement of stakeholders in resource management 
decision-making.  Participation of this kind is perhaps best termed ‘representative’ 
participation, because it provides stakeholders with formal representation in the management 
organisations whose decisions shape a resource management system.  Finally, participation 
can suggest that stakeholders are able to contribute to the science that underpins a resource 
management system.  Participation in scientific processes facilitates assessments of the 
science used in resource management decisions.  It can therefore go some way toward 
satisfying stakeholders that the science underpinning resource management is reliable and 
that it is used in an honest way. 
Of course, one implication of treating participation in this way is that, by definition, it goes 
some way toward ensuring that a process is fair.  ‘Full’ participation requires satisfying the 
hearing principle (audi alteram partem) and is therefore an expression of procedural fairness.  
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I expand on this idea in section 4.9.1.  Another implication of the way I define participation is 
that it requires the establishment of specific processes – regular public meetings, for instance, 
or a requirement to notify the public of decisions or timelines.  Such processes make 
participation a predictable or even formal part of a resource management system, and so are 
the surest way of guaranteeing that stakeholders are able to have their voices heard.  Clearly, 
a resource management system might in practice be participative even participation in it is 
unpredictable or informal.  However, predictability is important because it makes 
participation an integral part of the management system.  It establishes an expectation of 
participation.  Arguably, such systems are more likely to be legitimate than those where 
participation is ad hoc and can ‘dry up’ suddenly.   
The preceding discussion should clarify the connection between participation and procedural 
fairness.  Participation also contributes directly to effective communicative.  The rationale 
here is simple: participation brings together diverse stakeholders and provides them with an 
opportunity to communicate and to engage in discourse.  Without participation, it is easier to 
obfuscate and to communicate in a way that is less than clear or honest.  This relationship is 
dealt with in section 4.9.2.  Finally, participation and trust are linked because the former can 
provide the conditions under which trust emerges.  I discuss each of these points in the 
sections that follow. 
4.11.1 Participation and procedural fairness 
My definition of participation (see section 4.9) suggests that participation is an expression of 
procedural fairness and in particular the hearing rule (the principle of audi alteram partem).  
Participation therefore increases the likelihood that a process is perceived as fair because it is 
one way in which individuals can ensure that their voices are heard and considered by 
authorities.  Conversely, if individuals cannot make their voices heard in a decision-making 
process, the process does not satisfy the hearing rule and thus cannot be deemed fair.   
This conception of participation and procedural fairness is valuable, but it is also limited 
insofar as it does not consider the influence of participation on other aspects of procedural 
fairness.  For instance, participation may have an impact on the quality of decision-making 
and the quality of inter-personal treatment, both of which Tyler suggests are integral to 
conceptualisations of procedural fairness.  Firstly, participation enhances the evidence base 
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on which decisions are made because it provides decision-makers with perspectives that they 
may otherwise have not been able to consider.  It should therefore help improve the neutrality 
of decision-making, in that as many points of view are taken into account as possible23.  It 
should also ensure that decisions are taken with as many of the facts available.  Both of these 
features enhance the quality of decision-making.  Secondly, participation can promote an 
individual’s sense that he has a meaningful role to play in decision-making.  That, in turn, can 
lead to the perception that one is being treated with dignity and respect, and can therefore 
cause improved assessments of the quality of inter-personal treatment. 
Thus, participation and procedural fairness are connected at a number of levels.  Most 
importantly, participation satisfies the hearing rule and hence represents one way in which 
procedural fairness is manifested in a resource management system.  Furthermore, 
participation has benefits for the quality of decision-making and inter-personal treatment.  
Participation therefore contributes to positive assessments of procedural fairness through 
these two criteria. 
4.11.2 Participation and communication 
One key aspect of participation’s legitimation function is the way it can contribute to 
effective communication.  The relationship between participation and communication exists 
because participation often engenders communication (Cavalcanti et al., 2011).  (I have 
already commented that communication and participation are closely related, with the key 
difference that participation entails significantly more than communication does.)  Certainly, 
it is clear that participation in meetings and other events allows people to exchange 
information directly and share perspectives (Stringer et al., 2006).  It brings together 
stakeholder groups that are otherwise distinct and may not normally have an opportunity to 
communicate.  Participation can therefore serve to address the uncertainty that stakeholders 
may have about a plan’s development, afford them an opportunity to contribute to decision-
making, and allow them to reach compromise and/or consensus.  It also means authorities can 
communicate their plans directly to several and/or large stakeholder groups, which is 
advantageous relative to situations where communication is impersonal or reaches small 
groups only.  Furthermore, participation can allow authorities to hear stakeholders’ concerns 
                                                 
23 Of course, this assumes that the decision-makers themselves are unbiased. 
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directly and in person.  Participation can therefore enhance the quality of communication.  In 
so doing, it can lead to effective communication.   
4.11.3 Participation and trust 
In addition to its role in effective communication and procedural fairness, participation can 
also indirectly build trust.  Participation is linked to trust because it affords stakeholders the 
opportunity to learn about the trustworthiness of other group members (Stringer et al., 2006).  
Although interacting in a participatory process does not necessarily mean that one 
stakeholder will come to trust another, it does make it easier to learn about and assess other 
stakeholders’ trustworthiness compared to situations where stakeholders cannot communicate 
face-to-face or never meet in person.  This is especially true in cases where there are repeated 
interactions over time.  Repeated interactions provide stakeholders with multiple 
opportunities in which to build a picture of other stakeholders’ character.  A further 
implication of this argument is that a participatory process is more likely to be effective when 
participation occurs repeatedly over a period of time.  Thus, participation in regular meetings, 
say, allows stakeholders to interact in person and to develop an impression over time of their 
fellow stakeholders’ honesty, sincerity and trustworthiness.  In turn, these meetings might 
prove to be ideal conditions for the emergence of trust between stakeholders in a resource 
management system.  
Figure 10 below summarises the legitimation function played by participation through its 
effect on communication, procedural fairness and trust.  As in figures 8 and 9, the broken 
arrows in figure 10 represent indirect relationships. 
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Figure 10. A framework to show the direct and indirect impact of participation on 
communication, procedural fairness and trust. 
4.12 The importance of trust 
Figures 8, 9 and 10 should demonstrate that the legitimation function criteria can interact and 
affect one another.  For instance, trust in a resource management context may also depend on 
the satisfaction of communication, participation and procedural fairness.  The argument here 
is that trust in a resource management plan or resource management authorities is broken if 
any of the other three legitimation function criteria are not themselves satisfied.  Thus, 
individuals are less likely to trust resource management authorities if those authorities do not 
communicate clearly, or if they are perceived to carry out management processes in a way 
that is unfair.   
However, the effect that exogenous features can have on trust means that an actor may still 
trust a resource management plan even if it does not satisfy any of the three other legitimacy 
criteria.  Equally, they may mistrust the management system even if it satisfies 
communication, participation and procedural fairness.  By extension, there is a sense that 
trust is the most difficult of the legitimation criteria to satisfy.  It is also plausible that trust is 
the most important criteria of the four that serve a legitimation function.  Stakeholders’ 
assessments of communication, participation and procedural fairness are likely to be coloured 
by the absence of trust between stakeholders.  For instance, a resource management authority 
will struggle to communicate effectively if stakeholders dismiss those communications as 
dishonest.  Similarly, it is more likely that stakeholders will view management decisions as 
procedurally unfair if they mistrust the motives of decision-makers.  Mistrust may predispose 
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them to believe that resource managers are making biased decisions, for example.  Even if 
decision-makers are doing no such thing, the perception that that is the case is damaging, if 
not fatal to assessments of procedural fairness and therefore legitimacy.  Thus, trust has a 
significant impact on many aspects of the other legitimation function criteria.  The absence of 
trust, or outright mistrust, is almost certain to be negative to the legitimacy of a resource 
management system.       
4.13  Empirical support for the legitimacy framework 
The framework described in the preceding sections is based on literature from a variety of 
disciplines.  Much of that literature has a strong empirical foundation (notably the work on 
procedural fairness and legitimacy, and trust).  In addition, it is possible to demonstrate the 
validity of the legitimacy framework with evidence from the interview data (see chapters 3 
and 5).  The legitimacy framework is therefore based on two distinct empirical foundations.  
These foundations should give us confidence that the framework does indeed reflect ‘real 
world’ processes, rather than remaining purely theoretical.  Of course, additional empirical 
scrutiny will further strengthen or weaken the framework.   
4.14 Summarising the legitimation function framework 
The framework outlined here argues that legitimacy has four principal underpinning criteria: 
procedural fairness, communication, participation and trust.  The relationship between 
procedural fairness and legitimacy is well established empirically in the criminology and 
social psychology literature.  Tyler (2009) conceives of procedural fairness as comprising the 
quality of decision-making and the quality of inter-personal treatment, and Leventhal’s 
(1980) fairness criteria usefully inform what shapes the quality of decision-making and the 
quality of inter-personal treatment.   
The role that trust plays in legitimacy is theoretical, but it is based on the reasonable intuition 
that authorities and regulations are more likely to be viewed as legitimate if people trust those 
authorities.  Trust itself emerges when there is an expectation that trusting behaviour is likely 
to be reciprocated, and is therefore linked to the extent to which social norms like reciprocity 
are widespread in a community.  Ostrom (2009b) identifies particular ‘micro-situational’ 
attributes that increase the probability that the norms that lead to trust are used.  Those 
features of a resource management system that allow these attributes to emerge therefore 
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increase trust in the resource management system, and by extension the system’s legitimacy.  
The development of trust is also linked to the impact of formal and informal institutions 
(Fehr, 2009).  Fehr’s conclusions suggest that the presence or absence of particular 
institutions improves the likelihood that trusting behaviour is widespread.  Trust therefore has 
an exogenous component, because these institutions may be independent of the resource 
management system.  Finally, trust or mistrust depends to some extent on information 
asymmetry and the uncertainty that it creates.    Authorities and others organisations that 
withhold information that could otherwise address information asymmetry provide people 
with a reason to mistrust those organisations.  Given how common information asymmetries 
are in SESs, and given the power management authorities have over stakeholders’ lives, 
addressing information asymmetries is a key problem in resource management and one which 
has a direct impact on trust and therefore legitimacy.   
Effective communication is one way to address information asymmetry.  The key word in the 
phrase ‘effective communication’ is, of course, ‘effective’.  It implies that the manner in 
which communication takes place accounts for its ability to solve or reduce an information 
asymmetry.  Habermas identified a number of criteria like clarity, honesty, sincerity and a 
lack of deception, distortion and manipulation that impact on the quality of communication 
(Lockwood et al., 2008).  These criteria characterise ‘ideal’ discourse.  Simplifying 
Habermas, I argue that communication is ‘effective’ when it satisfies four of his criteria: 
clarity, honesty, and a lack of distortion and manipulation.  Arguably, sincerity and a lack of 
deception are redundant because they relate primarily to honesty.  Indeed, one can argue that 
being insincere or deceptive during a conversation is equivalent to being dishonest.   
When individuals and organisations are able to communicate effectively, it goes some way 
toward negating information asymmetry, and therefore builds trust and consequently a sense 
that an organisation or a set of rules is legitimate.  Effective communication is also important 
to procedural fairness, insofar as effective communication – especially in discourse situations 
– contributes to satisfaction of the hearing rule.  Finally, communication is perhaps most 
effective when it is face-to-face.  A commitment to effective communication is therefore a 
commitment to participation.  Thus, effective communication plays a legitimation function 
indirectly, through its effect on trust, procedural fairness and participation, but also directly, 
insofar as a failure to communicate effectively may preclude satisfaction of all the other 
criteria.         
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Participation itself serves a legitimation function by encouraging effective communication, 
by shaping perceptions of procedural fairness, and by affecting the likelihood that 
stakeholders are able to assess the trustworthiness of others.  Participation in certain forms 
(notably events, meetings, and workshops) can lead to effective communication because it 
provides stakeholders with an opportunity to engage personally with one another.  In this 
sense, participation improves the quality of communication and therefore facilitates the 
conversations that encourage compromise and cooperation.  Equally, participation is an 
expression of the hearing rule, and can therefore lead to positive assessments of procedural 
fairness.  Finally, participation allows people to assess the trustworthiness of other 
stakeholders.  Although this does not imply that participation increases trust, it does suggest 
that participation can establish conditions in which trust is likely to develop. 
What is perhaps more important than the individual criteria that make up the legitimation 
function framework is the way that these criteria interact and influence one another.  
Communication, participation, procedural fairness and trust are all in various ways 
interconnected and interdependent.  As a result, it is necessary to think about the legitimation 
function criteria in a holistic way.  Each criterion depends to some extent on the satisfaction 
of the others.  Conversely, and as I argue in section 4.4, a narrow view of the criteria as boxes 
in a box-ticking exercise is insufficient for legitimacy.  A box-ticking approach treats each 
criterion as an end and a means in itself.  Furthermore, such an approach lacks the 
authenticity and commitment to communication, participation, procedural fairness and trust 
that the legitimation function requires.  The criteria can never be truly satisfied if the 
motivation underlying the attempt to satisfy them is disingenuous.   
Figure 11 below summarises the relationship between each of these four criteria and 
legitimacy itself, and the direct and indirect relationships between the criteria. 
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Figure 11. A framework for understanding legitimacy. 
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Chapter 5 An application of the legitimation function framework 
In chapter 4, I introduced a framework that suggests that a legitimate resource management 
system satisfies four criteria: communication, participation, procedural fairness, and trust.  Of 
these four criteria, trust is a ‘higher level’ criterion: it can be broken if at least one of the 
other three criteria is missing from a resource management process.  Furthermore, but rather 
conversely, trust has a strong exogenous component in that an individual might perceive that 
a resource management plan does not satisfy any of the other three criteria but still retain his 
trust in it.   
In this chapter, I explore the degree to which the four legitimation function criteria are being 
satisfied in PIECAS and in the fishery.  The chapter proceeds as follows: in section 5.1, I 
outline the methodology employed.  In sections 5.2 to 5.6, I show that the halibut fishery 
satisfies to a great extent the four legitimation function criteria.  In sections 5.7 to 5.12, I 
suggest that, to a lesser extent, PIECAS is not satisfying the legitimation function criteria.  
Based on this analysis, I hypothesise about the elements that PIECAS should contain if it is to 
address its legitimation function ‘deficit’.  I conclude the chapter in section 5.13.   
The chapter’s central proposal is that there are key differences in the way that the fishery and 
PIECAS were designed and are managed that have of themselves satisfied (or failed to 
satisfy) the legitimation function criteria, and therefore contributed to differences in 
perceptions of each plan’s legitimacy.  In the fishery, for instance, the participation element 
of legitimacy has been satisfied by, amongst others, the incorporation of regular, public 
meetings into the management process.  Conversely, PIECAS has failed to satisfy the 
participation criterion by excluding agricultural stakeholders from the design process 
(intentionally or otherwise). 
Of course, one element of the legitimation function that this analysis does not address is the 
context in which each resource management scheme is placed.  The institutions and social 
norms that shape governance and society may make the legitimation function much harder to 
satisfy if they themselves lack legitimacy or in some way constrain behaviour that is 
conducive to satisfying the legitimation function.  For instance, norms of reciprocity that 
encourage trust – and therefore make it easier to satisfy the participation and trust 
components of legitimation function – may be absent in a particular community.  As I discuss 
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in chapter 6, the legitimation function can therefore depend in part on exogenous 
institutional, political and socio-economic features.  However, it is possible that even in well-
managed countries a resource management scheme lacks legitimacy or is unsuccessful.  In 
these circumstances, a lack of legitimacy arises because the scheme does not satisfy the 
legitimation function criteria.   
A good example of a resource management scheme whose legitimacy is not always perceived 
positively but is placed within a strong institutional context is the CFP.  Metrics for 
institutional robustness like electoral malpractice and rule of law are strong in most EU 
Member States, but, irrespective, the CFP’s failings have proved so numerous and severe that 
its legitimacy has been questioned (Schwach et al., 2007; Lavers, 2011).  Arguably, the 
CFP’s putative lack of legitimacy stems not only from its failure to maintain fish stocks at 
sustainable levels (‘eudaemonic legitimacy’ – see chapter 4) but also from problems 
satisfying the legitimation function criteria.  For instance, it is intuitive that fishermen are less 
likely to trust the CFP when it is apparent that the quota-setting process is deeply politicised 
and therefore procedurally unfair (because it is not impartial and also suffers from political 
bias).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
The chapter has some relationship with literature that explores the design features of 
institutions that address environmental problems successfully (see, for instance, Andresen 
and Hey, 2005; Berardo and Gerlak, 2012).  It may also complement the design principles 
literature (see chapter 3 and Ostrom, 1990).  That literature suggests that the presence of 
certain design principles can lead to robust and sustainable resource management systems.  
Here, I suggest that the presence of the four legitimation function criteria contributes to 
similarly successful and legitimate resource management schemes.  Conversely, the absence 
of the legitimation function criteria contributes to the illegitimacy and so possible failure of a 
management system.   
Interestingly, some of the design principles identified by Ostrom – notably principle 3, that 
resource users are able to participate in making and modifying rules – enhance participation 
and perceptions of procedural fairness and legitimacy.  In the context of this thesis, it is 
noteworthy that principle 3, which is seen as important for sustainability, also has a strong 
effect on legitimacy.  It suggests, perhaps, that participation in rule making and modification 
contributes to sustainable outcomes precisely as a result of its implications for legitimacy and 
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therefore compliance and enforcement.  In a similar way, the design principle that ‘rule 
monitors’ are accountable to those affected by the rules is ultimately concerned with the 
legitimacy of those ‘rule monitors’.  Introducing accountability ensures that the authorities 
that implement rules do so fairly.  As Ostrom (2000) notes, ‘the community legitimates a 
position’.  Finally, the design principle that rule infractions are addressed with graduated 
sanctions depending on the severity and context of the infraction also has a strong procedural 
fairness and legitimacy component.  It ensures that punishments are commensurate with the 
nature of the transgression, which is consistent with the classical definition of retributive 
justice and, crucially, the procedural standards and procedural fairness that retributive justice 
entails.  It means that the sanctions imposed are fair, because they are not malicious or 
vengeful; instead, they are consistent, objective, and limited in their scope because they are 
determined by due procedure.  This in turn means that they are more likely to be legitimate.  
It is striking that a number of design principles that were originally identified for their 
importance in contributing to sustainable outcomes, and which have withstood significant 
empirical scrutiny (see, for instance, Cox et al., 2010), should be so heavily suffused with 
features that ensure the maintenance of fairness and trust and therefore legitimacy.  In short, 
these design principles are important because they serve a legitimation function.   
5.1 Methodology for chapter 5 
This chapter is based on an analysis of the qualitative data I collected with semi-structured 
interviews during my fieldwork, the survey data made available by researchers at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and the survey I administered myself in 2014/2015.  In 
addition, it uses documentary evidence available online.   
There are limitations to the method employed in this chapter.  Most importantly, the halibut 
fishery and the Paraná delta are so different that any comparison is difficult to justify because 
we are not comparing like with like.  Then again, the legitimation function criteria are 
capable of being applied to any resource management system.  In addition, the framework 
does not cross-apply features of one management system to another, thereby avoiding the 
problems that come with making generalised statements from specific case studies.   
In respect of the differences between the delta and the fishery, the fishery is nested in the 
strong institutions that characterise the United States, and focuses on a specific, mobile 
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resource (Pacific halibut) that is harvested only within the jurisdictional limits of the United 
States EEZ.  Many of the tools developed to manage the halibut stock – notably IFQs - are 
unique to fisheries.  Conversely, the Paraná delta is situated in a country with weak 
institutions.  The delta itself straddles three different jurisdictions, each of which adheres to a 
separate legislative framework (see chapter 3).  Management tools have not yet been 
developed because the plan is still in its design stage.  I attempt to avoid the problems that 
arise from a direct comparison by simply analysing whether or not IFQ management and 
PIECAS satisfy the four legitimation function criteria.  Thus, there is no need to employ a 
comparative methodology.  Nonetheless, there are instances where shared features are 
qualitatively different in both plans.  In these cases, a brief comparison is worthwhile and 
reasonable because we are indeed comparing like-for-like.  For example, participation in 
PIECAS is significantly different to participation in the halibut fishery.   
To assess stakeholders’ perceptions of communication and procedural fairness in PIECAS, I 
use data from my own and the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee surveys.  The data were 
analysed in Microsoft Excel.  To illustrate assessments of the effectiveness of communication 
and procedural fairness, I plotted bar charts for the 2010, 2012 and 2014 cross-sectional 
survey data.  For the procedural fairness data, I also used two-sample T tests to determine 
whether or not there was a significant difference in respondents’ perceptions of PIECAS’s 
fairness depending on the frequency of their participation in the plan. 
The Wisconsin-Milwaukee data used to illustrate perceptions of communication and 
procedural fairness are proxies for these two legitimation function criteria.  Nonetheless, they 
are suitable proxies because they measure, respectively, stakeholders’ success in influencing 
discussions at PIECAS and whether PIECAS was procedurally fair in the sense that it 
allowed all voices to be heard equally.  Both of these measures capture at least some aspects 
of effective communication and procedural fairness.  For effective communication, the proxy 
data measure stakeholders’ ability to communicate their concerns and have these acted upon.  
For procedural fairness, the proxy data reflect the idea that a process is fair if group opinions 
are considered (the hearing rule, discussed in chapter 4).    
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5.2 An analysis of the extent to which the halibut fishery satisfies the four legitimation 
function criteria.   
There is good evidence to suggest that the way in which the halibut fishery was designed and 
is operated means that it satisfies the four criteria that characterise a legitimate resource 
management plan.  In particular, I show that participation in meetings, representative 
participation, and participation in research occurs at various stages of the fishery’s 
management process.  Similarly, the fishery’s management authorities – the IPHC and 
NPFMC – communicate effectively by promulgating information on the decisions they make 
and by generally acting in a transparent way.  Procedural fairness is evident in the ability of 
stakeholders to participate in decision-making, and in the formality and predictability of the 
management process.  Furthermore, procedural fairness was an implicit functional 
consideration at the earliest stages of the IFQ’s design scheme through the inclusion of a 
quota allocation appeals mechanism and through consideration of the socio-economic impact 
of IFQs on rural Alaskan communities.  Finally, there is evidence from the interview data that 
stakeholders trust the fishery’s management authorities and (by and large) the decisions they 
make.    
5.3 Participation in the halibut fishery 
Various features of the IFQ management scheme’s organisation and operation ensure that it is 
participative.  Establishing a participative management process is some achievement in light 
both of the distances involved the fishery - which impose significant transaction costs on 
those stakeholders who do wish to participate - and the fishery’s history, which has been 
characterised at times by fractious relationships between management authorities and 
fishermen.  To illustrate the scale of the former problem, the fishery has management 
authorities based in Anchorage (NPFMC) and Seattle (IPHC).  These cities are some 2300 
km apart.  In respect of the latter, relationships between fishermen and management 
authorities like the NPFMC (the main stakeholder groups in the fishery) were difficult during 
the derby fishery’s nadir.  As I argue in chapter 3, the collaborative, bottom-up approach 
taken during the fishery’s reform was essential to repair this relationship.      
One aspect of the halibut fishery’s operation that has almost certainly facilitated participation 
is the regularity with which the NPFMC, and to a lesser extent the IPHC, meet.  The former 
does so every two months, with meetings in Seattle and throughout Alaska.  In the last 6 
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months of 2014, for instance, the NPFMC met in Seattle, Anchorage and Nome, Alaska24.  
Changing the location of meetings is an obvious way to engage with stakeholders who are not 
able to reach Anchorage or Seattle easily.  Crucially, the meetings themselves are open to the 
general public, both in person at the meeting venue and through the Internet (presumably to 
facilitate the attendance of people who cannot do so in person).  An agenda and schedule of 
events are available to download in advance of the meeting.  Forthcoming meetings are 
clearly advertised on the home page and on the same webpage from which the agenda and 
schedule of events are available.  Details of the location of these forthcoming meetings are 
prominent.  Clearly, each of these features simplifies participation at NPFMC meetings. 
From a theoretical point of view, the NPFMC’s approach to participation is structured in such 
a way that the transaction costs of participating are reduced almost as far as is realistically 
possible.  Stakeholders incur minimal costs in searching for information because it is readily 
available from the NPFMC’s website.  The information is clearly laid out and is 
comprehensive in its scope.  The costs associated with travelling through the region to reach 
meetings are overcome by broadcasting online, and the regularity with which the NPFMC 
meets means that missing one meeting does not carry a significant opportunity cost.    
Of course, the NPFMC’s efforts would be cancelled out if participation in IPHC meetings 
were difficult.  However, the clarity and regularity with which the IPHC broadcasts its 
meetings is similarly impressive.  The IPHC follows a biannual schedule, with an interim 
meeting and a more complete annual meeting.  The annual meeting is open to the public and 
online.  The interim meeting was previously by invitation of the Commissioners, but as of 
2014 is also public and online.  Furthermore, and similar to the NPFMC, the dates of the 
forthcoming meetings are clearly marked on the IPHC’s website.  As with the NPFMC, then, 
participating at IPHC meetings is uncomplicated and seemingly encouraged. 
One feature common to the IPHC’s and NPFMC’s approach to participation is the 
predictability of the process that surrounds the meetings.  A good example of that 
predictability is the procedure for public input that the NPFMC follows, which reduces the 
uncertainty stakeholders may have about how to participate.  This predictability complements 
the frequency with which the NPFMC meets, as well as the clarity and comprehensiveness of 
information available to prospective participants (see section 5.4 on effective communication 
                                                 
24 See http://www.npfmc.org/2014-council-meetings/ for details. 
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in the halibut fishery).  Furthermore, it means that stakeholders are much less reliant on social 
connectedness to reduce the costs of participating in a resource management plan (Coggan et 
al., 2010).  With predictable procedures for participation in place, there is less need to use a 
social network to become involved in a plan.  All of these measures are likely to facilitate 
participation in the meetings, because they reduce the costs that stakeholders incur when 
attempting to participate. 
The survey data provide good evidence that participation in the fishery is indeed 
straightforward.  Asked to evaluate the ease of participation on a scale between 0 and 10, 
where 0 indicated that it was not possible to participate, and 10 that it was very easy to 
participate, 11 of the 12 respondents to the survey suggested that participation was, at worst, 
easy and at best, very easy.  The exception to this pattern was a respondent who did not know 
whether it was easy to participate in the fishery.  Furthermore, the frequency with which 
these respondents participated was generally high (especially compared to PIECAS).  Of the 
12 respondents, 4 participated on a daily, weekly or monthly basis, and a further 3 
participated trimonthly or biannually.  Of the remaining 5 respondents, 4 participated 
annually.  Only one respondent (respondent 7) did not participate at all.  A neat summary of 
the extent to which participation is an integral part of the fishery, possibly tongue-in-cheek, 
came from respondent 8: ‘Seems like every day we are talking about fish, fisherman [sic] and 
fisheries management’. 
5.3.1 Representative participation at the NPFMC and IPHC 
The IFQ management scheme also satisfies representative participation.  In particular, the 
structure and composition of both the IPHC and NPFMC means that there are a number of 
fishery stakeholders who are independent of both organisations but still play an important 
role in their operations. At the IPHC, for instance, the ‘Commission’ – which is arguably the 
most powerful body at the organisation because it adopts regulatory proposals – is made up 
of one member from a federal fisheries agency, one fisherman, and one halibut buyer or 
processor.  The Commission is therefore representative of the three key stakeholder groups 
involved in the fishery, and provides stakeholders outside government the opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making that shapes the fishery.  The role has genuine influence and 
power, and should not be considered a ‘puppet’ position. 
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In addition to the composition of the Commission, the IPHC structure includes a number of 
Advisory Bodies from which it can seek advice.  Indeed, the advisory role that these bodies 
play is aimed to ‘encourage public participation in the management of the resource’ (IPHC, 
2014c).  There are presently 5 advisory boards: the ‘Conference Board’, which is a panel 
representing American and Canadian commercial and sport fishermen; the ‘Processor 
Advisory Group’, which represents halibut processors; the ‘Research Advisory Board’, which 
is made up of fishermen and processors who suggest where the IPHC should focus its 
research efforts; the ‘Management Strategy Advisory Board’, which consists of a broad range 
of stakeholders, including academics, who advise the IPHC on its management strategy; and 
finally the ‘Scientific Review Board’, which provides independent scientific review of the 
IPHC’s science.  It is striking that the Advisory Boards cover so comprehensively the range 
of stakeholders involved in the fishery.  Their presence in the IPHC management structure 
provides further opportunity for stakeholders to participate in a meaningful way in 
influencing the decisions that shape the fishery.  The ‘quality’ of participation that the 
Commission and the Advisory Boards offer therefore surpasses mere attendance at meetings; 
it gives stakeholders the means both to advise the IPHC and to participate in decision-
making. 
In a similar way, the ‘Council’ at the NPFMC is made up of 15 broadly representative 
members.  The current Council has members from the U.S. Coastguard; fisheries officials 
from Alaska, Washington and Oregon, and the NMFS; an official from the U.S. State 
Department and the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission; and fishing industry 
members.  As with the IPHC, then, the body with the most decision-making responsibility at 
the NPFMC is representative of key stakeholder groups.  Alongside the Council, there are a 
number of Committees at the NPFMC that ‘assist in the collection and evaluation of 
information relevant to the fishery’ (NPFMC, 2014b).  Of these, the ‘Advisory Panel’ plays a 
key role in the Council process.  It is made up of 21 members, all of whom represent 
segments of the fishing industry (whether commercial or sport fishing, processing, consumers 
or environmental interests).  In addition, there are other committees like the ‘Rural Outreach 
Committee’, which aims to ‘improve outreach and communication with rural communities 
and Alaska Native entities, and develop a method for…community participation in the 
development of fishery management actions’ (NPFMC, 2014c). 
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Thus, both the IPHC and NPFMC facilitate participation in the fishery through the 
composition of their decision-making bodies and the presence of subsidiary bodies like the 
Rural Outreach Committee.  These features allow stakeholders to engage with and advise the 
IPHC and NPFMC, and in some cases like the Commission at the IPHC, to make decisions 
that determine the way the halibut fishery is managed.  The structure of the IPHC and 
NPFMC therefore contributes to the participation of a range of fishery stakeholders, rather 
than limiting participation to a select few.  
5.3.2 Participation in research at the IPHC  
In chapter 3, the collaborative research trips organised by the IPHC were highlighted as one 
way in which fishermen and IPHC scientists are able to develop trust for one another (see 
page 104).  Clearly, the research trips improve participation in the fishery’s risk assessment 
processes, in much the same way that the IPHC’s Advisory Bodies and the openness of its 
meetings do.  Arguably, participation at that stage of the management process is crucial 
because the scientific advice produced by the IPHC – notably their quota recommendations – 
has a bigger impact on fishermen’s livelihoods than almost any other management decision.  
(Along with allocated quota share, the IPHC’s recommended TAC imposes a limit on the 
amount of money an individual fisherman is able to make from halibut fishing in a given 
season.)   
5.3.3 Summarising participation in the fishery 
The preceding analysis should establish that several aspects of the halibut fishery’s operation 
and structure ensure that the fishery satisfies the participation criterion of the legitimation 
function.  In particular, the IPHC and NPFMC are organised and run in such a way that 
participation is built in to the management process.  Any stakeholder who wishes to 
participate in meetings and scientific research has the opportunity to do so.   
Another theme that emerges by considering participation is that many of the features that 
facilitate participation in the fishery’s management process also contribute to effective 
communication between management authorities and stakeholders.  In the section that 
follows, I highlight the effectiveness of communication in the fishery. 
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5.4 Effective communication in the halibut fishery 
There is evidence that the halibut fishery satisfies the communication criterion of legitimation 
function from both the interview data and from broader analysis of the fishery’s management 
process.  In respect of the interview data, a number of interviews representing different 
interests in the fishery spoke positively about communication and transparency.  Interviewee 
B, for instance, said that “the openness of the NPFMC and the federal fisheries management 
process, and in Alaska the State Board of Fish Processing, those are excruciatingly 
transparent and open to public scrutiny.”  Interviewee K believed that the Council process 
forces transparency and public debate.  Interviewee L said of both the IPHC and NPFMC, 
“both processes are…very public. They’re fairly transparent.  For those of us who are 
involved and who understand the process, I would say it’s a really accessible, and 
transparent and legitimate process.” 
The survey data also lend support to the idea that communication in the fishery is effective.  
For instance, 10 of the 12 respondents to the survey were unanimous in believing that 
communications from the IPHC were honest (the remaining two skipped the question), and a 
further 9 believed that the information provided by the IPHC was comprehensive in scope.  
Furthermore, none of the 12 respondents believed that information from the IPHC was not 
comprehensive.  Similarly, 9 of the 12 respondents suggested that information from the IPHC 
was clear to very clear, of whom 7 evaluated the clarity of communication with a score of 9 
or 10 (out of 10).  Only two respondents indicated that communication from the IPHC lacked 
clarity. 
The survey data were more ambiguous for the NPFMC.  Assessments of clarity, 
comprehensiveness and honesty did not match those of the IPHC.  This may partly explain 
why the NPFMC lacked legitimacy in the eyes of some stakeholders (see chapter 3).  
Nevertheless, the assessments made were still average.  Some 9 respondents believed that 
communications from the NPFMC were honest or honest from time to time.  Evaluations of 
the clarity and comprehensiveness of NPFMC communication were less positive.  For clarity, 
6 respondents believed that communication was not clear, while the remaining 6 believed that 
its communication ranged from quite clear to very clear.  A similar pattern applied to 
comprehensiveness, although marginally more respondents than not (n = 7) believed that 
communication was comprehensive or quite comprehensive.   
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These data provide a good picture of communication in the fishery.  Although the NPFMC 
does not communicate as well as the IPHC, I would argue that, for the fishery overall, 
communication is effective.  Certainly, many of the features that facilitate participation in 
meetings at the NPFMC and IPHC also have the effect of transmitting information about the 
meetings themselves, and the output of those meetings.  For instance, the inclusion of an 
agenda and schedule of events for each NPFMC meeting, as well as information on how one 
can participate and provide input at meetings, are both features that satisfy effective 
communication as well as facilitating participation.  The former clarifies what issues will be 
discussed at meetings, and when; and the latter elucidates the procedure a stakeholder must 
follow if they wish to contribute their views before or during the meeting.  Similarly, 
information on forthcoming meetings is (as mentioned in section 5.2.1) highly prominent on 
the NPFMC’s website in particular.    
To demonstrate how important these features are to satisfying effective communication, 
consider a situation where both were absent from the fishery.  It is obvious that stakeholders 
would have much less certainty about how they could participate in those meetings, and what 
issues the meetings aimed to address.  Indeed, the failure to make this information readily 
available would mean that stakeholders would have to rely more heavily on social 
connectedness to keep abreast of developments in the fishery. 
The IPHC and the NPFMC also make the vast majority of the documents that accompany 
each meeting, and the minutes taken therein, readily and freely available on their websites.  
The level of transparency is striking.  For instance, the IPHC lays out each meeting in 
chronological order on its website, and makes accessible the documents that were presented 
at each of these stages25.  It is therefore possible to access the presentations that were made 
at, say, the 1-5pm session on day one of the 2014 annual meeting.  Furthermore, there are 
reference documents available on the same webpage.  For instance, the ‘IPHC Annual 
Meeting Handout’ contains detailed information on the schedule of events at the meeting.  
Similarly, minutes for each NPFMC meeting are available to download, free of charge, from 
the NPFMC’s website.  Indeed, there is an entire webpage26 dedicated to minutes from each 
Council meeting dating back to 2003.  Given that there are 5 NPFMC meetings a year, this is 
                                                 
25 See http://www.iphc.int/meetings-and-events/annual-meeting/documents.html for details. 
26 See http://www.npfmc.org/meeting-minutes/. 
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a significant amount of information.  Furthermore, the minutes that are available are those 
from the meetings of each of the Council, Advisory Panel and Scientific and Statistical 
Committee.  In total, then, the minutes from 165 meetings (as of 2014) are easily accessible 
to anyone interested in them. 
The IPHC and NPFMC do not just communicate details of their meetings effectively, 
however.  Each organisation also makes information about their general activities readily 
available.  The NPFMC, for instance, produces a bimonthly newsletter - also available from 
its website, and to which one can subscribe – that contains news that is relevant to North 
Pacific fisheries.  The April 2014 newsletter, for example, mentions Council discussion 
papers on Gulf of Alaska trawl by-catch management and Bering Sea canyons.  
Unsurprisingly, the newsletter also has details on upcoming Council meetings, a draft outlook 
for the next Council meeting, and a short section on the move to make meeting items 
available digitally.  Indeed, fishery stakeholders are encouraged to contact Council officials if 
they require more information on these digital documents or if they need help downloading a 
software package that enables one to read the documents.  (It is worth noting that this 
software is not the only way in which stakeholders can access the documents – it is just 
another option.) 
The IPHC does not produce a newsletter, but it does produce an annual report that provides a 
year-end ‘summary of the halibut fisheries, including catch limits, catch sectors, and 
regulation changes’ (IPHC, 2014d).  These annual reports are part of the Commission’s 
library, and are complemented by scientific reports, technical reports, and reports on the 
IPHC’s assessment and research activities.  The library itself is easily accessed through the 
Internet. 
There is, of course, an argument that all of these measures only benefit stakeholders with 
access to the Internet.  However, it is possible to acquire hard copies of the reports produced 
by the IPHC by contacting the IPHC directly.  Although it is unclear that it is possible to do 
the same thing with NPFMC documents, it is reasonable to assume that the NPFMC does 
make hard copy available when it is requested.  Furthermore, there is a sense that, in moving 
to primarily digital documents and a strong online presence, the IPHC and NPFMC are 
simply moving with the times.  Indeed, it would be possible to criticise both organisations for 
communicating ineffectively if they did not have a comprehensive online presence. 
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Beyond documents, minutes and reports, the IPHC plays a key role in communication in the 
fishery because it provides the NPFMC with stock assessment estimates and management 
recommendations.  Clearly, these data and recommendations must be communicated in a 
clear and intelligible way if they are to be implemented properly.  In this respect, it is 
interesting that the IPHC recently (2012) changed the format of its harvest advice.  In so 
doing, the IPHC aimed to ‘present more information and options for consideration by the 
Commission as it sets annual catch limits’ (IPHC, 2014e).  The harvest advice is now 
summarised in a decision table that explicitly links harvest choices to impacts on stock and 
fishery metrics.  The table is an improvement on previous harvest advice that focused on 
point biomass estimates and catch limit recommendations and did not therefore adequately 
communicate the ‘uncertainties around stock estimates and the risks of various possible 
outcomes at different catch levels’ (IPHC, 2014f).  Thus, the new decision table is more 
effective at conveying the limits of the IPHC’s understanding and at providing the 
Commissioners with a range of management scenarios.      
The amount of information that the IPHC and the NPFMC make available through their 
websites, and through minutes, presentations, newsletters and reports is striking; so too are 
the improvements that the IPHC has made to the way it communicates its harvest advice.  
The result of this transparency is that fishery stakeholders are able, if they to wish, to stay 
very well informed about the state of the fishery and the decisions that its management 
authorities are taking.  It demonstrates the extent to which both management organisations 
communicate their activities, their decisions, and their knowledge clearly and openly. 
5.4.1 Communication from stakeholders to the fishery’s management authorities 
Of course, communication in the fishery would hardly count as effective if it flowed only 
from management authorities to stakeholders.  The analysis that shows that stakeholders are 
able to participate in meetings and advisory or decision-making bodies also suggests that 
stakeholders can provide significant and valuable input into the fishery’s management 
process.  Perhaps the best example of this is the role that advisory bodies play at the IPHC.  
The IPHC ‘regularly seeks advice from its advisory bodies’ (IPHC, 2014d) and therefore 
facilitates communication between officials and the stakeholders involved in the advisory 
bodies.  Similarly, the collaborative research trips discussed in section 5.3.2 almost certainly 
encourage communication – even if informal – between fishermen and IPHC officials. 
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The same argument applies to the NPFMC.  Most notably, the NPFMC Advisory Panel 
provides the Council with input on analyses and issues arising at Council meetings.  Thus, 
there is communication between stakeholders representative of the fishing industry at large 
(the Advisory Panel) and the Council itself (which, for good measure perhaps, has a number 
of fishing industry members too).  Of course, it is not necessary to be a member of the 
Advisory Panel or other committees to provide input into the Council process.  Council 
meetings provide stakeholders with an opportunity to submit issues for consideration in 
advance of the meetings, and to make oral comments during proceedings themselves.  Indeed, 
an entire section of the NPFMC’s website is entitled ‘How do I get involved?’ and provides 
stakeholders and members of the public alike with details on how to raise issues for 
deliberation at Council meetings.  The Council emphasises that ‘public testimony – both 
written and oral – is taken on each and every issue prior to final deliberations’ (NPFMC, 
2014a).  Stakeholders attending Council meetings are therefore able to do more than simply 
participate; they are able to testify, and to communicate their concerns and interests.   
5.4.2 Problems with communication 
Although the analysis above suggests that the fishery’s management process satisfies the 
communication criterion of legitimation function to a large degree, it would be disingenuous 
to claim that communication in the fishery has no room for improvement.  In particular, the 
IPHC was advised to improve its communication and transparency as recently as 2012 (in the 
performance review by McCreary and Brooks, 2012).  Furthermore, a number of 
interviewees noted that the IPHC was not as open or transparent in its communication as it 
might be, especially with regard to its stock assessment model.  Interviewee J, for instance, 
suggested that there was frustration with IPHC over the “secrecy, the privacy with which they 
conduct their business.”  Interviewee J explained that this secrecy had not been a problem in 
the past, but concerns had emerged in the last few years as a result of the model over-
estimating exploitable biomass.27  Interviewee J said that keeping the model secret “seems 
like the worst thing in the world, to us”, noting that there was “lots of resistance” (on the 
part of the IPHC) to “[running] the model past some people who might be able to help”.  That 
                                                 
27 The IPHC had difficulties with its stock assessment model due to retrospective bias.  These difficulties were 
addressed in 2013, but the changes made to the model showed a ‘much more pronounced decline in the 
estimated stock trend’ and a large decrease in current population estimates and estimated average productivity 
levels.  For further information, see Stewart et al. (2013).    
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resistance “brings forth more suspicion on the political side of the process.”  Interviewee J 
went on to comment that:  
“I think it’s not inherent mistrust of the IPHC, but inherent mistrust of a secret process. 
Um…it’s inherent mistrust of…you know… six people [the IPHC commissioners] behind 
closed doors, who use a formula we don’t get to look at, that determines what the fishery is 
worth or how we fish in our waters.  And…um…and it’s also, it’s inherent because in other 
processes that we’ve been in, where we have had a more open process and we’ve been able 
to question things, we see that process and those questions change things. Because it brings 
information forth.  Before the decision-making process, that has, at times, been a real help.” 
These comments suggest that the IPHC has failed to explain to fishery stakeholders how its 
stock assessment model works or how it is structured.  Perhaps this is unsurprising; 
modelling is highly technical and the value of expending resources to teach stakeholders who, 
in all likelihood, have limited training in the field is questionable.  However, the IPHC is 
strikingly clear and honest about the limitations and weaknesses inherent in their model.  In a 
report from Stewart et al. (2013), for example, the difficulties experienced with retrospective 
bias – and the serious negative implications for halibut stock trends – are dealt with directly 
and without obfuscation.  This information is also made available during annual and interim 
meetings, and to the press.  For instance, an article in the Alaska Journal of Commerce 
(Dischner, 2012) cites IPHC staff discussing the problems caused by retrospective bias.  But 
neither of these articles clarifies model function; nor is there any information on the IPHC’s 
website.  Thus, there is good evidence to suggest that the IPHC is communicating effectively 
about the flaws in its model without explaining in detail how it works.  
Drawing firm conclusions about communication in terms of the IPHC’s stock assessment 
from the information above is difficult.  However, it is interesting that, in spite of the various 
other measures taken to improve communication and increase transparency, interviewee J 
focused on problems with the stock assessment model in particular.  It indicates, perhaps, that 
management organisations like the IPHC have to communicate every aspect of their 
operations effectively.  Anything that does not meet that standard is liable to be interpreted 
with suspicion.  In some ways, then, satisfying the legitimation function encourages a 
virtuous circle, because it puts pressure on organisations to lift every feature of their 
management to the same high standard.  Equally, this example demonstrates how challenging 
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it is for management organisations to communicate effectively across all of their practices.  
Every detail requires consideration.   
On balance, however, the extraordinary lengths to which the IPHC and NPFMC go to 
communicate their activities, decisions and knowledge of the halibut fishery, and the 
opportunities fishery stakeholders and general members of the public have to provide input 
into the management process, clearly suggests that the management scheme does satisfy the 
communication criteria of legitimation function.  Arguably, this is one of the halibut fishery’s 
greatest strengths. 
5.5 Procedural fairness in the halibut fishery 
There are a number of elements in the fishery that satisfy the procedural fairness component 
of the legitimation function.  One of these elements is closely linked to the participation 
described in section 5.3.  In chapter 4, I argued that one characteristic of a fair procedure is 
participation in that procedure.  Thus, one consequence of the participation that characterises 
the fishery is that it satisfies this element of procedural fairness.  Following the ideas 
elaborated in chapter 4, predictable participation and communication in meetings and 
advisory bodies, committees and panels ensures that the fishery’s management process is 
consistent with the hearing rule and Leventhal’s closely related ‘representativeness’ rule (‘all 
phases of the allocative process must reflect the basic concerns, values and outlook of 
important subgroups’ – Leventhal, 1980, pg. 43).   
However, an important distinction is needed between the procedural fairness achieved by the 
role of advisory bodies and testimony at Council meetings, and simple attendance at meetings 
and research trips.  The latter arguably do not satisfy the hearing rule, or the 
representativeness rule, because mere participation is not sufficient to make one’s voice 
heard.  In this respect, it is interesting that there is ample evidence to suggest that 
stakeholders are able to communicate effectively with the IPHC and the NPFMC.  It is this 
combination of opportunities to participate, along with regular, institutionalised opportunities 
to communicate one’s views that satisfies the hearing and representativeness rules, and so 
makes the management process procedurally fair.  As Leventhal (ibid, pg. 45) notes, ‘workers 
probably attribute greater fairness to allocative procedures when there is genuine 
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participatory decision-making and frequent consultation with management’.  Thus, Leventhal 
emphasises both communication and participation. 
In addition, the fishery’s management process satisfies the representativeness rule by 
changing the composition of the Commission (IPHC) and Council and Advisory Panel 
(NPFMC) on a regular basis.  Leventhal (ibid, pg. 44) suggests that ‘rotating individuals 
through decision-making positions reduces the likelihood that a representative clique will 
exercise control’.  Members of the Council and NPFMC Advisory Panel each serve a three-
year term.  Council members serve a maximum of three terms.  In addition, Council members 
are able to reappoint or replace Advisory Panel members at the year-end Council meeting.  
Similarly, IPHC commissioners from both Canada and the United States serve a maximum 
two-year term, although there is the possibility of reappointment by the Canadian government 
and the President of the United States.  This rotation satisfies the representativeness rule in 
the way described by Leventhal, and therefore contributes to procedural fairness in the 
fishery.  
Another element that satisfies the procedural fairness criterion of legitimation function is the 
structured and predictable way with which the management process is carried out.  There is a 
chain of steps to which the IPHC, NPFMC and NMFS must adhere when making decisions in 
respect of the halibut fishery.  Furthermore, it is clear what role each organisation and the 
individuals therein play in the fishery.  For instance, the IPHC’s role is limited to providing 
scientific advice and management recommendations only.  Clearly, this structure prevents ad 
hoc decision-making.  More importantly in terms of procedural fairness, it ensures that 
responsibility and therefore accountability for decision-making is well defined because it 
should be clear where along the chain due process has not been followed, and where the 
responsibility for that failure lies.  The transparency demonstrated by the IPHC and NPFMC 
should facilitate that process.   
5.5.1 The halibut fishery’s quota allocation process and appeals mechanism 
The quota allocation process and the appeals mechanism that accompanied it played a key 
role in legitimising IFQ management during its early development.  Indeed, interviewee C 
believed that the “whole process would have been ruled illegal or illegitimate without an 
allocation appeals process.”  The appeals process provided fishermen who were unhappy 
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with the quota share they had been allocated the ability to challenge their allocation, first by 
addressing the NMFS and subsequently through the federal court system if the complainant 
remained dissatisfied.   
Arguably, the quota allocation process served a legitimation function in the fishery by 
satisfying the legitimation function’s procedural fairness component.  At one level, the quota 
allocation process and the appeals mechanism followed a predetermined procedure.  Initial 
allocation decisions were made by NMFS on the basis of catch records only.  Challenges to 
allocation decisions started at the NMFS; if unresolved, they would then go to the courts for 
settlement.  Both branches of the quota share allocation process therefore satisfied the 
consistency rule, because they were ‘consistent across persons and over time’ (Leventhal, 
1980; pg. 41).  There was consistency in the way allocation decisions were made and in the 
application of the appeals process.  In turn, this consistency reduced the possibility that the 
allocation process (including appeals) was biased or favoured particular fishermen for 
reasons other than their catch record.  Each fisherman could have confidence that he was 
being treated equally to his peers in a strictly procedural sense.  Thus, both aspects of the 
quota allocation process were procedurally fair insofar as they satisfied the consistency rule 
and the rule against bias. 
The use of catch records to determine quota share allocations may itself have shaped 
perceptions of procedural fairness in a positive way.  Using catch records meant that 
allocation decisions were not arbitrary.  Instead, they were based on the best available proxy 
for a fisherman’s stake in the halibut fishery.  (Days at sea in pursuit of halibut may have 
been another suitable proxy, but it provides little information on what constitutes an adequate 
quota share allocation.)  Grounding quota share allocation in catch data satisfies Leventhal’s 
‘accuracy rule’, which argues that ‘it is necessary to base the allocative process on as much 
good information and informed opinion as possible’ (Leventhal, 1980; pg. 42).  Of course, 
the same argument might be made for days at sea data.  The key difference is that allocation 
based on catch records established a clear link between a fisherman’s track record - and 
therefore his effort, skill and expertise - and the amount of quota share he was allocated.  In 
some ways, then, the allocation process was meritocratic28.  Thus, the use of catch records as 
                                                 
28 Of course, there is an argument that the allocation process favoured fishermen who had been involved in the 
halibut fishery for a number of years over recent entrants to the fishery.  Indeed, interviewee L pointed out that 
some fishermen became millionaires overnight thanks to their quota allocation.  This situation arose because one 
quota share was allocated to each pound of halibut caught in a fisherman’s best five years’ fishing from the 
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the cornerstone of the quota share allocation process contributed to procedural fairness in the 
fishery because catch records represented the best available information for the purposes of 
that decision.  It satisfied the accuracy rule, as well as introducing a basis for quota 
allocations that was meritocratic and therefore a reward for past commitment to, and skill in 
the fishery. 
As an extension to this argument, it is worth drawing attention to the comments made by 
respondent 9 in chapter 3 in respect of quota share allocations.  Respondent 9 complained that 
using catch records to determine quota allocation rewarded people who had engaged in illegal 
practices and boosted their catch record as a result of these practices.  Clearly, a situation like 
this is detrimental to the procedural fairness of quota allocation.  Nevertheless, I would argue 
that it is not fatal to procedural fairness for the simple reason that the NPFMC data collection 
procedure would have made the NPFMC alive to the problem.  Hence, the NPFMC would 
have attempted to root out instances where illegal fishing was used to support a larger quota 
allocation as part of its resource allocation procedure.   
 At another level, the appeals mechanism ensured that allocation decisions could be modified 
or reversed.  The allocation process therefore satisfied Leventhal’s ‘correctability’ rule, 
which suggests that ‘the perceived level of fairness will be increased by the presence of 
appeal procedures (formal and informal) that allow for review and modification of decisions’ 
(Leventhal, 1980; pg. 43).  It is certainly intuitive that giving fishermen the ability to 
challenge quota share decisions was essential to establishing the procedural fairness of the 
quota allocation process.  The quota allocation process determined an individual fisherman’s 
base level of earnings.  The potential for ill-feeling and mistrust if fishermen had been unable 
to question allocation decisions that were clearly erroneous or with which they disagreed was 
therefore significant.  Consider clerical mistakes that may have had serious consequences for 
an individual’s livelihood.  Furthermore, the appeals process ensured that the NMFS was 
accountable to fishermen – and subsequently to the courts - for the allocation decisions it 
made.  Thus, the introduction of an appeals mechanism ensured that fishermen had means to 
correct mistakes and/or decisions that were themselves perceived as wrong or unfair.           
                                                                                                                                                        
seven years between 1984 and 1990.  Thus, new entrants who had five years fishing or less would almost 
certainly receive less quota than established participants.  However, there is a sense that fishermen who had 
made a commitment to halibut fishing merited recognition for that commitment.    
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Finally, the quota allocation appeals mechanism imbued the IFQ development process with 
the characteristics of natural justice.  The three rules that characterise natural justice (the bias 
rule, the evidence rule, and the hearing rule - see chapter 4) were all satisfied during the quota 
allocation process, in part because it was accompanied by an appeals mechanism.  The quota 
allocation process was consistent with the bias rule because the NMFS, rather than fishermen, 
decided on the mechanism for allocating quota shares and therefore the ultimate distribution 
of quota share.  For example, an allocation process run by fishermen may have had the 
potential for bias in favour of particular groups of fishermen who were linked professionally 
to the fishermen orchestrating the allocation.  Equally, the quota allocation process was 
consistent with the hearing rule because the appeals mechanism provided fishermen with the 
means to have their side heard in the allocation process.  Finally, the allocation process and 
the appeals mechanism satisfied the evidence rule because both were evidence-based.  Initial 
quota allocation was based on catch records, and the appeals mechanism overturned initial 
quota allocation decisions on the basis of evidence only.  The quota allocation process and 
the appeals mechanism were therefore fair not just from the point of view of the 
‘correctability rule’; they were also consistent with the principles of natural justice. 
Extending the argument that the allocation process and appeals mechanism were similar to 
procedurally fair processes in a legal context, it is interesting that fishermen were able to take 
their appeals to the federal courts in instances of last recourse.  Reverting to the legal system 
for resolution of outstanding allocation disputes was important from a procedural fairness 
perspective because it meant that the NMFS was no longer the ultimate arbiter of allocation 
decisions.  This removed the possibility that the NMFS was skewing allocation outcomes in a 
biased way.  Instead, final allocation decisions were taken by judges whose impartiality and 
integrity was presumably beyond dispute, who were required to treat all parties equally under 
the law, and who had to follow specific procedural conventions that themselves satisfied the 
principles of natural justice.  Fishermen could therefore have confidence that, in the final 
instance, their appeals would be handled by an institution whose impartiality was assured.  
Furthermore, the introduction of the courts into the appeals process ensured that the process 
had several layers of accountability.  Ultimately, then, the NMFS would have been 
accountable to fishermen both from within its organisation and externally through the legal 
system. 
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5.6 Trust in the IFQ management regime 
It is evident from the interview data that many stakeholders have significant confidence in the 
IFQ management regime and the authorities that operate it.  (See chapter 3 for a discussion of 
the competence of the IPHC and NPFMC.)  Interviewee K, for instance, described the 
NPFMC as ‘fantastic’; there was ‘nothing else like it’, according to interviewee K.  Similarly, 
interviewee L believed that there was “huge trust” amongst halibut fishermen in the IPHC, 
and that, “halibut fishermen do hold the IPHC in very high regard.”  Interviewee L also 
noted that the picture was more mixed for the NPFMC, but felt that they were, “respected as 
the authority that’s going to make the decisions for the most part.” Interviewee E focused on 
the IPHC’s collaborative research trips, claiming that they ‘build and maintain trust’.  
Similarly, when asked about participation by fishermen in the IPHC’s research, interviewee L 
noted that, “when they [fishermen] are part of the research, they trust it, and when they trust 
it, they support the policy that stems from it.”  At several levels, then, there is strong trust in 
the IPHC and some trust for the NPFMC.  The IPHC’s collaborative research in particular 
seems to have an important impact in fostering trust. 
Elsewhere, Alverson (1997) details a letter written by Walter Hickel, Governor of Alaska 
1966-1968 and 1990-1994, in which he states that in ‘no way, at no time, should we go back 
to the old [derby] system… There should be no thought given to reversing the current [IFQ] 
programme’.  This is a strong endorsement of the IFQ management regime, and good 
evidence that people trusted it would continue to deliver satisfactory outcomes. 
The survey data provide more concrete results on stakeholder’s trust in the IPHC and 
NPFMC.  Encouragingly, they reflect the interview data.  Trust in the IPHC is strong, but 
more mixed with the NPFMC.  Figures 12 and 13 below outline stakeholders’ trust in the 
IPHC and NPFMC respectively. 
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Figure 12. Trust in the IPHC. 
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Figure 13. Trust in the NPFMC. 
These results are striking, but they require cautious interpretation because the survey sample 
size is small.  Nevertheless, they re-emphasise that trust in the IPHC is consistently strong.  
The picture is much more varied for the NPFMC (as far as one can tell with these limited 
data).  Although some people do trust the NPFMC – and trust it strongly – there are also 
stakeholders who have almost no trust in the NPFMC at all.  Of course, these data are a 
challenge to my argument that stakeholders trust the fishery’s management organisations to a 
great extent.  They may even be a challenge to my assertion that the fishery overall is 
legitimate, in that it fails to satisfy the trust criterion of the legitimation function.  However, I 
suggest that they actually tie in neatly with existing observations.  In particular, the trust data 
in figure 13 may explain why a number of stakeholders believe the NPFMC specifically lacks 
legitimacy or has no legitimacy (see figure 6, chapter 3).  Levels of trust in the IFQ 
management system overall are high enough to satisfy the legitimation function, but at the 
particular level of the NPFMC, there is insufficient trust for satisfaction of the legitimation 
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function.  This pattern indicates why the NPFMC suffers from the legitimacy deficit evident 
in figure 6.   
5.7 An analysis of the extent to which PIECAS satisfies the four legitimation function 
criteria 
Unlike the halibut fishery, the way in which PIECAS is being designed does not satisfy the 
four legitimation criteria to any great degree.  To a certain extent, the veracity of this 
statement depends on the perspective from which one views it.  For instance, agricultural 
stakeholders are evidently much less likely to have positive perceptions of PIECAS’s 
satisfaction of legitimation function criteria than environmental NGO stakeholders who have 
been more heavily involved in designing the plan.  Nonetheless, PIECAS fails to fulfil the 
legitimation function criteria at a variety of levels, irrespective of one’s involvement in the 
plan.  Participation in meetings is limited, and there are no mechanisms for representative 
participation or participation in research.  Communication between the High Level 
Committee and stakeholders is poor.  The plan’s design process has at times been 
procedurally unfair, especially in respect of the participation of agricultural stakeholders.  
Finally, the plan’s difficulties to date and the perception amongst some stakeholders that the 
Committee and other organising authorities lack competence and familiarity with the delta 
are detrimental to trust in PIECAS and the organisations in charge of designing and 
implementing it. 
5.8 Participation in PIECAS 
In general, government at both a federal and provincial level has dominated participation in 
PIECAS.  This is hardly surprising; PIECAS is a government-led plan, and we would 
therefore expect government officials to make up the majority of the people involved in the 
scheme.  Nevertheless – and in distinct contrast to the fishery – there is very limited 
participation in PIECAS by stakeholder groups of all kinds outside of government.  The 
almost total absence of agricultural stakeholders is the most notable example of this 
participative failure, but even stakeholders at environmental NGOs have found themselves 
increasingly marginalised from the plan (Berardo et al., 2015).  (See chapter 3 for survey data 
that illustrate the participation problems in PIECAS.)      
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One reason why PIECAS has experienced problems with participation is that it is difficult to 
participate in meetings with the High Level Committee specifically.  These meetings are 
closed to the public and occur infrequently.  For instance, the National Environment 
Secretariat’s webpage for PIECAS (http://www.ambiente.gov.ar/?idarticulo=10287) shows 
that the Committee met in October 2010, March 201229, November 201230, and most recently 
in August 201331.  No further details about upcoming meetings are listed on the PIECAS 
webpages, and there appears to be no regular schedule that the Committee follows which 
would allow stakeholders wishing to participate in PIECAS to plan ahead.  Furthermore, 
there are no contact details for the High Level Committee available through the same 
website, nor information on the process that stakeholders must follow if they wish to 
participate.  The contrast with the halibut fishery is striking.  It is clear that participating in 
PIECAS is much more complicated and ad hoc than it is in the fishery.   
In particular, the lack of predictable opportunities to participate at meetings of the High Level 
Committee means that stakeholders interested in PIECAS must rely on ad hoc means and/or 
social connectedness to do so.  In general, these are less effective and more serendipitous 
than institutionalised mechanisms.  A stakeholder’s ability to participate in PIECAS therefore 
depends on whom he knows, and the costs that he is able to bear.  The former in particular is 
disadvantageous to stakeholders who have no particular connection to the High Level 
Committee.  Certainly, the interview data suggest that some stakeholders have found it 
difficult to approach the High Level Committee.  Interviewee ♯9, for instance, claimed that it 
had taken over a year and a half to meet with the official at the National Environment 
Secretariat in charge of PIECAS’s design and implementation, and that the meeting itself had 
only been possible because of an introduction from an acquaintance in common at the 
research institute INTA-Delta. 
5.8.1 Representative participation in PIECAS 
In addition to its failure to facilitate participation in meetings, PIECAS does not satisfy 
representative participation.  The High Level Committee is made up entirely of government 
officials, one each from the National Environment Secretariat and the three provinces with 
                                                 
29 See http://www.ambiente.gov.ar/archivos/web/DOAT/file/ACTA%20II-1%20REUNION%20CIAN%20-
PIECAS-DP.pdf. 
30 http://www.ambiente.gov.ar/archivos/web/DOAT/file/ACTA%20III%20CIAN.pdf 
31 http://www.ambiente.gov.ar/archivos/web/DOAT/file/ACTA%20IV%20REUNION%20CIAN.pdf 
205 
 
territories in the delta.  The Committee is not therefore representative of the diversity of 
people with interests in the delta (agricultural stakeholders, NGOs, local and federal 
government, academics, and so on).  Furthermore, the advisory bodies and committees that 
are so prominent at the IPHC and NPFMC are absent from PIECAS.  Thus, stakeholders 
from outside government are unable to provide input into the PIECAS design process or to 
contribute to decision-making.  As with meetings, participation is possible only by invitation 
or by ad hoc means.  Certainly, the best description for the involvement of academics and 
environmental NGOs evident from the interview data is participation by invitation rather 
participation arising from a procedural opportunity to do so. 
5.8.2 Participation in research 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the way in which the High Level Committee is organised does not 
lend itself to opportunities for participation in research.  Both document analysis and the 
interview data suggest that the High Level Committee does not arrange collaborative 
research.  Indeed, it is unclear how much research is presently conducted under the auspices 
of PIECAS.  Previously, however, at the earliest stages of the design process there was 
participative research.  Data from interviewee ♯11 suggest that the National Environment 
Secretariat produced a baseline environmental and ecological report on the delta and a 
preliminary environmental impact assessment that identified environmental “pressure points” 
shortly after the plan’s inception.  As part of this, there were several research meetings: “the 
key meetings were government meetings, but there were also meetings with NGOs, with 
environmental organisations in the region, and with academics from the University of San 
Martin” (interviewee ♯11).  This information was corroborated in part by interviewee ♯1 (an 
academic at the University of San Martin), who described attending PIECAS’s inaugural 
meeting.  Thus, there is good evidence to indicate that participation in research was occurring 
at the earliest phases of PIECAS’s development.  Nevertheless, the crucial point is that these 
examples of participation in research do not appear to have continued through to the present.  
It is possible that further research is no longer required to make the plan a success.  Whatever 
the reason, PIECAS no longer satisfies this component of participation. 
5.8.3 The exclusion of farmers and agricultural interests from PIECAS 
The exclusion of agricultural stakeholders first mentioned in chapter 3 is one of the most 
important aspects of participation in PIECAS and therefore PIECAS’s legitimacy.  Although 
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various stakeholders have misgivings about PIECAS, the group that appears to be most 
anxious about the plan are agricultural stakeholders - agronomists (interviewee #13), 
employees of agri-businesses (interviewee #9, respondent C) and farmers (respondent F).  
The frustration evident in the interview data demonstrates how powerfully these participation 
problems have affected their attitudes toward the plan.  Interestingly, however, data from 
interviewee ♯9 indicate that in the last year agriculturalists have been able to engage with 
members of the High Level Committee.  This rapprochement has, according to interviewee 
♯9, improved agricultural stakeholders’ assessments of the plan. 
The participation problems experienced by agricultural stakeholders primarily concern 
participation in meetings.  Certainly, the complaints made by interviewees ♯9 and ♯10 are 
related to their inability – and the inability of agricultural stakeholders generally – to 
participate in meetings.  The frustration felt by interviewees ♯9 and ♯10 seems to have been 
exacerbated by the attendance of environmental NGOs and academics at these meetings, 
whom interviewee ♯10 in particular believed did not have the expertise needed to shape 
PIECAS in a way that was appropriate to the delta. 
Of course, there is an argument that agricultural stakeholders fare just as poorly in terms of 
participating in PIECAS as any other stakeholder group.  For instance, there are no 
stakeholders outside government that are involved in representative participation processes in 
PIECAS.  This is as true of environmental NGO stakeholders as it is of agricultural interests.  
Nonetheless, the absence of agriculturalists from meetings like the ones linked to PIECAS’s 
initial research programme is especially problematic because, by almost any measure, 
agriculturalists constitute a key stakeholder group in the delta.  Agriculture shapes the delta’s 
ecology in a number of key ways (Baigún et al., 2008), and in parts of the delta is people’s 
main livelihood.  Thus, there is little apparent justification for the exclusion of agricultural 
stakeholders from PIECAS.  Arguably, if any stakeholder group could expect to participate in 
PIECAS, it would be the delta’s agriculturalists.  Their absence from the plan is therefore 
detrimental to PIECAS’s satisfaction of the participation element of legitimation function. 
5.8.4 Comparing participation in the fishery with participation in PIECAS 
As mentioned in the methodology for this chapter, there are difficulties associated with 
comparing the IFQ management regime to PIECAS.  Nonetheless, it is instructive to consider 
207 
 
the significant qualitative differences in participation that exist between the two plans.  The 
most striking observation is that the fishery has a much more comprehensive structure in 
place to facilitate participation than PIECAS.  Even the length of the analyses presented in 
this chapter indicates that the fishery is considerably more participative than PIECAS, and 
that it achieves participation with a diversity of means that are absent from PIECAS.  In 
addition, it is clear that participation is treated seriously in the fishery; it is a central feature of 
the management process.  The IPHC and the NPFMC appear to go to tremendous lengths in 
encouraging participation, even if it is at significant financial cost to the organisations 
themselves.  By contrast, PIECAS emphasises the importance of participation but in practice 
pays it lip-service only.  The features that facilitate participation in the fishery are absent 
from PIECAS, even though implementing them would almost certainly benefit participation.  
In this light, it is difficult to judge PIECAS’s efforts at participation to date favourably. 
5.9 Communication in PIECAS 
Communication and participation in the halibut fishery were closely linked, with many of the 
features that facilitate participation also satisfying the effective communication component of 
the legitimation function.  A similar pattern is evident with PIECAS.  However, unlike the 
IPHC and NPFMC in the fishery, the High Level Committee is communicating its intentions 
for PIECAS’s design poorly. 
One example of ineffective communication in PIECAS is the failure to advertise forthcoming 
High Level Committee meetings.  There is no information at all on the National Environment 
Secretariat’s webpages about the Committee’s next meeting, or, as mentioned in section 5.8, 
information on the schedule that the Committee is following.  More problematically still, 
minutes of the Committee’s meetings are not publicly available.  However, a summary of the 
decisions taken at Committee meetings are accessible from the National Environment 
Secretariat’s website.  These documents are described as ‘Acts’ and so presumably stipulate 
the measures that the Committee would like to see taken in respect of PIECAS’s 
development.  There is therefore at least some transparency on the High Level Committee’s 
decision-making, even if it is restricted.  
In general, information on PIECAS is condensed to a single webpage on the National 
Environment Secretariat’s website.  Although this webpage provides access to documents 
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that establish the rationale and the legal basis on which PIECAS is founded, including the 
Letter of Intent that formalised PIECAS and a document describing how PIECAS will be 
operationalised, there is a notable lack of information on the key players involved in 
PIECAS.  In particular, it is not clear how one can contact the High Level Committee or other 
individuals working toward implementing PIECAS.  In addition, there are sections on the 
webpage that have been left blank or contain no documents for download.  For instance, a 
section entitled ‘Activities in progress’ has yet to be furnished with relevant documents; 
another section on ‘PIECAS forums’ is similarly empty.  Given that the National 
Environment Secretariat’s website is the primary source of information for people interested 
in PIECAS, these omissions are unhelpful and representative of the limits of communication 
under PIECAS. 
5.9.1 Communication between the High Level Committee and the delta’s stakeholders 
In addition to the paucity of information available on PIECAS, there is evidence to suggest 
that communication between the High Level Committee and the delta’s stakeholders has been 
equally ineffective.  Clearly, this is attributable in part to the limited opportunities for 
participation that have characterised PIECAS.  Participation in meetings is an obvious way in 
which people can have a voice in the plan’s design process.   
Comments from two interviews in particular suggest that communication between the 
Committee and stakeholders is ineffective.  Interviewee ♯9 remarked that the plan’s 
communication was not yet adequate.  Communication was neither frequent nor clear 
enough.  In general, interviewee ♯9 believed that communication under PIECAS did not 
provide stakeholders with sufficient detail on PIECAS, leaving stakeholders with uncertainty 
about the plan’s development.  Poor communication also made long-term decision-making 
difficult.  Interviewee ♯9 noted that he/she still felt distant from the plan. 
Elsewhere in the interview data, interviewee ♯1 described the misinformation that 
characterised PIECAS’s inaugural meeting: 
“In that sense, problems started with the first meeting in Victoria.  It started with a version 
that what was wanted was a national park.  As a result, everyone started to fear – and by 
everyone I mean agricultural producers in the islands, local people – that, suddenly, 
everything was going to be converted into a national park, and that it wouldn’t be possible to 
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do anything at all [in the delta].  Which was completely false, that idea.  At no time was the 
idea to establish a strict reserve.  And I think the blame there lies with the National 
Environment Secretariat; they should have made local actors participate… And so when the 
meeting was called, there were dozens of people outside protesting. “No to PIECAS.”  In that 
respect, the meeting in Victoria was between national civil servants, provincial civil servants, 
others too: academic centres, who were invited to speak – like us [the University of San 
Martin], the University of Buenos Aires, and other groups…but agricultural producers 
weren’t there, for example.  And all this because of misinformation…” 
Although this a single incident and therefore insufficient to draw generalised conclusions, it 
does indicate that, even at PIECAS’s early stages, the High Level Committee and the 
National Environment Secretariat were not communicating clearly.  Whether or not the 
rumour about a national park in the delta originated with the High Level Committee or 
National Environment Secretariat, it is reasonable to argue that misinformation of that kind 
emerged only as a result of poor communication before and during the inaugural meeting.  It 
is difficult to imagine that similar protests would have taken place if the National 
Environment Secretariat and/or High Level Committee had outlined succinctly PIECAS’s 
aims and ensured that the delta’s stakeholders had a firm grasp of the plan’s details.32 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee survey data also provide evidence about the 
effectiveness of communication between stakeholders and the High Level Committee.33  
These data are a close proxy for effective communication because they demonstrate 
stakeholders’ perceptions of their ability to express their concerns and have those concerns 
accounted for during discussions.  Figures 14, 15 and 16 below show how successful survey 
respondents felt they were in influencing the discussions taking place in PIECAS.   
 
                                                 
32  A problem here, of course, is that PIECAS’s objectives are broad and poorly defined.  Communicating them 
is therefore challenging.  See chapter 3 for details. 
33 Survey respondents were asked to assess their success in influencing discussions taking place in PIECAS, on 
a scale of 0-10 (0 = not at all successful; 10 = very successful). 
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Figure 14. Assessments of success in influencing discussions in PIECAS (2010 survey). 
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Figure 15. Assessments of success in influencing discussions taking place in PIECAS 
(2012 survey). 
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Figure 16. Assessments of succes in influencing discussions taking place in PIECAS 
(2014 survey). 
In 2010 and 2012, few respondents believed they were ‘very successful’ in shaping the 
discussions taking place in PIECAS; indeed, only one respondent across 2010 and 2012 
scored his success in influencing discussions as ‘10’.  Instead, the majority of respondents in 
both surveys were generally positive about their effectiveness in communicating during 
discussions; most scored ‘7’ in the 2010 survey and ‘8’ in the 2012 survey.  However, in spite 
of these assessments, it is notable that at least some respondents did not believe that they had 
been successful in influencing discussion in PIECAS.  In 2010, one respondent rated his 
effectiveness as ‘4’; a further 3 respondents believed they had been neither successful nor 
unsuccessful (‘5’) in shaping discussions. These respondents would likely agree that they had 
a neutral impact in shaping discussions, thus suggesting no real sense of empowerment in 
influencing effective communication.  By 2012, at least one respondent believed that he was 
‘not at all successful’ (or a score of ‘0’) in shaping discussions in PIECAS, and a further 8 
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respondents scored their effectiveness as ‘3’ or ‘5’.  The deterioration in assessments of 
success between 2010 and 2012 is notable, and suggests that communication between 
stakeholders and the High Level Committee worsened at that time.  Thus, the 2010 and 2012 
survey data provide some evidence that effective communication in PIECAS was fragile.  It 
is possible that the lack of institutionalised communication processes contributed to this 
fragility. 
However, the data for 2014 paint a more positive picture.  Most respondents (n = 10) 
believed they had had at least some success influencing discussions, evaluating their 
effectiveness as ‘7’ or ‘8’ on the fairness scale.  Furthermore, the number of respondents who 
felt they were ‘very successful’ (a score of 10 on the fairness scale) increased between 2012 
and 2014 (n = 1 in the former, to n = 4 in the latter).  In contrast, the respondents who 
suggested they had limited success influencing discussions fell, from 9 in total in 2012 to 1 in 
2014.  Moreover, none of the respondents involved in the 2014 survey believed they had had 
no success influencing discussions at PIECAS. 
Thus, the survey data indicate that communication under PIECAS improved between 2012 
and 2014.  Recent communication efforts may therefore have been more effective than in the 
past.  These latest data may give us pause to consider the conclusions drawn from the 2010 
and 2012 surveys.  It will be interesting to see whether survey data in 2016 imply continued 
improvements, or whether communication regresses back to 2010 and 2012 levels.  
5.9.2 Comparing communication in the fishery to communication under PIECAS 
It is worthwhile extending the argument outlined in section 5.8.4 and considering the 
differences in communication between the fishery and PIECAS.  As with participation, it is 
evident that there are important qualitative differences in the degree to which communication 
is effective in each plan.  Most striking, perhaps – and similar to participation - is the 
commitment to clear and frequent communication in the fishery.  The same level of rigour 
appears to be absent from PIECAS.  Furthermore – and again similar to participation – the 
range of features that facilitate effective communication is far greater in the fishery than in 
PIECAS.  In light of these differences, it is unsurprising that PIECAS appears at times to 
have failed to satisfy the communication element of the legitimation function. 
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5.10 Perceptions of procedural fairness in PIECAS 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee survey data also provide valuable evidence about 
perceptions of procedural fairness in PIECAS34.  Although these data do not directly address 
procedural fairness, they are a suitable proxy because they measure people’s perceptions of 
the extent to which PIECAS provides stakeholders with voice in the process.  As I have 
argued before, having voice in a process goes some way toward ensuring that that process 
satisfies the hearing rule. 
Figures 17, 18 and 19 show that there is significant variation in perceptions of procedural 
fairness as measured by the proxy variable.  Stakeholders in the 2010 survey were mostly 
positive about perceptions of procedural fairness in PIECAS, although a number (n = 6) were 
lukewarm in their assessments.  They gave PIECAS a score of 5 or 6, which arguably 
suggests some misgivings about the plan’s fairness.  It is certainly not a strong endorsement.  
Figure 17 summarises the results from the 2010 survey.   
 
                                                 
34 Survey respondents were asked to assess, on a score of 0-10 (0 = very unfair; 10 = very fair), whether 
PIECAS was fair in the sense that all voices were equally heard.   
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Figure 17. Assessments of procedural fairness in PIECAS (2010 survey). 
Results from the 2012 survey are more striking.  Four of the survey respondents believed that 
PIECAS was actually unfair (fairness scores of 2, 3 or 4), while a further six assessed 
procedural fairness as neither fair nor unfair (fairness scores of 5 or 6).  In addition, only two 
respondents believed that PIECAS was very fair (fairness score of 10), compared to five 
respondents in the 2010 survey.  In general, the most important difference between 
respondent attitudes in the 2010 survey and the 2012 survey is the notable increase in the 
number of people who were critical of PIECAS’s procedural fairness.  It suggests 
deterioration in overall assessments of procedural fairness between 2010 and 2012.  
Furthermore, the respondents who provided the fairness scores in both surveys did not 
include agricultural stakeholders.  Given their absence from the PIECAS design process, it is 
likely that they would have assessed PIECAS’s procedural fairness poorly in both years.  
Thus, there is good evidence to believe that PIECAS did not satisfy the procedural fairness 
component of legitimation function between 2010 and 2012.  Figure 18 below outlines the 
results from the 2012 survey.    
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Figure 18. Assessments of procedural fairness in PIECAS (2012 survey). 
However, the data from the 2014 survey suggests that there has been an improvement in 
assessments of procedural fairness since 2012 (consistent with the earlier observation that the 
effectiveness of communication also improved in 2014).  The number of respondents who 
believed that PIECAS was procedurally unfair fell; indeed, there were no respondents who 
indicated that PIECAS scored less than 5 on the fairness scale.  Conversely, the number of 
respondents who believed that PIECAS was very fair (score of 10) increased, from 2 in 2012 
to 5 in 2014.  The most recent assessments of PIECAS’s procedural fairness therefore suggest 
that PIECAS is going some way to satisfy the procedural fairness element of the legitimation 
function.  Crucially, however, the 2014 survey does not include agricultural stakeholders 
(like the 2010 and 2012 surveys).  Given that agricultural stakeholders have reason to believe 
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that PIECAS is procedurally unfair, their inclusion in any survey may change the nature of 
the results observed.  What is clear, however, is that perceptions of both procedural fairness 
and the effectiveness of communication have improved in the last two years.  It is possible 
that the two are connected; improvements in communication have enhanced procedural 
fairness, and vice versa.  Figure 19 below summarises the 2014 survey data on procedural 
fairness. 
 
Figure 19. Assessments of procedural fairness in PIECAS (2014 survey). 
The legitimation function framework also suggests that there is a relationship between 
participation and procedural fairness.  In the halibut fishery, the ample opportunities for 
participation that exist have arguably contributed to satisfying the procedural fairness 
criterion of the legitimation function.  In PIECAS, conversely, the participation problems that 
have characterised the plan have contributed to indifferent or negative assessments of the 
plan’s fairness.  Indeed, the survey data suggest that frequency of participation in PIECAS is 
positively correlated with higher assessments of PIECAS’s fairness.  A two-sample T test 
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with unequal variances35 on the 2010 survey data shows that mean fairness scores for survey 
respondents who had been involved in PIECAS in the last six months were significantly 
higher than mean fairness scores for survey respondents who last participated in PIECAS 
longer than six months ago (T = 3.0571, p = 0.0062).  This is good evidence that PIECAS’s 
participation problems are strongly associated with negative perceptions of its fairness.  
Stakeholders who are unable to participate in the plan, or participate infrequently, are more 
likely to question its procedural fairness and, by extension, its legitimacy.  The full output of 
these tests appears in appendix E. 
The statistical evidence supporting the idea that participation and assessments of procedural 
fairness are linked is further corroborated by considering in an intuitive way the 
consequences of the absence of agricultural stakeholders from PIECAS.  It is apparent that 
there is something fundamentally unfair – in general and in procedural terms – in the absence 
from PIECAS of the stakeholder group (agricultural interests) whose livelihoods may be most 
affected by PIECAS.  Their absence means that rules that may affect their day to day 
business are being developed without their input or their consent.  Under these circumstances, 
PIECAS fails to satisfy several aspects of the various conceptualisations of procedural 
fairness outlined in chapter 4.  In terms of natural justice, the absence of agriculturalists 
means that PIECAS is inconsistent with the hearing rule.  The High Level Committee and the 
National Environment Secretariat cannot hear the views of agricultural stakeholders if they 
are not present at meetings and are generally unable to participate and have a voice in 
PIECAS.  Similarly, the absence of agriculturalists means that PIECAS is inconsistent with 
Leventhal’s representativeness rule.  Indeed, it is clear that agricultural stakeholders are not 
involved in the ‘genuine participatory decision-making’ and ‘frequent consultation’ that 
Leventhal attributes to improved assessments of fairness.   
Finally, the absence of agriculturalists means that PIECAS does not satisfy Ostrom’s design 
principle that stakeholders are able to participate in making and/or modifying the rules that 
affect them.  Although this design principle does not explicitly address procedural fairness, it 
is evident that it plays a legitimation function precisely because it makes a process fairer.  
The design principle is consistent with both the hearing rule and the representativeness rule, 
and therefore goes some way to providing a process with the elements that make it fair. 
                                                 
35 A Shapiro-Wilk W test provided some evidence that the data were approximately normally distributed (z = -
3.460, p = 0.999).     
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5.10.1 Leventhal’s representativeness rule and the organisation of the High Level 
Committee 
In section 5.3.1, I argued that the composition of the Commission (IPHC) and Council 
(NPFMC) and the use of limits on the terms that Commissioners and Council members could 
serve were consistent with Leventhal’s representativeness rule.  By extension, it is clear that 
the composition of the High Level Committee does not satisfy the representativeness rule.  I 
describe in section 5.8.1 how the Committee is made up solely of government officials at a 
federal and provincial level.  Thus, the people who actually make decisions about PIECAS’s 
development are not representative of stakeholders outside government.  The ‘genuine 
participatory decision-making’ described by Leventhal is not possible with a High Level 
Committee organised along these lines.  The contrast with the Commission and Council in 
the fishery – where decisions are taken by individuals from a number of different 
organisations and sectors in the fishery – is striking.  Furthermore, the officials on the High 
Level Committee can, in theory, serve indefinitely because there is no stipulation on fixed 
terms.  As a result, there is no requirement to rotate individuals in and out of the High Level 
Committee.  This too is in contrast to the fishery and in contravention of Leventhal’s 
representativeness rule.  It is additional evidence that PIECAS is unlikely to satisfy 
procedural fairness elements of the legitimation function. 
5.11 Trust in PIECAS 
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about stakeholders’ trust in PIECAS and their trust in 
the High Level Committee from the interview data.  However, it is intuitive that amongst 
agricultural stakeholders in particular, trust in the High Level Committee is likely to be low 
because their absence from the PIECAS design process gives them reason to mistrust the 
High Level Committee.  Any given agricultural stakeholder might reasonably ask why he or 
she is unable to participate in PIECAS and to communicate his (or her) views and concerns 
about the plan, especially when the plan may have a significant impact on their lives.  This 
sentiment is likely to be exacerbated by the involvement of academics and environmental 
NGOs, whose expertise is questioned by agricultural stakeholders like interviewee ♯10 (see 
section 5.8.3) and who have much less to lose from PIECAS but are nevertheless active 
participants in the plan.  Without clear information from the High Level Committee, it is 
probable that agricultural stakeholders will feel suspicious of the Committee and other 
participants in PIECAS.  Interviewee ♯10’s comments about a lack of expertise could 
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certainly be interpreted as evidence for suspicion, although this is a tentative argument at 
best. 
The survey data do provide interesting information on trust in the High Level Committee, 
however.  Two observations merit discussion.  The first is that some of the stakeholders 
surveyed did not know about the High Level Committee.  The second is that marginally more 
stakeholders did not trust the High Level Committee than trusted it (n = 4 and n = 3, 
respectively).  Interestingly, and in support of my argument above, the people who mistrusted 
the High Level Committee were almost exclusively agricultural stakeholders.  Conversely, 
those respondents who trusted the High Level Committee belonged to NGOs or provincial 
government.  The sole exception to this pattern was interviewee ♯8, who, despite working for 
a NGO, lacked trust in the High Level Committee.  However, these data should be interpreted 
with caution given the small size of the samples involved.     
Trust in the High Level Committee and PIECAS generally will also have an exogenous 
component that is independent of the design and operation of PIECAS (see chapter 4 and the 
introduction to this chapter).  This exogenous component might be determined by attitudes to 
the incumbent government, say.  Again, however, it is difficult to reach particular 
conclusions about trust in the government from the interview or survey data.  Perhaps the 
only indication that some stakeholders might mistrust the government comes from remarks 
made by interviewee ♯9, who believed that there was a political element in the recent change 
of attitude to agricultural stakeholders’ involvement in PIECAS: 
“They really are looking at us in a different light.  There are also people who were 
‘fundamentalists’ in respect of agricultural production in the delta.  These people are 
politicians. They’re more cautious.  They’re no longer categorical.  They don’t tell us, “You 
have to do this because it’s happening to me.” Going to a meeting with a municipal 
Environment Secretary where they tell me, “You’re not going to be taken into account 
because there’s not space for you in my municipality,” with a strong, defined, intransigent 
position, I’ve suffered that.  These same people are now giving us dialogue in the 
municipality, and they respect us and they listen.  And I’m sure, Anthony, that it’s a political 
question, that someone said, “Look, you’re making a mistake.”  They almost ordered them to 
change their position.” 
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Of course, interviewee ♯9’s remarks do not address trust explicitly.  However, they do 
indicate that interviewee ♯9 believed political machinations might explain the trajectory 
PIECAS is following.  If other stakeholders share interviewee ♯9’s views, their opinion of 
PIECAS might be coloured by their attitude toward the incumbent government in Buenos 
Aires.  If interviewee ♯9 is mistrustful of that government, it suggests that interviewee ♯9 
may also mistrust the government officials that make up the High Level Committee and that 
are responsible for shaping PIECAS.  The same argument applies to stakeholders with beliefs 
similar to interviewee ♯9.  Again, however, it is worth cautioning that this argument is 
inconclusive at best and speculative at worst. 
5.12 Legitimation function criteria and top-down management approaches    
Both the halibut fishery and PIECAS are top-down insofar as the lead management 
organisations in both schemes are offshoots of government at a federal and/or state or 
provincial level (or both, in the case of the High Level Committee).  The IPHC is unusual in 
that it is an international organisation, but it too operates in a top-down fashion; it produces 
scientific advice and management recommendations that the NPFMC has limited discretion 
to change or to ignore. 
The problems associated with top-down or centralised resource management plans are widely 
recognised (see, for example, Acheson, 2006).  There is frequently outright antagonism 
between local communities and government bureaucracies.  Non-cooperative or non-
compliant behaviour can arise because there are ‘misunderstandings about new resource 
policies and distrust of government’s sincerity or ability to hold on to its promises’ (Baland 
and Platteau, 1996, pg. 254).  In some cases, governments lack detailed knowledge of SESs.  
As a result, they introduce measures that are culturally or ecologically inappropriate, or 
impose perverse incentives and significant costs on stakeholders.  In other cases, agency 
problems lead to corruption or the protection of particular stakeholder groups at the expense 
of others.   
Arguably, many of the problems that accompany top-down approaches are a product of the 
significant institutional and geographical distance that often exists between management 
authorities and the stakeholders affected by management rules.  For instance, an increase in 
institutional and geographical (and even ideological) distance increases the transaction costs 
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of establishing trust-based relationships (Lubell, 2007).  As a result, it is harder to develop 
trust in management authorities – and without that trust, there is a higher likelihood of ill-
feeling and hostility.  Similarly, an increase in institutional and geographical distance in 
particular can have a negative impact on stakeholder participation in a management plan.  It 
is clear, for example, that stakeholders who are based hundreds or even thousands of 
kilometres from the headquarters of management authorities will find it harder to participate 
in resource management processes than stakeholders who are closer.  Difficulties with 
participating in a plan can also lead to ill-feeling, especially if there is a sense that 
management authorities are not doing enough to facilitate participation, or if one’s exclusion 
from a resource management plan is unfair.   
Lubell (2007, referenced above) suggests that transaction costs play a role in mediating the 
effects of significant institutional and geographic distances.  Similarly, Adger et al. (2006) 
and Coggan et al. (2010) highlight the transaction costs associated with the vertical interplay 
between ‘public parties’ (regulators like the NPFMC, say) and ‘private parties’ (resource 
users like fishermen, for instance).  Transaction costs are broadly defined (see, for example, 
Demsetz, 1968; Williamson, 1981), but are usually thought of as the resources used to 
establish, maintain or transfer property rights, or the costs of ‘planning, adapting, and 
monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures’ (Williamson, 1981).  In 
a resource management context, there are transaction costs associated both with establishing 
trust (as Lubell (2007) suggests), and with stakeholder outreach, participation and consensus 
building (McCann et al., 2005).  In a resource management context, these transaction costs 
might be more appropriately considered management costs (Nielsen, 2003).  Irrespective of 
the nature of the cost, however, it is clear that the higher the transaction costs in an 
interaction, the harder it is for regulators and stakeholders alike to overcome the difficulties 
associated with significant institutional or geographical distances.     
One implication of this argument is that measures that reduce the transaction costs associated 
with a resource management plan will go some way toward enhancing trust, participation in, 
and communication of the plan.  Hence, minimising transaction costs helps to close the 
institutional and geographical distance (metaphorically, at least) that might otherwise 
accompany a top-down management approach.  As a result, minimising transaction costs 
should also enhance perceptions of legitimacy.  Management authorities that design or 
operate resource management plans in such a way that the transaction costs of 
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communicating, participating and developing trust are reduced can improve perceptions of a 
plan’s legitimacy.   
Interestingly, the analysis in this chapter suggests that the fishery and PIECAS fare 
differently in the extent to which they reduce transaction costs and therefore the degree to 
which they mitigate the impacts of top-down management.  In the halibut fishery, it is evident 
that both the IPHC and the NPFMC have introduced a number of measures that facilitate 
stakeholder participation in the IFQ management process and that encourage stakeholders to 
voice their concerns and ideas.  Although these measures are presumably costly to both 
organisations (consider interviewee B’s comments about the ‘excruciating’ transparency of 
the Council process), they significantly reduce the transaction costs that fishery stakeholders 
incur when participating and communicating.  For instance, the costs associated with the 
search for information are lowered by the accessibility and clarity of the information 
presented in documents, newsletters and on the IPHC’s and NPFMC’s websites.  The ready 
availability of information reduces the uncertainty – and therefore the transaction costs – of 
how one can participate, or how one can provide the IPHC and NPFMC with one’s opinion.  
Consider the benefit to stakeholders of the NPFMC’s ‘How do I get involved?’ webpage, for 
example.  Arguably, many of these transaction cost-reducing measures are essential to 
effective communication and participation in the fishery given the vast size of the region 
covered by IFQ management (see section 5.3 for additional detail on the region’s geography).     
Conversely, the manner in which PIECAS is being designed does little to reduce the 
transaction costs of communicating about, and participating in the plan.  Indeed, the measures 
that have successfully facilitated effective communication and participation in the fishery are 
all but absent from PIECAS.  There is no procedure that a stakeholder can follow if he wishes 
to participate at PIECAS meetings, for instance.  Equally, there is no specific or obvious way 
for a stakeholder to communicate with the High Level Committee.  As a result, many of the 
problems associated with top-down management approaches are evident in PIECAS.  The 
antagonism that exists between agricultural stakeholders and the High Level Committee is a 
good example. 
The implication of this argument is that, without particular features that facilitate effective 
communication, participation and trust-building, satisfying the legitimation function is 
considerably more challenging in top-down than bottom-up or grassroots management 
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approaches.  The latter are less likely to suffer from problems of institutional and 
geographical distance, which in turn reduces the cost of satisfying the legitimation function 
criteria.  This is not to say that top-down approaches are always inimical to satisfying the 
legitimation function; it is simply more difficult.  By extension, the organisations charged 
with designing a top-down resource management scheme should recognise the costs that top-
down management schemes impose, and the consequences for legitimacy implied by these 
costs.  Arguably, a basic principle in top-down resource management should be to reduce the 
transaction costs of satisfying legitimation function criteria.  This principle further 
emphasises the importance of the design of resource management systems. 
5.13 Conclusions arising from the application of the legitimation function framework 
The preceding analysis suggests that the four legitimation function criteria are broadly 
satisfied in the halibut fishery but remain largely unsatisfied in PIECAS.  Indeed, the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee survey data suggest that perceptions of some 
legitimation function criteria like effective communication and procedural fairness have 
worsened at times in PIECAS.  The chapter’s overall conclusion about the legitimation 
function in both management schemes is therefore consistent with the interview data and 
survey data, where it was suggested that PIECAS lacks legitimacy (especially amongst 
agricultural stakeholders) but the halibut fishery is imbued with it.  An argument based on the 
legitimation function criteria is one possible explanation for this pattern.  Of course, it is 
difficult to show an indisputable causal relationship between the legitimation function criteria 
and the emergence of legitimacy, but the analysis does at least suggest that there is some 
correlation between the four criteria and perceptions of legitimacy.  Further research should 
establish whether this correlation holds in other resource management systems, and with 
sufficient evidence may even point to causation.      
One striking aspect of the analysis is the starkness of the differences in the satisfaction of the 
legitimation function between the fishery and PIECAS.  The former has a wealth of features 
that encourage effective communication and participation, and that demonstrate 
trustworthiness and procedural fairness.  The NPFMC and IPHC both reduce the transaction 
costs associated with participating in the fishery’s management by organising regular 
meetings that are open to the public, both in person and online.  They deal with the 
challenges presented by Alaska’s geographical size by hosting meetings in different cities.  
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The meetings themselves, and the decisions made at them are apparently communicated 
clearly and honestly.  Advisory Bodies, Committees and collaborative research trips further 
encourage participation and consideration of stakeholder opinions.  Finally, there is a 
predictability and level of rigour accompanying participation at both the IPHC and NPFMC 
that ensures stakeholders have certainty about how, when and where they can participate.  
Collectively, these features satisfy each of the four legitimation function criteria.  It is clear 
that they facilitate participation.  They contribute to effective communication.  They provide 
the management process with many of the elements that make for procedural fairness.  And 
in turn, in part by satisfying the preceding three criteria, they increase the likelihood that trust 
between stakeholders and management authorities emerges (although this conclusion is 
challenged by a lack of trust in the NPFMC).  The cumulative effect of these measures is to 
provide the fishery with legitimacy. 
Conversely, similar measures are absent in PIECAS.  Indeed, the way the plan is being 
designed is preventing the satisfaction of the four legitimation function criteria.  The High 
Level Committee meets infrequently and on an apparently ad hoc basis.  These meetings are 
not open to the public, and the Committee itself is comprised only of government officials at 
a federal and provincial level.  There is no information on forthcoming meetings or matters 
for discussion, nor input from advisory bodies.  There is no formal mechanism by which 
stakeholders can raise their concerns with the High Level Committee; participation is 
therefore heavily dependent on social connectedness.  Furthermore, the diversity of tools in 
the fishery that encourage participation and effective communication in the fishery are 
missing from PIECAS.  Finally, the absence of agricultural stakeholders from the plan’s 
design has had a serious impact on their perception of the plan’s fairness and legitimacy.   
The principal effect of these features has been to limit participation in PIECAS, but they have 
also shaped the clarity of communication, perceptions of fairness, and the trust stakeholders – 
but particularly agricultural stakeholders – have in the plan and the High Level Committee.  
In turn, it is unsurprising that a number of the stakeholders interviewed for this research 
questioned PIECAS’s legitimacy. 
One implication of these conclusions is that it is possible and desirable to design a resource 
management plan in such a way that it is more likely to satisfy the four legitimation function 
criteria.  If, as suggested here, legitimacy can emerge when certain criteria are met, then it 
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should be feasible to design a resource management plan that satisfies these criteria from its 
inception.  In this regard, it is reasonable to assume that where the legitimation function 
criteria are not designed into a plan, the effort required to establish legitimacy after a resource 
management system and its outcomes are first seen as illegitimate is significant. 
The two case studies point to at least some design features for legitimation function criteria 
that could be appropriate.  The experience of the halibut fishery suggests that a conscious 
undertaking to make management meetings open and predictable serves a valuable 
legitimation function.  Similarly, facilitating participation by including non-government 
stakeholders in decision-making councils or committees can also encourage legitimation.  So 
too can establishing advisory bodies or committees that are comprised entirely of 
stakeholders independent of the management authority.  None of these features are 
unreasonably difficult to implement, but their impact on legitimacy is significant.  
Of course, it is also possible that, even if a resource management scheme satisfies each of the 
four legitimation function criteria, a scheme will still be perceived as lacking legitimacy.  
This observation points to the impact that the institutional and socio-economic setting in 
which a resource management scheme is placed can have on perceptions of legitimacy; that 
is, the wider context in which a resource management scheme is embedded establishes pre-
conditions for legitimacy or illegitimacy.  For instance, it is conceivable that a resource 
management scheme is deemed illegitimate because the authorities implementing it have 
come to power through non-democratic institutions that themselves lack legitimacy.   
Furthermore, I have not proven that satisfaction of the legitimation function criteria is a 
guarantee of the success of a resource management scheme.  Indeed, legitimacy is not 
necessarily highly correlated with decision implementation (Berardo, personal 
communication, 2014).  A scheme may satisfy each of the criteria but still lead to 
unsustainable outcomes.  There are a number of possible instances in which such a scenario 
might arise.  For instance, a resource management system may prove to be unsuccessful even 
with satisfaction of the legitimation function when sound scientific advice is beyond the 
management system’s reach.  This might occur when scientific advice is too complex or 
multifaceted to account for in management processes.  For example, many EU fisheries are 
multi-stock fisheries where several fish species will be found in the same area.  Each of these 
stocks requires a quota limit, and a process for allocating a share of multiple quotas across 
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countries.  Although establishing a scientifically justifiable quota limit is relatively 
straightforward, even in a multi-stock fishery, the allocation process is much more 
complicated – for instance, it is difficult to ensure that individual countries receive a share of 
quota that is ecologically sound.  The United Kingdom might receive a larger share of cod 
quota than its domestic fisheries can withstand, say, even if the overall EU cod quota is 
sustainable.  The politicisation of the CFP may have occurred precisely because a politically-
driven allocation process is easier to negotiate than a scientific one.   
This example should demonstrate ways in which sound scientific advice can be beyond the 
reach of a management process.  In such cases, satisfaction of the legitimation function is 
unlikely to lead to successful management outcomes.  Another way in which a management 
system can fail, even with satisfaction of the legitimation function, is when technical 
solutions to a given management problem are not known.  Prior to the invention of ITQs, for 
example, it is not clear that measures for successfully addressing over-capacity in fisheries 
were well-established. 
Finally, there are two other instances in which satisfaction of the legitimation function may 
not be sufficient for successful management outcomes.  Interestingly, these two situations 
relate in some way to communication and participation in a management process, and are 
therefore not entirely distinct from the legitimation function.  Firstly, it is possible that the 
participants in a management process collectively conclude that one management approach is 
superior to another, even though the opposite may be true.  In such cases, an attempt to 
implement the appropriate approach – against the collective’s wishes – is likely to be 
unpopular, even if it will ultimately lead to sustainable outcomes.  Indeed, the appropriate 
approach may lack legitimacy because its implementation is perceived to be unsound and 
raises issues of trust.  This is perhaps a weakness inherent in any resource management 
system where stakeholder participation is a key element.  It is not possible to guarantee that 
stakeholders will agree with or agree to suitable management measures, thus jeopardising the 
management system’s success.  Perhaps the only solution to this problem is to communicate 
the merits of an approach effectively – which raises the legitimation function once again. 
Secondly, it is possible that a suitable management measure, executed in a way that satisfies 
the legitimation function, is still rejected by stakeholders if it is perceived as culturally 
unacceptable.  Cultural mores of this kind may mean certain management approaches are not 
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available to management authorities, even if those approaches are likely to be more suitable 
and lead to successful outcomes.  Culture can therefore be a constraint on the decisions 
management authorities are able to make.  Furthermore, culture can be so ingrained in a 
community that it is difficult to overcome any constraints with effective communication and 
participation alone.  This argument points to the importance of exogenous factors like culture 
to management outcomes.    
Interestingly, the legitimacy of a resource management plan may also depend in part on 
exogenous factors over which management authorities may not have control.  This is not to 
say that legitimacy is purely exogenous.  Satisfying or failing to satisfy the legitimation 
function criteria will contribute to the emergence of legitimacy, but their effect may be 
mediated by exogenous factors.  The legitimation function remains a crucial issue to consider 
when designing a resource management plan because a failure to satisfy the legitimation 
function may well be fatal to a plan’s legitimacy, irrespective of its institutional setting.  I 
turn to the interplay between the legitimation function criteria and exogenous factors in 
chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 The influence of ‘exogenous’ factors on legitimacy. 
Keywords: culture, marginalisation, tradition, unionism. 
The legitimation function framework introduced in chapter 4 goes some way toward 
explaining why stakeholders may perceive a resource management system as legitimate.  The 
analysis in chapter 5 then shows the explanatory power of the framework, through its 
application to the two case studies presented in chapter 3.  Chapters 4 and 5 should 
demonstrate that the legitimation function framework provides resource management 
authorities with some indication of the features a legitimate resource management system 
might contain.  The framework is therefore a guide to designing management systems with 
legitimacy in mind.   
However, the framework has less explanatory power in the absence of a thorough 
understanding of exogenous influences and their interrelationship with the framework.  These 
exogenous factors are those that are beyond the immediate control of the resource 
management organisations charged with designing, implementing and operating the 
management system.  Consider a case where a management authority has assiduously 
satisfied the four legitimation function criteria – communication, participation, procedural 
fairness and trust - but finds that its management system still lacks legitimacy in the eyes of 
many stakeholders.  It is possible that the lack of legitimacy observed is related in some way 
to pre-existing beliefs about the nature of the management authority, or the presence of norms 
or cultural traits that predisposes some stakeholders to view management efforts as 
illegitimate.  These beliefs, norms and cultural traits may carry greater weight in determining 
perceptions of legitimacy than the legitimation function criteria.  Indeed, their influence may 
be so significant that satisfaction of the legitimation function criteria cannot by itself ensure 
legitimacy. 
Perhaps the most obvious demonstration of this principle is a situation where stakeholders 
reject the legitimacy of the State itself.  The State may have become tyrannical, for instance, 
with its authority resting on fear and coercion rather than legitimacy.  In these cases, 
government-led management systems like PIECAS or IFQs are likely to suffer from a lack of 
legitimacy simply because they are an extension of the State’s illegitimate power.  
Furthermore, even if the management authorities involved generate goodwill by satisfying the 
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legitimation function criteria, they are unlikely to have legitimacy themselves because they 
are agents of an illegitimate State.  It is evident then that the legitimation function criteria are 
not the entire picture when it comes to understanding legitimacy in resource management 
contexts.  In essence, we are recognising that resource management systems are ‘not isolated 
from wider political structures of region and state’ and that the ‘specificity of local socio-
cultural forms and their historical particularity’ is important to the system’s function (Mosse, 
1997). 
Assuming that there is merit in this argument, it is interesting to consider whether there are 
certain beliefs, socio-cultural forms and political structures that might predispose 
stakeholders in the fishery and in the delta to view halibut IFQs and PIECAS as illegitimate.  
We require an understanding (even if it is incomplete) of the recent history of Argentina and 
the United States, and more importantly, some sense of how this may have influenced 
stakeholder perceptions of government and government policy.   
At one level, both the Argentine and the United States government may be perceived as 
legitimate because they are democratically elected.  Their authority does not rest on coercion 
and force (although in Argentina’s case, the military junta’s rule between 1976 and 1983, and 
other factors, has led to deep-rooted suspicion of government.)36  In this respect, it is 
reasonable to assume that PIECAS and halibut IFQs are not illegitimate extensions of an 
illegitimate State.  Any legitimacy (or lack thereof) the two resource management systems 
may have is therefore not attributable to a broader perception that government, government 
organisations and government initiatives lack legitimate authority.  However, the 
performance of government in Argentina and the United States diverges significantly, and 
therein there may be a reason for believing that government and by extension government 
initiatives like PIECAS or halibut IFQs are illegitimate.  The argument here is that while the 
Argentine government and the United States government are seen as legitimate because they 
are democratically elected and not tyrannical in their use of power, differences in their 
conduct and effectiveness may have influenced stakeholder perceptions in such a way that 
PIECAS lacks legitimacy but halibut IFQs do not, independent of the four legitimation 
function criteria. 
                                                 
36 The death of Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman early in 2015 – and accusations that he was murdered on 
the order of the Argentine government to ensure that he did not reveal potentially damaging information on the 
links between the government and Iranian terrorists suspected of blowing up a Jewish centre in Buenos Aires in 
1994 – is a case in point. 
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In particular, Argentina suffers from corruption, weak institutions and weak rule of law to a 
much greater extent that the United States.  Transparency International’s corruption 
perception index ranks Argentina 107th out of 175 countries surveyed, well below the United 
States (ranked 17th).  Spiller and Tommasi (2003) suggest that Argentina’s public policy is 
‘incoherent’, and that economic policy in particular is highly volatile.  In general, they argue 
that Argentina ‘presents low-quality and incoherent public policies, with instability in some 
dimensions and excess rigidity in others’.  Although policy in the United States may also be 
criticised for incoherence, the general picture is more favourable than it is in Argentina.  For 
instance, management of the American economy has, over the long-term, been highly 
successful.  In contrast, Argentina has endured a century of economic decline.  Prior to the 
First World War, it was one of the 10 richest countries in the world.  Economic growth 
averaged 6% per annum.  Income per head was 92% of what it was in the 16 wealthiest 
countries in the world; today, it is just 43% (The Economist, 2014).  In addition to these 
problems, the repressive military junta that ruled Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s had and 
continues to have a profound effect on Argentine society and politics.   
All told, Argentina’s policy problems and its turbulent recent history may have an important 
effect on perceptions of legitimacy not just in resource management contexts but in a range of 
situations.  In particular, it is possible that a belief that the State is corrupt has the effect of 
delegitimising government organisations and government initiatives.  Thus, it is plausible 
(although difficult to attribute conclusively) that PIECAS’s lack of legitimacy is linked to a 
wider societal perception that the Argentine State is corrupt, and that organs of the State like 
the National Environment Secretariat are also corrupt.  Corrupt behaviour may be 
delegitimising because it exploits the trust that the electorate places in government.   
In contrast to Argentina, the United States has much stronger institutions and rule of law.  
Halibut IFQs are situated in a context where the rigour with which institutional processes are 
carried out is assumed, if not assured.  Exogenous factors like corruption or an inability to 
rely on the law are therefore unlikely to be as significant in shaping legitimacy as they 
possibly are in the Paraná delta.  Nevertheless, there are other exogenous factors that may 
play a role in shaping the fishery’s legitimacy.  For instance, the IPHC is based in Seattle, 
which is some 2000km from Alaskan fishing communities (see chapter 5).  It is possible that 
halibut fishers in Alaska question the IPHC’s legitimacy precisely because it is so far 
removed from them, although there is no evidence of this in the interview or survey data.  
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Similarly, there are aboriginal communities in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest that may feel 
a cultural or traditional right to halibut that is at odds with government-led management in 
the form of halibut IFQs.  These communities may believe that IFQs are illegitimate in the 
sense that they have superseded historical, culturally important forms of managing the 
fishery. 
The comparison between Argentina and the United States suggests that it is indeed possible 
that ‘exogenous factors’ can shape perceptions of legitimacy in addition to or independently 
of the legitimation function criteria.  However, it is interesting that the argument in the 
paragraphs above makes a connection between perceptions of corruption and a factor like 
trust (which is, of course, included in the legitimation function framework).  It implies, 
perhaps, that the effect that some – if not all - exogenous factors have on legitimacy is 
mediated via the legitimation function criteria.  For instance, one might argue that corrupt 
practices are an example of a breakdown in procedural fairness.  Indeed, most definitions of 
corruption include the idea that the conduct of an individual or organisation has failed to 
follow due process and not met some agreed-upon standard. 
Neither the interview nor the survey data contain any information that provides us with clues 
about the exogenous factors that have influenced perceptions of legitimacy in the fishery or in 
the delta.  As a result, the approach taken in this chapter uses meta-analysis to see whether 
there are cultural, historical or socio-economic factors beyond the immediate control of 
resource management authorities that have influenced the legitimacy of fisheries management 
systems. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: in section 6.1, I provide details on the methodology 
employed; in section 6.2, I outline the results of the meta-analysis; section 6.3 discusses these 
results, before section 6.4 concludes the chapter.  Section 6.1 is comprehensive but should be 
read as complementary to the methodology chapter (chapter 2).   
6.1 Meta-analysis methodology 
Meta-analysis – or a ‘study of studies’ – is a method that is routinely employed in disciplines 
as diverse as economics and medicine, and is increasingly used by scholars trying to 
understand the management of CPRs and SESs.  For instance, Cox (2014) describes a meta-
analytic approach (the SESMAD project) that assesses whether the variables that explain 
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management outcomes in small-scale CPR systems are relevant to environmental governance 
outcomes at larger scales.  As part of the SESMAD project, Epstein et al. (2014) investigated 
international governance of Atlantic Bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus).  Elsewhere, Pagdee et 
al. (2006) used meta-analysis to identify factors that influence the success of community 
forest management.  Similarly, Rudel (2008) employed meta-analysis to understand changes 
in local forest cover in Mexico. 
In this chapter, I have applied Pagdee et al.’s method to the following research question: what 
are the exogenous factors that characterise legitimate and illegitimate resource management 
systems?  Clearly, this is such a broad research question that it opens a variety of avenues for 
further investigation.  In this instance, I have chosen to make fishers the unit of analysis.  
Thus, I aim to identify the attributes that describe the fishers (and by extension, fishing 
communities) included in the case studies that make up the meta-analysis sample.  In 
particular, I ask the following: are there factors – a colonial legacy, for instance, or a history 
of unionism – that might have skewed fishers’ perceptions of government in such a way that 
government-led resource management initiatives are deemed illegitimate?  Does a history of 
unionism, say, correlate with a belief that a resource management system is illegitimate? 
At this stage, I should clarify how I am defining ‘exogenous’ factors.  In this chapter, I treat 
factors and attributes as exogenous if they are not directly contingent on the resource 
management system for their existence.  Of course, this is a broad definition and necessarily 
subjective.  However, it does allow us to make a distinction between factors that emerge from 
management decisions, and factors that have their origins outside the management system or 
SES in question.  For instance, participation in rule-development is clearly an ‘endogenous’ 
factor, according to my definition, in that its presence depends on decisions made within the 
framework of any given resource management system.  Conversely, fishermen in a particular 
SES having a long history of unionism (militant or otherwise) is not contingent on the 
decisions and rules that comprise a management system.  Unions may have existed before a 
particular management system came into existence, for example.  A history of unionism is 
therefore an exogenous factor.  My definition is similar to one used by Agrawal (2001, 2003), 
who suggests that ‘context’ (or the exogenous factors that surround a resource management 
system) is best seen as the ‘encompassing variables that remain constant for a given study but 
not across studies’. 
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6.1.1 Sampling       
Following Pagdee et al. (2006), the first step in the meta-analysis was the identification of 
sample papers.  I started by concentrating on the CPR management literature, but chose to 
limit the study to papers discussing fisheries management only.  The rationale for focusing on 
fisheries alone, rather than fisheries and wetlands (the environment most similar to the Paraná 
delta), was twofold.  Firstly, there are significantly more papers studying fisheries than there 
are wetlands.  Secondly, wetlands contain a variety of resources.  They are likely to have a 
variety of management systems to deal with these different resources.  Unless papers 
distinguish clearly between management systems, it may be difficult to link certain 
exogenous factors with the legitimacy (or otherwise) of particular management systems.  
Fisheries suffer from this problem to a lesser extent, because management systems tend to 
focus on one resource or even one stock.  The halibut IFQ system is a case in point.   
I used the Digital Library of the Commons (DLC) database (http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/) 
as the source database for sample papers.  The DLC is maintained by the University of 
Indiana at Bloomington, and contains any article published that is relevant to CPR and SES 
management.  The DLC has the advantage of containing a significant number of papers, some 
of which go back to the 1980s and earlier.  It is also simple to use.  In particular, specific 
search terms produce the same list of papers on every search.  The only difference between 
searches is that additional papers may have been added to the database in the intervening 
period.   
Searching for papers classified under ‘fisheries’ produced a list of 593 papers.  Once this 
sample was collated, I proceeded to read through the abstract (and where necessary, the 
introduction) of each of these papers, in order to determine whether the study in question 
analysed a case or cases where there was an interaction between a government resource 
management authority and a local community or aboriginal group.  The reason for focusing 
on papers examining cases of this kind specifically was that papers where there is an 
interaction between a management authority and a local community may provide a useful 
proxy measurement of legitimacy.  For instance, a paper may chronicle protests by a local 
aboriginal community against a management initiative being pushed forward by a 
government resource management authority.  Although not a perfect proxy, it is reasonable to 
argue that, in a case like this, the protests against the management plan are a symptom of a 
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lack of legitimacy.  Furthermore, by focusing on such papers, the benefits arising from larger 
sample sizes in meta-analysis are not lost due to the paucity of papers that measure 
legitimacy directly.  
In determining whether or not a paper included an example of a community-government 
interaction, the paper had to pass a relatively low threshold.  Thus, I excluded articles that 
focused on aquaculture, marine protected areas (MPAs), or whaling; articles that assessed the 
viability of proposed management interventions, rather than existing community-government 
interactions and management systems; and articles that investigated conflicts between 
fishermen (on the basis that the interactions of interest in the meta-analysis were fishermen-
government interactions rather than fishermen-fishermen interactions).  I included articles 
examining co-management systems (where government devolves some responsibility to 
fishermen for managing fisheries resources); articles that discussed court decisions (the 
rationale being that these had a direct impact on the fisher-government interactions of 
interest); and articles looking at the creation or rebuilding of institutions, because here too it 
was likely that fisher-government interactions would be affected. 
I made no distinction between conference papers, journal articles, reports, discussion 
documents and book chapters.  As a result, some of the studies included in the sample are not 
peer-reviewed.  This is a potential weakness of the approach adopted in this chapter, but 
including peer-reviewed papers only would significantly reduce the number of case studies 
available for sampling in the DLC. 
Using the selection criteria outlined above, I was left with 73 papers from the original sample 
of 593.  Once I had collated this smaller sample, the next step in the process was to determine 
whether or not the management systems included in the papers were examples of legitimate 
or illegitimate systems, or whether the articles did not contain sufficient information to draw 
such a conclusion.  Again, I used a variety of criteria to determine whether or not the 
management system in a particular case study was legitimate or illegitimate.  A legitimate 
management system was one where the fishers affected by a fisheries management system 
supported the system, as manifested by a lack of complaints, protests, and ill-feeling.  
Particular language usually accompanied these cases: words like ‘accepted’, ‘justifiable’, 
‘well-supported’, and ‘satisfied’ were used as guidance.  An illegitimate management system 
was one where the local population expressed anger or dissatisfaction with the management 
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system, or complained about or protested against management decisions and rules.  In studies 
where court decisions were discussed, the contents of any court rulings were seen as evidence 
that a management system was or was not legitimate.  For instance, a court decision in favour 
of a community protest indicated that the management system that was the source of the 
community’s ire was indeed illegitimate. 
Sampling papers using these criteria was unavoidably subjective.  Without direct 
measurements of legitimacy, deciding whether or not a case study contained an example of a 
legitimate or illegitimate resource management system often required a subjective judgement.  
I attempted to overcome this problem in two ways.  Firstly, I read through each article in its 
entirety.  In virtually all cases, it was clear by the end of the article whether or not the 
fisheries management system in question was legitimate or illegitimate.  Secondly, I used a 
relatively high threshold when drawing my conclusions.  Articles where I was unsure about 
the legitimacy of the management system were not included in the final sample.               
Following this process, I finished with a sample of 26 papers (from the initial 73).  Thirteen 
of these papers investigated resource management systems that appeared to be legitimate, 
although two examined systems that had started as illegitimate but subsequently gained 
legitimacy.  The other thirteen papers included case studies where the management systems 
under analysis were illegitimate (excluding the two papers mentioned above).  A further 28 
papers (from the sample of 73 papers) had insufficient information to draw a firm conclusion; 
and 17 papers were incorrectly sampled (that is, the papers did not actually contain examples 
of fishermen-government interactions). 
It is worth noting the distinction I make between papers (or articles – I use the terms 
interchangeably) and case studies.  Case studies comprise the individual analyses included 
within any given paper.  Thus, one paper can contain one or more case studies.  In several 
instances in the final sample, I determined that one case study investigated in a paper 
included an example of a legitimate or illegitimate management system, while other case 
studies in the same paper did not.  Of course, there were also a number of papers (indeed, the 
majority) with only one case study. 
The qualitative nature of the results in all of these papers, as well as small sample sizes, made 
statistical analysis difficult.  Furthermore, each paper did not necessarily represent a non-
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independent datum.  There were cases where two or more papers examined the same resource 
management scheme.  Nevertheless, I used Fisher’s exact test to evaluate the significance of 
the correlation between legitimacy and certain exogenous factors with relatively high counts 
in the final sample.  Using Fisher’s exact test was one way to overcome in part the challenges 
presented by small sample sizes.  In addition, Fisher’s exact test uses count data and does not 
therefore require the difficult conversion of qualitative data into quantitative data.  Although 
an imperfect approach, choosing Fisher’s exact test was the best way to incorporate some 
statistical methods into the analysis. 
6.1.2 Coding of selected case studies 
Given the difficulties associated with using statistical techniques with the data I collected, I 
developed a coding form to interpret the qualitative results included in the sample.  In this 
respect, I was using a standard protocol in meta-analysis (see, for instance, Schlager, 1990; 
Pagdee et al., 2006).  Coding protocols allow for the extraction of data from each paper in a 
uniform way, even if the results contained across papers vary significantly.  As the papers in 
the sample I had collected did indeed contain a variety of results collected with a range of 
methods, coding was a sensible way to overcome problems associated with methodological 
diversity. 
Although there are several existing coding protocols (for instance, the SESMAD project 
protocol used by Epstein et al. (2014)), none of them were suitable for the purposes of my 
research question.  I therefore developed my own protocol, following the method employed 
by Pagdee et al. (2006).  Pagdee et al.’s research focused on the factors that determine the 
success or failure of community forest management schemes.  They devised a conceptual 
framework of reasonable measures of success, before categorising the data in their sample 
papers according to this framework.  If a particular paper included a measure not previously 
considered, it was added to the framework.  In a similar way, I developed a framework of 
factors that might reasonably influence fisher-government relations.  Where my subsequent 
reading of the sample papers suggested there were factors I had missed, these were added to 
the framework, and the papers re-read with the new factor(s) in mind.   
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Though this is an incomplete list of exogenous factors that might impact upon stakeholder 
attitudes to the legitimacy of a management system, the final coding framework included the 
following factors: 
1. Colonial legacy 
2. Aboriginal and/or land treaties 
3. Marginalisation 
4. Experience and/or perception of government corruption 
5. History of political activism 
6. History of unionism 
7. History of government abuses 
8. History of protest 
9. Suspicion of government 
10. Discontent with government 
11. Questioning government use of science 
12. Class and/or labour identity 
13. Culture and/or traditions 
14. Socio-economic status 
15. Government action 
Each of these exogenous factors required careful definition.  These definitions are included in 
table 16 below. 
Table 16. Definitions of the coding variables. 
Exogenous factor Definition 
Colonial legacy Author(s) discussed impact of colonial government on 
fishing communities. 
Aboriginal and/or land treaties Author(s) discussed impact of aboriginal or land treaties, 
historic or otherwise. 
Marginalisation Evidence that fishers do not wield much political or socio-
economic power. 
Experience and/or perception of 
government corruption 
Evidence of corruption (i.e. bribes, kickbacks, nepotism) 
in the day-to-day business of government. 
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Exogenous factor Definition 
History of political activism Evidence that individuals or communities have long 
experience lobbying and/or protesting against government. 
History of unionism Evidence of union activity, including labour unions, 
cooperatives, and associations. 
History of government abuses 
Evidence of serious abuses of power and injustices by 
government – a more serious category than simple 
corruption. 
History of protest 
Evidence of a tendency to express dissatisfaction or 
interests through protest, whether street protests, 
demonstrations, rallies, picketing, and similar. 
Suspicion of government 
Predisposition to see government as a threat to liberty and 
prosperity; an ideological disagreement with the concept 
of the State. 
Discontent with government Disagreement with government decisions, interventions, 
and regulations. 
Questioning government use of 
science 
Evidence that fishers and fishing communities question 
the use and application of science by government 
agencies. 
Class and/or labour identity Evidence that fishers identify themselves according to 
facets of their background or profession. 
Culture and/or traditions Evidence of traditional modes of behaviour, customs, and 
ways of thinking. 
Socio-economic status Information on the socio-economic status of fishers and 
fishing communities. 
Government action Government interventions that affect and are relevant to 
the livelihoods and well-being of fishers and fishing 
communities. 
 
For each paper, I determined whether or not these factors were absent or present.  One of the 
problems with this approach is that concluding that a factor is present or absent leads to a loss 
of heterogeneity that may be important to the case in question (Epstein et al., 2014).  There is 
a trade-off between heterogeneity within a case and homogeneity across cases (ibid).  I 
attempted to address this issue by recording the detail associated with each factor when it 
appeared in a case.  Indeed, these details provided the bulk of the data in the analysis that 
follows. 
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6.2 Results 
I now turn to presenting the results of the meta-analysis.  I begin by providing a simple 
description of the articles that form the basis of the meta-analysis.  I then summarise the 
results of the coding exercise. 
6.2.1 Describing the sample papers 
The initial meta-analysis sample (n = 73) was comprised largely of conference papers (n = 
45), followed by articles in the peer-reviewed journal literature (n = 24).  One case study 
formed a book chapter; a further three case studies came from working papers.  As 
mentioned, it is potentially problematic in terms of the quality of the case studies that not all 
of the papers included in the sample are peer-reviewed.  The secondary sample (n = 26), 
which included the final case studies chosen for analysis, also contained more conference 
papers (n = 14) than any other document type.  There were 10 journal articles in the sample, 
one working paper and one book chapter.   
The 26 articles in the final sample were published between 1991 and 2014.  The majority of 
articles in the sample were published in the 2000s (n = 20), with the remaining 6 published in 
the 1990s. 
Within the 26 papers, 34 case studies were discussed.  These case studies were global in their 
reach.  Twelve case studies were North America-focused (including American Samoa and 
Hawaii); six were situated in Europe; four in Latin America (including the Caribbean); seven 
in Asia (including India); four in Africa; and one in Oceania. 
The full list of papers included in the final meta-analysis sample is found in the appendix E. 
6.2.2 Coding results 
The data produced in the meta-analysis are both qualitative and quantitative (the latter in the 
form of count data).  Figure 20 below illustrates the quantitative data.  The bar chart shows 
the number of times in which a particular exogenous factor is mentioned in the meta-analysis 
sample, split by the factor’s appearance in a legitimate or illegitimate case study.  One factor 
- a history of unionism – appeared nine times (three times in legitimate case studies, six times 
in illegitimate case studies).  Discontent with government and culture and traditions appeared 
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eight times each.  Class or labour identities were mentioned six times.  Marginalisation was 
present in six case studies, and questioning government competence or use of science in five 
case studies.  At the other end of the spectrum, there was only one instance of experience or 
perception of government corruption, and government action.  Colonial legacy impacts were 
not discussed in a single case study, surprising perhaps given that a number of case studies 
were situated in countries with colonial histories (India and New Zealand, for instance). 
 
 
Figure 20. Count data for external factors by legitimacy or illegitimacy of case study. 
6.2.3 Qualitative results 
Qualitative data collected for each exogenous factor provided additional detail on the 
attributes and impacts of each factor.  For example, the case studies revealed that one way in 
which labour unions had shaped fishing communities was by increasing the ease with which 
fishing communities could express their opinions in a political or management arena.  Holm 
and Rånes (1996), for instance, suggested that a fishermen’s union established in the 1920s 
had helped northern Norwegian fishermen access the polity more easily.  Similarly, Barrett 
(1991) showed that the Bermuda Industrial Union had provided Bermudan fishermen with its 
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full support when disputes between fishermen and the Bermudan government on over-fishing 
reached a head in the 1980s.  In British Columbia, the Native Brotherhood – a labour union 
for aboriginal peoples – played a key role in providing fishermen with representation during 
discussions on salmon management in the Nass and Skeena Rivers (Wright, 2008). 
The case studies also provided interesting details on culture and traditions and discontent 
with government.  For instance, a number of the fishing communities discussed in the case 
studies had a cultural conception of nature and CPRs37 that were at odds with government 
views of and objectives for those resources.  King (2011), for example, described how the 
Mi’kmaq First Nation in New Brunswick, Canada, viewed conservation in more holistic 
terms than government.  For the former, conservation is linked not only to the health of fish 
stocks but the wider ‘economic, political and spiritual well-being’ of the community; for the 
latter, the purpose of fisheries conservation was simply to ‘improve the material lives of 
people’.  Furthermore, King notes that the Mi’kmaq believe the creator ‘Kisulk’ provided 
them with a ‘divine obligation’ to enjoy nature’s bounty, but also to protect and preserve it.  
Similarly, in a case study of the São Francisco River in Brazil, de Andrade (2006) describes 
how fishing communities along the river conceive of it as a ‘life-force’ or ‘Father’, in contrast 
to government designations of the river as a commodity and source of income.  In addition, 
some case studies emphasise how individual species or stocks have cultural significance.  In 
New Zealand, for example, rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii and Jasus verreauxi) are culturally 
important to the Maori (Yandle, 2004). 
In terms of discontent with government, King (2011) again provides some interesting detail.  
King found that the Mi’kmaq believed that policy-making at the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans (the Canadian government’s fisheries management arm) was ‘biased and racist’, 
‘adversarial’, and ‘paternalistic and condescending’ between the years 1993 to 2000.  
Evidently, the culture at the Department of Fisheries and Oceans was in some way inimical to 
the Mi’kmaq’s way of being and thinking.  Elsewhere in the meta-analysis, Delaney (2006) 
describes how party political considerations meant local governments were unresponsive to 
the complaints of fishermen in Cambodia.  This is a good example of how factors 
independent of a fishery (that is, party politics) can have a significant impact on a fishery’s 
performance and on the beliefs and behaviour of fishermen. 
                                                 
37 Of course, these communities would not call resources like fish stocks CPRs.  The term ‘CPR’ is largely, if 
not entirely academic. 
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Three other factors that appeared in a number of case studies merit further elaboration: class 
or labour identity, questioning government use of science, and marginalisation.  Class or 
labour identity as an exogenous factor appeared in 6 case studies, and questioning 
government use of science was present in 5 case studies.  In three of the case studies that 
mention class or labour identity, the theme underpinning the factor is one of adversity and 
resistance against power (that is, ‘David and Goliath’ attitudes).  Thus, Holm and Rånes 
(1996) describe how coastal fishermen felt some antipathy toward offshore trawl fishermen in 
northern Norway; King (2011) discusses the distinction ‘native’ Mi’kmaq fishermen made 
between themselves and ‘non-native’ fishermen; and also in northern Norway, Olson (1996) 
highlights how coastal fishermen considered themselves ‘little guys’ at odds with the State, 
trawlers and local fish-buyers. 
In most of the case studies in which questioning government use of science was identified as 
an exogenous factor, the recurring theme was of fishermen challenging the competence or 
experience of government fisheries management organisations.  For instance, Rova (2004) 
noted that bleak-roe fishermen in the Gulf of Bothnia (Sweden) believed officials at the 
National Board of Fisheries in Gothenburg were ‘novices’ when it came to managing the 
bleak-roe fishery.  Similarly, Hara (2008) suggested that Malawian fishermen around Lake 
Mangochi believed that newly instituted ‘Beach Village Committees’ (local-level 
organisations that aimed to ensure local participation in fisheries management) were making 
decisions on issues in which they had little knowledge, and that those decisions were often 
capricious.  Finally, Wright’s paper (2008) on salmon management on the Nass and Skeena 
Rivers in British Columbia describes how the Canadian government used science to justify 
and legitimise the salmon management decisions it made.  Significantly, however, aboriginal 
groups were quick to exploit inconsistencies and weaknesses in the science – particularly in 
respect of their application to fisheries regulations - to support their own arguments.   
Two interesting observations were made in two case studies that discussed marginalisation of 
fishermen and fishing communities.  Delaney (2006) noted that artisanal fishermen in 
Cambodia believed that curbing illegal fishing would be possible only with the assistance of 
institutions with money and power.  By extension, the fishermen did not have the means – 
either financial or political – to address illegal fishing themselves.  Thus, Cambodian 
fishermen are to some extent powerless to shape their own fishery precisely because they are 
marginalised.  In the other case study (de Andrade, 2006, examining fisheries on the lower 
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São Francisco River in Brazil) marginalisation was linked to a lack of democratic 
representation.  During the military dictatorship of the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, 
fishermen had to fight for ‘citizenship rights’ that had otherwise been denied.  (It is unclear 
from the paper what ‘citizenship rights’ refers to, but presumably it does not mean the right to 
vote given that the Brazilian state was a dictatorship.)  It was only in 1988, with the 
introduction of the Federal Constitution, that fishermen’s colonies and federations – fishing 
associations at a municipal and state level, respectively, that were headed up by individuals 
who were unelected, had strong ties to local political elites, and were not fishermen – became 
democratic bodies. 
6.2.4 Statistical results 
Although the data produced in the meta-analysis are derived from qualitative findings, and 
although the final sample size was relatively small, it was possible to use statistical 
techniques in this chapter’s analysis.  In particular, statistical techniques allow us to 
determine with some confidence whether or not a particular exogenous factor predicts the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a resource management system. 
The count data for a number of the exogenous factors are so low that they preclude the use of 
statistical methods.  However, the factors with higher counts – namely a history of unionism, 
culture and traditions, discontent with government, marginalisation, and class or labour 
identities – lend themselves to analysis using the Chi-squared (χ2) test and Fisher’s exact test.  
The null hypothesis for each factor is as follows: 
H0 = There is no significant difference in the legitimacy of resource management systems 
with and without a history of unionism. 
H0 = There is no significant difference in the legitimacy of resource management systems 
with and without exogenous culture and traditions. 
H0 = There is no significant difference in the legitimacy of resource management systems 
where discontent with government is present or absent. 
H0 = There is no significant difference in the legitimacy of resource management systems 
with and without marginalisation. 
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H0 = There is no significant difference in the legitimacy of resource management systems 
with and without class or labour identities. 
For a history of unionism, we accept the null hypothesis38 (χ2 = 0.153, d.f. = 1, p > 0.05).  For 
culture and traditions39, we accept the null hypothesis (p > 0.05).  For discontent with 
government – which had the same count data as culture and traditions – we also accept the 
null hypothesis (p > 0.05).  For class or labour identities, we accept the null hypothesis (p > 
0.05).  For marginalisation, we accept the null hypothesis (p > 0.05), but the result is almost 
statistically significant.   
6.3 Discussion 
The statistical findings outlined above have great value in answering this chapter’s primary 
research question.  They provide us with at least some evidence that a number of the 
exogenous factors hypothesised to contribute to legitimacy or illegitimacy in resource 
management systems do not actually do so.  Thus, according to the statistics, a history of 
unionism, culture and traditions, discontent with government, marginalisation, and class or 
labour identities are not significantly correlated with legitimacy in resource management 
contexts. 
If, as the results suggest, these exogenous factors have no impact in shaping people’s 
perceptions of the legitimacy of a resource management system, then by extension ‘other’ 
factors may have a more important influence on legitimacy.  We cannot conclude with 
complete confidence that these ‘other’ factors are endogenous because we lack statistics for 
the remaining exogenous factors (and, moreover, the list of exogenous factors is almost 
certainly incomplete).  Thus, ‘other’ exogenous factors may still potentially have a role in 
influencing legitimacy.  However, the identity of these exogenous factors is not clear, and my 
analysis of the relevant literature did not reveal any candidate factors.  It will be possible to 
rule out the other exogenous factors included in this chapter by running statistical analyses on 
them too, but to do so requires increasing the sample size for each factor significantly. 
                                                 
38 The χ2 statistic and p value were calculated online at http://www.graphpad.com/quickcalcs/contingency1/.  
The p value was corroborated with a separate calculation in Excel. 
39 The p values for culture and traditions, discontent with government, class or labour identities, and 
marginalisation were all calculated using Fisher’s exact test, online at 
http://www.graphpad.com/quickcalcs/contingency1/.   
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In terms of a history of unionism, culture and traditions, discontent with government, class or 
labour identities, and marginalisation, the statistical results are perhaps surprising.  Each of 
these factors could ostensibly have a significant impact on perceptions of legitimacy in 
resource management contexts.  Indeed, other literature emphasises the importance of history, 
culture and institutions (amongst others) to the success of, for instance, NGO-led natural 
resource management projects in the developing world (Black and Watson, 2006).  This 
apparent discrepancy between the quantitative results produced in the meta-analysis, and the 
qualitative conclusions drawn in other papers is worth examining further.     
Unions, for instance, can shape opinions of management authorities in a number of ways.  At 
one level, unions often provide a balance to the power of business and political elites 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013).  Support from unions can therefore enable fishermen and 
other stakeholders in a resource management system to interact with authorities and other 
interest groups on a similar political footing.  Unions form a ‘public sphere’ in which 
stakeholders can have a voice (Ishihara and Pascual, 2009).  This is especially significant in 
some fishery management systems because fishermen are often marginalised in both a 
political and socio-economic sense (Béné and Fried, 2011).  They may wield limited political 
power, and are therefore more easily ignored by government.  Clearly, the fairness – in both 
an absolute and procedural sense – of this situation is dubious.  Unions go some way toward 
addressing these issues by changing political equilibria in favour of fishermen. 
This argument also suggests that a history of unionism and union representation can enhance 
communication and shape participation in resource management systems.  In particular, 
unions allow members to engage in political processes that might otherwise be closed to 
them.  Holm and Rånes’s (1996) make this point when they note that fishing unions facilitate 
‘access to the polity’ (see page 241).  In addition to changing political equilibria and the 
power wielded by their members, then, unions can provide opportunities for participation and 
dialogue in a management process that individual fishermen may otherwise lack.  On both 
counts – political power, and communication and participation – one might expect that a 
history of unionism is positively correlated with perceptions of legitimacy in a resource 
management system.  In this light, the statistical results from the meta-analysis are counter-
intuitive. 
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The results produced by Fisher’s exact test for culture and traditions, class or labour identities 
and discontent with government also suggest that these exogenous factors do not significantly 
affect perceptions of legitimacy in resource management contexts.  As with a history of 
unionism, this is unexpected.  Culture and traditions in particular can have powerful effects 
on people’s behaviour and their attitude toward management authorities (Mosse, 1997).  In 
his study of fisheries in Malawi, for instance, Hara (2008) indicated that customary tribal 
authority had diminished the standing of government-backed Beach Village Committees 
(BVCs) amongst local fishermen.  BVCs were government-instituted organisations that 
aimed to increase local-level participation in the fishery.  However, traditional community 
leaders, who were not necessarily included in the BVCs and who still wielded significant 
authority as a result of tribal customs, disputed and diminished the standing of the BVCs.  
Hara’s case study goes to the heart of questions about legitimacy.  The conflict he describes 
arises because the legitimacy of the BVC’s authority had not been established as strongly as 
it was for tribal leaders. 
This example suggests strongly that the conclusions drawn from the statistical analysis about 
culture and traditions should be treated cautiously.  Cultural or traditional notions of 
legitimate authority can conflict with a government’s authority.  Hara’s research 
demonstrates this principle neatly.  It is clear, then, that there are instances in which culture 
or traditions can have a significant impact on perceptions of legitimacy in resources 
management systems.  This nuance is missed in the statistical analysis, and is of significant 
interest.  It also raises an important question: to what extent can an exogenous predisposition 
to feelings of illegitimacy be put aside when the internal features of the management system 
itself give no reason for a charge of illegitimacy to arise?  For instance, the problems 
surrounding BVCs in Malawi could be resolved by equitable decision-making that provides a 
role for traditional community leaders in the BVC (thus satisfying procedural fairness).  
Indeed, if difficult decisions about trade-offs in a resource management system satisfy pre-
agreed criteria, then exogenous factors should for the most part be eliminated from the 
management system itself.  Arguably, exogenous factors should only resonate in a 
management system which provides evidence that exogenously-derived perceptions of 
illegitimacy are replicated in the management system itself.  This is an important observation 
as it resides alongside the point that experiential learning - leading to trust drawn from 
communication, participation and being treated in a procedurally fair manner - may well lead 
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a participant in a management system to overcome an exogenous pre-disposition towards the 
illegitimacy of decision-making institutions. 
In the case of Malawian BVCs, the government’s management system was not appropriately 
designed to consider or to respect the traditional leadership provided by tribal community 
chiefs.  Thus, the perception that the new management system lacked legitimacy arose not 
because of the pre-existence of traditional tribal authority, but because such authority was not 
sufficiently reflected in the system.       
A critical analysis of other case studies included in the meta-analysis sample further supports 
the ideas suggested by Hara’s case study.  For instance, in a paper examining the response of 
Mi’kmaq aboriginal people in New Brunswick, Canada, to fisheries management efforts by 
the Canadian government, King (2011) noted that the Mi’kmaq believe they have unique 
sovereignty over natural resources as a result of rights and responsibilities given them by 
Kisulk, the Creator (see again section 6.2.3).  Thus, Mi’kmaq ‘cultural sovereignty’ is derived 
from a higher authority than that invoked by government, say.  Claims for the legitimacy of 
government-led resource management systems that rest on the legality and natural authority 
of government interventions are therefore weakened because government is perceived to have 
less authority relative to the community itself; the community’s authority and sovereignty 
over fisheries and other natural resources flows from Kisulk itself.  Furthermore, the 
Mi’kmaq have different conceptions of conservation and the aims of resource management 
compared to government resource managers.  For the latter, resource management is couched 
in scientific terms and concerns the enhancement of fish stocks and the improvement of 
economic and social structures in (aboriginal) communities.  For the Mi’kmaq, conversely, 
resource management is a holistic process that is linked not only to the health of fish stocks 
but to the ‘economic, political and spiritual well-being of the wider community’ (King, 
2011). 
Interestingly, these cultural beliefs have not shaped perceptions of judicial and government 
interventions in the New Brunswick fishery in a consistent way.  In 1999, for instance, the 
Canadian Supreme Court ruled in its Marshall decision that Mi’kmaq people had a treaty 
right to fish and to earn a ‘moderate livelihood’ from the fishery.  In addition, any imposition 
by the Canadian DFO of close seasons and licences represented an ‘unreasonable 
interference’ on these treaty rights.  In a subsequent clarification – Marshall II – the Supreme 
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Court ruled that these treaty rights could only be limited when there was justification to do so 
on conservation grounds.  Crucially, the Court’s decision in Marshall was greeted ‘with joy’ 
by the Mi’kmaq.  Arguably, the reason why Marshall provoked such a warm response was 
that it reflected the Mi’kmaq’s exogenous cultural beliefs about their sovereignty.  Indeed, 
King notes that the Mi’kmaq believed Marshall was an ‘affirmation of their treaty rights to 
earn a livelihood from the fishery’ – and, for the Mi’kmaq, the legitimacy of these treaty 
rights ultimately rested on the Mi’kmaq’s cultural and traditional ties to the fishery. 
Conversely, Mi’kmaq perceptions of interventions by the DFO were negative.  In section 
6.2.3, I mentioned that the Mi’kmaq believed that the DFO was ‘biased and racist’, 
‘adversarial’, ‘paternalistic’, and ‘condescending’ in its attitudes and relationship to the 
Mi’kmaq.  In addition, the Mi’kmaq believed the DFO had ‘mismanaged’ the fishery.  
Conversely, the DFO was anxious about the Mi’kmaq system of fisheries management, and 
also expressed concern that the integrity of fish stocks was at stake.  More importantly, 
however, the Mi’kmaq perspective was that the DFO’s interventions were ‘intended to 
separate them [the Mi’kmaq] from their lands and resources’.  Indeed, King suggests that 
some Mi’kmaq people feel that the DFO’s focus on conservation is a ‘convenient excuse for 
maintaining control over the community and its resources’.  Arguably – and unlike Marshall 
– the DFO’s actions in this instance were illegitimate because they did not sufficiently 
address the Mi’kmaq’s cultural beliefs on sovereignty over the fishery.  On the other hand, if 
these beliefs had been reflected in the DFO’s management decisions, then it is likely that the 
decisions would have been perceived as legitimate. 
The key issue, then, was that the DFO did not conduct itself and did not design its 
management plan in a culturally appropriate way, from the point of view of the Mi’kmaq.  In 
general, a management system that is designed such that it contradicts or fails to account for 
traditional and long-held beliefs about natural resource management is unlikely to be 
legitimate.  The issue here is normative.  Cultural and traditional ideas can lead to 
disagreements about how natural resources ought to be managed.  Mosse (1997) makes a 
similar point when noting that the ‘cultural and symbolic construction of common property 
has a bearing on the way that these resources are (or have been) managed or mis-managed’. 
This conclusion is particularly interesting in light of the legitimation function criteria.  It is 
clear from King’s case study that the DFO failed to satisfy at least one of the legitimation 
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function criteria (communication) during its dispute with the Mi’kmaq.  There are several 
problems evident in the DFO’s conduct (although it is probable that both parties are partly to 
blame).  Firstly, the DFO and the Mi’kmaq were concerned by different issues.  For the DFO, 
the crux of the matter was fisheries access and resource management; for the Mi’kmaq, it was 
governance, rights and sovereignty (the very issues which had a cultural component for the 
Mi’kmaq).  Problematically, however, the government appeared interested only in the issues 
which it deemed important; indeed, it ‘disallowed other topics from the conversation’ (King, 
2011).  This position is hardly conducive to clear, honest dialogue.  It actually suggests that 
the government was unwilling to listen to the Mi’kmaq.  Moreover, the Mi’kmaq did not 
believe the DFO’s sincerity when it claimed that the only issue at stake was conservation.  
Instead, they believed that the DFO was motivated by a desire to reassert control over the 
fishery.  Arguably, this situation arose precisely because the DFO was failing to 
communicate its intentions clearly and sincerely.  Finally, the government’s attempts at 
mediation fell flat.  A government-appointed mediator was accused by the Mi’kmaq of being 
‘disinterested’ in their concerns; in turn, the Mi’kmaq were blamed for making 
‘unreasonable’ demands. 
It is clear, then, that dialogue between government management authorities and the Mi’kmaq 
was limited and often fraught.  The honest and ready exchange of information and views 
supposed by the legitimation function was apparently absent.  Indeed, the breakdown in the 
relationship between the two parties is arguably attributable in part to poor communication.  
Interestingly, the dispute between the DFO and the Mi’kmaq finally ended when the 
Mi’kmaq’s Band Council elected a leader who was ‘more willing to work with government 
than the sovereigntist activists at the forefront of the dispute’ (King, 2011).  The implication 
is that clear, honest dialogue was re-established following this election, and with that, a 
solution to the differences between the two groups emerged.    
Thus, communication (or a lack thereof) appears to have played an important role in shaping 
perceptions of legitimacy in the New Brunswick fishery examined by King.  More 
importantly, the perception that the DFO’s management interventions were illegitimate was 
attributable to the DFO’s failure to reflect the Mi’kmaq’s cultural beliefs in the design of 
their management plans.  Clearly, the two issues are linked; with better communication, the 
Mi’kmaq may have been able to convey how management could reflect their cultural beliefs, 
and in turn the DFO could have demonstrated how they had adjusted their plans accordingly.         
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The conclusions drawn from the critical analysis of King’s research are at odds with the 
conclusions from the statistical results.  Culture and traditions can have an impact on 
perceptions of legitimacy in resource management systems, but only insofar as a management 
system reflects cultural beliefs and traditions.  Thus, it is not culture or tradition that leads 
directly to legitimacy or illegitimacy; instead, design flaws in the management system that 
fail to account for the essential continuity of culture and tradition in the life experiences of 
resource management system stakeholders lead to illegitimacy.   
This argument extends to other exogenous factors.  The statistical results suggest that class or 
labour identities do not have a significant effect on legitimacy, but critical analysis indicates 
otherwise.  In particular, class or labour identities can group people much like unions do and 
therefore have an impact on communication and participation.  (In turn, it is hardly surprising 
that unions often represent one particular class or trade.)   
For instance, Holm and Rånes (1996) and Olson (1996) describe how fishermen 
distinguished between themselves based on the particular fleet and sector to which they 
belonged.  In these case studies, coastal fishermen viewed themselves and their interests as 
separate from offshore trawler fishermen.  Furthermore, coastal fishermen felt that there was 
a tension between their interests and those pursued by government.  These beliefs are 
important to perceptions of legitimacy at two levels.  Firstly, they probably reduce goodwill 
and trust in government and other stakeholders, and therefore have a direct impact on 
legitimacy.  Identifying as a small-scale coastal fisherman can lead to the perception that 
there are other groups with interests that are not necessarily aligned with one’s own.  A 
divergence of opinions on the design and objectives of a resource management system, say, 
can be sufficient to cause a loss of trust between different groups and therefore undermine a 
management system’s or a group’s legitimacy. 
Secondly, a failure to account for class or labour identities in a resource management system 
may mean that the system is inappropriately designed and therefore illegitimate.  Thus, class 
or labour identities can have an impact similar to culture and traditions, in that their reflection 
in a management system can shape perceptions of legitimacy.  Class or labour identities are 
perhaps types of biases or predispositions which can be carried into a resource management 
system and prejudice one’s conduct.  We have already seen one example of this in the 
paragraph above – the belief amongst coastal fishermen that government was pursuing an 
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agenda inimical to their own interests would have had an impact on coastal fishermen’s trust 
in government.  However, having an awareness of these biases and prejudices can allow 
resource managers and stakeholders alike to account for them.  Thus, when entering into a 
resource management system, it is important to ‘leave behind’ one’s predispositions and 
recognise the impact they can have on one’s conduct and perceptions.  In some instances, a 
voluntary commitment to do this may be sufficient; in others, it may be necessary to require 
managers and stakeholders to sign a ‘code of conduct’ that binds them to be conscious or 
mindful of predispositions like class or labour identities to the extent that these prejudices 
may undermine resource management decision-making processes.        
The final exogenous factor that the statistical results suggest has a non-significant effect on 
legitimacy is discontent with government (p > 0.05).  Discontent with government is defined 
broadly as disagreement with government decisions, interventions and regulations that are not 
directly related to the fisheries management system in question.  In the meta-analysis case 
studies, the causes of discontent with government were varied; they ranged from bureaucratic 
hold-ups (Rova, 2004) to concerns that fisheries management organisations were withholding 
information and refusing to communicate on party political grounds (Delaney, 2006).  
Although these are likely to be irritants, it is difficult to see how they could threaten the 
legitimacy of a resource management system directly.  They are not serious enough to 
represent a threat to the legitimacy of government organisations themselves.  Instead, the 
causes of discontent with government (if any) are likely to impact the legitimation function 
criteria.  For instance, withholding information on party political grounds clearly fails to 
satisfy the communication criterion.  It may also be deemed procedurally unfair, in that 
withholding information because of party politics is biased and favours some people over 
others.   
The statistical results for discontent with government therefore match the expectations 
produced by a critical explanation of its impact on legitimacy.  Any impact it does have 
seems to be through the legitimation function criteria.  Marginalisation is the other exogenous 
factor for which the conclusions from the statistics are similar to those from critical analysis.  
The statistics suggest that marginalisation does not have a significant impact on the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a resource management system (p > 0.05), but the result is only 
weakly insignificant.  Indeed, a χ2 test produces results that are only just insignificant (χ2 = 
2.991, d.f. = 1, p > 0.05).  Although both tests indicate that marginalisation does not have a 
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significant role in shaping perceptions of a resource management system’s legitimacy, the 
weakness of the results suggest further analysis is worthwhile.    
One way in which marginalisation would appear to shape legitimacy is through its impact on 
trust.  Almost by definition, marginalisation means people are isolated from and even at odds 
with government and other authorities.  A situation like this is bound to influence how people 
think about government.  For instance, powerlessness – manifested perhaps as an inability to 
express one’s concerns to government, and evidence that government does not respond to 
these concerns in any case – can lead marginalised people to conclude that government or 
other authorities are fundamentally inimical to their interests.  Mistrust emerges and grows in 
such situations.  Other features of marginalisation like disenfranchisement or poverty can also 
shape trust.  Thus, it is reasonable to argue that marginalisation can and does have an effect 
on perceptions of legitimacy.  However, the effect is not direct; it is mediated through 
legitimation function criteria like trust.   
It is worth noting that the key point in this argument is not that resource management systems 
lead to marginalisation, and that marginalisation in turn causes a perception that the system 
lacks legitimacy.  An argument along these lines would connect legitimacy to management 
outcomes, even though I suggest in chapter 4 that legitimacy is frequently independent of 
outcomes.  Instead, I am suggesting that marginalisation changes the way one thinks about 
government and its objectives, which in turn can establish the conditions that cause one to 
question government’s legitimacy.  The role that procedural fairness and trust play in this 
process may be of some importance.  Tyler (2001) notes that the ‘key antecedent of being 
viewed as trustworthy is to use fair procedures’.  But marginalisation may induce the 
perception that government is failing to treat people fairly, especially if marginalised people 
attribute their difficulties to government actions (or inaction).  Without positive perceptions 
of procedural fairness, trust in government is diminished and perceptions of legitimacy are 
damaged. 
6.3.1 Other exogenous factors 
Of course, the meta-analysis included some exogenous factors for which we do not have 
statistical results (for instance, socio-economic status and colonial legacy).  This limits 
discussion of these factors.  Nevertheless, there are some interesting parallels between the 
254 
 
two sets of factors.  In particular, there are similarities between the impact that class or labour 
identities can have on perceptions of legitimacy, and the effect of socio-economic attributes 
like caste.40  Kurien (1991) provides an example that demonstrates this idea practically.  In 
Kerala state, India, fishing has historically been caste-bound; that is, only members of a 
particular caste could seek their livelihoods through fishing.  Up until the 1960s, fisheries in 
Kerala were artisanal and relatively low-impact ecologically.  But modernisation reforms in 
the 1960s changed fishery dynamics, especially with the introduction and spread of shrimp 
farming.  The response of fishing castes to the degradation of their fisheries is noteworthy.  
They organised state-wide protests to demand state regulation of what they perceived were 
destructive fishing practices.  This reaction was not defined by narrow self-interest; it also 
depended on what fishermen perceived as an ‘infringement of their traditional rights at sea’ 
(Kurien, 1991).  In addition, it created a ‘new sense of unity’ (ibid) amongst the fishermen. 
Thus, caste-bound fishermen formed groups in response to fisheries reforms that did not just 
threaten their livelihoods but also offended a perceived right to access and use the fishery in a 
traditional way.  Arguably, this right was tied in with caste identities because the reforms had 
opened up fisheries to people of different castes who would not traditionally have been able 
to access them.  Kurien’s case study therefore provides us with some support for the 
argument that the perspectives and values produced by particular cultural outlooks, class 
identities or socio-economic attributes (like caste) can unite people and cause them to 
perceive resource management initiatives as inimical not just to their interests but also to their 
values.  Indeed, it is unsurprising that caste fishers should protest reforms that were damaging 
fisheries and weakening fisheries management systems that had probably existed for decades, 
if not centuries.  As with BVCs in Malawi and the Mi’kmaq in New Brunswick, the reforms 
described by Kurien failed to reflect important cultural and socio-economic attributes and so 
lacked legitimacy.  
Two other exogenous factors for which we do not have statistical results also merit 
discussion.  The first of these is questioning government competence in, and use of science.  
The paper from Wright (2008) is especially useful in this respect.  In Wright’s case study, 
officials from the Skeena Salmon Management Committee in British Columbia, Canada, used 
                                                 
40 Of course, it is debatable whether caste would be more appropriately coded as ‘class or labour identities’ than 
‘socio-economic status’.  The rationale for including caste in the socio-economic status code was that caste is 
not merely a question of class or trade; it also has ramifications for an individual’s economic, social and political 
standing, and was therefore seen as being a broader issue than class or labour alone.  
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science to legitimate the management decisions they made.  Scientific data provided the 
evidence needed to show that management decisions were impartial and objective.  In effect, 
the use of science and scientific data demonstrated procedural fairness in decision-making 
processes.   
However, the case study is instructive because these same data were used by aboriginal 
stakeholders to dispute some of the Management Committee’s decisions.  Even with 
scientific backing, the Management Committee was not able to legitimate its management 
interventions consistently.  In particular, as much as science can provide an impartial and 
objective basis for management decisions, it can also create uncertainties that cloud 
decisions.  For instance, Wright notes that aboriginal groups in British Columbia were quick 
to spot inconsistencies between the science used by the Management Committee and its 
application.  In one case, the Management Committee had proposed opening sub-areas 
outside the mouth of the Nass River to fishing before allowing fishing on the Skeena River.  
These sub-areas were of interest because pink (Oncorynchus gorbuscha) and sockeye salmon 
(Oncorhynchus nerka) swam through them on their way to the Skeena, a fact that had been 
confirmed in tagging studies organised by the Management Committee.  However, aboriginal 
leaders used this information to argue that it was illogical to allow these salmon to be caught 
outside of the Skeena River when fishing was prohibited in the Skeena itself.  It was also 
inconsistent with the Skeena Salmon Management Committee’s stated conservation aims.  
The argument was successful, and the Management Committee backed down on its proposal. 
In another case, the methods used to collect data on salmon were criticised by aboriginal 
people.  Wright notes that a fisher from the Gitxsan community objected to tagging studies 
and the practice of catching smolts41 in screened traps to count and mark them.  The fisher 
claimed that the latter method ‘increased mortality of young fish’ (Wright, 2008).  Similarly, 
at a meeting in an aboriginal community well upstream on the Skeena River, people 
complained about counting fences and the stripping of pink salmon eggs for an experimental 
hatchery.  These methods interfered with the salmon in a way that was ecologically damaging 
and culturally inappropriate, insofar as many aboriginal people felt that salmon should not be 
interfered with unless they were being caught for food. 
                                                 
41 A smolt is a juvenile salmon that is approaching the stage where it can swim to sea for the first time. 
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Thus, the Management Committee’s use of science and scientific data did not always give 
their decisions legitimacy.  Interestingly, the science that was disputed by aboriginal groups 
was, perhaps, not as rigorous as it might have been, thereby giving people some justification 
for their complaints.  For instance, the proposal to open sub-areas outside the Nass River 
before fishing on the Skeena River was allowed was irrational in light of the evidence that 
showed Skeena-bound salmon swam through those sub-areas before reaching the Skeena 
itself.  The conservation objectives implicit in closing the Skeena would have been 
contradicted by permitting fishing in those sub-areas.  Similarly, people’s complaints that egg 
stripping was interfering with salmon were reasonable.  Handling salmon can damage their 
skin and increase the likelihood of infections (Rottman et al., 1992). 
 Questions about the use of scientific data therefore arise when there are problems with the 
methods used to collect it, or problems with its underpinning logic.  Conversely, science that 
is properly executed is difficult to contest, and therefore unlikely to contribute to perceptions 
of illegitimacy.  This conclusion is important in the context of this chapter because it suggests 
that questions about how science is used, and the competence with which it is applied, can 
indeed shape perceptions of legitimacy.  However, it is difficult to determine whether its 
impact on legitimacy is truly exogenous or whether it is mediated by legitimation function 
criteria like procedural fairness.  On one hand, the key issue is the rigour with which 
scientific data is collected and used; on the other, questions about impartiality and objectivity 
and therefore procedural fairness are inextricably linked to these issues.  In either case, it is 
incumbent on resource managers to demonstrate that the science they have used to justify 
their decisions is the best available.  Doing so avoids the problems described by Wright.  It 
also re-emphasises the importance of designing management systems appropriately.         
The other exogenous factor that merits discussion despite the lack of statistical results is 
historic land treaties and legal decisions that provide aboriginal people with rights to their 
traditional territories.  These treaties and judgements may shape perceptions of legitimacy in 
and of themselves.  Resource management systems are frequently nested in legal frameworks 
that include these treaties.  For instance, Spangler (1998) describes how fisheries 
management in Wisconsin, United States, was influenced by treaties signed in 1836, 1837, 
1842 and 1856.  These treaties ceded traditional territories to the U.S. government (1837 and 
1842), but also described the natural resources to which Native American tribes were entitled.   
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Of course, the legality and therefore legitimacy of a natural resource management system is 
questionable if it contravenes any of these treaties.  Furthermore, because many treaties 
address delicate questions about the traditional rights and sovereignty of aboriginal groups, 
they raise the kinds of cultural issues already discussed.  The impact of treaties and legal 
decisions on legitimacy is therefore twofold.  There is the narrow question of a resource 
management system’s legality within the framework provided by the treaties.  There is also 
the broader question of cultural sensitivity, and the extent to which the treaties adequately 
capture deep-seated cultural beliefs and values.  If a treaty fails to encapsulate these values, 
then it may be deemed illegitimate in a cultural sense.  By extension, a resource management 
system that is nested in a framework of illegitimate treaties may itself be illegitimate.  This 
argument is similar to the one made in the introduction to this chapter, in which a resource 
management system is perceived as illegitimate because it is a branch of an illegitimate 
government.  Thus, treaties can provide a management system with a culturally appropriate 
frame.  They can also fail to provide such a frame, in which case the legitimacy of the 
management system is itself questionable.  This analysis also calls to mind Coicaud’s 
discussion on legitimacy and legality, in which he points out that claiming legitimacy on the 
basis of due legal procedure is unsatisfactory because it ignores the content of the law (see 
section 4.1, chapter 4).   
6.3.2 Do exogenous factors affect legitimacy through the legitimation function 
criteria? 
Throughout this discussion, I suggest that exogenous factors can have an effect on legitimacy 
through the legitimation function criteria.  Marginalisation, for instance, may influence 
perceptions of legitimacy because it shapes people’s trust in government.  Unionism can 
increase access to the polity and therefore facilitate communication and participation.  
Discontent with government is often the result of government agencies failing to satisfy one 
or more of the legitimation function criteria.  These observations raise an interesting question 
– do exogenous factors have an impact on legitimacy in and of themselves, or is their effect 
mediated through evidence for the presence or absence of the legitimation function criteria in 
resource management systems? 
The data produced in the meta-analysis do not provide a firm answer to this question.  Any 
conclusions drawn are therefore tentative at best.  However, the preceding discussion does 
point toward a number of possibilities.  For some exogenous factors – notably discontent with 
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government, a history of unionism, and marginalisation – the analysis suggests that at least 
part of their influence on legitimacy is a result of their effect on the legitimation function 
criteria.  For instance, a history of unionism shapes perceptions of legitimacy in part because 
it facilitates communication and participation.  It may also have an impact on legitimacy 
through procedural fairness.  Consider, for example, the factors that underpin procedural 
fairness (see Leventhal, 1980, and chapter 4).  Leventhal suggests that neutrality of decision-
making, and consideration of group opinions, are both important in determining whether or 
not a process is fair.  It is evident that political processes skewed in favour of elites are 
unlikely to satisfy either of these criteria.  By changing political equilibria, unions increase 
the likelihood that political processes do not benefit elites alone.  In turn, these processes are 
more likely to be neutral and consider group opinions.  Perceptions of their procedural 
fairness will improve.  Thus, unionism’s impact on legitimacy may be mediated through the 
legitimation function criteria even in instances where its proximate impact (changing political 
equilibria) is not obviously related to the criteria. 
If this line of argument is correct, it is not a history of unionism per se that influences 
perceptions of legitimacy.  Instead, it is the effect that unionism has on the criteria that 
underpin legitimacy.  In addition, satisfaction of the legitimation function criteria will give 
unionists no cause to complain about the legitimacy of a resource management system, even 
if the system’s outcomes are not in their interests.  This argument can be extended to 
marginalisation and discontent with government.  Discontent with government is often 
attributable to a failure to satisfy one or more of the legitimation function criteria.  The 
example from Delaney (2006), where fishermen were not furnished with information they 
requested on party political grounds, is a case in point.  There is a clear communication 
failure that provides fishermen with good reason to complain and to question the legitimacy 
of management authorities.  Similarly, marginalisation can affect people’s trust in 
government.  A failure by government or other authorities to engage with marginalised 
people and their concerns can give these people the basis on which to question an authority’s 
legitimacy.        
Conversely, culture and traditions and class or labour identities may have an impact on 
perceptions of legitimacy that is independent of the legitimation function criteria.  Both these 
factors provide a lens that shapes an individual’s perception of the world, including their 
understanding of SESs and the natural resources contained therein.  Both factors can also 
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unite people into groups on the basis of shared identities and values.  These facets of culture, 
traditions, and class or labour identities are significant for legitimacy.  They can cause people 
to have conceptions of resource management systems that are fundamentally distinct to those 
espoused by resource management authorities.  King’s (2011) case study of the Mi’kmaq in 
New Brunswick is an excellent demonstration of this point.  Crucially, a failure to reflect 
aspects of culture, traditions and class or labour identities in a resource management system 
can lead to the perception that the system is illegitimate.  In New Brunswick, the DFO’s 
management proposals were illegitimate because they did not account for the Mi’kmaq’s 
beliefs about sovereignty.  Thus, exogenous factors like culture and class identities influence 
a management system’s legitimacy only when a broader sense of illegitimacy (or legitimacy) 
resonates within the management system itself.   
Of course, one way to ensure that exogenously-derived illegitimacy is not reflected in a 
management system is to communicate clearly and honestly, to facilitate participation, and to 
make decisions in a way that meets basic standards for procedural fairness.  Thus, the 
legitimation function criteria continue to have an important role to play even in instances 
where culture, traditions and class or labour identities shape perceptions of legitimacy.  A 
resource management system may be illegitimate because it contradicts cherished ideals, but 
a process of dialogue and participation can ensure that the system does in time account for 
those ideals.  Indeed, it is reasonable to suggest that the legitimation function criteria 
represent the best way to ensure that exogenous factors are appropriately reflected in a 
management system.              
6.4  Conclusions arising from the meta-analysis 
There are three main conclusions to draw from the discussion above.  The first is that - 
despite statistical evidence to the contrary in a number of cases - exogenous factors like a 
history of unionism, class or labour identities, culture and traditions, discontent with 
government, and marginalisation may indeed have an impact on perceptions of legitimacy in 
resource management contexts.  These factors can colour attitudes to new management 
systems.  Secondly, the effect that some of these exogenous factors have on legitimacy is not 
direct.  Instead, their influence is mediated through the four legitimation function criteria 
introduced in chapter 4.  In particular, marginalisation, a history of unionism and discontent 
with government may shape legitimacy because they affect trust (marginalisation), or 
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facilitate or are symptoms of a lack of communication and participation (a history of 
unionism and discontent with government).  They may also have consequences for 
procedural fairness.   
Thirdly, the remaining exogenous factors – class or labour identities, and culture and 
traditions - also affect legitimacy.  Both of these factors can shape perceptions of legitimacy 
in contexts outside a resource management system.  When these exogenously-derived 
perceptions of legitimacy or illegitimacy are not addressed in a resource management system, 
the perception (whether positive or negative) can transfer through to the management system 
itself.  The solution to this problem is to ensure that a management system’s design accounts 
for and reflects exogenously-derived perceptions of legitimacy.  Of course, it is not possible 
to correct for exogenous factors entirely.  The best that can be hoped for is a management 
system that is designed in a deliberate fashion with these factors (and the legitimation 
function criteria) in mind.    
This analysis and the conclusions drawn from it are a useful point of departure for further 
research.  In particular, it would be interesting to extend the meta-analysis to a significantly 
larger sample.  Coding a larger sample of papers would produce higher counts for individual 
factors and therefore increase the power of any statistical tests performed on the data.  One of 
the limitations of the present study is that the final meta-analysis sample is so small that the 
results produced by statistical techniques require cautious interpretation.  In addition, it would 
be worthwhile developing a coding procedure that is more closely linked with existing 
literature.  This is another weakness of the meta-analysis in this chapter.  The definition of 
external factors is not grounded in the SES framework, say, or in existing coding protocols.  
As mentioned, this is in part because other coding protocols were not immediately suitable 
for this chapter’s research question.  Nevertheless, the standalone nature of the coding 
protocol is problematic because it limits the chapter’s relevance to other meta-analysis 
studies.  It cannot be compared to other meta-analytic approaches, for instance.  Indeed, the 
only way in which this chapter could form the foundation of comparative research is if other 
studies adopt the coding protocol.  Finally, we cannot come to a quantitative or qualitative 
conclusion about the relative importance of exogenous factors.  This is a ‘degrees of 
influence’ problem.  The answer is likely to be context-dependent. 
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Despite these limitations, the meta-analysis has produced some worthwhile results.  Most 
importantly, it suggests that legitimacy in resource management contexts is not solely a 
product of satisfying the legitimation function criteria.  Instead, exogenous perceptions of 
legitimacy can flow into a resource management system if there is no evidence in the 
management system itself that the exogenous perceptions are being accounted for and 
addressed.  Interestingly, a similar conclusion is drawn by Brown and Lassoie (2010) in a 
study of decentralised community-based forest management in Cameroon.  They found that 
inappropriate forest management institutions are those that ‘did not reflect local systems of 
accountability in resource management’.   
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Chapter 7 Primary research conclusions 
This thesis has two distinct strands running through it.  The first strand is an exploratory 
investigation of two government-led resource management systems.  The investigation 
attempts to outline, in broad terms, why these systems are both achieving and failing to 
achieve their ecological and socio-economic goals.  The second strand builds on an 
observation made in both case studies, namely that perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
resource management systems has had a material effect on their performance and outcomes.  
I have attempted to build a richer understanding of the factors that lead to positive 
perceptions of legitimacy.  I have also tried to establish whether or not some of these factors 
are present in the two resource management systems under study. 
There are broad conclusions to draw from each of these strands, and I will outline them 
chapter by chapter in the sections that follow.  Before I do so, however, it is worth coming to 
a summary conclusion of the thesis.  Arguably, there are two key points that emerge from my 
research.  The first is that perceptions of legitimacy are important to the success or failure of 
resource management systems. In other studies, the focus is on the design principles that 
characterise successful community-based resource management systems (see, for instance, 
Cox et al., 2010), or on the impact of property rights (Agrawal, 2001; Baland and Platteau, 
1996).  There is also an extensive literature on the impact of factors like communication, 
heterogeneity (Cardenas et al., 2011), reciprocity, reputation, and trust (Ostrom, 2009) on 
CPR management (and collective action).  Legitimacy is often mentioned in this literature, 
but has received little attention.  Nevertheless, at both a theoretical and empirical level, it is 
apparent that legitimacy can have an effect on resource management outcomes that is as 
significant as these other factors. 
From a theoretical point of view, there is a clear connection between legitimacy and 
compliance with management rules (Nielsen, 2003).  Compliance is often interpreted in 
narrow economic terms.  Individuals are seen to choose to comply depending on the benefits 
and costs of rule-breaking.  However, it is indisputable that compliance can also be 
attributable to an internal perception that following rules is ‘right’ and rule-breaking is 
‘wrong’.  In these circumstances, a sense that the rules are legitimate increases the likelihood 
that an individual will follow them because it is the ‘right thing to do’.  Thus, compliance is 
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not always and solely a question of cost-benefit analysis; it is also grounded in the norms 
subscribed to by an individual, and his belief in the legitimacy of authorities and rules. 
Of course, this conclusion has significant implications for resource management.  It suggests 
that the perception that a resource management system is legitimate can benefit rule 
compliance.  Although it is too simple to conclude that a successful resource management 
system is one with high rule compliance, it is clear that having stakeholders comply with the 
rules framework helps a great deal.  Consider systems where rule compliance is negligible.  
In cases where there is a limit on resource extraction, and that limit is ignored, low 
compliance is likely to be problematic and detrimental to long-term resource sustainability.  
Thus, legitimacy can shape the success of a resource management system through its effect 
on compliance. 
There is an additional theoretical consideration with legitimacy, namely that legitimacy is 
overlooked in the resource management literature.  However, it is possible to infer it in 
several of Ostrom’s design principles for long-lived, sustainable resource management 
systems.  In particular, the principle that resource users should be able to make and modify 
the management rules that affect them (Ostrom, 1990; 2010) could, in theory and if actually 
elaborated, relate to questions about legitimacy and the procedural fairness criterion of 
legitimacy.  Arguably, the reason why this design principle is important is that management 
rules which stakeholders are unable to design or modify are unlikely to be perceived either as 
fair or as legitimate.  This sentiment is probably exacerbated further if the management rules 
also produce outcomes that are detrimental in some way to the stakeholders themselves.  
Thus, although Ostrom does not refer to legitimacy in describing the design principle, it is the 
issue at the principle’s core.  Clearly, however, legitimacy is merely implicit in the principle 
and so a more sophisticated elucidation is needed to understand legitimacy more completely.   
At an empirical level, the data from the two case studies suggest that perceptions of 
legitimacy are acknowledged implicitly, if not directly by stakeholders in the two 
management systems.  In the Paraná delta, the feeling that PIECAS lacks legitimacy was 
evident during interviews with a range of stakeholders.  The converse was true in Seattle, 
where almost every interviewee was convinced that IFQ management is at heart a legitimate 
system.  More importantly, both the interview data and the survey data suggested that 
stakeholders believed legitimacy was a significant factor in influencing management 
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outcomes.  Although these data cannot tell us anything about the causal mechanisms that link 
perceptions of legitimacy to management outcomes, it is striking that there was a belief that a 
factor as intangible as legitimacy could have a material effect on the way in which a 
management system performs.  In this respect, legitimacy is perhaps similar to factors like 
trust or social capital.  It is difficult to define or to quantify, but nevertheless has a profound 
influence on the function of resource management systems. 
Thus, there is at least some reason to believe that legitimacy has a), an important role in CPR 
and SES management; and, b), merits further investigation, especially in light of the limited 
attention it has received in the CPR management literature to date.  Of course, the thesis is 
built around these two observations.  In the section that follows, I summarise the conclusions 
and contribution made by each chapter.  In the first half of the thesis, the aim is to develop a 
broad understanding of the institutional success and failure observed in the fishery and in the 
Paraná delta.   The chapters that make up the second half of the thesis improve the precision 
with which we talk about legitimacy (Geertz, 1973).   
7.1  Chapter conclusions 
7.1.1 Chapter 3 – ‘Two resource management case studies’ 
There are a number of distinct conclusions to draw from the exploratory case studies that 
make up the core of this thesis.  Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, the case studies 
provide us with an indication of some of the factors that shape and have shaped PIECAS and 
halibut IFQs.  The former’s difficulties are arguably attributable to: legislative fragmentation; 
un-implementable objectives; a lack of communication and participation; factors relating to 
political economy; a lack of familiarity with the delta amongst the decision-makers in charge 
of PIECAS; the plan being a short-term political fix to a crisis; and a lack of legitimacy.  The 
latter’s overall success relative to the derby fishery is linked to: the appropriateness of IFQs 
as a tool to solve the derby fishery’s fundamental economic problems; the leadership effect 
from British Columbia’s IVQ programme; the bottom-up trajectory followed during the IFQ 
programme’s development; the expertise of the scientific and management organisations 
involved in the fishery; the separation of risk assessment from risk management in the 
fishery; a cultural legacy that encourages conservatism; and positive perceptions of 
legitimacy. 
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Clearly, the range of factors putatively affecting PIECAS and the fishery is broad.  Given that 
the factors identified were based on people’s opinions rather than experiments, and in light of 
the case-specific nature of the studies, I was unable to draw conclusions about causal 
mechanisms or the relative importance of the factors.  Nevertheless, the sheer variety of 
factors in the case studies is striking.  So too is the observation that the design of the 
management system, and the conduct of the management organisations, is not the only issue 
at play.  In each case study, there are wider political and socio-cultural issues that ostensibly 
have an important effect on each management system. 
The literature has identified an equally large and complex variety of conditions or factors that 
facilitate successful CPR management (see, for instance, Agrawal, 2002; Wade, 1988, 
chapter 10).  Wade, for example, found 14 different conditions to be important in managing 
south Indian commons.  Thus, the observation that a number of factors play a role in PIECAS 
and the fishery is consistent with previous studies that also identify a range of conditions in 
successful CPR management.  More importantly, there is some overlap between the specific 
factors themselves.  The significance of communication has already been noted in this 
chapter, and it appears in dozens of research articles (see, for instance, Hackett et al., 1994; 
Balliet, 2010).  Similarly, Baland and Platteau (1996; page 255) note that ‘a lack of genuine 
involvement or participation of user communities is at the root of the failure of social forestry 
programmes’. 
Other factors identified in the case studies also appear in the literature.  Culture and political 
economy are highlighted by Oakerson (1992) as factors that affect collective decision-making 
arrangements in community-based management systems.  In general, then, many of the 
factors identified in the case studies are consistent with existing research on CPRs and SESs, 
even though there is a tendency to focus more on community-based management systems 
than government-led systems in the CPR management literature. 
There are a number of ways in which the case studies could be improved and expanded.  
Firstly, the decision to make the case studies broad and exploratory meant that they are more 
descriptive than explanatory.  To produce a study with more explanatory power, is would be 
useful to return to the Paraná delta and Seattle with an explicitly defined causal model to test 
(Agrawal, 2003).  This would require focusing one or two specific factors that are of 
theoretical interest.  The work on legitimacy outlined in subsequent chapters is a first step in 
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this direction.  Secondly, it would be worth designing a comparative study, so that the 
conclusions drawn from the delta and the fishery could be contrasted against similar 
environments elsewhere in the Americas or the rest of the world.  Doing so would reduce the 
number of factors of interest, because in all probability only some of the factors identified in 
this research would also appear in these new systems.  It is worth noting that any comparative 
study would also require the definition of a causal model linking theoretically relevant factors 
to putative outcomes. 
7.1.2 Chapter 4 – ‘Legitimation function – a framework’  
Chapter 4 builds on the observation made in the two case studies that legitimacy was in some 
way important to the operation of and outcomes produced by PIECAS and halibut IFQs.  It 
also attempts to fill a gap in the CPR management literature, which frequently mentions 
legitimacy but does not explore it in any real depth (the notable exceptions being the papers 
by Jentoft (1989, 2000), Nielsen (2003) and Pinkerton and John (2008)). 
The chapter’s two key conclusions – and its primary contribution to the literature – is, firstly, 
that perceptions of legitimacy can be shaped in a deliberative way by resource managers, and 
secondly, that four particular criteria – communication, participation, procedural fairness and 
trust - serve a ‘legitimation function’   Legitimacy requires the satisfaction of these four 
criteria.  The idea of a legitimation function is itself important because it reveals the way in 
which resource managers can design and operate a legitimate resource management system.  
These ideas are part of a wide and rigorous intellectual tradition harking back to Weber.   
Of course, an implication of these two conclusions is that management systems and 
management authorities should behave in a deliberative way where legitimacy is concerned.  
However, it is apparent from the literature that, although legitimacy is recognised as 
important, it is rarely actively considered during the design or the operation of a resource 
management system.  Arguably, this may be the result of a belief that legitimacy is so 
intangible that it cannot be addressed in any meaningful way.  Chapter 4 suggests this belief 
is mistaken.  Indeed, in light of legitimacy’s importance to quantifiable measures of 
management success like compliance, consciously accounting for and designing legitimacy 
into a management system is essential.  This conclusion also suggests that resource 
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management authorities like the IPHC can conduct themselves in a way that improves how 
people perceive their legitimacy. 
The second conclusion from chapter 4 is that satisfying the legitimation function criteria 
depends in part on ensuring that each criterion is characterised by certain attributes.  For 
communication, there is an emphasis on clarity, honesty and sincerity, and the absence of 
deception, distortion and manipulation.  In addition, communication is conceived of as a two-
way process.  Management authorities need to communicate clearly, honestly and sincerely 
with stakeholders in the management system.  Equally, stakeholders must have the 
opportunity to express their concerns and ideas to management.  At some point, there may 
even be discourse between managers and stakeholders.  A resource management system that 
lacks one or more of these features is less likely to be legitimate. 
The need for stakeholders to have the opportunity to communicate with management is 
closely related to the participation criterion.  At one level, participation might be thought of 
as ‘having voice’ in a management process.  This does not imply, however, that participation 
is synonymous with communication.  Participation entails something additional to 
communication.  It includes opportunities to attend events and meetings in person, and to 
express one’s concerns and opinions at these events and meetings.  Ideally, however, a 
resource management system will also provide for ‘representative participation’ in advisory 
or decision-making bodies, and participation in scientific processes like data collection.  A 
management system that does not guarantee its stakeholders the ability to ‘have voice’ in the 
most basic sense of attending events and meeting is likely to be illegitimate; but once this 
minimum standard is satisfied, additional opportunities for representative participation and 
participation in research are equally important.  
The third criterion that a legitimate management system is likely to satisfy is procedural 
fairness.  There are different ideas about what constitutes a fair process, but a useful 
framework is found in common law jurisprudence and in Leventhal (1980).  In a legal setting, 
a process is fair if it satisfies three rules: the bias rule, the evidence rule and the hearing rule.  
The bias rules states that the person making decisions or judgements should not have a 
personal interest in the case at hand.  For instance, a management system where quota 
allocation decisions were made by people who also owned quota would break the bias rule.  
The evidence rule states that decisions should be made on the basis of evidence and reasoned 
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argument, not emotion or speculation.  The High Level Committee for PIECAS could be 
accused of breaking the evidence rule because it lacks expertise in and familiarity of the 
delta.  Its decisions may therefore lack the evidence-base required to meet the evidence rule.  
Finally, the hearing rule states that individuals adversely affected by a decision should have a 
say in the decision-making process that leads to the decision.42  The hearing rule is therefore 
closely related to communication and participation.  A number of facets of IFQ management 
in the halibut fishery satisfy the hearing rule, notably the ability of fishery stakeholders to 
become members of advisory boards and decision-making bodies. 
The last criterion that contributes to legitimacy in resource management systems is trust.  
Trust is different to the other three criteria in that it is not necessarily contingent on the 
features of the management system itself.  Instead, trust in management authorities, for 
instance, can pre-exist the design and operation of a management system.  However, trust is 
also something that can be earned.  In the legitimation function, therefore, two elements of 
trust are considered: pre-existing trust, and trust that emerges because of the attributes of the 
system and its managers.  The former ‘type’ of trust is exogenously derived and depends on 
the presence of institutions and norms that encourage trusting and trustworthy behaviour.  
The example used in chapter 4 is norms of reciprocity that make it more likely that trusting 
behaviour is reciprocated.  The second ‘type’ of trust emerges when a resource management 
system and management authorities satisfy various ‘micro-situational attributes’.  These 
attributes include participants in the system being able to communicate fully, and the ability 
to sanction or reward past behaviour as appropriate.  (See chapter 4 for a full list of the 
micro-situational attributes underpinning trust.)       
The final conclusion that flows from the work presented in chapter 4 is that existing ideas on 
legitimacy – particularly those of Habermas and Weber – are useful to our understanding of 
legitimacy in resource management contexts, but do not provide the entire picture.  Habermas 
stresses the importance of discourse to legitimacy, which ties in neatly with the emphasis on 
communication and participation here, but he does not discuss procedural fairness or trust.  
Equally, Weber argues that legitimacy rests on ‘traditional’, ‘charismatic’ and ‘rational’ 
grounds, but does not suggest that communication, participation, procedural fairness and trust 
are important.   
                                                 
42 The hearing rule is remarkably similar in purpose to Ostrom’s third design principle, which – as we have seen 
– suggests that people affected by rules should be able to have a say in making and modifying them. 
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It is worth stressing that my conclusions are not a challenge to Habermas’s or Weber’s work, 
and certainly do not mean to imply that they are wrong about legitimacy.  Indeed, it is evident 
from chapter 4 that I draw on Habermas extensively.  Although I believe that Habermas’s 
work on legitimation crisis in particular is distinct from my own in a number of important 
ways, his ideas on ‘ideal’ dialogue inform my analysis on communication as a criterion for 
legitimacy in an important way.  Moreover, there is a sense that my work on the legitimation 
function is both an empirical and theoretical extension of Habermas’s research on 
administrative institutions, because resource management systems form a specific category of 
administrative institution that have not been studied in the Habermasean tradition.  More 
generally, the analysis informs ideas on what constitutes legitimate authority (a tradition in 
which Weber worked).  Indeed, ideas about the nature and exercise of authority – whether in 
a resource management or other administrative system – are inextricably linked to legitimacy. 
7.1.3 Chapter 5 – ‘An application of the legitimacy framework’ 
Chapter 5 attempts to demonstrate the utility of the legitimation function framework by 
evaluating to what extent PIECAS and IFQ management satisfy the four criteria included in 
the framework.  There is a potential methodological problem with the chapter, namely that 
the legitimacy and illegitimacy of PIECAS and IFQ management are already known.  As a 
result, it is possible that the analysis in chapter 5 is shaped to fit this observation.  I have tried 
to avoid this problem by considering as much data as possible in drawing my conclusions.  I 
used document evidence and surveys sent to stakeholders in both the delta and the fishery. 
The key conclusion that flows from the analysis presented in the chapter is that PIECAS 
lacks legitimacy because it has failed to satisfy communication and participation criteria in 
particular, with a concomitant effect on trust in PIECAS.  The plan is insufficient in these 
criteria at a number of levels.  Communication between the High Level Committee and 
agricultural stakeholders living and working in the delta appears to be limited.  Furthermore, 
communication between the High Level Committee and other stakeholders like NGOs 
appears to have slowed significantly, to the extent that many NGOs have not communicated 
or participated in the plan for a number of years.  Participation is equally poor.  There is no 
representative participation on the High Level Committee, and its meeting are not open to the 
public.  Many stakeholders – especially agricultural stakeholders – do not even have voice in 
the process.  These multiple failures in both communication and participation are almost 
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certain to have affected trust in PIECAS and in the High Level Committee, and perceptions 
of procedural fairness.  Certainly, agricultural stakeholders are unlikely to view the PIECAS 
design process as procedurally fair given their near total absence from it. 
Conversely, IFQ management in the fishery is considered ‘legitimate by almost all players’ 
(see chapter 3).  IFQ management is more effective than PIECAS at every level.  There is 
clear communication between stakeholders and the IPHC and NPFMC, and many 
opportunities for participation (both representative participation and participation in public 
meetings and processes).  Trust between the IPHC and NPFMC and the fishery’s 
stakeholders is generally strong, although the NPFMC fares less well than the IPHC.  Finally, 
IFQ management satisfies many of the criteria that make a process fair.  For instance, the 
IPHC’s management decisions are based purely on scientific evidence.  As a result, they 
satisfy the evidence rule.  Furthermore, the IPHC goes some way toward demonstrating the 
impartiality of its decision-making by organising collaborative research trips with fishermen.  
These research trips also satisfy participation.  Fishermen are involved in collecting the data 
that is subsequently used as the basis for management decisions. 
The application of the legitimation function framework helps us to understand why PIECAS 
and IFQ management are perceived as illegitimate and legitimate, respectively.  However, the 
analysis cannot prove that their legitimacy is attributable to their ability to satisfy the 
legitimation criteria.  It may be the case that other factors are involved, and the four criteria 
are simply confounding variables. 
There are a number of reasons to believe this is not the case, however.  Firstly, many 
interviewees focused on, for instance, problems with communication when they discussed the 
legitimacy of PIECAS.  Thus, at least some interviewees attributed a lack of legitimacy to 
issues arising with communication.  This is important because it implies that these 
interviewees were making a direct connection between their perception of a plan’s legitimacy 
and their experience of communication in and around the plan.  Secondly, the four 
legitimation function criteria cover a number of key processes in a resource management 
system.  Indeed, it is difficult to see what other aspects of a management system could 
explain legitimacy.  The obvious candidate is legality, but both PIECAS and IFQ 
management are legal and there are theoretical reasons to believe that legitimacy as legality is 
an unsatisfactory explanation (see Coicaud, 2002).  Alternatively, legitimacy could rest (as 
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Weber suggests) on the charisma or traditional authority of a particular leader – but neither in 
PIECAS nor in the halibut fishery is there one ‘figurehead’ driving the plans forward.  The 
legitimation function criteria are therefore a good choice for the factors that could be 
contributing to legitimacy in these management systems. 
The potential difficulties caused by confounding variables point to avenues for further 
research.  It would be interesting to use survey methods to evaluate whether there is indeed a 
significant correlation between the legitimation function criteria and perceptions of 
legitimacy.  If there is a significant correlation across a number of case studies, it would 
increase our confidence that the legitimation function criteria do have value in helping us to 
understand legitimacy.  Of course, this approach entails large sample sizes.  In order to 
collect suitably-sized samples, special surveying strategies like hiring surveying companies 
might be sensible. 
7.1.4 Chapter 6 – The influence of ‘exogenous’ factors on legitimacy 
The legitimation function criteria do not address the possibility that legitimacy in resource 
management systems is exogenously derived; that it is not the criteria themselves that affect 
perceptions of legitimacy, but beliefs or ideas that are actually independent of the resource 
management system in question.   
Chapter 6 attempts to explore this problem.  Its primary finding is that exogenously-derived 
perceptions can influence legitimacy if those perceptions are reflected in some way in the 
management system.  This conclusion has two implications.  Firstly, it suggests that, in some 
cases, it is not exogenous factors per se that influence a resource management system’s 
legitimacy, but rather the failure to account for those exogenous factors or replicate them in 
the management plan.  Secondly, the design of a management system is crucial not only in 
terms of the legitimation function criteria, but also in reflecting exogenous legitimacy.  A 
management system may satisfy all of the legitimation function criteria, but not consider, for 
instance, traditional structures of tribal authority.  As a result, an exogenous factor (tribal 
authority) is not accounted for in the management system and the system’s legitimacy is 
threatened.  However, a design fix – namely, to shape management organisations in such a 
way that they do align with tribal custom – may resolve the problem. 
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Of course, there will be instances where taking exogenous factors into account in a resource 
management system will call for difficult compromises and trade-offs.  In some cases it may 
not be possible to design a management system around exogenous factors.  This is not 
necessarily fatal to legitimacy.  Communication and participation offer one way to 
demonstrate that the exogenous factor is not being ignored intentionally. 
The second conclusion that emerges from chapter 6 is that the effect of some exogenous 
factors – particularly those relating to marginalisation, unionism and general discontent with 
government – is actually mediated via the legitimation function criteria.  Thus, these factors 
do not have a direct impact on a management system’s legitimacy; instead, they shape 
opportunities for and the degree of satisfaction of the legitimation function criteria.   
This conclusion is interesting because it further reinforces the idea that the design of a 
management system is crucial.  All management systems are nested in wider cultural and 
socio-economic structures.  Some of these structures have influence on the operation of these 
management systems.  In chapter 6, I argued that a history of unionism, for instance, 
encouraged greater communication and participation in management plans.  But 
communication and participation can only occur if management systems have appropriate 
mechanisms in place (public meetings, say).  Without these mechanisms, unions that want to 
express the views of their members will struggle to do so and therefore have cause to 
complain about the management system.  It is not the exogenous factor that is important, but 
its effect on the legitimation function criteria in a suitably designed system that matters.  
Thus, some exogenous factors manifest themselves in the extent to which the legitimation 
function criteria are satisfied.  As a result, the management system should be properly 
designed to achieve that goal. 
7.2 Limitations 
Of course, the thesis has a number of limitations. The conclusions drawn in each chapter 
should be interpreted in this light. In particular, the thesis is based on just two case studies – 
PIECAS and the fishery. As a result, the observations made in the case studies – and the ideas 
developed from those observations – should be seen as specific to PIECAS and the fishery, 
rather than generalizable to other resource management systems. This is potentially 
problematic for the emphasis made in the thesis on legitimacy. The argument in the thesis is 
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that legitimacy is a factor that is likely to be of interest across resource management systems. 
This justifies the exploration of legitimacy that follows. However, it is possible that 
legitimacy is a factor unique to PIECAS and the fishery, and that the focus on it is misplaced. 
Only additional case studies can provide further empirical support for the idea that legitimacy 
is an important factor in a range of management systems, although as mentioned there are 
strong theoretical reasons for believing that it is indeed of general significance. 
The two case studies are themselves constrained by relatively small sample sizes in both the 
interview data and survey data.  It is possible that the factors identified during interviews 
would have changed considerably if a larger number of interviewees had been approached, 
which in turn would have shaped the subsequent analysis.  Similarly, reaching a larger 
number of respondents in the surveys may have led to different results on perceptions of 
legitimacy, honesty, trust and so on in PIECAS and the fishery.  Despite the limitations 
imposed by small sample sizes, however, the results presented are not without merit.  Above 
all, the interview and survey data record faithfully the views of individuals with expertise 
and/or close involvement in both management systems, and are therefore likely to represent 
at least a portion of perceptions on the drivers of success, failure and legitimacy in PIECAS 
and the fishery. 
The thesis also has limitations in its more theoretical sections.  One clear limitation is that 
legitimacy is such a broad topic that many aspects of existing thought are beyond the scope of 
the thesis.  As a result, the review of legitimacy in chapter 5 is not as extensive as the 
literature might suggest desirable.  For instance, Habermas’s ideas on legitimacy and 
legitimation crisis are condensed to a few essential points.  The defence to these criticisms is 
that much of the literature I review is so abstract that it is of limited value to a functional 
treatment of legitimacy.  I argue as much about Habermas’s ideas on legitimation crisis in 
chapter 5.  In general, the discussion of legitimacy in the thesis attempts to strike a balance 
between the thesis’ ultimately practical purpose, and satisfactory coverage of a complex and 
well-studied theme. 
A final limitation of the thesis is that the legitimation function framework remains theoretical 
– it is not empirically validated to any significant degree.  The survey data go some way 
toward providing an empirical foundation for the ideas presented in the framework, but as 
mentioned these are limited by small sample sizes and the low number of case studies.  
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Further research is needed to extend the evidence base that supports or disproves the 
framework. 
7.3  Reflections, cross-cutting themes and other implications 
There is a tradition in the British Foreign Office that ambassadors leaving the service and 
departing from their embassies for the last time write a ‘valedictory’ telegram summarising 
their thoughts on their careers and postings.  As I come from a diplomatic family, I thought 
this was the appropriate moment in the thesis to write my own valedictory despatch.  There 
are a variety of themes that emerge from the preceding chapters and my own experience of 
producing a PhD on which I would like to reflect. 
The first theme concerns legitimacy’s place amongst the issues that resource managers must 
consider when designing and operating a resource management system.  Legitimacy is 
perhaps easy to ignore or forget in a resource management context.  It does not offer 
immediate solutions in a way that ‘technical’ fixes like ITQs apparently do.  The resource 
manager who focuses on introducing technical management measures that rapidly ‘solve’ a 
system’s problems is likely to win more plaudits and political capital than one who focuses 
on a factor like legitimacy that is difficult to understand and whose impact is uncertain.  But 
it is indisputable that legitimacy is crucially important to the success of a resource 
management system.  Indeed, I would go as far as saying that an illegitimate resource 
management system is likely to fail – irrespective of the effectiveness of the technical fixes 
imposed. 
This point of view raises a number of interesting questions.  Firstly, what explains the 
tendency to concentrate on technical rather than non-technical issues in resource management 
and resource sustainability problems?  Clearly, one aspect of an answer is that resource 
sustainability issues are technical in nature and therefore intuitively require a technical 
response (and resource managers rely upon or execute technical analysis in devising these 
responses).  However, I would argue that another reason why non-technical tools are 
neglected is that they are more difficult to operationalise and their outputs are less immediate 
than technical tools.  Legitimacy specifically is something that is ‘hard to get right’.  
Furthermore, non-technical tools do not lend themselves well to situations where short-term 
solutions are a pressing need.  But short-termism is increasingly prevalent, especially in 
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resource management (consider the EU’s CFP).  I suggest that short-termism has skewed the 
way we think about resource management systems, and focused our attention on factors or 
tools over which we believe – superficially – we have more control.  This trend has been to 
the detriment not only of legitimacy and related issues, but resource management systems 
themselves.  Indeed, one might argue that in systems where problems appear intractable – 
climate change negotiations, say - a focus on legitimacy as well as technical solutions may 
prove more beneficial.   
In many ways, this argument relates to Habermas’s ideas on the colonisation of lifeworld by 
system.  As I argue in chapter 4, legitimacy is a factor that belongs to lifeworld rather than 
system.  But as system colonises lifeworld, an emphasis on legitimacy is lost in favour of the 
instrumental, technical measures that belong to system.  Unsurprisingly, this in turn means 
that resource management systems become less legitimate.  Legitimacy is neglected as a 
point of negotiation, and is therefore not reflected in the final design of a resource 
management system. 
This analysis also speaks to the importance of keeping issues like legitimacy at the forefront 
of resource management.  As I have already argued, doing so is not easy.  It requires a 
commitment to communication, participation and procedural fairness that may test the 
integrity of stakeholders.  There are no short-cuts to legitimacy.  Decisions made for 
expediency’s sake will undermine the legitimation function because it provides a reason to 
mistrust management authorities.  But behaving in a way that satisfies the legitimation 
function contributes to successful resource management outcomes a great deal.  Indeed, a 
central message of this thesis is, perhaps, that things that are difficult to do well – achieving 
legitimacy, acquiring trust, leading by example – are as important, if not more so, than 
technical fixes.  We should therefore not be seduced by the apparent efficacy and neatness of 
technical fixes to resource management problems; their success depends in part on achieving 
intangible goals like legitimacy. 
These ideas are not just limited to resource management contexts.  One could argue that 
similar biases in favour of the technical versus non-technical are evident in the move toward 
quantitative (technical) research methods over qualitative (non-technical) research methods in 
the CPR and SES management literature (and this literature suffers from the problem to a far 
lesser extent than, say, economics).  I would argue that it is often assumed that qualitative 
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methods lack the rigour of quantitative methods, and that the preponderance of quantitative 
methods in the CPR and SES management literature is justified on this basis.  But my 
experience as a doctoral candidate has taught me that qualitative methods can be just as 
rigorous as quantitative methods.  The difficulty is that it takes decades to develop anything 
approaching real expertise in qualitative research.  Few people are able to make such a 
commitment, especially if quantitative methods produce interesting results that resonate in 
the research community. 
This discussion raises one final point about expertise and evidence.  In favouring the 
technical over the non-technical, the assumption is made that technical (or quantitative) 
approaches require greater expertise than non-technical approaches.  We place a premium on 
this expertise, which in turn explains why technical approaches are seen as superior in some 
way to non-technical approaches.  However, this discourse fails to consider the importance of 
appropriately evaluating evidence in making sound decisions, whether in resource 
management or other spheres.  Expertise is not enough for good decision-making; it also 
requires a dispassionate and logical analysis of data and evidence, and the honesty to come to 
the conclusions to which the data point.  We therefore over-emphasise expertise at the cost of 
non-technical issues inherent in evaluating evidence.                
7.3.1 The uses and abuses of policy research 
My second theme concerns the way in which policy-relevant research like this thesis is used.  
There is always a danger that ideas like the legitimation function criteria will be used as the 
basis for a ‘box ticking’ exercise in which legitimacy is claimed simply because the four 
criteria have ostensibly been satisfied.  Box ticking is arguably a form of reductionism that is 
short-term and technical in nature.  Indeed, ‘box ticking’ is especially likely where resource 
management is politicised and apparent satisfaction of the legitimation function criteria 
represents a convenient way of justifying management decisions.  But to use the legitimation 
function in this way is to abuse it.  It will lead to outcomes that lack legitimacy, because the 
four criteria will not have been satisfied in any meaningful way. 
One reason why using the legitimation function criteria in a box ticking exercise cannot lead 
to ‘true’ legitimacy is that satisfying the legitimation function criteria requires crossing a 
relatively high threshold on a continuous basis.  The legitimacy of a resource management 
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system might be claimed easily enough, but the characteristics of the legitimation function 
criteria mean that it should be obvious when those claims are disingenuous.  It is 
straightforward to claim that a resource management system is satisfying ‘communication’, 
but harder to do so in practice.  Resource managers might have started publishing a monthly 
newsletter, say, and used this as evidence that there was sufficient communication between 
managers and stakeholders.  But if it is apparent that the motivation underpinning the 
newsletter was not honest or sincere – that is, that the reasons for producing the newsletter 
were not a genuine attempt to improve communication – then stakeholders in the system are 
likely to disagree with the idea that communication has been satisfied.  The legitimation 
function criteria need to be culturally, institutionally and temporally present at a minimum 
level over time.  A lapse in the criteria leads to a reduction in legitimacy.  Thus, using the 
legitimation function criteria to ‘tick boxes’ and claim legitimacy should in theory be easy to 
see through.  The key point is that the legitimation function criteria are effective when they 
are satisfied pre- and post-decision in the same spirit as they were written. 
There is another possible criticism to aim at the legitimation function – that it is authoritarian 
because it tells people how to design a resource management system.  Interestingly, 
Habermas’s ideas on legitimacy and legitimation have also been criticised for being 
authoritarian.  His theory of legitimation can be construed as an attempt to ‘tell people how to 
do their politics’ (Blaug, 1997) or how to design their institutions, which has ramifications for 
the manner in which people live their lives.  It is worth paying attention to these criticisms 
when considering the legitimation function criteria.  Certainly, there is a danger that a 
resource management system could stray into authoritarianism if resource managers coerce 
stakeholders in the system to follow processes that are recommended by the legitimation 
function criteria.  Blind application of the criteria in this way is not just coercive; it can also 
ignore local context and the spirit in which the legitimation function criteria should be 
treated.  But the way in which the criteria are designed guards against authoritarianism.  In 
particular, communication and participation embed local context into the management system 
and therefore undermine coercive top-down approaches.  Furthermore, an authoritarian 
system cannot be procedurally fair because it is at some level unethical (Leventhal, 1980) or 
otherwise favours one interest (that of a powerful elite, say).  Arguably, the legitimation 
function is a partial answer to the tyranny of a powerful minority. 
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Perhaps the final conclusion to draw from this analysis is that good leadership is crucial in 
establishing legitimate resource management systems.  Problems with box ticking 
reductionism and authoritarianism are much less likely to occur with good leadership.  
Almost by definition, strong leaders are able to demonstrate that management decisions and 
interventions are guided by motivations that make for legitimacy.  For instance, good leaders 
are often those who communicate effectively and who are impartial and fair.  Equally, good 
leaders are unlikely to use the legitimation function criteria in a dishonest or disingenuous 
way. 
7.3.2 The importance of design in resource management systems 
I suggested in the introduction to the thesis that, if there was one overriding to conclusion to 
draw from this research project, it was that the design of a resource management system is a – 
perhaps the – crucial element in shaping its success.  It is certainly striking that PIECAS – 
which has suffered, as we saw in chapter 3, from a long and complicated design process – is 
even now not at a stage where its implementation is feasible.  In contrast, the reform of the 
halibut fishery was meticulous.  Although it took an equally long period of time to conclude 
that IFQs were the best available option for the fishery, the process that led to their 
introduction covered almost all bases.  The quota allocation appeals process, the regular 
meetings between managers and stakeholders, and management’s deep understanding of the 
potential impact of IFQs, all point to a design process that was measured and well executed.  
Furthermore, the final IFQ management system contained within it provisions to count 
halibut by-catch in other fisheries and to protect small, rural communities that were perceived 
to be vulnerable in an IFQ system.  Thus, there was consideration of the interplay between 
the halibut and other fisheries and communities. 
Despite my emphasis on the importance of ‘design’, the term is perhaps confusing.  Ostrom 
(1990) defines her ‘design principles’ as ‘a characteristic that helps to account for the 
success’ of local, long-enduring institutions (see chapter 2).  In a similar vein, I would argue 
that the design of a resource management system refers to those elements of the system that 
have been crafted in a deliberative way by the management authorities charged with 
operating the system.  Thus, instituting regular public meetings in a resource management 
system might be considered a design element; so too might separating risk assessment 
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processes from risk management (like the separation between the IPHC’s and NPFMC’s roles 
in the halibut fishery).     
The legitimation function framework adds weight to the idea that design is a crucial 
consideration in resource management.  The framework suggests that a resource management 
system can be designed in a way that increases the likelihood that it is legitimate (see chapter 
4).  Design remains important even though we are dealing with an issue (legitimacy) that is 
hard to define or quantify. 
Of course, the importance of design is already emphasised by Ostrom, Wade and others.  
However, the explanatory power of the design principles is questionable because they could 
as easily be ‘features or consequences’ of successful systems as actual causes (Taylor, 1992).  
This ambiguity is significant.  It suggests that there is perhaps a need to identify with greater 
precision design factors or principles that are definitively causal in nature.  However, given 
the methodological constraints that accompany research in this field, untangling causal chains 
or links is, in my opinion, challenging.  Perhaps the only way in which we can come to firm 
conclusions about causality is through randomised control trials (RCTs).  Although RCTs 
may be difficult to implement, I believe there is scope to do so, particularly in areas where 
different villages have implemented their own community-based systems. 
One other problem that my emphasis on design raises is whether it is meaningful in a context-
heavy field like CPR management.  One might argue that talking about appropriate design in 
generalised terms has little explanatory power given that each unique resource management 
system will have to be designed in a unique way.  I would dispute this, because the key issue 
is the nature of the problems causing resource management dilemmas, and these may be 
similar across multiple contexts.  For instance, the economic problems that afflicted the 
halibut fishery prior to the introduction of IFQs are found in other fisheries with significantly 
different characteristics.  The challenge for researchers is to make generalised statements 
about the design features that are best suited to solve particular management problems.  
Context makes this difficult, but not impossible.  Furthermore, we have already made 
progress: in fisheries suffering from over-capacity problems, it would seem that IFQs are an 
appropriate design choice. 
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There are, then, three brief conclusions to draw from the preceding discussion.  The first is 
that design and design processes (that is, the processes that shape the final design of a 
resource management system) are critical in influencing the effectiveness of a management 
system.  Halibut IFQs and PIECAS provide some evidence to support this conclusion.  The 
second conclusion is that researchers in the field should focus much more on establishing 
causality between design elements and management outcomes.  Current research does not 
distinguish clearly enough between design elements that are potentially causal and those that 
are merely consequences of a successful management system.  Finally, an avenue for further 
research is to identify design elements that are well suited to solving particular problems, 
even if the heavy influence of context in resource management systems makes this 
challenging. 
7.4 Closing remarks 
We live in an increasingly resource constrained world.  The need for well-designed resource 
management systems that ensure the long-term ecological and economic sustainability of 
natural resources like fish or wetlands is pressing.  However, despite at least 50 years of 
government intervention in resource management, too many systems continue to be poorly 
planned and executed.  PIECAS and the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy are 
cases in point.  The contribution of this thesis is to point to ways in which one element of 
management system design – legitimacy – could be enhanced.  Legitimacy may appear 
intangible and therefore of less significance than quantifiable aspects of resource 
management, but it is arguably essential to the overall success of management systems.  
Indeed, establishing the legitimacy of a management system should be a priority for resource 
managers, in part because legitimacy is an indication that many other aspects of management 
are being done well.  Thus, this thesis is a modest attempt to improve the practice of resource 
management.  In so doing, I hope it will benefit future efforts in a field that is of fundamental 
importance to the continued sustainability of natural resources and the people who depend on 
them.                  
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Summary integrated resource management research. 
The document below is the conference paper I presented at the 13th International Conference 
on Environmental Science and Technology.  It provides a neat summary of the research I had 
carried out on integrated resource management.  See chapter 2 (Methodology) for additional 
details. 
INTRODUCTION 
In his paper evaluating global freshwater resources, Peter Gleick (2003) argues that the way 
in which water is developed, managed and used is undergoing a major transition.  Integrated 
water resource management (hereafter, IWRM) is, arguably, part of that transition.  IWRM is 
a concept and process that has its origins both in dissatisfaction with traditional approaches to 
resource management (Bellamy, 1999) and in the work of the international community, 
particularly the United Nations system (Biswas, 2008, Mitchell, 2005, Rahaman and Varis, 
2005).  It is an approach to water management that is growing in popularity.   
Nonetheless, IWRM has proved difficult to define and challenging to implement (Biswas, 
2004, Mitchell and Hollick, 1993).  This paper attempts to provide an insight into the latter 
problem by identifying specific criteria that contribute to achieving IWRM.  Two approaches 
are used to identify these criteria: an in-depth analysis of whole papers; and semi-structured 
interviews with environmental practitioners.  Brief observations are also made from a 
systematic review of paper abstracts.     
WHAT IS INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT? 
IWRM lacks a universally accepted definition.  It is a pseudocognate term - intuitively easy 
to grasp but difficult to define precisely.  Nonetheless, a number of researchers have offered 
specific definitions.  The Global Water Partnership’s version is frequently cited: IWRM is a 
‘process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and 
related resources, in order to maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in an 
equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems’ (GWP, 2000).  
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However, what is perhaps more important than an unambiguous definition are the principles 
that IWRM promotes.  Most notably, IWRM specifically (and integrated environmental 
management generally) is a holistic approach to managing water and natural resources 
(Margerum, 1999a).  IWRM therefore considers a system in its entirety and recognises its 
interdependencies, rather than focussing on sub-components (Margerum, 1999a, Bellamy and 
Johnson, 2000).  Indeed, ‘integrated’ (as in ‘integrated’ water resource management) refers in 
one sense to holistic thinking of this kind.  
IWRM also emphasises the need for collaboration, cooperation and participation between 
individuals and organisations concerned with water resources (Hooper et al., 1999).  This is 
another principle encompassed by the word ‘integrated’.  Here, ‘integrated’ refers to bringing 
together a variety of stakeholders and their opinions when developing a management plan. 
The final principle promoted by IWRM is the prevention of fragmented decision-making and 
fragmented responsibilities (Mitchell, 2005).  This implies that organisations coordinate such 
that their objectives do not conflict and their efforts are not duplicated (Mitchell, 2005).  It 
also suggests the development of common goals or a shared vision, in order to avoid the 
pursuit of separate, often mutually exclusive, interests (Mitchell, 2005).  Again, the term 
‘integrated’ conveys something of this coordinated approach to decision-making and 
management.  
METHODOLOGY 
Two methodological approaches were used for this study.  The first approach was an in-depth 
analysis of 20 papers examining IWRM schemes.  Each paper was read in its entirety.  Papers 
were selected by snowball sampling – that is, the references of one paper led to the 
identification of additional relevant papers.  This in-depth analysis produced a qualitative 
summary of criteria that appear to help achieve IWRM.   
The second methodological approach used in this study was semi-structured interviews with 
two environmental practitioners.  One practitioner was developing an integrated catchment 
plan for the River Wandle in south-west London.  The other practitioner had worked in a 
leading capacity on New York City’s Watershed Protection Programme, which has become a 
paradigm for IWRM.  Over the course of three interviews (two with the former and one with 
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the latter practitioner), ideas from the literature on the criteria and conditions necessary for 
successful IWRM were tested against their extensive practical experience. 
The author initially planned using a third methodological approach to complement the critical 
literature analysis and interviews, namely a systematic review of 1,000 abstracts from papers 
found on Science Direct.  The abstracts of papers that met specific search terms were 
analysed for criteria that the authors had explicitly identified as playing a key role in IWRM 
projects.  43 such papers were found, and the criteria they identified were recorded verbatim 
in an Excel spreadsheet and subsequently categorised.  The systematic review was inspired 
by quantitative meta-analyses common in the medical and social science literature (see, for 
example, Stanley, 2001).  It aimed to produce results from a large sample of papers that were 
also amenable to quantitative analysis.  Quantitative approaches are noticeably absent in the 
existing IWRM literature.   
However, the systematic review did not produce consistent results.  Most problematically, the 
categorisation was so subjective that different people would likely place the same criteria into 
different categories.  Indeed, this author would categorise the same criteria differently during 
various attempts at categorisation.  In addition, the number of papers that met both the search 
criteria and had criteria specifically identified by the authors was quite small.  As a result of 
both of these difficulties, meaningful quantitative analysis was impossible.  However, it was 
possible to make interesting qualitative observations from the systematic review.   
RESULTS  
The results presented here are divided into two sections, one for each methodology used.  
Table 1 below lists the criteria identified in the in-depth literature analysis.  Sixteen criteria 
were identified from the literature.  Each of these criteria is listed on the left-hand side of 
table 1.  A tick is placed below the papers in which particular criteria were identified.   
The results from the semi-structured interviews are presented below the results of the in-
depth analysis. 
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   Table 1. Criteria identified from the literature.        
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Appropriate institutional arrangements                     
Common/strategic goals                     
Communication/participation mechanisms                     
Conflict resolution mechanisms                     
Data                     
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Decision-making                     
Education/outreach                     
Empowerment                     
Enabling legislative and policy environment                     
Financing                     
Leadership                     
Legitimacy                     
Local governance/government arrangements                     
Organisational culture                     
Resources                     
Stakeholder commitment                     
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The results of the critical literature analysis shown in table 1 are noteworthy for the range of 
criteria identified.  The papers examined suggest that everything from common goals to 
stakeholder commitment play an important role in achieving IWRM.  However, there is a 
notable emphasis on appropriate institutional arrangements, an enabling legislative and policy 
environment, data, financing, legitimacy and leadership.  All of these criteria were identified 
in at least six different papers.  Here, ‘appropriate institutional arrangements’ refer to the 
institutions necessary for IWRM.  That criterion is closely related to the ‘enabling legislative 
and policy environment’ criterion that describes the regulations that make IWRM possible.  
‘Data’ refers to data availability and the ability of organisations to collect and analyse data; 
‘financing’ to the funding available to organisations involved in IWRM; ‘leadership’ to 
organisational and political leadership; and ‘legitimacy’ to the legitimacy of the institutions 
that influence IWRM.    
In addition to these ‘key’ criteria, the literature review also identified common and/or 
strategic goals, communication and participation mechanisms, conflict resolution 
mechanisms, education and outreach, empowerment, local governance or local government 
arrangements, organisational culture, resources and stakeholder commitment as important 
criteria for achieving IWRM.  Communication, participation and conflict resolutions 
mechanisms include memoranda of understanding, coordinating committees and informal 
exchange.  Empowerment deals with the power asymmetries that exist between stakeholders.  
Resources refer to human and technical resources.   
Conversely, the criteria discussed during the semi-structured interviews fell into two broad 
categories.  One interviewee identified institutional culture and leadership as key criteria not 
just in IWRM specifically but environmental management generally.  In particular, the 
interviewee argued that leadership was needed to ‘bring people together under new 
innovations’.  The interviewee also mentioned the difficulties associated with creating or 
redesigning institutions.  Institutional culture, leadership and difficulties with institutional 
change are all criteria that are recognised, directly or indirectly, in the literature.  They 
therefore overlap with some of the criteria listed in table 1.   
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The same interviewee also referred to the importance of a ‘sense of opportunity’ in IWRM 
specifically and environmental management generally.  None of the papers in the critical 
literature review discuss this criterion, although it is perhaps associated with leadership.  The 
interviewee also mentioned barriers to IWRM like a fear of change and poor training in 
environmental issues.   
The other environmental practitioner interviewed for this paper focussed much less, if at all, 
on institutional culture, leadership, a sense of opportunity and a fear of change.  Instead, the 
interviewee identified the need for ‘detailed guidance’ on specific ecological assessment tools 
and ecological restoration techniques, rather than ‘large-scale abstract thinking’.  Expertise in 
data analysis was crucial, as was ‘catchment specific’ information - that is, detail on the 
ecology, geology and hydrology of particular catchments or types of catchments.  These 
criteria are similar to those identified in the critical literature review that concern data and 
resources.   
DISCUSSION  
There are two observations to make with respect to the results presented here.  The first is 
that the criteria identified in the literature and in the interviews are not necessarily specific to 
IWRM.  For instance, appropriate institutional arrangements are important not only to IWRM 
but, for instance, to the performance of economies (North, 1990).  Likewise, leadership is a 
key criterion in the success of, say, a football team or multinational business.  Indeed, the 
criteria identified in the literature are generalisable to management in many disciplines.  This 
is not to say that these criteria are unimportant to IWRM; they are important, but they are not 
specific to IWRM.   
This observation is particularly striking when compared to the need for ‘detailed guidance’ 
on ecological assessment techniques identified by one of the interviewees.  Evidently, there is 
a lack of widely available and focussed advice and information on best practice and specific 
tools for IWRM.  This lacuna may stem in part from IWRM research focussing on the ‘large-
scale abstract thinking’ mentioned by the interviewee, rather than particular tools and 
techniques.  There is, perhaps, a need to encourage research on specific tools that 
organisations can employ in integrated management schemes.  Developing these tools and 
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disseminating them widely will strengthen the organisational capacity needed to implement 
IWRM.     
The second observation is that many of the criteria identified in the literature concern 
institutions and organisations.  For instance, 6 out of the 16 criteria identified during the in-
depth literature analysis related in some way to institutions.  Likewise, 8 of 20 papers 
discussed ‘appropriate institutional arrangements’.  Here, institutions are defined as they are 
in the economics literature – the ‘humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ 
(North, 1990).  They are distinct from organisations, which are ‘groups of individuals bound 
by some common purpose to achieve objectives’ (North, 1990).  In the context of IWRM, 
organisations include coordinating committees and political parties; conversely, institutions 
might comprise the regulations that determine land use or water quality standards.   
Some criteria like ‘appropriate institutional arrangements’ are direct references to institutions.  
The indication by one interviewee that ‘institutional culture’ was a key part of IWRM is also 
a direct reference to institutions.  Other criteria like an ‘enabling legislative and policy 
environment’ allude to the regulations and rules that shape IWRM and other environmental 
objectives.  More subtly, ‘conflict resolution mechanisms’ and ‘communication/participation 
mechanisms’ refer in part to regulations or rules (that is, constraints) that formally or 
informally influence IWRM outcomes.  For instance, voting procedures or memoranda of 
understanding contain rules that shape the way people involved in IWRM interact.  Likewise, 
‘decision-making’ is a criterion of which constraints are a component.  
The criteria identified in the literature also relate to organisations.  Again, there are direct 
references – ‘organisational culture’, for example.  In addition, ‘local governance/government 
arrangements’ concern government organisations.  Criteria like ‘leadership’ – mentioned both 
in the literature and in one of the interviews - or ‘stakeholder commitment’ arguably relate to 
organisations because they are important to an organisation’s success.  It is also striking that 
data and financing were identified in several papers.  Data availability and analysis are key if 
organisations are to make sense of the resources with which they are concerned.  Equally, 
data allows organisations to evaluate the impact of management interventions.  Financing is, 
of course, crucial to the continued operation of an organisation and its management schemes.      
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The literature’s emphasis on institutions and organisations suggests they play an important 
role in achieving IWRM.  If other criteria – data and resources, say – were more important, 
then logically there would be greater focus on those criteria.  The results presented here 
indicate otherwise: many of the criteria identified do allude to institutions and organisations. 
The focus on institutions in particular raises two interesting questions: is institutional reform 
needed to achieve IWRM?  And if it is necessary, how quickly can we expect institutions to 
change until they are appropriate to IWRM?  Neither of these questions have clear answers.  
However, a tentative suggestion is that institutional reform is indeed a prerequisite for 
achieving IWRM.  The difficulties associated with IWRM’s implementation, and the 
importance of institutions to IWRM, suggest that existing institutions are a barrier to IWRM 
(although some authors like Medema et al. (2008) argue that there is insufficient evidence to 
support this contention).  In addition, rapid institutional reform is unlikely.  As North (1990) 
points out, most institutions change slowly. 
Given the importance of institutions and organisations in IWRM, it is surprising that many 
papers in the IWRM literature – including those used in the in-depth literature analysis – do 
not define institutions and organisations.  The definitions used here are an attempt to give 
further discussion a solid intellectual foundation based on the widely cited economics 
literature.  Of course, many papers discuss institutions and organisations colloquially.  
Although this is not of itself problematic, it does mean that institutions and organisations are 
used synonymously.  Using specific definitions like North’s reflects the difference between 
organisations and the framework of regulations and behavioural norms (that is, institutions) 
within which organisations operate.  This difference is real and should be reflected in the 
IWRM literature. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Two clear conclusions follow logically from these observations.  The first is that research is 
needed to develop specific techniques and tools for IWRM.  As seen, the criteria for 
successful IWRM identified in the literature are frequently generalisable to decision-making 
or management in all kinds of organisations.  Although this does not detract from the 
criteria’s importance, it does suggest that future research should focus on developing 
techniques and tools that will help organisations with the practical elements of IWRM.  This 
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research agenda is particularly relevant in the context of the European Union’s Water 
Framework Directive (WFD), which makes significant demands of data availability, data 
analysis and data collection (Mostert, 2003).  The development of these techniques could 
therefore contribute to member states’ efforts to implement the WFD. 
The second clear conclusion is that institutions and organisations are fundamentally 
important to achieving IWRM.  That in itself raises interesting questions about institutional 
reform and the speed at which institutions change.  More generally, the IWRM literature does 
not define terms like institutions and organisations as precisely as it should.  By grounding 
the IWRM literature’s treatment of institutions and organisations in terminology from the 
economics literature, it is hoped that this paper will encourage definitional precision in future 
IWRM research.   
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Appendix B. Proposed ‘minimum conditions’ for sustainable resource 
management 
1. Problem definition and solution matching. 
2. Define the regime’s sustainability goal(s). 
3. Separate risk assessment processes from risk management processes. 
4. Negate politicisation of risk assessment and risk management organisations and 
decisions. 
5. Introduce economic incentives. 
6. Introduce a resource allocation procedure. 
7. Incorporate legitimation functions. 
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Appendix C. Case study interview questions. 
Interview questions for PIECAS case study. 
1. Why has PIECAS’s design process been so slow? 
2. What factors have slowed it down? 
3. Is it a purely political issue? 
4. Does the plan have sufficiently clear objectives to be implementable in practice? 
5. Is there sufficient technical capacity in provincial governments to design and 
implement the plan? 
6. Is there enough money to design and to implement it? 
7. Does the plan have legitimacy amongst local communities? 
8. Are there cultural factors that have slowed its implementation? 
9. From the point of view of each provincial government, does PIECAS make economic 
sense? 
10. Have provincial politicians been bribed/blackmailed to maintain the status quo by 
extractive interests like cattle ranching or gas fracking? 
11. Has civil society been active enough encouraging PIECAS’s design and 
implementation? 
12. Is organizational culture in provincial government an explanation for slow design? 
13. Were there meetings between government and stakeholders during PIECAS’s 
development?  
14. Enough meetings? 
15. Is there enough data to understand PIECAS’s environmental impact? 
16. Is PIECAS an electoral issue? 
17. Could its implementation lead to electoral losses? 
Interview questions for Seattle case study. 
1. Has the ITQ management regime for Pacific halibut been a success? 
2. In your opinion, what factors contributed to the ITQ regime’s success compared to the 
TAC regime? 
3. Was the decision to maintain the NPFMC and NMFS as management authorities for 
the ITQ fishery an important factor? 
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4. Would it have been too costly/legally challenging/too lacking in legitimacy to create 
new organisations? 
5. Was collaboration during the ITQ programme’s development an important factor? 
6. Was the ITQ’s grassroots development (fishers requested it) actually more important? 
7. Were the ITQ programme’s management objectives clear? 
8. Was the quota allocation appeals process an important factor? 
9. Did the appeals process help legitimise the new regime? 
10. How important was the data collection and data analysis that the NMFS carried out as 
a matter of course? 
11. Was the change in management regime supported by sufficient funding? 
12. Was it simply the case that ITQs were the right tool for the problem at hand? 
13. Did the Pacific north-west’s culture contribute to success? 
14. Is the IPHC’s presence important?  
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Appendix D. Output for two-sample Student’s T test  
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1 |      11    8.545455    .5110352    1.694912    7.406797    9.684112 
       2 |      11    6.727273      .30424     1.00905    6.049384    7.405162 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |      22    7.636364    .3515301    1.648822    6.905317     8.36741 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            1.818182    .5947428                .5775701    3.058794 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                                      t =   3.0571 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       20 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9969         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0062          Pr(T > t) = 0.0031 
Output for Shapiro-Wilk W test  
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
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Variable |    Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
fairnesssc~e |     22    0.99283      0.182    -3.460    0.99973 
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